



## Bulletin n. 1/2009 - July 2009

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No abstract available

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#### *Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government*

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Nieguth Tim

**An Austrian Solution for Canada? Problems and Possibilities of National Cultural Autonomy**  
in *Canadian Journal of Political Science--Revue canadienne de science politique*, Volume 42 - Issue 01 - March , 1-16

science, especially in the guise of national cultural autonomy. National cultural autonomy is a model of self-government that was pioneered by Austrian theorists and politicians Karl Renner and Otto Bauer in the waning days of the Habsburg Empire, yet was never implemented in Austria–Hungary. This paper will examine some of the problems and possibilities that may attend a transfer of national cultural autonomy as a model of self-government into Canadian political discourse, especially as regards Quebec nationalism, Francophone communities outside Quebec, Anglophone Quebecers, self-government for Aboriginal peoples, and political values in English-speaking Canada.

Résumé. Au cours des dernières décennies, les formes non territoriales d'autonomie gouvernementale nationale ont fait l'objet d'un intérêt croissant en science politique, en particulier le concept de l'autonomie culturelle nationale. L'autonomie culturelle nationale est un modèle autonomiste développé par les théoriciens et politiciens autrichiens Karl Renner et Otto Bauer lors du déclin de l'Empire habsbourgeois, mais qui ne fut jamais mis en place dans l'Empire austro-hongrois. Cet article examinera quelques-uns des problèmes et quelques-unes des possibilités qui pourraient émerger d'un transfert de ce modèle dans le discours politique canadien sur l'autonomie gouvernementale, en particulier en ce qui a trait au nationalisme québécois, aux communautés francophones situées à l'extérieur du Québec, aux Québécois anglophones, à l'autonomie gouvernementale des peuples autochtones et aux valeurs politiques du Canada anglais.

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#### *Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government*

##### *Subsection 1. The theory of federation*

Olivieri Marco

**Anti-Senatica. Bentham e il sistema politico e istituzionale degli Stati Uniti**



in **Pensiero Politico (II)**, Anno XLI, n. 2, maggio-agosto 2008 , 169-188

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 1. The theory of federation*

Caron Jean-Francois, Laforest Guy

**Canada and Multinational Federalism: From the Spirit of 1982 to Stephen Harper's Open Federalism**  
in **Nationalism and Ethnic Politics**, Volume 15, Issue 1, January 2009 , 27-55

Since the end of the Second World War, principles of diversity and multiculturalism have increasingly been codified in international law. The present article takes a closer look at the evolution of Canada's attitude towards the recognition of its multinational character over the past 25 years. The article shows that the more recent idea of "open federalism" put forward by Prime Minister Stephen Harper's government as a recognition of multinationalism closely resembles the monist idea of the state that was promoted by former Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau. Thus, contrary to what is being portrayed in political discourses, nothing much has changed over the last 25 years. Stephen Harper's "open federalism" remains largely inspired by philosophical elements of monism and does not contribute to making Canada a truly multinational state.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

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Kris Deschouwer

**Coalition Formation and Congruence in a Multi-layered Setting: Belgium 1995-2008**  
in **Regional and Federal Studies**, Volume 19 Issue 2 , 13 - 35

One of the concepts with which the relation between governments at different levels can be analysed is the congruence of the coalitions. This article analyses the dynamics of government formation in Belgium from that perspective. The Belgian case is interesting because the recent decoupling of the electoral cycles from 2003 on allows us to see how the parties are trying to adapt to the possibilities and consequences of incongruence. The Belgian case is also rather exceptional. The absence of state-wide parties makes it indeed impossible for parties to define strategies at one level without assessing consequences at the other level. Congruence then seems to be the preferred strategy, although incongruence can offer interesting opportunities. Smaller parties, however, appear to be unable to play the double role imposed by incongruent coalitions.

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Upadhyaya Anjoo Sharan

**Conserving Diversities through Governance Mechanism**  
in **Indian Journal of Federal Studies**, Issue 19

No abstract available



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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 1. The theory of federation*

Per G. Fredriksson, Herman R. J. Vollebergh

**Corruption, federalism, and policy formation in the OECD: the case of energy policy**

in **Public Choice**, Volume 140, Numbers 1-2 , 205-221

We investigate whether the effect of government corruption is conditional on a country's institutional structure. Federal systems have an additional layer of government, making lobbying relatively more costly. We investigate whether the effect of government corruption on environmental policy (in the form of restrictions on energy use) is conditional on a federal system being in place. Using 1982–96 data from 11 industry sectors in 12 OECD economies we find that while greater government corruption reduces the stringency of environmental policy, the effect declines in federal systems.

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Benz Arthur

**Ein gordischer Knoten der Politikwissenschaft? Zur Vereinbarkeit von Föderalismus und Demokratie**

in **Politische Vierteljahresschrift**, 50. Jahrgang, Heft 1, März , 3-22

ABSTRACT: Politische Systeme im nationalen und internationalen Kontext werden zunehmend nach Prinzipien des Föderalismus organisiert. Nach wie vor ungeklärt ist aber, wie sich dies auf die Demokratie auswirkt. Während Föderalismusforscher überwiegend annehmen, dass sich beide Formen wechselseitig unterstützen, diskutiert man in der Demokratieforschung die negativen Folgen von Ebenendifferenzierung und -verflechtung. In dem vorliegenden Artikel wird eine analytische Perspektive vorgestellt, die zur Klärung dieser wichtigen Problematik durch vergleichende Forschung beitragen soll.

Over the last decades, federalism became increasingly relevant in national or international political systems. However, scholars still dispute the consequences of federal organisations on democracy. In research on federalism, both forms are said to be congruent, and mutually support each other. In contrast, research on democracy focuses on the negative effects of multilevel structures and interlocking politics. This article outlines an analytical perspective that should contribute to the clarification of this relevant issue in comparative research.

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Philip G. Roeder

**Ethnofederalism and the Mismanagement of Conflicting Nationalisms**

in **Regional and Federal Studies**, Volume 19 Issue 2 , 203 - 219

Recent discussions of federal solutions to ethnic conflict have focused on ethnofederal arrangements; in these the constituent units are homelands for ethnic minorities. Like autonomy arrangements in non-federal states, these institutional arrangements structure subsequent politics in ways that increase the likelihood of escalating conflict that



results in nation-state crises. Tinkering with the institutional details of these arrangements is unlikely to exorcise these problems.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

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Irina Scediltefuriuc

**Explaining Government Formation in Multi-level Settings: Coalition Theory Revisited—Evidence from the Spanish Case**

in *Regional and Federal Studies*, Volume 19 Issue 2 , 97 - 116

This article argues that regional government formation in decentralized countries follows different rules than national government formation in unitary states. It revises some basic assumptions that classical coalition formation theory makes, positing that in multi-level settings parties do not behave as unitary actors, that the goals they pursue might vary across levels at any given time, that regional coalition formation is part of a two-level game and that the policy space in which coalitions are mapped is often two-dimensional. Employing a combination of quantitative and qualitative techniques, several classical propositions are tested in light of these revised assumptions on data about Spanish regional governments. We find that classical predictors do their fair share, but multi-level factors are crucial in explaining the making and breaking of regional governments.

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Schakel, Arjan H.

**Federalism and Regionalism in Western Europe. A Comparative and Thematic Analysis: The Architecture of Government: Rethinking Political Decentralization**

in *Acta Politica*, Volume 44, Number 1, April , 113-117

Book review on two volumes on federalism, regionalism and decentralization:

Wilfried Swenden, *Federalism and Regionalism in Western Europe. A Comparative and Thematic Analysis*. Palgrave Macmillan: Houndmills 2006, 325pp. ISBN 978-1-4039-0627-4;

Daniel Treisman, *The Architecture of Government. Rethinking Political Decentralization*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2007, 328pp. ISBN 978-0-521-69382-0.

Full text available on-line: [http://www.arjanschakel.nl/docs/Book\\_review\\_Acta\\_Politica\\_2008.pdf](http://www.arjanschakel.nl/docs/Book_review_Acta_Politica_2008.pdf)

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

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Suresh Kumar

**Governance in a Multi-Cultural Society**

in *Indian Journal of Federal Studies*, Issue 19

No abstract available

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***Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government***

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Thomas Daumlubler, Marc Debus

**Government Formation and Policy Formulation in the German States**

**in *Regional and Federal Studies***, Volume 19 Issue 2 , 73 - 95

This article theorizes and analyzes two aspects of government building in the German states while paying special attention to interrelations between the federal and state level. First, we examine which factors influence the choice of the partisan composition of the next government. Secondly, we ask for the determinants of the policy positions of the newly formed coalition governments. Original empirical results show that both government formation and policy formulation in the German Laumlinder are clearly affected by federal politics. State-level coalitions cross-cutting the federal government-opposition divide are avoided, and the strength of this effect depends on institutional context and the federal election cycle. The policy position of state-level governments is affected by the position of the respective federal government. On the economic policy dimension, all state-level governments move towards the federal government. On the social policy dimension, those state governments whose partisan composition is congruent with the federal government seem to move away from the latter.

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Chiti-Batelli Andrea

**Il federalismo europeo e il caso belga**

**in *Affari Esteri***, Anno XLI, n. 161 , 181-193

No abstract available

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***Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government***

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Irina Scediltefuriuc

**Introduction: Government Coalitions in Multi-level Settings—Institutional Determinants and Party Strategy**

**in *Regional and Federal Studies***, Volume 19 Issue 2 , 1 - 12

Government formation is an essential aspect of party politics. In those countries with a multi-level system of governance, coalition formation itself is a multi-level game. This special issue brings together contributions that explore regional coalition formation in Belgium, Spain, Germany and Italy. Party coalition choices appear to be constrained by systemic determinants, such as whether the federal setting tends to be joint or competitive, bipolar or multipolar, majoritarian or consociational and uni- or plurinational. Furthermore, the distribution of veto powers in the multi-level decision-making structure is a crucial determinant of how integrated party coalition strategies are across levels. Other key factors that explain these choices pertain to how integrated national and subnational party systems are and to individual party attributes, such as ideology, goals and internal organization. Last, but not least, it appears that the role of personal relations both within parties at different governing levels and between parties at the same level is also highly important, as multi-level settings are characterized by great complexity.



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Leo Christopher, Ennsa Jeremy

**Multi-Level Governance and Ideological Rigidity: The Failure of Deep Federalism**

in **Canadian Journal of Political Science--Revue canadienne de science politique**, Volume 42 - Issue 01 - March , 93-116

Abstract. This article addresses multi-level governance by posing the following question: How can we have policies that are truly national and yet fully take into account the very significant differences among regions and communities? A major objective of this approach is to get beyond ideologically driven, dichotomous debates, which often leave the impression that the study of multi-level governance can be reduced to a choice between two alternatives—for example between neo-liberalism and the welfare state, or local autonomy and centralization. Our inquiry is focused on the implementation of a federal–provincial agreement on immigration and settlement in Vancouver. The implementation took place under the authority of an aggressively private market-oriented provincial government, and our close examination of the process and the fall-out from it suggests the existence of fundamental contradictions in the theory the government applied. In particular, we find a contradiction between the intention of introducing market mechanisms in order to reduce bureaucracy and the reality of new bureaucratic burdens that accompanied the introduction of market competition. We also confront the government's claims of democratic bona fides with the reality that the introduction of contracting out posed fundamental obstacles to government responsiveness to democratic demands. Our findings suggest that straight-line, ideologically driven approaches to governance are unlikely to meet the challenge of adapting national policy to the distinct requirements of particular communities.

Résumé. Cet article étudie la gouvernance multi-paliers en posant la question suivante : « Comment formuler des politiques gouvernementales qui soient réellement nationales tout en répondant aux différences importantes qui existent entre les régions et les communautés? » Un objectif important de cette méthode est de mettre de côté les débats idéologiques dichotomiques qui donnent l'impression que l'étude de la gouvernance échelonnée se ramène à un choix entre les deux termes d'une alternative : entre néolibéralisme et État - providence, par exemple, ou entre autonomie locale et centralisation. Notre enquête porte sur l'exécution d'un accord fédéral provincial concernant l'immigration et l'intégration des immigrés à Vancouver. Le gouvernement provincial auquel il incombait d'exécuter cet accord était fortement axé sur la libre entreprise. Et les résultats de notre enquête suggèrent qu'il y ait des contradictions fondamentales dans la théorie appliquée par le gouvernement. L'intention de ce gouvernement de réduire la bureaucratie en introduisant la libre entreprise et la réalité que l'introduction de ladite libre entreprise a entraîné de nouvelles charges bureaucratiques, nous paraissent contradictoires. Il en est de même pour l'argument que l'action du gouvernement tienne de la bonne foi démocratique et la réalité que le recours aux sous-traitants crée des obstacles fondamentaux qui entravent la capacité du gouvernement de répondre aux réclamations démocratiques. Les résultats de notre enquête suggèrent que les conceptions de la gouvernance qui sont linéaires et rigoureusement calquées sur des idéologies ne pourraient probablement pas répondre au défi d'adapter la politique nationale aux besoins des communautés particulières.

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Jan Erk, Lawrence Anderson



**The Paradox of Federalism: Does Self-Rule Accommodate or Exacerbate Ethnic Divisions?**

in *Regional and Federal Studies*, Volume 19 Issue 2 , 191 - 202

The paradox of federalism is about whether self-rule accommodates or exacerbates ethnic divisions. A federal arrangement that formally recognizes ethno-linguistic diversity to help manage divisions can also pave the way for eventual disintegration. In this introductory piece, the editors of this Special Issue highlight a number of common reference points for the study of the secession-inducing and secession-preventing features of federalism: First, the political will of the secessionists and their capacity to mobilize to this end; secondly, the characteristics of federal institutional/constitutional design; and, thirdly, economic and sociological uncoded factors that have a bearing upon these questions.

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Hudson Meadwell

**The Political Dynamics of Secession and Institutional Accommodation**

in *Regional and Federal Studies*, Volume 19 Issue 2 , 221 - 235

Although not at the core of the history of ideas, federalism has a distinguished pedigree in political theory. This paper does not turn directly to federalism, however, and to the question of whether its institutional arrangements can be fine-tuned so as to reconcile territorial integrity and cultural heterogeneity. I propose instead a focus on the political dynamics of secession. This focus reveals the sensitivity of institutional accommodation to degrees of heterogeneity, showing that stable accommodation may depend on imposition rather than self-limiting behaviour or mutual enforcement.

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Jekewitz Jürgen

**Unser aller Grundgesetz seit sechzig Jahre. Was bedeutet der Bundesrepublik ihre Verfassung und was bedeutet dieser Verfassung ihr Staat?**

in *Recht und Politik*, 45. Jahrgang, Heft 2, 2009 , 65-74

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

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Carter Neal, James Patrick

**"Grab the Signatures and Run": Federal Unity Strategy in Canada from the Referendum to Patriation**

in *International Political Sociology* , Volume 3, Issue 2, June 2009 , 194-217

Whether as a traumatic event or great accomplishment, the legacy of the First Ministers' Conference of 1981 lives on in Canadian politics. Constitutional negotiations among the prime minister and provincial premiers in 1981 produced the only "packaged" agreement since Confederation to achieve even the minimal support necessary to achieve ratification.



The resulting Constitution Act of 1982, which included the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, remains in place and is the principal manifestation of intergovernmental bargaining from over two decades ago. This study reevaluates the strategic interaction and conflict processes that took place between Ottawa and the provinces in negotiations leading up to that fateful November 1981 conference. We apply the sociological framework for assessment of the dynamics of identity contention adopted from McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001) and find tentative support for its propositions. After an overview of the article's agenda, we present an analytic framework for the study of conflict processes. Second, the background to the constitutional crisis of 1980-81 is summarized. Using the analytic framework, the third section focuses on the federal strategy in the crisis as suggested by minutes from cabinet meetings, and the fourth section examines key events of the First Ministers Conference of November 1981. Fifth, and finally, the contributions of the preceding sections are summed up and ideas are put forward for further research.

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Mayr Irene, Schwartz Walter

**A New Broom Sweeps Clean? An Attempt to Gradually Change the Austrian Constitution**  
in *European public Law*, Volume 15 (2009) Issue 2 , 151-162

No abstract available

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Detjen Stephan

**Abschied vom Grundgesetz? Essay**  
in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, Band 18-19, 2009

Wie erinnern wir uns an die Entstehung des Grundgesetzes vor 60 Jahren? Welche Geschichten der Verfassung erzählen wir uns? Wie erkennen wir die deutsche Nachkriegsgeschichte im vielfach veränderten Text unserer Verfassung wieder?

<http://www.bpb.de/publikationen/EWMYYL.html>

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Braun Dietmar

**Constitutional Change in Switzerland**  
in *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, vol. 39, n. 2, Spring , 314-340

The article presents a case of successful constitutional change in Switzerland, the "re-assignment of responsibilities between the federal government and the cantons and the new fiscal equalization scheme," which was adopted in 2004 by referendum. By starting from the general assumption that ways and means are needed to strengthen general



interests at the expense of distributive interests in constitutional discussions, the article endeavors to identify favorable conditions for successful constitutional change. By using insights from "constitutional political economy" and "actor-centered institutionalism," four such conditions are revealed: the procedural separation of problem solving and bargaining interaction modes; the importance of ideational factors like "frames," "causal theories," and focal points; active agenda-crafting; and the structuring of constitutional debates by earlier decisions. In addition, this article highlights that other conditions, more directly linked to interest and interest struggle, can help to mitigate the intensity of distributive conflicts and are therefore indirectly conducive to a problem-solving interaction orientation of actors.

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Simeon Richard

**Constitutional Design and Change in Federal Systems: Issues and Questions**

in **Publius: The Journal of Federalism**, vol. 39, n. 2, Spring , 241-261

This article reviews the literature on constitutional design and change, especially in territorially divided societies that have adopted or are considering the adoption of federal or federalist regimes. The study of these processes, it argues, must integrate normative and empirical analysis and must be highly sensitive to historical, cultural, economic and geo-political contexts. There are few sustainable generalizations in the field, and few prescriptions for constitution-making processes or specific constitutional arrangements that are easily transferable. Questions addressed in the article include: What are the starting points or drivers for movements to constitutional change; what are the issues that arise in efforts to reform federal constitutions; who participates; in what arenas; with what decision rules; and with what results?

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Dreier Horst

**Das Grundgesetz - eine Verfassung auf Abruf?**

in **Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte**, Band 18-19, 2009

Dass dem Grundgesetz einmal ein 60-jähriges Jubiläum vergönnt sein würde, hätte bei seiner Verkündung durch den Präsidenten des Parlamentarischen Rates, Konrad Adenauer, am 23. Mai 1949 wohl niemand vermutet - am wenigstens die Mitglieder des Parlamentarischen Rates selbst, die es nach einem Dreivierteljahr intensiver Beratungen am 8. Mai 1949 mit der eindrucksvollen Mehrheit von 53 Ja- gegenüber 12 Nein-Stimmen (außer den beiden KPD-Abgeordneten stimmten Vertreter der CSU, des Zentrums und der Deutschen Partei/DP dagegen) beschlossen hatten. Denn im Grunde genommen gingen alle Beteiligten davon aus, mit dem Grundgesetz lediglich eine Art Notbau für einen begrenzten Zeitraum geschaffen zu haben - um dem "staatlichen Leben für eine Übergangszeit eine neue Ordnung zu geben", wie es die Präambel in ihrer ursprünglichen Fassung klar und deutlich ausdrückte.

<http://www.bpb.de/publikationen/X1YIJ3.html>

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Zohlnhöfer Reimut

**Der Politikverflechtungsfalle entwischt? Die Effekte der Föderalismusreform I auf die Gesetzgebung  
in Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft**, 19. Jahrgang (2009), Heft 1, 39-76

The Reform of German Federalism Part I: Effects on Lawmaking

The paper discusses the effects of the first step of the reform of German federalism on policy-making. It turns out that the new legislative competences of the Länder are of limited importance because they tend to coordinate policies among themselves. On the federal level, the overall ratio of bills needing Bundesrat approval to all bills decreases substantially, but it is mostly routine decisions that can be adopted without Bundesrat approval now. A counterfactual analysis of the red-green coalition's key decisions reveals that the necessity of Bundesrat approval might even decrease for important reforms. Nevertheless, the permanent electoral campaign which German governments find themselves in continues to make coherent and far-reaching reforms difficult. Furthermore, the effects of the reform depend on how the Federal Constitutional Court interprets the new constitutional rules.

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Vorländer Hans

**Die Deutschen und ihre Verfassung**

in **Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte**, Band 18-19, 2009

Was in der Retrospektive wie eine Erfolgsgeschichte aussieht, war 1949 keineswegs absehbar. Das Grundgesetz hatte die Bundesrepublik Deutschland aus der Taufe gehoben, mit seiner Verkündung vor 60 Jahren, am 23. Mai 1949, war die westdeutsche Republik gegründet. Aber das Grundgesetz war nur die Verfassung eines Teilstaates, weshalb es auch nicht Verfassung, sondern, als Ausdruck seines transitorischen Charakters, "Grundgesetz" genannt wurde. Mit der Wiederherstellung der deutschen Einheit sollte seine Existenz beendet sein und durch eine Verfassung, die das gesamte deutsche Volk in Freiheit beschließen sollte, ersetzt werden.

<http://www.bpb.de/publikationen/GENSCL.html>

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Heitsch Christian

**Die asymmetrische Neuverflechtung der Kompetenzordnung durch die deutsche 'Föderalismusreform I'  
in Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart**, Band 57, 2009

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

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Schneider Hans-Peter

**La reforma del federalismo en alemania. Fines, negociaciones, resultados**

in *Revista d'Estudis Autonomics i Federals*, n.8 , 11-36

The object of the article is to study the first phase in the reform of federalism, which came into force on 1 Sept 2006 and that, based on the numerous constitutional reforms undertaken since the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany, has led to reorganization of the system to distribute competences between Bund and Länder. After studying the ultimate causes of the reform, the author analyses the procedure to carry it out, the work by the Commission on federalism and the culmination of the reform after the general elections. After considering both the achievements as well as the matters not resolved by the reform, the author concludes that one may not consider a clear winner has appeared due to the changes enacted and he is also critical about some results of the reform, especially in the field of competences and, in particular, in relation to the new competence technique, that allows the Bund and Länder to issue regulations on certain matters that successively substitute those of the other body.

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*Subsection 2. Constitutional reform*

Moro Gabriele

**La riforma del Titolo V della Costituzione: quale collocazione per il diritto del lavoro? Un'analisi dottrinale e giurisprudenziale**

in *Quaderni Regionali* , n.3

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

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Candido Alessandro

**Norme cedevoli e poteri sostitutivi legislativi al nuovo assetto costituzionale**

in *Quaderni Regionali* , n.3

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

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Burkhart Simone

**Reforming Federalism in Germany: Incremental Changes instead of the Big Deal**



in **Publius: The Journal of Federalism**, vol. 39, n. 2, Spring , 341-365

The unique characteristics of Germany's federalism have been long identified as one of the main obstacles to legitimate and efficient governance. In 2006, the grand coalition adopted a federal reform which aims to disentangle the intertwined levels of government by reducing the influence of the Länder governments in federal policy-making and strengthening the Länder by granting more legislative competences to the federal states. In this article, I summarize the reasons for the constitutional change, provide a short overview of the reform process, and evaluate its results. I argue that the achieved compromise will only lead to incremental changes in Germany's federalism and will not be sufficient to solve the perceived problems of Germany's federal structure.

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**Gautam S. Aniruddh**

**The Federal Republic of Nepal**

in **Indian Journal of Federal Studies**, 18th Issue, 2/2008

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 2. Constitutional reform*

**Behnke Nathalie, Benz Arthur**

**The Politics of Constitutional Change between Reform and Evolution**

in **Publius: The Journal of Federalism**, vol. 39, n. 2, Spring , 213-240

In this article, we investigate the dynamics of constitutional policy. Starting from the observation that federal systems are confronted with a two-sided dilemma of stability and flexibility, the question is how necessary constitutional change can be accomplished in spite of special rules of amendment and numerous veto players. We propose an analytical distinction of reform and evolution as two modes of constitutional change that can complement and in part substitute for each other. Comparative research shows that those two modes can effectively account for different patterns of constitutional change and that a two-track mode of constitutional change making use of a flexible interplay of both reform and evolution can best secure federal stability over the long run.

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**Möllers Christoph**

**Vom Altern einer Verfassung: 60 Jahre Grundgesetz - Essay**

in **Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte**, Band 18-19, 2009

Verfassungen können älter werden als Menschen, sie werden es aber nur in den seltensten Fällen. Das macht es schwer, das Alter einer Verfassung in die auf den Menschen bezogene Kategorienwelt des Alterns einzuordnen. Nur eine einzige wirklich alte, geltende Verfassung gibt es, soweit ersichtlich, im Moment auf der Welt: die Verfassung der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika aus dem Jahr 1787. Nur wenige Verfassungen können auf die Zeit vor dem Zweiten



Weltkrieg, ganz wenige auf die Epoche vor der Zeitenwende des Ersten Weltkriegs zurückschauen. Außer Konkurrenz steht das Vereinigte Königreich, dessen ungeschriebene Verfassungskultur vormoderne Traditionen in den Rang geltenden Rechts erhebt. Die englische Verfassung ist alt, das ist sicher, aber ist sie auch eine Verfassung?

<http://www.bpb.de/publikationen/83Z3X0.html>

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 3. The division (and the conflicts) of powers and competences*

Onida Valerio

**Applicazione flessibile e interpretazione correttiva del riparto di competenze in due sentenze "storiche" in Regioni (Le)**, n.4-5 , 773-778

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

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Ravallion Martin

**Decentralizing Eligibility for a Federal Antipoverty Program: A Case Study for China**  
in **World Bank Economic Review (The)**, Volume 23, Number 1, 2009

In theory, the informational advantage of decentralizing the eligibility criteria for a federal antipoverty program could come at a large cost to the program's performance in reaching the poor nationally. Whether this happens in practice depends on the size of the local-income effect on the eligibility cutoffs. China's Di Bao program provides a case study. Poorer municipalities adopt systematically lower thresholds—roughly negating intercity differences in need for the program and generating considerable horizontal inequity, so that poor families in rich cities fare better. The income effect is not strong enough to undermine the program's overall poverty impact; other factors, including incomplete coverage of those eligible, appear to matter more.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

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Ooyen Robert Chr. van

**Der Bundespräsident als 'Integrationsfigur'?**  
in **Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart**, Band 57, 2009

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 3. The division (and the conflicts) of powers and competences*

Niclauß Karlheinz

**Die Bundesregierung im Verfassungssystem**  
in **Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte**, Band 18-19, 2009



Die Entstehung des Grundgesetzes liegt 60 Jahre zurück. Es war ursprünglich als provisorische Verfassung für Westdeutschland gedacht. Aufgrund seiner Bewährung und des Zeitdrucks bei der Wiedervereinigung wurde es im Jahre 1990 zur gesamtdeutschen Verfassung. Die Beratungen des Parlamentarischen Rates in den Jahren 1948/1949 wirken deshalb bis in die politische Gegenwart. Sie standen unter dem Eindruck der deutschen Geschichte von 1919 bis 1945. Die Autorinnen und Autoren des Grundgesetzes hatten die Weimarer Republik und das "Dritte Reich" miterlebt und waren bestrebt, aus beiden Erfahrungen Schlussfolgerungen zu ziehen.

<http://www.bpb.de/publikationen/U4FEJU.html>

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 3. The division (and the conflicts) of powers and competences*

Vandelli Luciano

**Esigenze unitarie e prospettive dinamiche della delimitazione delle competenze: qualche nota a margine delle sentenze nn. 303/2003 e 14/2004 della Corte costituzionale**

in *Regioni (Le)*, n.4-5 , 883-896

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 3. The division (and the conflicts) of powers and competences*

Vora Nilay

**Federal Common Law and Alien Tort Statute Litigation: Why Federal Common Law Can (and Should) Provide Aiding and Abetting Liability**

in *Harvard International Law Journal*, Volume 50, Issue 1 (Winter 2009)

After *Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain*, lawsuits against corporations under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) have become the focus of human rights litigation. One of the most important legal issues in this area is how corporate aiding and abetting liability operates in lawsuits alleging violations of customary international law. Federal courts and legal commentators are split over whether federal common law can and should define the relevant standard for aiding and abetting liability. When recently confronted with the issue, the Supreme Court failed to muster a quorum. In the academic debate, Professor Steinhardt argues for the Modern position that federal common law is the appropriate source for secondary liability standards under the ATS. On the other side, Professors Bradley, Goldsmith, and Moore argue for the Revisionist position that established federal common law principles bar the creation of a corporate aiding and abetting liability. This Article evaluates the Revisionists' principles of federal common law. The Article argues that instead of barring the creation of corporate aiding and abetting liability, the Revisionists' limitations actually enable and encourage the creation and application of federal common law for ancillary issues, such as secondary liability, under the ATS.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

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Bellia Anthony J.

**Federalismo e matrimonio omosessuale nell'Unione Europea: una prospettiva americana**

in *Quaderni Costituzionali*, numero : 1, febbraio , 131-142

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

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Bellia Patricia L.

**Federalization in Information Privacy Law**

in *Yale Law Journal (The)*, Vol. 118, n. 5, March , 868

In Preemption and Privacy, Professor Paul Schwartz argues that it would be unwise for Congress to adopt a unitary federal information privacy statute that both eliminates the sector-specific distinctions in federal information privacy law and blocks the development of stronger state regulation. That conclusion, though narrow, rests on descriptive and normative claims with broad implications for the state-federal balance in information privacy law. Descriptively, Professor Schwartz sees the current information privacy law landscape as the product of successful experimentation at the state level. That account, in turn, fuels his normative claims, and in particular his sympathy with theories of competitive federalism. As I will argue, however, we cannot ignore the federal inputs—judicial and legislative—that shape significant segments of state information privacy law. The story of information privacy law is one of federal leadership as well as state experimentation, and we should be wary—whether on the basis of observable practice or theoretical perspective—of disabling Congress from articulating and federalizing privacy norms. Moreover, even from the perspective of competitive federalism, the arguments for federal regulation of information privacy law are stronger than Professor Schwartz suggests.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

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Taylor Greg

**Germany: A slow death for subsidiarity?**

in *International Journal of Constitutional Law*, Vol.7, n.1 , 139-154

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 3. The division (and the conflicts) of powers and competences*

Mangiameli Stelio

**Giurisprudenza costituzionale creativa e costituzione vivente. A proposito delle sentenze n. 303 del 2003 e n. 14 del 2004**

in *Regioni (Le)*, n.4-5 , 825-842

No abstract available



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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 3. The division (and the conflicts) of powers and competences*

Giuseppe DI Genio

**Il conflitto in difesa dell'autonomia locale in Spagna: il caso Ceuta come 'primera ocasion'**

in *Diritto pubblico comparato ed europeo*, n.4 , 1649 ss.

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 3. The division (and the conflicts) of powers and competences*

Ruggiu Ilenia

**Il principio di competenza tra flessibilizzazione ed esigenze unitarie nelle sentenze della Corte costituzionale n. 303 del 2003 e n. 14 del 2004**

in *Regioni (Le)*, n.4-5 , 865-874

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 3. The division (and the conflicts) of powers and competences*

Ruggeri Antonio

**Il problematico "bilanciamento" tra politica e diritto costituzionale (tornando a riflettere su Corte cost. n. 303 del 2003)**

in *Regioni (Le)*, n.4-5 , 849-864

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 3. The division (and the conflicts) of powers and competences*

Anzon Demming Adele

**Istanze di unità e istanze autonomistiche nel "secondo regionalismo": le sentenze nn. 303 del 2003 e 14 del 2004 della Corte costituzionale e il loro seguito**

in *Regioni (Le)*, n.4-5 , 779-790

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 3. The division (and the conflicts) of powers and competences*

Di Giannatale Barbara

**L'integrazione multilevel della tutela dell'ambiente: alla ricerca di un equilibrio costituzionale**



in *Nuova rassegna di legislazione, dottrina e giurisprudenza*, n. 2 , 199-222

No abstract available

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**Section A) *The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government***

*Subsection 3. The division (and the conflicts) of powers and competences*

**Cabellos Espiérrez Miguel Ángel**

**La relación derechos-estado autonómico en la sentencia sobre el estatuto valenciano**

in *Revista d'Estudis Autònomicos i Federals*, n.7 , 106-144

Constitutional Court ruling 247/2007, of 12 December, dealing with the challenge brought by the government of the Autonomous Community of Aragon against the new art. 17 of the Statute of Autonomy of the Autonomous Community of Valencia, chooses to review the main questions arising from the approval of the new Statutes of Autonomy. Among the number of issues dealt with in the ruling, this article focuses on analysing a specific one: the relationship between citizens' rights and the territorial distribution of powers between the Central Government and Autonomous Communities. It is in relation to this that the article analyses the Court's case law as it relates to three fundamental aspects of the matter: the function of the art. 139.1 of the Spanish Constitution (SC) and the equality mandate that it contains; the function of art. 149.1.1 SC, within the Central Government's jurisdiction, in linking together equality and rights; and finally whether the statutes of autonomy can contain bills of rights. Of these three aspects, the one treated as most debatable is this last one, since the Court establishes a distinction between rights that will actually be rights and rights that will be mere mandates to the legislator, without establishing a clear basis on which this distinction can be made.

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**Section A) *The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government***

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**Mas Joaquín Tornos**

**La sentencia del tribunal constitucional 247/2007 y el sistema constitucional de distribución de competencias entre el estado y las comunidades autónomas**

in *Revista d'Estudis Autònomicos i Federals*, n.7 , 79-105

The aim of this study is to examine articles 7 to 10 of ruling 247/2007 of the Constitutional Court, in which the role of the Statutes of Autonomy in the division of jurisdictions between the Central Government and the Autonomous Communities is analysed, and the impact that the ruling in this case may have on the future ruling on the Catalan Statute. To link ruling 247/2007 with the future ruling on the Catalan Statute, on one side the appellant parties – the Partido Popular and the ombudsman, and the Parliament of Catalonia,



on the other, the Constitutional Court makes its arguments regarding the extent to which the Statutes of Autonomy limit its jurisdiction. Public knowledge of the appellants' arguments and the Constitutional Court's decision regarding this case, which are included in a ruling from previous appeals that pronounces on many of the issues covered in the mentioned appeals, allows the study to close with a series of considerations about the future ruling of the Constitutional Court on the part of the Catalan Statute relating to the new model for distribution of jurisdictions.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

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Bifulco Raffaele

**La tutela della concorrenza tra parte I e II della Costituzione (in margine alla sent. 14/2004 della Corte costituzionale)**

in **Regioni (Le)**, n.4-5 , 791-800

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 3. The division (and the conflicts) of powers and competences*

D'Atena Antonio

**Le aperture dinamiche del riparto delle competenze, tra punti fermi e nodi non sciolti**

in **Regioni (Le)**, n.4-5 , 811-816

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 3. The division (and the conflicts) of powers and competences*

Caretti Paolo

**Le sentenze nn. 303/2003 e 14/2004: due letture "creative" del nuovo Titolo V della Costituzione**

in **Regioni (Le)**, n.4-5 , 807-810

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

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Keddie J.N., Smith R.F.I

**Leading from Below: How Sub-National Governments Influence Policy Agendas**

in **Australian Journal of Public Administration**, Volume 68, Number 1 , 67-82

This article takes a state's eye view of trends towards a more centralised system of governance in Australia. It argues



that while globalisation strengthens the roles of national governments it also provides less noticed public policy and management opportunities for sub-national governments. The article shows how state governments in Australia can use high-level policy proposals to reinforce their continuing relevance as key members of a federal system of government. It proposes that skilful deployment of policy ideas and analyses can enable the states to sustain alternative national agendas despite hostility or lack of interest by the federal government. In conclusion, the article examines the implications for federal-state relations under the Rudd government. It suggests that the elements for productive reform agendas are present but that bringing them together will require considerable effort

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

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Pfiffner James P.

**Presidential Signing Statements and Their Implications for Public Administration**

in **Public Administration Review**, March -April 2009 - Volume 69 Issue 2 , 249-255

For most of U.S. history, presidents have issued signing statements to comment on bills being signed into law. These statements often are hortatory and comment on the merits of the new law. In recent decades, presidents also have used signing statements to indicate portions of laws that they consider unconstitutional. Pointing out such parts of new statutes is not a problem, but indicating that the president may not execute part of the law is problematic. President George W. Bush used signing statements in an aggressive way to imply that he might not faithfully execute more than 1,000 provisions of statutes that he signed into law. This essay argues that this practice undermines the rule of law and threatens the separation of powers system

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

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Padula Carlo

**Requisiti della delibera di impugnazione e requisiti del ricorso: un'ulteriore strettoia nel giudizio in via principale?**

in **Regioni (Le)**, n.6 , 1077-1098

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 3. The division (and the conflicts) of powers and competences*

Moles Plaza Ramon J. Garcia Hom Anna

**Sobre les comeptències autonòmiques i locals en la governança del desplegament d'infraestructures de telefonia mòbil a catalunya**

in **Revista d'Estudis Autònomic i Federals**, n.8 , 292-334

This article seeks to analyze the options for distribution of authority at the regional and local level over the process of deploying mobile telephone antennas in Catalonia, given that these infrastructures have a tremendous impact on town planning, the environment, and public health; and given



that such impact can allow the exercise of administrative planning and oversight powers to promote efficient deployment while preventing a digital divide.

Although Spain's regulatory framework for telecommunications grants the Spanish government sole authority in this field, it also allows Catalonia's regional government and local bodies to have indirect influence through their regulation of related issues within their purview, such as land use, public health, and the environment. It is therefore through the exercise of these powers that Catalan government agencies can build a model of governance for the deployment of mobile telephone infrastructures that can overcome disputes generated by a social construction of risks from their transmissions, and avoid a digital divide caused by potential gaps in coverage areas.

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***Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government***

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Toens Katrin

**The Bologna Process in German Educational Federalism: State Strategies, Policy Fragmentation and Interest Mediation**

in **German Politics**, Volume 18, Issue 2, June , 246-264

The article provides an impact assessment of the current European higher education reform (Bologna process) in the context of German educational federalism. The goal is to come to grips with the puzzling observation that the reforms have had a large impact, even though the joint decision-making trap of German educational federalism has continuously impeded structural changes in previous decades. It suggests that the reason why the Bologna process has been so influential is its openness, ambiguity, and the complete absence of binding commitments. These characteristics of soft governance dovetail with the strategy of the central government and the federal states to protect their political autonomy against potential threats resulting from inter- and transnational political cooperation as well as the national reform of the constitutional principles of federalism at home. However, drawing on empirical examples of policy fragmentation, understood as the co-existence of partly incompatible reform islands, illustrates the costs of soft governance in the national implementation process.

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***Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government***

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Jones Stephen

**The Future of Renewable Energy in Australia: A Test for Cooperative Federalism?**

in **Australian Journal of Public Administration**, Volume 68, Number 1 , 1-20

In the context of the Australian federal system industry development will be influenced by the policies of each sphere of government. When announcing a set of policies in 1997 to develop the renewable energy industry the Australian federal government acknowledged the need for a cooperative approach between all governments and industry. The objective of this article is to analyse the government policies over the 1997-2007 period to promote the development of the renewable energy industry in Australia. The article highlights a number of factors that have served as barriers to the



development of the industry. The research provides important insight into the difficulties associated with establishing cooperative national arrangements in areas of state government responsibility in the Australian federation. The lessons also inform the current debate on the policy initiatives needed to more effectively reduce greenhouse gas emissions from stationary energy from the increased availability of renewable energy.

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Marchildon Gregory P.

**The Prairie Farm Rehabilitation Administration: Climate Crisis and Federal–Provincial Relations during the Great Depression**

in *Canadian Historical Review (The)*, Volume 90, Number 2, June , 275-301

The federal government established the Prairie Farm Rehabilitation Administration (pfra) during the greatest environmental and economic crisis in twentieth-century Canada. While the pfra was a logical policy response to the disaster, it was also a calculated political response by successive Conservative and Liberal administrations in Ottawa. As a result of intergovernmental and constitutional conflicts between the federal government and the respective Prairie provincial governments, the pfra program was introduced at different times in the Prairie provinces while the community pasture program was never allowed to be established in Alberta. The pfra was headquartered in Saskatchewan, the province most supportive of the federal initiative.

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Falcon Giandomenico

**Un problema, due risposte, alcune riflessioni**

in *Regioni (Le)*, n.4-5 , 817-824

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 3. The division (and the conflicts) of powers and competences*

Rossi Emanuele

**Una breve considerazione sul fondamento delle "istanze unitarie" nella riflessione di Carlo Mezzanotte**

in *Regioni (Le)*, n.4-5 , 843-848

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 3. The division (and the conflicts) of powers and competences*

Gisela Piltz Maja Pfister



**Verfassungsrechtlich nicht unbedenklich: das BKA-Gesetz**

in *Recht und Politik*, 45. Jahrgang, Heft 2, 2009 , 4-11

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 3. The division (and the conflicts) of powers and competences*

Denison Dwight V., Hackbart Merl, Moody Michael J.

**When States Discriminate: The Non-uniform Tax Treatment of Municipal Bond Interest**

in *Public Administration Review*, May/June 2009 - Volume 69 Issue 3 , 458-468

There is a long history of states using tax systems to encourage residents to invest in bonds issued by jurisdictions within their state. This preferential or discriminatory tax treatment was ruled unconstitutional in 2006 by the Kentucky Court of Appeals. The Kentucky court decision, which sets the stage for this essay, was overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2008. This essay addresses the possible implications of this and similar discriminatory tax policies. Such discriminatory policies are the foundation of the municipal bond market, and altering the practice would have significant implications for revenue collections and borrowing costs in most states and localities. While the Supreme Court's position has been rendered, the case has caused policy makers and administrators to scrutinize discriminatory tax policies and their impact on budgets and borrowing costs.

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Köhler Gerd Michael

**Übergangs- und Schlussbestimmungen in den Verfassungen der deutschen Bundesländer**

in *Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart*, Band 57, 2009

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 4. The legislative branch*

Moten Abdul Rashid

**2008 General Elections in Malaysia: Democracy at Work**

in *Japanese Journal of Political Science*, Volume 10 - Issue 01 , 21-42

The Barisan Nasional (BN) which won a landslide in 2004 was returned to power in 2008 elections with reduced majority and the loss of five state assemblies. Dissatisfied with unfulfilled promises, the electorate protested by voting for a strong opposition. BN additionally was characterized by factionalism. Three opposition parties joined hands and, using alternative media, unexpectedly won 82 seats in the parliament. A strong responsible opposition bodes well for Malaysian democracy.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**



*Subsection 4. The legislative branch*

Fraile Ortiz Maria

**Il problema del Senato in Spagna  
in Regioni (Le), n.6 , 1157-1196**

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 4. The legislative branch*

Kaiser André, Fischer Jörn

**Linkages between Parliamentary and Ministerial Careers in Germany, 1949-2008: The Bundestag as Recruitment Pool**

**in German Politics**, Volume 18, Issue 2, June , 140-154

Delegation theory assumes strong direct links between the parliamentary majority and the government in parliamentary democracies. Based on a data set of career characteristics for all federal cabinet ministers in Germany 1949 to 2008, we test whether the Bundestag serves as the dominant recruitment pool throughout the period, whether party membership of ministers is a sine qua non, and whether non-party members and/or non-MPs seek membership as soon as possible after their selection for a cabinet post. We find confirmation for all three hypotheses, although in more recent times an increasing number of ministers are level-switchers, i.e. are recruited from the ranks of Länder executives.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 4. The legislative branch*

José Antonio Cheibub, Argelina Figueiredo, Fernando Limongi

**Political Parties and Governors as Determinants of Legislative Behavior in Brazil's Chamber of Deputies, 1988–2006**

**in Latin American Politics & Society**, Volume 51 Issue 1 , 1 - 30

This article examines the relative importance of regional and national forces in shaping the behavior of Brazilian legislators at the national level. A widely held view is that national legislators respond to state pressures in making decisions, rather than pressures from the national government. Governors not only can influence national debates but also can determine outcomes by exerting control over their states' legislative delegations. This article examines a dataset of all roll-call votes in the Chamber of Deputies between 1989 and 2006 to isolate and evaluate the impact of local pressures on legislative voting. Spanning the terms of five presidents and five different congresses, the data show that the local influence is weaker than the national on the voting decisions of individual legislators and the voting cohesion of state delegations. Alternative institutional resources allow the central government to counteract the centrifugal pressures of federalism and other institutional influences.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 4. The legislative branch*

Suzanne S. Schüttemeyer

**The German Politics Lecture 2008: Deparliamentarisation: How Severely is the German Bundestag Affected?**



in **German Politics**, Volume 18, Issue 1, March , 1-11

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 5. The executive branch*

Pünder Hermann

**Democratic Legitimation Of Delegated Legislation—A Comparative View On The American, British And German Law**

in **International & Comparative Law Quarterly** , Volume 58 - Issue 02 , 353-378

This article addresses the problem of democratic legitimacy posed by the executive branch's use of delegated legislative powers. After some remarks on the need for delegated legislation and the problem of legitimation the study identifies in a comparative perspective three approaches of ensuring that delegated legislation carries sufficient democratic legitimation. A first means of democratic legitimation is parliamentary predetermination of the executive role. German law proves that the proper legislature under the Damocles sword of unconstitutionality is in many cases well able to prescribe for the executive a substantive programme of delegated legislation. A second technique of democratic legitimation is that parliament in some way participates in the rule-making procedure. German and British law show that by means of subsequent approval the proper legislature assumes political responsibility for subordinate legislation beyond the original empowerment. The US Supreme Court, however, considers the legislative veto to be unconstitutional. Therefore, American law developed a third approach to solve the problem of democratic legitimacy. American experience makes clear that the democratic legitimation of secondary legislation can also be secured by means of comprehensively involving the public in the delegated legislative process. The author assesses the different models for legitimation and explains that the different approaches suggest valuable solutions to each country's problems.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 5. The executive branch*

O'Hara Jonathan

**Late 19th century administrative reform in America: re-articulating Hamiltonian thought**

in **International Review of Administrative Sciences** , March 2009, Volume 75, No. 1 , 183-204

In this article, the intellectual thought of a group of key late 19th century national administrative reformers is isolated and analyzed. These reformers were interested in reforming the civil, military and business administrative functions of the executive branch to provide for greater elite administrative supervision over and intervention in the national society and economy. The reformers often articulated their reform purposes, motives and goals in the Hamiltonian language of administrative authority and popular deference to executive administrative counsels. An important key to understanding this article is recognizing that while environmental social and economic conditions had changed significantly for the Gilded Age reformers since the American constitutional founding, many elements of the Hamiltonian tradition still resonated with the reformers a full century later. In this way, the historically transmitted ideology and rhetoric of



Hamiltonian thought can be seen as having an independent, causative impact on the administrative reformers' purposes, motives and goals related to executive administrative reform.

Points for practitioners This article explores an era of American administrative reform that should be of interest to practitioners of administration in other countries. The article's narrative displays a route to reform that is distinct from the more conventionally studied pathways of bureaucratic efficiency and administrative legal mechanisms applied to administrative organizations. The particular American ideas and thinkers examined in this article give a glimpse of a pathway to reform that is absent in many other societies.

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***Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government***

*Subsection 5. The executive branch*

**Crotty William**

**Policy and Politics: The Bush Administration and the 2008 Presidential Election**

in *Polity*, Volume 41, Issue 3, July , 282-311

It was called the most important election since the Great Depression. The policies of the Bush administration established the storyline for the presidential election and determined its outcome. This could be seen in three areas: a failing economy, the continuing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the expansion of executive powers. In particular, the collapse of the financial industry in the fall of 2008 correlated with the increases in the Democratic vote. The Bush presidency should be considered transformative, a highly significant period in American history. Not only did it set the agenda for the election, pitting an advocate for change (Barack Obama) against a candidate committed to continuing the Bush policies (John McCain), it also dictated the problems the in-coming administration would have to deal with.

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***Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government***

*Subsection 5. The executive branch*

**Facal Joseph, Bernier Luc**

**Réformes administratives, structures sociales et représentations collectives : le cas québécois**

in *Revue française d'administration publique*, n. 127

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***Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government***

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**Caswell Bruce E.**

**The Presidency, The Vote, and The Formation of New Coalitions**

in *Polity*, Volume 41, Issue 3, July , 388-407



The 2008 presidential election can be said to suffer from an audacity of analysis, a rush to place the Barack Obama presidency in historical perspective before the Obama presidency actually makes history. Some historical facts are irrefutable, such as the election of the first African-American president and the smashing of campaign finance records. But other aspects of the 2008 election remain to be proven, such as whether a permanent Democratic majority has emerged and an electoral realignment has taken place. Another audacious aspect of the discussion of this election has been the crediting of a permanent shift in electoral and governing coalitions to the strategic efforts of a presidential candidate, that is, to link the presidency to structural changes in the vote and the formation of a new Democratic Party coalition. This paper identifies the questions that must be answered to prove such conclusions, and cautiously tenders some answers. First, what indications are there that the Obama coalition is a sustainable coalition or a permanent shift in the vote? Second, what might be the role of a presidential candidate and a sitting president in building and maintaining a majority party coalition?

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 5. The executive branch*

Riley Russell L.

**The White House as a Black Box: Oral History and the Problem of Evidence in Presidential Studies in Political Studies**, Volume 57, Issue 1, March , 187-206

Scholars who study the American presidency usually have to rely on indirect evidence for understanding the internal operations of the 'black box' that is a contemporaneous White House. Most of the direct evidence about White House behavior becomes available only after a president has left office, when confidential communications are opened to the public by the presidential libraries. In recent years, however, such direct evidence has become increasingly inaccessible, because of changes in the record-keeping habits of senior executive branch officials and because of the politics of archival release. This article explores the nature and extent of these problems, and how elite oral history interviewing can compensate for them. It further examines the strengths and weaknesses of oral history as a means of learning about the usually hidden workings of the American presidency.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 6. The judiciary branch*

Blocher Joseph

**Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis in New York University Law Review** , Vol.84, n.2 , 375-439

The least discussed element of *District of Columbia v. Heller* might ultimately be the most important: the battle between the majority and dissent over the use of categoricalism and balancing in the construction of constitutional doctrine. In *Heller*, Justice Scalia's categoricalism essentially prevailed over Justice Breyer's balancing approach. But as the opinion itself demonstrates, Second Amendment categoricalism raises extremely difficult and still-unanswered questions about how to draw and justify the lines between protected and unprotected "Arms," people, and arms-bearing purposes. At least until balancing tests appear in Second Amendment doctrine—as they almost inevitably will—the future of the Amendment will depend almost entirely on the placement and clarity of these categories.



And unless the Court better identifies the core values of the Second Amendment, it will be difficult to give the categories any principled justification. Heller is not the first time the Court has debated the merits of categorization and balancing, nor are Justices Scalia and Breyer the tests' most famous champions. Decades ago, Justices Black and Frankfurter waged a similar battle in the First Amendment context, and the echoes of their struggle continue to reverberate in free speech doctrine. But whereas the categorical view triumphed in Heller, Justice Frankfurter and the First Amendment balancers won most of their battles. As a result, modern First Amendment doctrine is a patchwork of categorical and balancing tests, with a tendency toward the latter. The First and Second Amendments are often presumed to be close cousins, and courts, litigants, and scholars will almost certainly continue to turn to the First Amendment for guidance in developing a Second Amendment standard of review. But while free speech doctrine may be instructive, it also tells a cautionary tale: Above all, it suggests that unless the Court better identifies the core values of the Second Amendment, the Second Amendment's future will be even murkier than the First Amendment's past. This Article draws the Amendments together, using the development of categoricalism and balancing tests in First Amendment doctrine to describe and predict what Heller's categoricalism means for the present and future of Second Amendment doctrine. It argues that the Court's categorical line drawing in Heller creates intractable difficulties for Second Amendment doctrine and theory and that the majority's categoricalism neither reflects nor enables a clear view of the Amendment's core values, whatever they may be.

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***Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government***

*Subsection 6. The judiciary branch*

**Terhechte Jörg Philipp**

**Judicial Ethics for a Global Judiciary - How Judicial Networks Create their own Codes of Conduct**

**in German Law Journal**, Vol.10, n.4 , 501-514

No abstract available

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***Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government***

*Subsection 6. The judiciary branch*

**Aragón Reyes Manuel**

**La reforma de la Ley Orgánica del Tribunal Constitucional**

**in Revista Española de Derecho Constitucional**, n.85

This article analyses the general significance of the latest reform to the Constitutional Court Act (Ley Orgánica del Tribunal Constitucional) and the changes it brings into the regulation of constitutional proceedings, how the court is run internally and the legal charter of both the court and its members. Proceedings that used to be the exclusive power of the Plenary can now be deferred to the court rooms in most cases, as can intervention of the parties in the a quo legal proceedings in matters of unconstitutionality. The admission of amparo appeals is made more objective, as they will not



be admitted in any case in which rights have been infringed but only if the case is of «special constitutional importance». The reform thus transforms the previous model of amparo appeals, which no longer give protection under tutelage but now protect by providing a control. The indirect appeal for protection is also reformed, so that it becomes a figure in which unconstitutionality is questioned by the court itself. And along this same line of reducing and simplifying the protection proceedings under amparo appeals for constitutional protection, the reform orders that when such protection is not admitted, it is sufficient for the court to argue grounds of «non-compliance with requirements», and the court rooms are empowered to delegate cases that merely require application of doctrine to its departments for ruling. Other changes include the measures for the court to be able to annul acts by any branch of public power that undermine its supreme jurisdiction, as well as new legal provisions regarding the mandate and election of the president and vice-president.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 6. The judiciary branch*

Shany Yuval

**No Longer a Weak Department of Power? Reflections on the Emergence of a New International Judiciary in European Journal of International Law**, Vol.20, n.1 , 73-91

The article assesses some of the theoretical and practical implications arising out of some recent changes in the field of international dispute settlement: the rise in the number of international courts, the expansion of their jurisdictional powers, their increased invocation by state and non-state parties, and the growing inclination of national courts to apply international law. Arguably, these developments point to the emergence of a new judiciary the operation of which is governed by a new ethos (international norm-advancement and the maintenance of co-operative international arrangements), which is different from the traditional ethos of international courts (conflict resolution). The article then moves on to discuss some of the 'blind spots' of the present judicial institutional landscape, which includes a consideration of the remaining difficulties associated with addressing politically-charged conflicts before international courts (especially those relating to war and terror), and problems relating to the enforcement of judicial orders and judgments. While national courts can, in theory, fill some of these remaining gaps, their actual ability to do so remains unclear. In addition, the article addresses in brief some concerns that the emergence of the new institutional judiciary may actually exacerbate: co-ordination problems, and concerns relating to the effectiveness and legitimacy of international adjudication.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 6. The judiciary branch*

Berman Mitchell N.

**Originalism Is Bunk**

**in New York University Law Review** , Vol.84, n.1 , 1-96

Critical analysis of originalism should start by confronting a modest puzzle: Most commentators suppose that originalism is deeply controversial, while others complain that it means too many things to mean anything at all. Is one of these views false? If not, how can we square the term's ambiguity with the sense that it captures a subject of genuine debate? Perhaps self-professed originalists champion a version of originalism that their critics don't reject, while the critics challenge a version that



proponents don't maintain.

Contemporary originalists disagree about many things: which feature of the Constitution's original character demands fidelity (framers' intent, ratifiers' understanding, or public meaning); why such fidelity is required; and whether this interpretive obligation binds judges alone or citizens, legislators, and executive officials too. But on one dimension of potential variability—the dimension of strength—originalists are mostly united: They believe that those who follow some aspect of a provision's original character must give that original aspect priority over all other considerations (with a possible exception for continued adherence to non originalist judicial precedents). That is, when the original meaning (or intent, etc.) is adequately discernible, the interpreter must follow it. This is the thesis that self-professed originalists maintain and that their critics (the non-originalists) deny.

Non-originalists have challenged this thesis on varied wholesale grounds, which include: that the target of the originalist search is undiscoverable or nonexistent; that originalism is self-refuting because the framers intended that the Constitution not be interpreted in an originalist vein; and that originalism yields bad outcomes. This Article proceeds differently. Instead of mounting a global objection—one purporting to hold true regardless of the particular arguments on which proponents of originalism rely—I endeavor to catalogue and critically assess the varied arguments proffered in originalism's defense.

Those arguments are of two broad types—hard and soft. Originalism is “hard” when grounded on reasons that purport to render it (in some sense) inescapably true; it is “soft” when predicated on contingent and contestable weighings of its costs and benefits relative to other interpretive approaches. That is, hard arguments seek to show that originalism reflects some sort of conceptual truth or follows logically from premises the interlocutor already can be expected to accept; soft arguments aim to persuade others to revise their judgments of value or their empirical or predictive assessments. The most common hard arguments contend that originalism is entailed either by intentionalism or by binding constitutionalism. Soft arguments claim that originalist interpretation best serves diverse values like democracy and the rule of law. I seek to show that the hard arguments for originalism are false and that the soft arguments are implausible.

The upshot is not that constitutional interpretation should disregard framers' intentions, ratifiers' understandings, or original public meanings. Of course we should care about these things. But originalism is a demanding thesis. We can take the original character of the Constitution seriously without treating it as dispositive. That original intents and meanings matter is not enough to render originalism true.

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## ***Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government***

### ***Subsection 6. The judiciary branch***

**Garrison Arthur H.**

## **The Internal Security Acts of 1798: The Founding Generation and the Judiciary during America's First National**



## **Security Crisis**

in **Journal of Supreme Court History**, March 2009 - Volume 34 Issue 1 , 1-27

It is a truism that a nation must protect itself from internal enemies as well as foreign threats of aggression and invasion. But that is not the entire matter. Our American democracy has striven, with mixed success, to be careful that the justified ends of the American experiment—freedom, justice, and the rule of law—are not sacrificed on the altar of the means to protect these ends.

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### ***Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government***

*Subsection 6. The judiciary branch*

**M.W., Weaver**

**The territory federal jurisdiction forgot: the question of greater federal jurisdiction in American Samoa**  
in **Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal (The)**, Vol. 18 No. 1, January

The United States Territory of American Samoa is over 7000 miles from Washington, D.C., and that distance might explain the United States' limited interest in the territory. The lack of interest has allowed American Samoa to maintain its unique cultural foundations. However, it has also kept American Samoa detached from the federal governmental structure, including the judicial system. In fact, a federal district court does not exist in American Samoa, nor has the territory been incorporated into a federal judicial district.

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### ***Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government***

*Subsection 6. The judiciary branch*

**Sen Ronojoy**

**Walking a Tightrope: Judicial Activism and Indian Democracy**  
in **India Review**, Volume 8, Issue 1, January , 63-80

The turf war between the judiciary and the two other branches is the most gripping bit of the story of the judiciary in independent India. At the heart of the friction between the courts and the other branches of government lies the power of judicial review. The first half of the article touches on some of the major flashpoints in relations between the judiciary on the one hand and the executive and legislature on the other. Beginning with differences between the judiciary and the Congress government under Jawaharlal Nehru over land reform right after Indian independence, some of the other major events are briefly reviewed. The second half of the article raises a few questions about the links between judicial activism and judicial accountability.

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### ***Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government***

*Subsection 6. The judiciary branch*

**Bazán Víctor**

**¿La Corte Suprema de Justicia argentina se reinventa, presentándose como un tribunal constitucional?**  
in **Cuestiones constitucionales. Revista mexicana de derecho constitucional**, n.20 , 3-63

No abstract available



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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism*

**Matthew J. Higgins, Andrew T. Young, Daniel Levy**

**Federal, state, and local governments: evaluating their separate roles in US growth**

in **Public Choice**, Volume 139, Numbers 3-4 , 493-507

We use US county level data from 1970 to 1998 to explore the relationship between economic growth and government employment at three levels: federal, state and local. Increases in federal, state and local government employments are all negatively related to economic growth. We find no evidence that government is more efficient at lower levels. While we cannot separate out the productive and redistributive services of government, we document that the county-level income distribution became slightly more unequal from 1970 to 1998. We conclude that a release of government-employed labor inputs to the private sector would be growth-enhancing.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism*

**Schaltegger Christoph A., Feld Lars P.**

**Are fiscal adjustments less successful in decentralized governments?**

in **European Journal of Political Economy**, Volume 25, Issue 1, March 2009 , Pages 115-123

A common political claim is that decentralized governments undermine policy-makers' ability to resist fiscal imbalance. This paper examines how fiscal centralization influences the likelihood of a successful fiscal adjustment. Using a panel of Swiss cantons from 1981 to 2001, we empirically investigate the determinants of successful long-lasting deficit reductions. Contrary to some results in the literature, we find that fiscal centralization significantly decreases the probability of a successful fiscal consolidation when the contravening effects of competitive and cooperative federalism are disentangled. The results also point to an important role of the economic environment, in particular the size of the primary balance in the years before the consolidation, in determining whether adjustment policy is successful.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism*

**Mingarelli Alberto**

**Autonomia e responsabilità nel d.d.l. sul federalismo fiscale**

in **Comuni d'Italia**, n. 2

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism*

**Renna Cinzia**

**Autonomia finanziaria degli enti locali dopo la legge sul federalismo fiscale**

in **Comuni d'Italia**, n. 2



No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism*

**Gambino Sivio**

**Autonomia, asimmetria e principio di eguaglianza: limiti costituzionali al federalismo fiscale**

**in *Politica del diritto*, n.1 , 3-44**

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism*

**Posner Paul L.**

**Budget Process Reform: Waiting for Godot**

**in *Public Administration Review*, March -April 2009 - Volume 69 Issue 2 , 233-244**

The unraveling of the budget process described by Irene Rubin will have extraordinary consequences for the long-term budget outlook facing the nation. The retirement of the baby boom generation will prompt unprecedented and unsustainable structural fiscal imbalances for decades to come. Early policy action on the spending and revenue sides of the budget is critical to avert fiscal and economic crisis and to phase in changes in order to avoid precipitous and politically perilous actions in the future. Yet such actions constitute what amounts to a politically unnatural act, as one generation of political leaders is asked to make sacrifices in current policies benefiting future generations. Budget process reforms can serve to highlight the salience of these issues and help deal with the significant political hurdles faced by decision makers in making these intertemporal budgeting trade-offs. Ironically, the need for budget rules and processes has intensified as policy makers have become more vulnerable to polarized political parties, ever more watchful media, and mobilized interest groups. Budget rules and processes can help policy makers cope by protecting their ability to make the hard choices that will be necessary. The pressures for budget process reform will accelerate as the current financial crisis increases near-term budgetary pressures, promoting greater alignment between near-term and long-term fiscal problems.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism*

**Benito Bernardino, Bastida Francisco**

**Budget Transparency, Fiscal Performance, and Political Turnout: An International Approach**

**in *Public Administration Review*, May/June 2009 - Volume 69 Issue 3 , 403-417**

This paper attempts, for the first time, to assess the relationships between budget transparency, fiscal situation, and political turnout using a comparative international approach. With this aim, the authors build a comprehensive index of budget transparency encompassing 40 budget features based on international standards for a sample of 41 countries. They find a positive relationship between national government fiscal balance and budget transparency: The more information the budget discloses, the less the politicians can use fiscal deficits to achieve opportunistic goals. The



univariate analysis shows a positive relationship between political turnout and transparency. This result gives some evidence of a positive answer to the question raised by James Alt and David Dreyer Lassen: Does transparency affect political outcomes such as turnout? To some extent, that the more transparent the budget reports are, the more incentives people have to vote. With respect to three variables—transparency, government fiscal balance, and electoral turnout—three clusters of countries arise: low transparency–fiscal imbalance, low transparency–small fiscal imbalance and high transparency–fiscal surplus.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism*

Falcon Giandomenico

**Che cosa attendersi, e che cosa non attendersi, dal federalismo fiscale  
in Regioni (Le)**, n.4-5 , 765-770

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism*

Bin Roberto

**Che ha di federale il "federalismo fiscale"?**  
in **Quaderni Costituzionali**, numero : 1, febbraio , 127-130

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism*

Samira Bakhshi, Mohammad Shakeri, M. Rose Olfert, Mark D. Partridge, Simon Weseen

**Do Local Residents Value Federal Transfers?: Evidence from Interprovincial Migration in Canada  
in Public Finance Review**, Volume 37, No. 3 , 235-268

A fundamental governance challenge for federal nations is benefiting from decentralization, while addressing potential negative side effects, including vertical and horizontal imbalances. Inefficient migration due to differential net fiscal benefits in subnational units is one potential negative side effect. To avoid this type of migration, federal payments to disadvantaged subnational units, a place-based policy, are often advocated. In this article, we assess federal equalization transfer payments in Canada as an example of such a policy. Equalization is appraised in terms of its marginal influence on interprovincial migration, after accounting for the persistent relative attractiveness (unattractiveness) of provinces as migration destinations/origins. We then compare equalization to an alternative policy that directly subsidizes workers. Compared to a "people-based" policy of wage subsidies, our findings suggest that at the margin, these federal transfers have virtually no impact on net migration.

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*Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism*



Tyrefors Hinnerich Björna

**Do merging local governments free ride on their counterparts when facing boundary reform?**

in *Journal of Public Economics*, Volume 93, Issue 5-6 , 721-728

The Western world exhibited a significant trend towards larger local governments in the twentieth century, which was driven to a large extent by boundary reforms. Boundary reforms can provide economic benefits, but may also give rise to costs driven by opportunistic political behavior. This study uses a Swedish compulsory reform to test for such behavior. The reform gives a local government the incentive to accumulate debt before a merger takes place, since the taxpayers in the new locality will share the cost. The strength of the incentive to free ride is determined by the population size of the initial locality relative to that of the new locality. I find an economically large and statistically significant free riding effect.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism*

Andreas Haufler, Alexander Klemm, Guttorm Schjelderup

**Economic integration and the relationship between profit and wage taxes**

in *Public Choice*, Volume 138, Numbers 3-4 , 423-446

This paper analyzes the development of the ratio of corporate taxes to wage taxes using a simple political economy model with workers and capitalists that own internationally mobile and immobile firms. Among other results, our model predicts that countries reduce their corporate tax rate, relative to the wage tax, when preferences for public goods increase, or when the share of capital employed in multinational firms is rising. We further show how an increase in the wage share changes both the relative size of tax bases and the political influence of different income groups. The predicted relationships are tested using panel data for 23 OECD countries for the period 1980 through 2004. The results of the empirical analysis support our main hypotheses.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism*

Mishra Renuka

**Effectiveness of Harmonizing VAT and Other Taxes in a Federation**

in *Indian Journal of Federal Studies*, 18th Issue, 2/2008

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism*

Ulrich Schreiber, Gregor Führich

**European group taxation-the role of exit taxes**

in *European Journal of Law and Economics*, Volume 27, Number 3 , 257-274

The European Commission's proposal to establish a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base reduces both compliance and administrative costs for European groups. The proposal would replace separate entity accounting with a



profit allocation based on formula apportionment. Since formula apportionment rests on the source principle, the group faces an incentive to invest in low tax member states. Residence-based group taxation based on separate entity accounting could be an alternative. The subsidiaries' profits and losses are attributed to the parent of the group (current inclusion), and the European group's profit is taxed at the corporate income tax rate of the parent. The parent's state of residence grants a foreign tax credit. Current inclusion prevents tax distortions regarding the location of investments, if no limitations on the foreign tax credit exist. A serious drawback of residence-based taxation is the incentive to move the group's headquarter to a low tax member state. At present, this incentive is mitigated by exit taxation. Applicable exit taxation rules, however, most likely infringe upon European law. Rules that conform to European law probably abolish unfavourable liquidity effects upon exit. In net present value terms, however, exit taxes still render it burdensome for the group to move the headquarter to another member state.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism*

**Nobile Riccardo**

**Federalismo fiscale e autonomia organizzativa: due termini in relazione necessaria**  
in *Comuni d'Italia*, n. 2

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism*

**Gambino Silvio**

**Federalismo fiscale e uguaglianza dei cittadini**  
in *Federalismi*, Anno VII, N. 7

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism*

**Pisauro Giuseppe**

**Federalismo fiscale, questione settentrionale e questione meridionale**  
in *ItalianiEuropei*, n. 1

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism*

**Olivieri Luigi**

**Federalismo fiscale: l'occasione per riorganizzare l'ordinamento locale**



in *Comuni d'Italia*, n. 2

No abstract available

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**Section A) *The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government***

*Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism*

Renna Cinzia

**Federalismo fiscale: la prospettiva del disegno di legge**

in *Comuni d'Italia*, n. 1

No abstract available

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**Section A) *The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government***

*Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism*

Kumar Pandey Sanjay, Badriotti Augusta

**Fiscal Arrangements Between National and Sub-national Governments: Perspectives from India and Italy**

in *Indian Journal of Federal Studies*, 18th Issue, 2/2008

No abstract available

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**Section A) *The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government***

*Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism*

Boex Jameson, Simatupang Renata R.

**Fiscal Decentralisation and Empowerment: Evolving Concepts and Alternative Measures**

in *Fiscal Studies*, Volume 29 Issue 4 , 435 - 465

Decentralisation reforms are among the most common and significant public sector reforms, particularly in developing and transitional countries around the world. Despite the importance of the topic to policy practitioners and academic researchers alike and the extensive empirical research on the topic, there is consensus in the literature that the measures of decentralisation that are currently used are unsatisfactory. In response, we propose an alternative measure of fiscal decentralisation based on the notion that decentralisation is more than simply the inverse of centralisation. Following Bahl (2005), we consider fiscal decentralisation as 'the empowerment of people by the [fiscal] empowerment of their local governments'. Accordingly, we develop a measure of fiscal empowerment that allows us to quantify fiscal decentralisation as the gain in empowerment due to devolution and we analyse the proposed measures of empowerment and decentralisation for a cross-section of developing, transitional and industrialised countries.

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**Section A) *The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government***

*Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism*

Azam Khan M.

**Fiscal Devolution to the Local Bodies: Issues and Challenges**

in *Indian Journal of Federal Studies*, Issue 19



No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism*

**Levaggi Rosella, Menoncin Francesco**

**Fiscal Federalism, Patient Mobility and Soft Budget Constraint in Italy**

in *Politica economica*, 3, dicembre 2008 , 367

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism*

**Noël Alain**

**Fédéralisme d'ouverture et pouvoir de dépenser au canada**

in *Revista d'Estudis Autonomics i Federals*, n.7 , 10-36

In power since January 2006, the leader of the Canadian Conservative party, Stephen Harper, promised to break with the previous governments' "domineering" style of governance and to put into practice a new type of "open federalism." Specifically, this approach involved correcting the fiscal imbalance between Ottawa and the provinces, taking measures to recognize Quebec's specificity, and limiting the federal government's recourse to an alleged spending power. This article briefly surveys the foundations of Canadian politics and the years when the Liberal party was in power, between 1993 and 2006, to assess the measures adopted by the Harper government, particularly with respect to the spending power. This power is not attributed in the constitution nor is it founded on clear jurisprudence, but Ottawa still claims and invokes it. Despite their promises, the Conservatives have failed to offer a satisfactory formula for limiting its usage. So, Canada remains driven by the centralising process that has prevailed since the start of the 1980's.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism*

**Yonghong Wu and Rebecca Hendrick**

**Horizontal and Vertical Tax Competition in Florida Local Governments**

in *Public Finance Review*, Volume 37, No. 3 , 289-311

This is an empirical exploration of tax competition among Florida local governments. We estimate a spatial lag reaction function for property tax rate of Florida municipal governments in 2000 and 2004. The level of "neighborliness" is measured as spatial distance between geographical centers of municipalities. The weight matrix excludes the municipalities locating within the same county to eliminate their common responses to higher-tier government property tax policy. By including the property tax rate levied by other local governments (counties, school districts), we find that



tax competition exists for property tax among neighboring municipalities (horizontal) as well as between municipalities and other local governments (vertical). The response of municipal governments is negative to county's property tax rate but positive to school district's property tax rate.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism*

Lovecchio Luigi

**I principi del coordinamento tributario nel disegno di legge delega sul federalismo fiscale**  
in *Comuni d'Italia*, n. 2

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism*

Covino Fabrizia

**Il criterio della standardizzazione dei costi e i meccanismi perequativi nel disegno di legge di delega per l'attuazione dell'art. 119 Cost.**  
in *Federalismi*, Anno VII, N. 7

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism*

Jorio Ettore

**Il federalismo fiscale al Senato. Due new entry: il patto di convergenza e la perequazione infrastrutturale**  
in *Federalismi*, Anno VII, N. 2

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

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Salerno Giulio Maria

**Il progetto di legge sul federalismo fiscale supera l'esame del Senato**  
in *Federalismi*, Anno VII, N. 2

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism*

Anderson Cameron D.

**Institutional Change, Economic Conditions and Confidence in Government: Evidence from Belgium**

in *Acta Politica*, Volume 44, Number 1, April , 28-49

Previous work on economic voting suggests that federal or multilevel institutions have important influences on the relationship of economic conditions and government support through blurring lines of responsibility. Building on these prior findings, the present work considers the extent to which the 1993 introduction of a formal federal constitution in Belgium might weaken economic effects on central government support. Using both aggregate objective and subjective economic indicators, results from popularity functions suggest that economic effects are weakened after the 1993 introduction of formal federal institutions in Belgium.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism*

István Ványolós

**Intergovernmental Revenue Estimation: Evidence from New York State School Districts**

in *Public Finance Review*, Volume 37, No. 3 , 312-338

This study develops a model of school budget decision making and examines the nature of state aid estimation. Revenue estimation can be divided into three distinct components: strategy-driven difference, uncertainty-triggered difference, and true error term. Underestimation of state aid revenues is the dominant budgetary behavior, but a significant number of districts end up with undesired overestimation. Overestimation is more prevalent among high aid dependent, rural, and urban districts. Institutional constraints, such as local budget vote, tend to reduce the size of state aid estimation difference. The uncertainty-triggered difference tends to increase as a response to compounded negative signals (low levels of Governor's proposal on state aid and late state budgets). Although there is evidence that state aid estimation differences ultimately end up in the fund balance, this study could not confirm that lower levels of prior year fund balances would trigger districts into a more aggressive underestimation of state aid.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism*

Dwight V. Denison, Merl M. Hackbart, Michael J. Moody

**Intrastate Competition for Debt Resources**

in *Public Finance Review*, Volume 37, No. 3 , 269-288

Limited economic resources create constraints that force trade-offs among desired objectives. Likewise, state-balanced budget requirements force policy makers to make budgetary trade-offs among competing state programs. Constrained state resources have also encouraged states to issue bonds to finance infrastructure and capital assets rather than using pay-as-you-go financing for such investments. However, the expanded use of debt financing often faces another constraint known as debt capacity. As a result, states may be required to make trade-offs among the competing demands for debt financing similar to the trade-offs they must make for operating program expenditures. The authors' empirical findings indicate that tradeoffs occur between highway project—related debt and other state debt in those states with formal restrictions on total general obligation and revenue-backed debt (umbrella debt limits). In states



without umbrella debt limits, there is no evidence of a trade-off between the highway debt and all other state debt.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism*

Posne Paul L.

**Introduction to the Mini-Symposium on the Federal Budget Process: The Persistence of Reform in Public Administration Review**, March -April 2009 - Volume 69 Issue 2 , 207-210

Paul L. Posne

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism*

Belke Ansgar, Gros Daniel

**Is a unified macroeconomic policy necessarily better for a common currency area?**  
in *European Journal of Political Economy*, Volume 25, Issue 1, March 2009 , Pages 98-101

It is widely assumed that a common currency makes it desirable to have also a common fiscal policy. However, if fiscal policy is a source of shocks, independent national fiscal policies are generally preferable because they allow risk diversification.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism*

Fraschini Angela, Franco Osculati

**L'Unione di Comuni come autorità fiscale unitaria**  
in *Amministrare*, n.1 , 129-144

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism*

Usai Stefano

**L'autonomia locale nella Costituzione**  
in *Comuni d'Italia*, n. 2

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism*

Tramontana Francesco



**L'autonomia normativa degli enti locali alla luce del titolo V della Costituzione e del disegno di legge sul federalismo fiscale**

in *Comuni d'Italia*, n. 2

No abstract available

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***Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government***

*Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism*

Jorio Ettore

**La legge delega di attuazione del federalismo fiscale**

in *Federalismi*, Anno VII - N. 8

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***Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government***

*Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism*

Sánchez Luis Pomed

**La potestad subvencional en el estado autonómico**

in *Revista d'Estudis Autonomics i Federals*, n.7 , 37-78

The exercise of legal authority over subsidies by Public Authorities has been a permanent source of jurisdictional controversies on a constitutional scale. The persistence of conflicts relating to this is better understood at times when a decrease in the number of general conflicts between the Central Government and the Autonomous Communities occurs. To take an obvious example, this is true for the VIII Legislature (2004-2008), in which the notable reduction in the total number of jurisdictional controversies formally brought before the Constitutional Court is in stark contrast with the increased number of conflicts relating to public subsidies. In recent years several pieces of new legislation have been passed, themselves not exempt from questions regarding their constitutionality, which may contribute to reducing the number of these conflicts. For this objective to be achieved, it will be necessary both for the various involved regional governments to be loyal, and for the procedural instruments that the Constitutional Court has at its disposal to be better used.

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***Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government***

*Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism*

Raymond G. Batina

**Local capital tax competition and coordinated tax reform in an overlapping generations economy**

in *Regional Science and Urban Economics*, Volume 39, Issue 4 , 472-478



We extend the classic capital tax competition model to an overlapping generations economy and study the effects of a coordinated reform where capital tax rates across all locations are increased to alleviate the policy externality. Welfare across generations is examined and several new effects are derived. Simulations calibrated to US data indicate these effects may be as large as the spending effect of the classic model. The initial old generation, however, may not be better off, and an additional transfer from the initial young to the initial old may be required for the reform to be a Pareto improvement.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism*

**Katharine Bradbury, Bo Zhao**

**Measuring Non-School Fiscal Disparities among Municipalities**

in *National Tax Journal*, 62, March

This paper develops new measures of non-school revenue capacity and environmental costs for Massachusetts cities and towns as the basis for a new municipal aid formula. On the capacity side, we account for the constraints of a tax limitation by estimating them as a function of residents' incomes, and also take account of non-property-tax revenue sources and non-municipal budget obligations. On the cost side, we quantify the effects on local non-school spending of characteristics related to environmental costs, controlling for preferences, efficiency, and non-school local revenue capacity. Our approach is potentially applicable to other states.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism*

**Blomquist Sören, Micheletto Luca**

**Nonlinear Income Taxation And Matching Grants In A Federation With Decentralized In-Kind Transfers**

in *International Economic Review*, Volume 50 Issue 2 , 543 - 575

We extend to a fiscal federalism setting the literature on redistributive in-kind transfers in the presence of nonlinear income taxation. Local governments have a cost advantage, motivating decentralization of the in-kind transfer. The cost structure varies across regions, and the central government cannot observe which region is which. We show that decentralized in-kind transfers can, in this setting, be an even more important instrument for relaxing self-selection constraints, thus, helping redistribution, than in single-government models. We characterize the optimal marginal tax rates and matching grants. The grants have a very different structure than the one derived in earlier studies.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism*

**Cavallini Cadeddu Lucia**

**Ordinamento contabile sardo e 'federalismo fiscale'**

in *Federalismi*, Anno VII - Nr. 9



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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism*

Capalbo Angelo

**Per una vera attuazione del federalismo fiscale: cosa c'è e cosa manca**

in *Comuni d'Italia*, n. 2

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism*

Tessaro Tiziano

**Responsabilità e autonomia costituzionale, organizzativa, normativa, finanziaria, tributaria degli enti locali dopo la legge sul federalismo fiscale**

in *Comuni d'Italia*, n. 2

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism*

Rubin Irene S.

**Response: Prospects for Budget Process Renewal**

in *Public Administration Review*, March -April 2009 - Volume 69 Issue 2 , 245-248

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism*

Kumar Anil

**Revisiting Indian Federalism in the Context of Economic Reforms**

in *Indian Journal of Federal Studies*, Issue 19

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism*

Vaughan Dickson

**Seat-vote curves, loyalty effects and the provincial distribution of Canadian government spending**

in *Public Choice*, Volume 139, Numbers 3-4 , 317-333



Federal government spending in the Canadian provinces for 1962–2002 is examined with emphasis on the role of seat-vote elasticities in majoritarian electoral systems. Fixed effects regressions establish that per capita federal spending in a province increases with political competition, as measured by provincial seat-vote elasticities, and with loyalty to the federal government as measured by the degree of provincial support for the federal government. However, too much loyalty can be counter-productive because very loyal provinces are uncompetitive with low seat-vote elasticities.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism*

Weingast Barry R.

**Second generation fiscal federalism: The implications of fiscal incentives**

in **Journal of Urban Economics**, Volume 65, Issue 3 , 279-293

First generation fiscal federalism (FGFF) studies the performance of decentralized systems under the assumption of benevolent social planners. Second generation fiscal federalism (SGFF) studies performance based on the fiscal and political incentives facing subnational officials. The paper focuses on three aspects of SGFF. First, it considers the design of intergovernmental transfers. While FGFF emphasizes correcting vertical and horizontal equity, SGFF emphasizes the importance of fiscal incentives for producing local economic prosperity. SGFF extends FGFF approaches by showing how non-linear transfer systems can produce both equalization and high marginal fiscal incentives to produce local economic growth. Second, the paper raises the fiscal incentive approach, showing how different tax systems produce different fiscal incentives for political officials to choose policies. Third, the paper discusses the interaction of democracy and fiscal federalism.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism*

Lars P. Feld, Emmanuelle Reulier

**Strategic Tax Competition in Switzerland: Evidence from a Panel of the Swiss Cantons**

in **German Economic Review**, Volume 10 Issue 1 , 91 - 114

Tax competition is discussed as a source of inefficiency in international taxation and in fiscal federalism. Two preconditions for the existence of such effects of tax competition are that mobile factors locate or reside in jurisdictions with –ceteris paribus– lower tax rates, and that taxes are actually set strategically in order to attract mobile production factors. It is well known from studies about Swiss cantonal and local income tax competition that Swiss taxpayers reside where income taxes are low. In this paper, empirical results on strategic tax setting by cantonal governments are presented for a panel of the Swiss cantons from 1984 to 1999. Completing the evidence on Swiss tax competition, income tax rates in cantons are the lower, the lower the tax rates of their neighbors.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism*

Chauhan Pradeep S.

**Strengthening India's Federal System through Fiscal Reforms**

in **Indian Journal of Federal Studies**, Issue 19



No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism*

**Meyers Roy T.**

**The "Ball of Confusion" in Federal Budgeting: A Shadow Agenda for Deliberative Reform of the Budget Process in Public Administration Review**, March -April 2009 - Volume 69 Issue 2 , 211-223

The budget process is seriously flawed, as Irene Rubin suggests, but there is little prospect for its effective reform. Current economic and political conditions could open the window for reform, but the excessive partisanship that helped create these conditions also has reduced the pool of institutionalists who could lead reforms. More important is confusion about which reforms might be most effective. Most proposed reforms would create more rules, but they will not work unless politicians commit to meeting the goals such rules are intended to support. Those commitments could be produced by deliberation over critical issues that have been neglected in recent discussions of budget process reform: how the process could support macroeconomic policy making, how improved budget concepts could accurately measure finances and aid in dealing with upcoming policy challenges, how reorganization could enable intelligent priority setting, and how the process could be better aligned with the constitutional sharing of powers and the electoral system.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism*

**Frey Rainer**

**The design of an asymmetric currency union with shock persistence and spillovers: Short-term versus medium-term in European Journal of Political Economy**, Volume 25, Issue 1, March 2009 , 85-97

We consider a central bank council made up of a central bank board that addresses aggregates of the currency area and a group of national central bank governors that are assumed to focus on their home economies. Relatively small member countries favour a situation where the group of national central bank governors has high voting shares, whereas large countries prefer decisions to be taken by the central bank board. With respect to output persistence, spillover effects also lessen the disadvantages of decisions taken by a central bank board for a relatively small country. Thus, international linkages reduce the significance of the design of the central bank council in a currency union. Furthermore, monetary policy decided by a short-term domestically-orientated governor of a small country may negatively affect the future welfare of the country.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism*

**Tanzi Vito**

**The future of fiscal federalism and the need for global government: A reply to Roland Vaubel in European Journal of Political Economy**, Volume 25, Issue 1, March 2009 , Pages 137-139



No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism*

Vaubel Roland

**The future of fiscal federalism and the need for global government: A response to Vito Tanzi**

in **European Journal of Political Economy**, Volume 25, Issue 1, March 2009 , Pages 133-136

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism*

Forni Lorenzo, Monteforte Libero, Sessa Luca

**The general equilibrium effects of fiscal policy: Estimates for the Euro area**

in **Journal of Public Economics**, Volume 93, Issue 3-4 , 559-585

This paper describes a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model featuring a fraction of non-Ricardian agents in order to estimate the effects of fiscal policy in the Euro area. The model takes into account distortionary taxation on labor and capital income and on consumption, while expenditures are broken down into purchases of goods and services, compensation of public employees and transfers to households. A newly computed quarterly data set of fiscal variables is used. Our results point to the prevalence of mild Keynesian effects of public expenditures. In particular, although innovations in fiscal policy variables tend to be rather persistent, government purchases of goods and services and compensations for public employees have small and short-lived expansionary effects on private consumption, while innovations in transfers to households show a slightly more sizeable and lasting effect. The effects are more significant on the revenue side: decreases in labor income and consumption tax rates have sizeable effects on consumption and output, while a reduction in capital income tax favors investment and output in the medium run. Finally our estimates suggest that fiscal policy variables contribute little to the cyclical variability of the main macro variables.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism*

Trujillo Salazar Lucía Paola

**Transferencias intergubernamentales y gasto local: repensando la descentralización fiscal desde una revisión de la literatura**

in **Gestion y politica publica**, Vol.17, n 2 , 451-486

There are different ways to establish a tax system from harmonization to tax competition between jurisdictions, as well as various designing alternatives for a system of grants and local spending autonomy. This article seeks to clarify some ideas, principles and recommendations about the design of the vertical and horizontal structures of governments. It develops a theoretical framework that, from economy, can provide critical judgments leading to sketch out some guidelines to arrive at that goal.



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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism*

**Martín y Pérez de Nanclares José, Corres Mariola Urrea**

**Unión europea y financiación autonómica: la jurisprudencia del tribunal de justicia sobre los sistemas tributarios de los entes territoriales subestatales**

in *Revista d'Estudis Autonomics i Federals*, n.8 , 37-84

The matter of financing sub-State territorial entities is a relevant matter in which Spain is becoming subject to a controversial political and juridical debate. We find ourselves faced with an internal matter and, due to this, each Member State is charged with regulating its articulation according to its national constitutional framework. However, that freedom of internal regulation must be adapted to the Community juridical framework in all cases and not clash with any Community regulations, most particularly, with those related to the juridical regime on State subsidies. Thus, the Courts of Justice of the European Union have successively prepared

jurisprudence that began with the Azores case (2006) and was confirmed in the UGT-Rioja case (2008), by virtue of which certain criteria are determined that must coincide in order that a tax subsystem in the autonomous regions – such as that available in the Basque Country and Navarra – may cohabit harmoniously with the national tax system without incurring breach of the juridical regime of State aid foreseen in the Constituting Treaties. Such criteria may be considered as a two-fold system: on one hand, the existence of an asymmetry of competences recognized in constitutional terms between the sub-State territory and the national territory in which it is integrated and, on the other hand, for the sub-State entity to have sufficient autonomy, both in institutional terms, as well as in procedural and economic ones.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism*

**Salerno Giulio M.**

**Verso l'approvazione finale della legge delega per l'attuazione del federalismo fiscale**

in *Federalismi*, Anno VII, N. 7

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism*

**White Joseph**

**What Not to Ask of Budget Processes: Lessons from George W. Bush's Years**



in **Public Administration Review**, March -April 2009 - Volume 69 Issue 2 , 224-232

Budget reform requires goals that are both good public policy and achievable. The core purpose of budgeting is to consider and relate details and totals. Common demands for reform are dubious because they slight consideration of details. For this reason, too strict a definition of "balance" would be bad policy; the demand for balance over many decades is neither good policy nor realistic; and multiyear discretionary spending caps can be both bad policy and impractical. Concern about passing annual budget resolutions ignores the fact that the major reason for annual totals is no longer endorsed by policy makers and economists. Scorekeeping should be honest and accurate and often can be improved, but possible achievements are limited. Budget reforms will not make government accountable if the governing coalition is united in seeking to avoid that, and if neither the public nor elites demand it.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism*

Rincke Johannes

**Yardstick competition and public sector innovation**

in **International Tax and Public Finance**, Volume 16, Number 3 , 337-361

The paper addresses the incentives of the public sector to implement new technologies in public service provision. The focus is on the role of local governments under decentralization. Exploiting variation in the level of innovation in a large sample of US school districts, the impact of yardstick competition on the choice of public sector technologies is identified. It is shown that the impact of other districts' innovation activity on a district's innovation score is much stronger in communities where incumbents face a high risk of being elected out of office. This finding suggests that under decentralization, yardstick competition is an important force shaping the decisions of local governments to adopt new technologies.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 8. The Central Bank(s)*

Pierre L. Siklos, Martin T. Bohl

**Asset Prices as Indicators of Euro Area Monetary Policy: An Empirical Assessment of Their Role in a Taylor Rule**

in **Open Economies Review**, Volume 20, Number 1 , 39-59

his paper estimates forward-looking and forecast-based Taylor rules for France, Germany, Italy, and the euro area. Performing extensive tests for over-identifying restrictions and instrument relevance, we find that asset prices can be highly relevant as instruments in policy rules. While asset prices improve Taylor rule estimates, different assets prove most relevant across countries and this result could be seen as complicating the tasks of the European Central Bank. Encompassing tests show that forecast-based outperform forward-looking Taylor rules. A policy implication is that central banks ought to release their own forecasts and the basis upon which they are generated.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 8. The Central Bank(s)*



Ulrike Neyer

**Interest on Reserves and the Flexibility of Monetary Policy in the Euro Area**  
in *Scandinavian Journal of Economics*, Volume 111 Issue 2 , 417 - 438

This paper shows that remunerating required reserves can increase the flexibility of monetary policy. The remuneration at the current policy rate implies constant net marginal interest costs of holding required reserves. This allows the central bank to change the policy rate also within a reserve maintenance period without inducing a problematic reserve shifting on behalf of the banks. In the euro area, required reserves are remunerated at an average rate. Therefore, the way in which reserves are remunerated has to be changed in order to make use of the advantage of a higher flexibility of monetary policy.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 8. The Central Bank(s)*

Volker Hahn

**Transparency of Central Bank Preferences**

in *German Economic Review*, Volume 10 Issue 1 , 32 - 49

In this paper, we examine whether the transparency of the central bank's preferences is desirable. We make two major points. First, in the literature on preference transparency variance-reduction frameworks are often adopted. As a consequence a change in the degree of transparency affects the magnitude of information asymmetries, but at the same time it implies a rather arbitrary effect on the distribution of preferences. We present a clean framework without this problem. Second, using a very general specification of shocks to the central bank's preferences, we show that society prefers transparency if it sufficiently values the employment target, whereas it prefers opacity if it estimates inflation as sufficiently important.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 8. The Central Bank(s)*

Patrick J. Raines, Heather R. Richardson, Charles G. Leathers

**Where Bernanke is taking the Federal Reserve: a Post Keynesian and institutionalist perspective**

in *Journal of Population Economics*, Volume 22, Number 3 , 367 - 382

We develop a perspective on where Bernanke is taking the Federal Reserve by drawing from Paul Davidson's Post Keynesian analyses of the current financial crisis and the Federal Reserve as an effective market maker and Thorstein Veblen's perception that the Federal Reserve was supporting credit-inflation by large investment banks in the 1920s. New Deal legislation restricted the ability of investment banks to create credit-inflation and left the Federal Reserve with only an indirect relationship with investment banks. Financial deregulation and financial derivatives resulted in a new and larger form of credit-inflation by underwriter-bank conglomerates. Bernanke's responses to the inevitable financial crisis are bringing the Federal Reserve into an even closer relationship with underwriter-bank conglomerates than Veblen envisioned.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**



*Subsection 8. The Central Bank(s)*

Magnus Andersson , Lars Jul Overby, Szabolcs Sebestyén

**Which News Moves the Euro Area Bond Market?**

in **German Economic Review**, Volume 10 Issue 1 , 1 - 31

This paper explores a long dataset (1999–2005) of intraday prices on German long-term bond futures and examines market responses to major macroeconomic announcements and ECB monetary policy releases. German bond markets tend to react more strongly to the surprise component in US macro releases compared with aggregated and national euro area and UK releases, and the strength of those reactions to US releases has increased over the period considered. We also document that the numbers of German unemployed workers consistently have been known to investors before official releases.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 9. Local government(s)*

S. Jitpiromrsi; D. McCargo

**A Ministry for the South: New Governance Proposals for Thailand's Southern Region**

in **Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs**, Volume 30, Number 3, December , 403-428

The ongoing conflict in Thailand's Muslim-majority southern border provinces has claimed more than three thousand lives since 2004. To date, successive governments have sought to control the violence mainly through the use of enhanced security measures, and by arresting and prosecuting insurgent suspects. Yet despite some limited successes in reducing the number of violent incidents, the underlying causes of the conflict have not been addressed. The Thai state suffers from a legitimacy deficit in the region, and many Malay-Muslims would like greater control over their own affairs. The insurgency is ultimately fuelled by political frustrations. Yet all suggestions that the region might be granted some form of special administrative status have been consistently rejected by the authorities. This article examines proposals in a recent report by a team of Thai academics based in the region, who have advocated the creation of a new ministry to oversee the administration of the Deep South. These controversial proposals offer a compromise political solution, one which recognizes the distinctive nature of the region while preserving the core principle of a unitary Thai state.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 9. Local government(s)*

Brian Dollery , Nigel Graves

**An analysis of budget compliance measurement in South African local government best-practice financial management technical assistance programs, 2001 - 2003**

in **Public Administration and Development**, Volume 29 Issue 2 , 101 - 116

South Africa's local government financial management best-practice technical assistance program (known as MFMTAP) was to reform municipal financial management; achieve credible, realistic budgets and prevent financial failure. We consider whether a budget compliance procedure, developed by National Treasury (NT) to measure funding requirements compliance with the Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA) focusing on realistic revenue budgeting, improves our understanding of technical assistance effectiveness. We assess a metropolitan municipality's compliance



before, during and after advisory assistance. The compliance procedure was robust. Potential exists for wider application to assess best-practice technical assistance (BPTA) program financial reform effectiveness. The findings from this single, important sample suggest that MFMA funding requirements are not being sustained 4 years after MFMTAP commencement, attributable to either BPTA performance or termination effects. We conclude that MFMA financial performance can be assessed by the procedure, from analysis of the metropolitan municipality performance assisted by a BPTA advisor for approximately 3 years. The analysis raises questions about BPTA program reform sustainability, but we add the caveat that conclusions cannot be drawn from a single sample metropolitan municipality, but a larger sample need be used for further methodology development to confirm its efficacy.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 9. Local government(s)*

**D. McDuie**

**Between National Security and Ethno-nationalism**

in **Journal of South Asian Development (The)**, Volume 3, No. 2, October , 185-210

Although scholarly interest in Northeast India is growing there is still relatively little discussion of the high levels of poverty in the region and the failures of development. When mentioned they are viewed instrumentally as causes and/or symptoms of ongoing insurgency and counter-insurgency. However this does not fully explain how a region that receives an extraordinarily large amount of development funding from the Indian Government, has its own development ministry, has some of India's highest human development indicators, and has an array of institutional layers assuring autonomy and decentralisation has poverty levels well above the Indian national average. Using the state of Meghalaya, this article examines the factors underpinning the development agenda in the region and the political space for contesting this agenda. The argument presented is three-fold; the regional development agenda is underpinned by national security imperatives which characterise relations between the various levels of governance ensuring minimal deviation, contestation of the development agenda is limited by national security from above and ethno-nationalism from below narrowing the political space for negotiating development alternatives, and this situation is the result of material and ideational factors embedding development in the politics of state-formation and ethnic identity.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 9. Local government(s)*

**Ettore Rotelli**

**Comuni capaci di politiche pubbliche, cioè autonomia**

in **Amministrare**, numero 1 , 145-164

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 9. Local government(s)*

**Rotelli Ettore**

**Comuni capaci di politiche pubbliche, cioè autonomia**



in *Amministrare*, n.1 , 145-164

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 9.Local government(s)*

Bevir Mark, Richards David

**Decentring Policy Networks: Lessons And Prospects**

in *Public Administration*, March - Volume 87 Issue 1 , 132-141

This Conclusion reflects on the contributions the various articles in this special issue have made to decentred studies of policy networks. It concentrates on three areas: the role of meaning in action in shaping networks; new research agendas that have been potentially opened; and key theoretical debates. In considering the theoretical debates, this Conclusion considers various criticisms of the decentred approach to exploring policy networks, before offering some suggestions for those who want to undertake decentred studies of policy networks.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 9.Local government(s)*

Zafra-Gómez José Luis ,López-Hernández Antonio Manuel , Hernández-Bastida Agustín

**Evaluating financial performance in local government: maximizing the benchmarking value**

in *International Review of Administrative Sciences* , March 2009, Volume 75, No. 1 , 151-167

One of the main problems in evaluating financial performance arises in carrying out comparisons between municipalities, as no account is taken of the impact of certain factors of the social and economic environment on the indicators in question. In this study, the concept of financial condition is applied, revealing the influence of such factors, and a methodology is proposed to minimize their effects on the results of the evaluation. The results of applying these to a sample of municipalities in Spain reveal that the model is useful for reinforcing the value of benchmarking between municipalities with similar characteristics.

Points for practitioners The use of indicators for evaluating financial performance has advanced considerably in recent years. However, many criticisms have been made by public sector managers concerning the application of such indicators. One of these is that, in many cases, the values measured by different authorities are not comparable, as the services they provide differ significantly. If local authorities were grouped according to the social and economic factors influencing their provision of public services, the evaluations made would be much more effective, facilitating decision-making by supervisory bodies and by municipal managers.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 9.Local government(s)*



Durose Catherine

**Front-Line Workers And 'Local Knowledge': Neighbourhood Stories In Contemporary Uk Local Governance in Public Administration**, March - Volume 87 Issue 1 , 35-49

One of the aims of this special issue is to 'decentre' a key facet of governance, namely networks. This article considers in particular the concept 'networked community governance', a key part of New Labour's reforms in local governance and, in particular, around neighbourhood-based working. This article draws on interpretive methods and analysis to explore the everyday work of front-line workers in contemporary local governance through their own stories. The article is based on empirical work in the neighbourhood management system developed in Salford, a local authority in the North West of England. Key to facilitating 'networked community governance', is front-line workers' own 'local knowledge', understood as the mundane, yet expert, understanding front-line workers develop from their own contextual experiences. The article explores the difficulties that front-line workers perceive themselves to face in their everyday work and how they use their 'local knowledge' to develop responsive, entrepreneurial strategies.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 9. Local government(s)*

Hsu S. Philip

**In Search of Public Accountability: The 'Wenling Model' in China**

**in Australian Journal of Public Administration**, Volume 68, Supplement 1 , S40-S50

This article specifically attempts to answer two interrelated research questions: firstly, how do democratic consultation assemblies (DCAs) heighten public accountability in the current institutional setting of China's sub-provincial localities?; and secondly, what can be learned, from the Chinese case, in relation to achieving public accountability elsewhere? To address the first question, this article will explore two particular variations of the DCAs, and will focus on the interplay between the managerial and democratic accountability orientations to address the second question.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 9. Local government(s)*

Feiock Richard C. , Steinacker Annette, Park Hyung Jun

**Institutional Collective Action and Economic Development Joint Ventures**

**in Public Administration Review**, March -April 2009 - Volume 69 Issue 2 , 256-270

There is high interest in economic development efforts involving cooperation or collaboration among metropolitan jurisdictions. To determine why some local governments engage in cooperative agreements while others do not, this paper investigates transaction obstacles, including bargaining, information, agency, enforcement, and division problems. The authors then advance an institutional collective action explanation for intergovernmental cooperation, focusing on the conditions under which these transactions costs are low. This work anticipates that the costs associated with interlocal cooperation are influenced by the demographic characteristics of communities, local political institutions, and the nature of regional government networks. Empirical analysis based on a national survey of local development officials provides support for several predictions from this model and identifies policy variables that, in turn, increase the prospects for cooperation, specifically through the development of informal policy networks.



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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 9. Local government(s)*

Thomas Olivier

**Intercommunalité française et hausse de la pression fiscale : effet collatéral ou stratégie**

in *Revue française d'administration publique*, n. 127

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 9. Local government(s)*

Boeuf Jean-Luc

**L'"intercommunalité" francese**

in *Amministrare*, n.1 , 119-128

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 9. Local government(s)*

Boeuf Jean-Luc

**L'"intercommunalité" francese**

in *Amministrare*, numero 1 , 119-128

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 9. Local government(s)*

Angela Fraschini, Franco Osculati

**L'Unione di Comuni come autorità fiscale unitaria**

in *Amministrare*, numero 1 , 129-144

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 9. Local government(s)*

Rosi Juri

**La riforma delle Comunità montane**

in *Federalismi*, Anno VII - N. 8



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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 9. Local government(s)*

Aucante Yohann

**Les défis de l'universalité : le gouvernement local de la protection sociale en Suède et en Norvège**  
in *Critique Internationale*, N°43 - Avril / Juin

The Challenges of Universality: The Local Government of Welfare in Sweden and Norway

This article explores a relatively neglected yet very important dimension of the social-democratic regimes of Northern Europe and their recent transformations. While being often cast as examples of homogeneous welfare state systems, these regimes have actually relied on powerful local governments that have been responsible for the managing most social services. Since the late 1980s, there has been a great deal of experimentation aiming at granting more autonomy to the local levels and it has opened the door for increasing differentiation of social policies in countries otherwise accustomed to a universalist and egalitarian framework. From the cases of Sweden and Norway, the article discusses the transformation of local "welfare states" and shows that both countries responded differently to a set of common stimuli. In fact, if Sweden carried on and intensified local experimentation, mixing public and private solutions under various guises, Norway has seen a return of the state and further decentralization has been postponed. This research documents the changes that have taken place and stresses the importance of studying the complex modes of territorial social regulation.

Cet article explore une dimension relativement négligée et pourtant essentielle des transformations des régimes sociaux-démocrates en Europe du Nord. Toujours appréhendés sous l'angle des politiques économiques et sociales de l'État, ces régimes s'appuient en réalité sur des formes de gouvernement local particulièrement ancrées et qui sont responsables de la gestion des services sociaux. Or, depuis la fin des années 1980, de nombreuses expérimentations ont été menées qui visaient à conférer plus d'autonomie à ces niveaux locaux et qui ont ouvert la porte à une certaine diversification des politiques sociales dans des pays habitués à un cadre universaliste particulièrement homogène et égalitaire. A partir des exemples suédois et norvégien, l'article présente et discute les modalités de ces évolutions en montrant comment les deux pays ont emprunté des trajectoires passablement différentes à partir d'un socle commun. En effet, là où la Suède a poursuivi et intensifié les expérimentations locales, le recours à des opérateurs privés, à des quasi-marchés, le système norvégien a été « repris » en main par l'État et la décentralisation a connu une évolution en demi-teinte. En esquissant un bilan de ces changements, l'article insiste sur la nécessité d'étudier plus avant ces formes complexes de régulation territoriale du social.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 9. Local government(s)*

Fenwick John; McMillan Janice, Elcock Howard

**Local Government and the Problem of English Governance**  
in *Local Government Studies*, Vol.35, issue 1 , 5 – 20

The paper is concerned with the problematic nature of English governance. The discussion begins with reference to the reluctance to engage in debates about English national governance. It then poses a series of questions about the



balance to be drawn between localism and regionalism and the fragmentation of local governance in England (in contrast to the rest of the UK), suggesting that local government might provide a solution to the problem through the building of effective patterns of governance from the bottom up. This is contrasted with the various proposed formal and institutional 'solutions' to English governance, which are bound to fail. The discussion goes on to consider the problem of the English regions and concludes that the political conditions do not exist for the English regions to be the primary sites for the building of new English governance. After a review of ways in which governance can be built, attention reverts to the local level where it is suggested that the current reorganisation of English local government suggests ways in which the foundations of English governance can be developed locally.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 9. Local government(s)*

**Maurel Marie-Claude**

**L'action publique «par le bas»: l'approche LEADER en Europe centrale**

in *Revue d'études comparatives Est-Ouest*, vol. 39, n. 4, Decembre , 33-61

A new local development model – LEADER (Links between Actions for the Development of the Rural Economy) – based on a bottom-up approach has introduced a completely new process in the formerly Communist countries of central Europe. The underway “Europeanization” process is a catalyst for transmitting this model of endogenous development, which seeks to develop the specific advantages of local areas and tap the initiatives conveyed by decentralized actors. The concept of “territorial governance” is part of this new approach to public interventions in a multilevel system. At the juncture between EU policies, national programs and bottom-up initiatives from local actors (elected officials, project leaders, etc.), an empirical approach must detect and interpret the new territorial structures involved in the changing governance of these areas. How is the model being transferred? With what effects? Empirical data are used to analyze the context wherein actors receive this EU model of local development and to assess its initial effects in terms of learning capacity.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 9. Local government(s)*

**Yetano Ana**

**Managing Performance at Local Government Level: The Cases of the City of Brisbane and the City of Melbourne**

in *Australian Journal of Public Administration*, Volume 68, Number 2 , 167-181

Local governments have been involved in a continuous reform process during recent decades. In many cases, this process has focused on the introduction of performance measurement and management. Reforms have evolved from the mere use of indicators to integrated management systems. In this article, the Balanced Scorecard, a system designed to answer the need for integrated management systems, is used as the framework to analyse how local governments have managed the use of performance management systems. The demands for better public performance, for greater customer focus, for enhanced decision-making and for increased responsiveness have an important role in the design of performance management systems. In addition, a perceived crisis in the area of management can act as catalyst for the implementation.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 9. Local government(s)*

Avellaneda Claudia N.

**Mayoral Quality and Local Public Finance**

in **Public Administration Review**, May/June 2009 - Volume 69 Issue 3 , 469-486

In most local developing settings, the political leader and the municipal manager are embodied in the same figure, the directly elected mayor. This research explores the impact of mayoral quality on local public finances in a developing country. Mayoral quality is operationalized as educational background and job-related expertise to analyze its impact on two local financial indicators: property tax collection and social spending per capita. The mayoral quality thesis is tested across 40 Colombian municipalities over five years (2000–2004). After considering other political, economic, and external influences, the findings reveal that mayoral quality is associated with greater property tax collection and more social spending per capita. This positive influence, however, decreases under external constraints—such as presence of illegal armed groups. This study demonstrates how much influence the mayor can have when circumstances permit. The findings point to the significance of electing qualified mayors, as decentralization may not directly improve subnational finance. Instead, through decentralization, qualified mayors contribute to improved local public finance.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 9. Local government(s)*

Schaap Linze, Daemen Harry; Ringeling Arthur

**Mayors in Seven European Countries: Part I. Selection Procedures and Statutory Position**

in **Local Government Studies**, Vol.35, issue 1 , 95 - 108

Western European countries differ according to the ways in which they organise local government, not least in the manner in which mayors are selected and in the mayors' statutory positions and responsibilities. The question is to what extent is mayoral performance affected by selection procedures and the statutory position of the mayoral office? In two exploratory articles, the results of a number of comparative empirical studies will be presented. In this first part the focus will be on the theoretical and methodological framework of the study, and on the variations in selection procedures and statutory positions. In the second part (to be published in the next issue of this journal) we will relate these findings to evidence on mayoral performance.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 9. Local government(s)*

Schaap Linze; Daemen Harry; Ringeling Arthur

**Mayors in Seven European Countries: Part II - Performance and Analysis**

in **Local Government Studies**, Vol.35, issue 2 , 235 - 249

Western European countries differ according to the ways in which they organise the selection and the statutory positions of mayors, as was described in Part I of this study. The question to be answered now is: 'To what extent is mayoral performance affected by selection procedures and the statutory position of the mayoral office?'. It will become clear that there are huge differences in mayoral performance. Several factors influencing that performance will be identified. The most important conclusion is that mayoral selection procedures and statutory positions do affect mayoral performance, although not as much as expected. Other factors are at stake.



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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 9. Local government(s)*

Percoco Marc, Giove Michele

**Multilevel governance at work: evidence from Structural Funds management in Lombardia, Italy**  
**in Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy**, Volume 27, Issue 3, June , 381-398

Multilevel governance is widely recognized as one of the striking features of local development policy implementation and management. In Lombardia, Italy, this framework has been applied in the context of European Regional Development Fund actions in order to increase the number and quality of projects. As a consequence the governance of regional development policies now has new meta-actors: the Programmi Integrati per lo Sviluppo Locale (PISL) aimed at promoting and soliciting projects to be submitted for funding by the regional government. In this paper we evaluate the impact of this new governance structure by estimating a discrete choice model over a sample of more than 6000 projects submitted for funding to the Regional Government of Lombardia. We find that projects within the context of the PISL have a slightly greater probability of being funded, although we cannot exclude the existence of adverse selection because we also find that those projects are, on average, of lower quality from a purely formal viewpoint. We finally argue in favour of this new governance structure, even though we identify some critical points to be addressed in the next planning period in order to enhance the effectiveness of development policies.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 9. Local government(s)*

Gustavsson Eva, Elander Ingemar, Lundmark Mats

**Multilevel governance, networking cities, and the geography of climate-change mitigation: two Swedish examples**

**in Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy**, Volume 27, Issue 1, February , 59-74

What geographical and institutional conditions are important for initiating and sustaining climate-change mitigation at the local level? Taking this question as a point of departure, we analyze local climate mitigation as a case of multilevel network governance. This is illustrated by the case of two Swedish cities, which are both involved in city networking in favour of climate-change mitigation. Different business structures and other local conditions in significant ways influence both the level of ambition and the climate-policy strategies of the two cities. The sheer size and intensity of the networking activities clearly illustrate the fact that cities are increasingly becoming arenas of globalization, rather than passive victims of global forces, thus confirming the call for a multilevel network-governance approach in policy and politics as well as in research.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 9. Local government(s)*

Gains Francesca

**Narratives And Dilemmas Of Local Bureaucratic Elites: Whitehall At The Coal Face?**

**in Public Administration**, March - Volume 87 Issue 1 , 50-64

The worlds of local bureaucrats are under researched and under theorized compared with those of civil servants in core



executives. Yet local bureaucratic elites, sitting as they do between central states and localities, are key actors in governance networks. In England, the role and responsibilities of local bureaucratic elites has been transformed since the days of professionalized officers heading departmental structures reporting to committees, firstly by NPM and politicization in the 1980s and 1990s and, more recently, by political management reform introducing a separation of powers. Drawing on interviews in 15 local authorities, this paper examines the changing narratives and dilemmas of local government elites. In particular it explores, but argues against, early expectations that the creation of an elected executive, with considerable devolution of decision-making responsibilities to individual cabinet member councillors, has meant a move closer to the logics of the 'Whitehall mandarin' tradition by local government chief officers.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 9. Local government(s)*

Angeon Valerie, Lardon Sylvie

**Participation and governance in territorial development projects: the 'territory game' as a local project leadership system**

in *International Journal of Sustainable Development*, Volume 11, Issue 2-3-4 , 262-281

This article deals with methods and tools dedicated to territorial development respecting participatory principles. This process enables the emergence of cross-cutting global approaches and involves new forms of decision-making (consultation, participatory management, collective development of territorial projects, cooperation, etc.). We analyse a concrete example that we have developed: the 'territory game'. It is a collective and cognitive instrument that promotes local coordination. This tool allows stakeholders to express and debate their individual and collective representations of the territory they belong to. The 'territorial game' is then implemented in order to facilitate a general agreement fostering the emergence of territorial projects. It can thus be considered as a relevant leadership tool for local, participatory governance.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 9. Local government(s)*

Ceriani Alberto (a cura di)

**Piccoli Comuni in Lombardia**

in *Amministrare*, n.1 , 35-118

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 9. Local government(s)*

Edge Sara, McAllister Mary Louise

**Place-based local governance and sustainable communities: lessons from Canadian biosphere reserves**

in *Journal of Environmental Planning and Management*, Volume 52, Issue 3, April , 279-295

The quest for sustainable communities might be fostered by a new 'place-based' governing approach that engages civil society and other actors in local decision-making processes. In Canada, lessons can be learned from the establishment



and maintenance of biosphere reserves by networks of local communities of interests and other organisations. Biosphere reserves are created to promote conservation, biodiversity and sustainable livelihoods. Municipal and public participation in these reserves can be encouraged, promoting a local sense of place as well as sustainable community and regional development. An examination of two Canadian biosphere reserves, Riding Mountain and Long Point, illustrates how local governments and these reserves might assist each other in their mutual goals of long-term sustainability while offering a worthwhile model of local collaborative, place-based governance.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 9. Local government(s)*

**Kuhlmann Sabine**

**Reforming Local Government in Germany: Institutional Changes and Performance Impacts in German Politics**, Volume 18, Issue 2, June , 226-245

The article analyses trajectories and impacts of local government reforms in Germany. It scrutinises four major approaches of reform that have affected the local authorities since the beginning of the 1990s: decentralisation, privatisation, administrative reforms ('New Steering Model') and the direct election of mayors. The objective of the article is to encompass the multifaceted elements and effects of local government reform in Germany. Firstly, the author examines the institutional changes that have occurred in the local councils. Secondly, the broader effects and impacts of the institutional transformations are dealt with, analysing how the latter has enhanced performance, steering capacity and political accountability. Finally, the author evaluates the extent to which the reforms have put their mark on the inherited and historic tradition of the German local government system.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 9. Local government(s)*

**Dollery Brian, Akimov Alexandr, Byrnes Joel**

**Shared Services in Australian Local Government: Rationale, Alternative Models and Empirical Evidence in Australian Journal of Public Administration**, Volume 68, Number 2 , 208-219

Widespread enthusiasm amongst Australian policy elites for structural reform in local government has evaporated as disappointing outcomes of council amalgamation programs became evident. As a consequence, emphasis has now shifted towards shared serviced models as a means of enhancing service provision and reducing costs. However, a disturbing feature of the current debate on shared services has been the absence of a well-articulated economic and political rationale for this form of service delivery, a lack of analysis of alternative models of shared service provision and a neglect of available empirical evidence. This article seeks to remedy these deficiencies by considering the analytical foundations of shared local services, conducting a review of alternative models as vehicles for shared services and evaluating available empirical evidence.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 9. Local government(s)*

**Rhys Andrews, George A. Boyne**

**Size, Structure and Administrative Overheads: An Empirical Analysis of English Local Authorities in Urban Studies**, Volume 46, No. 4 , 739-759



The relationship is analysed between size, local government structure and administrative overheads in English local authorities. Size and structure effects are tested while controlling for a range of other variables, including the relative prosperity of the local population and the diversity of their service needs. The empirical results show that population size consistently has a linear negative effect: central administrative costs are lower in larger local authorities. The results also show that, controlling for size, administrative overheads are higher for councils in the lower tier of the existing two-tier system. The analysis provides support for arguments that economies of scale might be achieved by amalgamating smaller councils into larger units and by combining counties and districts into unitary authorities.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 9. Local government(s)*

Subramanya T. R.

**The Application of International Law in Municipal Systems: An Assessment of the Impact of Universal Declaration of Human Rights on National and International Courts**

in **Indian Journal of International Law**, volume 48, issue 3 , 385-406

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 9. Local government(s)*

Reiter Bernd

**The Limits of Popular Participation in Salvador, Brazil**

in **Journal of Developing Societies**, Volume 24, No. 3 , 337-354

This article focuses on the changing nature of state-society interactions in the state of Bahia, Brazil and on the factors that condition democratic participation. During several research trips, conducted between 2001 and 2006, I collected data on participatory budgeting and on participatory urban planning in the city of Salvador. I was therefore able to compare two thematic sites where local states interacted with society in general, and with civil society specifically. In both cases, I found a very wide gap between the de jure mandate of citizen participation and the de facto state of affairs. The examined empirical cases point to some of the conditionalities of democratic participation at the local level. The existence of this gap between law and reality can, in part, be explained by the continued importance of 'Carlismo' as a way of doing local politics in Bahia and therefore, to the persistence of local political regimes persisting despite changes in political leadership.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 9. Local government(s)*

Bolgherini Silvia

**Unioni di Comuni: tre casi in Emilia-Romagna**

in **Amministrare**, numero 1 , 5-34

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 9. Local government(s)*

**Bolgherini Silvia**

**Unioni di Comuni: tre casi in Emilia-Romagna**

in *Amministrare*, n.1 , 5-34

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 9. Local government(s)*

**Burns Nancy, Laura Evans, Gamm Geraldand, McConnaughy Corrine**

**Urban Politics in the State Arena**

in *Studies in American Political Development* , Volume 23 - Issue 01 , 1-22

We seek to explain how states govern big cities. Political scientists' accounts of urban politics either fail to treat the state systematically or place state hostility at the center of such an account. Accounts by historians, by contrast, offer tools political scientists can use to theorize urban politics in the state arena. We use those tools, and we find that cities can manage the legislative process. This power starts with bill introduction and carries through to the vote on the floor. This ability results from a central feature of American state politics: on bills about big cities, state legislators now and in the past find their primary voting cues in the unity of local delegations. The city delegation, then, has tremendous power to manage the state's involvement in city affairs. In many respects, ours is an account of a special kind of divided government, with two institutional arenas where urban government is carried out.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization*

**'Making democracy a reality'? The politics of decentralisation and the limits to local democracy in Ghana**

in *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, Volume 27, Issue 1, January , 57-83

Through a case study of Ghana, this article focuses on the relationship between decentralisation and local democracy. The Ghanaian constitution emphasises decentralisation as the key means to 'making democracy a reality', reflecting the view common amongst international development agencies that decentralisation enhances local democracy and leads to more responsive government. This article questions such views and investigates whether decentralisation in Ghana has led to increased political participation at the local level and to downwardly accountable local government. Empirical findings are two-fold. On the one hand, relatively high levels of participation in local democratic processes are indicated. On the other, accountability mechanisms have not been strengthened, with a number of limitations and shortcomings identified at local level that undermine citizens' attempts to hold local government and their elected representatives to account. Yet, in seeking to explain this delinkage between participation and accountability, such local issues do not provide a full explanation. Attention is thus refocused on the national context, where structural obstacles to devolved government are identified in the form of legal, political, administrative and fiscal constraints. Such obstacles are not easily overcome, however, due to the politics of decentralisation, notably central government's reluctance to relinquish



control over its powers. Recent proposals for reform in Ghana's decentralisation system are considered, but political change is unlikely given the built-in advantages to the ruling party, whichever is in power. Without such reforms, though, local democracy is likely to remain more appearance than reality.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization*

Strakosch Elizabeth

**A Reconsideration of the Political Significance of Shared Responsibility Agreements  
in Australian Journal of Politics & History**, Volume 55, Issue 1, March, 80-96

The 1996–2007 Howard Coalition government introduced Shared Responsibility Agreements in 2005 to allocate discretionary funding to indigenous communities in a "mutually responsible" way. The policy was widely criticized as an ineffective and ideologically driven "showpiece". Its significant governance-building dimensions went without comment. Through the deployment of the conceptual tools of contract and governance, SRAs established new and depoliticised relationships between government and indigenous peoples, replacing the centralized political structure of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission. The future of the policy under the Rudd Government is uncertain, but understanding the impacts and implications of SRAs remains important.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization*

Gambino Silvio

**Autonomie territoriali e riforme  
in Federalismi**, Anno VII, N. 5

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization*

Saxena Naresh C.

**Central Transfers to States, Centrally Sponsored Schemes and Governance  
in Indian Journal of Federal Studies**, Issue 19

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization*

Chesnokov Alexey

**Contemporary Development of Russian Federalism (1991-2008)  
in Indian Journal of Federal Studies**, 18th Issue, 2/2008



No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization*

Lago Ignacio, Montero José Ramon

**Coordination between electoral arenas in multilevel countries**

in *European Journal of Political Research*, vol. 48, issue 2, march , 176-203

ABSTRACT: This article shows the existence of a coordination dilemma in multilevel countries that hold elections for different parliaments, at different territorial levels and with different electoral rules. With evidence from Spain, the analysis identifies interaction or contamination effects between national and subnational electoral arenas that generate, just as in most mixed-member electoral systems, a centrifugal force that increases the number of electoral parties in national elections. The incentives that solve this coordination dilemma faced by small regional or local parties are theoretically discussed and empirically tested.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization*

Carrillo Marc

**Costituzione e Statuto: la garanzia dei diritti da parte degli organi consultivi nell'ambito delle Autonomie**

in *Regioni (Le)*, n.6 , 1125-1156

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization*

Hopkin Jonathan, van Houten Pieter

**Decentralization and State-Wide Parties: Introduction**

in *Party Politics*, Volume 15, Number 2, March , 131-135

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization*

Bevir Mark , Richards David

**Decentring Policy Networks: A Theoretical Agenda**

in *Public Administration*, March - Volume 87 Issue 1 , 3-14

This introduction starts by specifying the theoretical and analytical framework underpinning the range of essays in this special issue. It then provides an overview of the existing literature on policy networks and network governance in order to identify what a decentred approach might contribute. What follows is an account of decentred theory, a discussion of



the potential alternatives it can offer to existing accounts and how these might be achieved through reconstructing networks by appealing to notions of situated agency and tradition; it concludes by considering the potential methodologies to be employed, with particular emphasis on ethnography.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization*

Linda Chelan Li

**Decision-making in Chinese local administrative reform: Path dependence, agency and implementation in Public Administration and Development**, Volume 29 Issue 1 , 79 - 87

How do policy makers make up their minds? What goes into their calculations when deciding whether a proposed policy or reform measure should or should not be adopted? This article looks into these important, if mundane, questions by considering the case of recent decisions taken in relation to Chinese township reforms. It argues that, in this case, policy makers were inclined to focus on costs, and neglected the potential benefits of reform due to the past reform trajectory whereby most previous township reforms have failed. Furthermore, policy makers were predisposed to perceive most stakeholders as resisters of change or passive beneficiaries. This article contemplates the possibility of improving decision-making capacity by recognising the agency role of reform targets.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization*

Jeffery Charlie

**Devolution in the United Kingdom: Problems of a Piecemeal Approach to Constitutional Change in Publius: The Journal of Federalism**, vol. 39, n. 2, Spring , 289-313

The UK's devolution reforms have been piecemeal, directed at specific territorial issues in one or other part of the UK, and poorly coordinated with one another. While this piecemeal approach reflects a centuries-old approach to territorial statecraft in the UK, the addition since 1999 of democratic process and, more recently, partisan conflict between UK and devolved government, has established strong centrifugal tendencies. The article explores how territorial policy variation, inter-regional spillovers, the fusion of UK central government institutions with those for governing England, contradictions in public opinion, and under-institutionalized intergovernmental relations underline that centrifugal dynamic. Most significantly there has been no sustained attempt to review and renew the purposes of union since devolution.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization*

Callejón Balaguer Francisco

**Die Territorialreform in Spanien**

**in Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart**, Band 57, 2009

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization*

Shaw Jon, MacKinnon Danny, Docherty Iain

**Divergence or convergence? Devolution and transport policy in the United Kingdom**

in *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy*, Volume 27, Issue 3, June , 546-567

We examine the impact of devolution in the United Kingdom on transport policies in the first two terms of devolved government, from 1999/2000 to 2007/08. In particular, we discuss the nature and extent of policy convergence and divergence between the devolved territories (Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, and London) and England (wherein responsibility for policy formulation remains with the UK government at Westminster), and between the devolved territories themselves. Our analysis builds on existing work on devolution and public policy not only through its focus on transport policy, but also by distinguishing between 'horizontal' and 'vertical' dimensions of policy divergence and convergence, referring to relations between territories and to links to previous policies adopted within the same territory, respectively. Findings point to a convergence of overarching transport strategies and a complex picture of both convergence and divergence in terms of specific policy measures. The latter provides evidence of a devolution effect on transport policy.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization*

Sharma Chanchal Kumar

**Emerging Dimensions of Decentralisation Debate in the Age of Globalization**

in *Indian Journal of Federal Studies*, Issue 19

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization*

Stephen Tierney

**Federalism in a Unitary State: a Paradox too Far?**

in *Regional and Federal Studies*, Volume 19 Issue 2 , Stephen Tierney

This paper takes the devolution settlements in the UK as a model of accommodation of territorial diversity, with a focus mainly upon devolution to Scotland. It is argued that the Scotland Act 1998, while in many ways a coherent attempt to meet the demands of national diversity, may also, paradoxically, contain elements that in the long run have the potential to destabilize the UK. We address the non-federal model that has been used to manage the plurinational UK, highlighting certain elements of this ad hoc arrangement which seem useful to the management of pluralism and others which seem to exacerbate the risk of secessionism.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization*

Katie Willis, Sorayya Khan

**Health Reform in Latin America and Africa: decentralisation, participation and inequalities**



in **Third World Quarterly**, Volume 30 Issue 5 , 991 - 1005

As part of broader neoliberal economic policies most governments of Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa have implemented reforms of the formal health sector since the early 1980s. Driven both by the need for greater efficiency and calls for increases in patient choice and participation, these reforms have taken on different forms across the regions, but the main features have been decentralisation, increased user fees and the introduction of forms of health insurance. This paper considers the nature of these reforms, how the broad category of 'neoliberal health sector reform' has played out in different places and the impact of these reforms across socioeconomic groups.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

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Pittella Gianni

**Il Mezzogiorno tra Europa e Mediterraneo**

in **Italiani Europei**, n. 1

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization*

Ingenito M. Rosaria

**Il Rappresentante dello Stato e della Conferenza Permanente**

in **Federalismi**, Anno VII, N. 7

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization*

Branca Marzio

**Il federalismo e il decentramento del giudizio amministrativo di appello**

in **Federalismi**, Anno VII, N. 5

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization*

Murmura Antonino

**Il federalismo e la Costituzione**

in **Nuova rassegna di legislazione, dottrina e giurisprudenza**, n. 20-21



No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization*

**Owusu George**

**Internal Boundaries And District Administration: A Challenge To Decentralization And District Development In Ghana**

in *Geografiska Annaler, Series B: Human Geography*, Volume 91 Issue 2 , 57 - 71

Traditional institutions in Africa and their role in a decentralized administrative framework has been the subject of analysis in recent times. However, these discussions have centred largely on political power and local control of resources, to the neglect of the challenges of local government boundary setting and its consequences for local development. Therefore, in countries implementing decentralization with existing strong chiefdoms and traditional areas of jurisdictions, such as Ghana, little consideration has been given to the effects of local government boundaries on community cohesiveness and local development. This article examines the challenges of decentralization in Ghana with particular focus on district administrative boundaries. It argues that the non-coincidence of the 'traditional' ethnic boundaries, namely Traditional Areas, and the 'formal' district administrative boundaries of some districts as well as the absence of an integrative system of traditional and modern governance present a challenge to local and district development under the present decentralization process. The article concludes that district boundary setting should be a process of 'negotiated contract' between the state and communities of which the boundary is meant to create a local government territorial area of jurisdiction. This process entails that the criteria for boundary setting take into account both cultural and economic factors.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

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**Moreno Luis**

**La federalización de la españa plural**

in *Revista d'Estudis Autonomics i Federals*, n.8 , 119-143

This paper provides a descriptive and normative analysis of the federalization process in Spain. Initial attention is paid to the considerable weight of history and historical interpretations on the shaping of attitudes, ideas and perceptions concerning the territorial unity and plurality of Spain. The following section analyses the effects of the diversity of the Spanish languages, the identity policies and the dual identities as a cultural and social basis for the federal logic in Spain. Then there is discussion of the options of confederal or federal structuring of the Spanish "State of Autonomies" in the 21st century. The conclusions emphasize the convenience of in-depth examination of de facto federalization, as an evolution arising from the regional logic. The aim would be to continue, in the reality of matters, the path of accommodation and integration of the internal plurality of Spain and consolidation of a shared political project in federal terms.



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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization*

Fedeli Marcello

**La nascita del federalismo municipalista**

in *Quaderni di sociologia*, n. 48, volume LII

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization*

Chiappa Roberto

**Le esperienze delle commissioni paritetiche e il valore delle norme di attuazione degli statuti speciali regionali**

in *Regioni (Le)*, n.6 , 1051-1076

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization*

Font i Llovet Tomàs

**Los diferentes modelos de participación local en los nuevos estatutos de autonomía**

in *Revista d'Estudis Autonomics i Federals*, n.8 , 259-291

The article analyses the regulation of employment and that of industrial relations in the Statute of Autonomy of Andalusia. In the first part of the article, the author starts by establishing the significance and insertion of this subject-matter within the general context of the territorial reforms that have taken place in Spain. Then, he analyses the process by which the definition of the subject-matter was established in the Statute. In the second part, the author, by following the rationale of the precepts of the Statute (in Chapter II, Title VI) that treat the subject-matter, examines how the latter has been dealt with in the Statute. In the conclusions, the author assesses the importance of these precepts and points out that the Andalusian Autonomous Community, in exercising its executive powers on the matter, might end up by encroaching powers.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization*

van Houten Pieter

**Multi-Level Relations in Political Parties. A Delegation Approach**

in *Party Politics*, Volume 15, Number 2, March , 137-156



Most political parties operate on several territorial levels, but we have only limited theoretical understanding of multi-level party dynamics. This article presents a delegation framework for studying the interaction between the national leadership and regional branches in state-wide parties. Assuming a principal—agent relationship, the national leadership can obtain benefits from delegating tasks to a regional branch, but also faces possible costs in doing this. The rules and conventions regulating the multi-level interaction in parties are possible mechanisms by which to control the actions and policies of regional branches. These include formal party rules, informal party procedures and conventions, and state laws affecting party organizations. The framework provides an agenda and hypotheses for empirical research, research that should focus on crisis situations in parties, on what regional branches cannot do (instead of just documenting the activities of branches), and on the role of parties in shaping state laws and regulations.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

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Karpen Ukrich

**Nation Building im Kleinen - Erfahrungen beim Aufbau von Bosnien-Herzegowina**

in *Revue européenne de droit public*, Vol. 19 - No. 2 , 463-480

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization*

Conti N. , Roux C., Tronconi F.

**Parties and voters in a multi-level electoral setting**

in *Modern Italy*, Volume 14, Issue 2, May , 127 - 133

In this article the main contents of this special issue are introduced. In particular, some of the main problems related to multi-level electoral competition in Italy are presented and how this work intends to analyse them. It will be shown that both parties and voters have strategically adapted and responded to the challenges of multi-level electoral competition to an extent that was probably unexpected in a system undergoing transformation and whose inefficiencies are a conventional wisdom.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization*

Hopkin Jonathan

**Party Matters: Devolution and Party Politics in Britain and Spain**

in *Party Politics*, Volume 15, Number 2, March , 179-198

This article addresses the relationship between political decentralization and the organization of political parties in Great Britain and Spain, focusing on the Labour Party and the Socialist Party, respectively. It assesses two rival accounts of this relationship: Caramani's 'nationalization of politics' thesis and Chhibber and Kollman's rational choice institutionalist account in their book *The Formation of National Party Systems*. It argues that both accounts are seriously incomplete, and on occasion misleading, because of their unwillingness to consider the autonomous role of political parties as advocates of institutional change and as organizational entities. The article develops this argument by studying the role



of the British Labour Party and the Spanish Socialists in proposing devolution reforms, and their organizational and strategic responses to them. It concludes that the reductive theories cited above fail to capture the real picture, because parties cannot only mitigate the effects of institutional change, they are also the architects of these changes and shape institutions to suit their strategic ends.

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***Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government***

*Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization*

Thorlakson Lori

**Patterns of Party Integration, Influence and Autonomy in Seven Federations**

**in *Party Politics***, Volume 15, Number 2, March , 157-177

In this article, I develop three measures of party organization in multi-level systems: vertical integration, influence and autonomy. I assess these in 27 parties in Canada, Australia, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, the United States and Spain and investigate how parties respond to the incentives and opportunities created by their institutional environment. Clear patterns emerge between the form of federal state design and the predominant form of party organization: in decentralized federations with low coordination requirements between federal and state-level governments, a tendency can be found towards highly autonomous state parties. Where resources are centralized and intergovernmental coordination requirements are high, integrated parties with low autonomy can be found. However, neither aspect of institutional design has a significant relationship with 'upward' influence of state-level parties in the governance structure of federal parties.

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***Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government***

*Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization*

Huang Yasheng, Sheng Yumin

**Political Decentralization and Inflation: Sub-National Evidence from China**

**in *British Journal of Political Science***, vol. 39, issue 2, april , 389-412

ABSTRACT: One possible political determinant of macroeconomic instability scholars have explored at length is decentralization, but cross-national research measuring political decentralization in terms of constitutional federalism has produced mixed evidence regarding its effects on inflation. Conceptualizing political decentralization in terms of governing political party decentralization but acknowledging the challenges of cross-national data collection, the authors suggest the utility of a sub-national approach by studying one country under single-party rule. Drawing on provincial-level cross-section time-series data, they find that political decentralization measured as the inverse of central government political control, via the ruling party, over the different provincial governments is positively correlated with provincial inflation in China during 1978–97. The finding is robust to alternative specifications, expanded year coverage and Granger causality tests.

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***Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government***



*Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization*

Allegrezza Paolo

**Prove di federalismo. Sedi di raccordo interistituzionale, burocrazia, equilibrio dei poteri**  
in *Queste istituzioni*, n. 150-151 , 165-180

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization*

Arsenio M. Balisacan, Hal Hill Sharon, Faye Piza

**Regional Development Dynamics and Decentralization in the Philippines: Ten Lessons from a Fast Starter**  
in *ASEAN Economic Bulletin*, Volume 25, Number 3 , 293-315

Spatial disparities, regional dynamics and centre–region relations are the focus of much attention in the developing world, owing to growing analytical and policy interest, concern over deeply entrenched spatial inequality, transitions from economic crises or command economies, and the uneven effects of rapid global integration. Many countries are embarking on major decentralization programmes. This paper examines regional dynamics and decentralization with reference to the Philippines, a country well suited to such a study and from which other developing countries can learn lessons. The Philippines initiated a major decentralization programme relatively early (1991), and it is one of the most spatially diverse countries in the world. The reforms occurred in the wake of a deep economic crisis, and were accompanied by a major liberalization programme.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization*

Bauer Michael, Pitschel Diana

**Regionalisierung und Dezentralisierung in Mittel- und Südosteuropa 1997–2007**  
in *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, 50. Jahrgang, Heft 1, März , 130-154

ABSTRACT: Der Beitrag zieht eine Bilanz der Ergebnisse der mittel- und südosteuropäischen Regionalisierungsforschung der vergangenen zehn Jahre. Das zentrale Ergebnis der Bestandsaufnahme ist, dass das wissenschaftliche Interesse an Erklärungsversuchen aus der Perspektive der Staatstransformation und der europäischen Konditionalitätspolitik, welche die Forschung bislang geprägt haben, nachlässt. Nachdem die Mehrzahl mittel- und südosteuropäischer Staaten der Europäischen Union beigetreten ist, gewinnt nun der Governance-Ansatz immer stärker an Bedeutung. Damit „normalisiert“ sich die Debatte über politische Dezentralisierung und Regionalisierung in Mittel- und Südosteuropa und konvergiert mit den einschlägigen Regionalisierungsdiskursen westeuropäischer Provenienz.

The review essay takes stock of the last decade of decentralisation and regionalisation research in Central and South Eastern Europe. Classifying the existing scholarship with regard to its focus of analysis, its explanatory programme, and methodological predilections, we suggest to distinguish three different agendas: system transformation, EU conditionality and subnational governance. We argue that scholarly interest in regionalisation and decentralisation issues from the perspective of state transformation or Europeanisation is vanishing. Instead, we witness the emergence



of a subnational governance approach which is rooted in comparative politics and policy analysis. The debate about decentralisation and regionalisation in CEEC is thus in a process of “normalising” and converging with the Western European subnational political discourse.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization*

**Keating Michael, Wilson Alex**

**Renegotiating the State of Autonomies: Statute Reform and Multi-level Politics in Spain**

*in West European Politics*, vol. 32, n. 3, may , 536-558

ABSTRACT: The regional/national question is central to Spanish politics, where different conceptions of the state co-exist. The 1978 Constitution sets out different paths to autonomy, although the end point is similar. State-wide parties have sought to contain autonomy and to make regional statutes uniform. Territorial parties in the historic nationalities have sought to maintain a differential status, while other regions have sought to catch up, creating a competitive dynamic. The recent round of statute reform involved more parties and more complex politics than previous rounds, with an active role for regional governments. Regional political elites used statute reform to make symbolic assertions and resource claims, as well as to demand more competences. Competition among regional elites to gain more symbolic status and substantive powers creates centrifugal dynamics. On the other hand, the normalisation of territorial politics at both centre and periphery may be an integrative factor. The dominance of parties is also a reflection of the weak institutionalisation of territorial relations and intergovernmental conflict.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization*

**Mullen Tom**

**Scotland's Constitutional Future**

*in European public Law*, Volume 15 (2009) Issue 1 , 33-46

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization*

**Mazzoleni Martino**

**The Italian regionalisation: a story of partisan logics**

*in Modern Italy*, Volume 14, Issue 2, May , 135-150

The history of the Italian Republic's territorial structure has always been intertwined with party competition. Partisan logics have notably played a relevant role in the ways regions have been moulded, set up and run. This article illustrates the discourse of Italy's political parties on the 'ordinary' statute regions throughout the successive phases of regionalisation. After the consensus reached in the Constituent Assembly, a paralysis due to party contrasts followed. The Centre-left governments in the 1960s re-started the process, which culminated in the 1970s-also thanks to the Communists' support-in the establishment of the 15 ordinary-statute regions. The 1990s inaugurated a period of further



devolution, which reached constitutional status in the early years of the millennium. Once again, partisan motivations were of primary importance, notably because of the electoral threat posed to mainstream parties by the Northern League. In recent years, party positions have differentiated consistently according to inter-coalition competitive dynamics.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization*

Erin K. Jenne

**The Paradox of Ethnic Partition: Lessons from de facto Partition in Bosnia and Kosovo**  
in **Regional and Federal Studies**, Volume 19 Issue 2 , 273 - 289

No abstract available

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization*

Jason Sorens

**The Partisan Logic of Decentralization in Europe**  
in **Regional and Federal Studies**, Volume 19 Issue 2 , 255 - 272

Since the 1970s, a decentralizing trend has gathered pace in several Western European countries. Governments in Spain, Italy, Belgium and the United Kingdom have moved to bestow significant powers on certain regions, while France and Portugal have made more limited reforms. The fact that countries facing nationalist challenges in the periphery have been more likely to decentralize poses a puzzle, because research shows that greater autonomy does not necessarily decrease secessionist sentiment and may even increase some forms of nationalist agitation. Why then do governments decentralize? This paper argues that the explanation lies in partisan political calculations, which can also explain the timing and character of devolution.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization*

Mazzoleni Martino

**The Saliency of Regionalization in Party Systems. A Comparative Analysis of Regional Decentralization in Party Manifestos**  
in **Party Politics**, Volume 15, Number 2, March , 199-218

The article centres on the saliency that regional decentralization has had for British, Italian and French political parties in the past 60 years. A longitudinal analysis of the emphasis that parties have assigned to this issue in their manifestos confirms the hypothesis that certain environmental factors influence the changes of attention of parties on regionalization in their electoral discourse. Electoral threats and institutional reforms have a relevant impact and are mediated by the nature of party goals (policy-, vote- or office-seeking).



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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization*

Stegarescu Dan

**The effects of economic and political integration on fiscal decentralization: evidence from OECD countries in Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue Canadienne d'Economique**, Volume 42, Number 2 , 694-718

This paper examines the impact of economic and political integration on the vertical government structure. It argues that, by increasing the market size and the benefits of decentralized provision of public goods, integration triggered the recent process of decentralization in OECD countries. A panel analysis relates the degree of fiscal decentralization to economic and European integration, controlling for interregional heterogeneity, economies of scale, and institutions. The results mostly support a decentralizing effect of economic integration in general and of European integration in particular for heterogeneous EU countries, whereas participation of subnational governments in national decision-making is associated with more centralization.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization*

Tronconi Filippo, Roux Christophe

**The political systems of Italian regions between state-wide logics and increasing differentiation in Modern Italy**, Volume 14, Issue 2, May , 151-166

The aim of this article is to describe the evolution of the Italian regional party systems 25 years after the establishment of 15 Ordinary Statute regions and five years after the implementation of a major Constitutional reform increasing the powers of the regions and the visibility of regional political actors. The theoretical point of departure of the article is the second order election model originally applied to European elections to highlight their dependence on the national political level. The article begins by showing that this model has been applicable for regional elections only since the mid-1990s, a finding that goes against the conventional wisdom. The article then explains the structure of regional political competition through the analysis of two phenomena, fragmentation and differentiation, and the way they are correlated, stressing the changing pattern of competition before and after the breakdown of the First Republic.

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**Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government**

*Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization*

Jeffery Charlie, Hough Dan

**Understanding Post-Devolution Elections in Scotland and Wales in Comparative Perspective in Party Politics**, Volume 15, Number 2, March , 219-240

In this article, we explore the electoral dynamics of multi-level political systems for the case of the United Kingdom (Scotland and Wales) through a comparison with multi-level voting behaviour in Germany, Spain and Canada. The analysis suggests that sub-state elections can be 'second order' in relation to state-wide elections, but that this 'second orderness' is reduced when more powers are decentralized to the sub-state level (and, thus, more is at stake in sub-state elections), and if sub-state identities and parties are stronger. Consequently, elections in Scotland and Wales are unlikely to be or become only 'second order' to Westminster elections, and British state-wide parties will continue to



face challenges and pressures to adapt their organizations and programmes to the devolution of the British state.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system*

Sayapin Sergey

**The Definition of the Crime of Aggression for the Purpose of the International Criminal Court: Problems and Perspectives**

in *Journal of Conflict and Security Law*, Volume 13, Number 3, Winter , 333-352

The definition of the crime of aggression for the purpose of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) remains a key issue of contemporary international criminal law. The work accomplished to date by the Preparatory Commission for the ICC and the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression has resulted in promising draft amendments to the Rome Statute, which defines the crime on the basis of relevant international law sources and suggests workable mechanisms of interaction between the Court and the United Nations Security Council. This article examines the draft amendments in a critical way and recommends substantial and procedural improvements. In particular, the respective roles of the International Court of Justice and the United Nations General Assembly for the determination of acts of aggression are reconsidered, and a more 'measurable' definition of the crime of aggression is proposed. It is suggested that the new rules of the Rome Statute, if duly recognized, should affect the practice of both the International Criminal Court and the Security Council, as well as of other relevant principal organs of the United Nations, such as the International Court of Justice.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system*

Schlesinger Stephen

**A New Administration and the UN**

in *World Policy Journal*, vol. 25, n. 4, winter , 109-114

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system*

Ehmke Ellen

**Alternativmodell ILO**

in *Blätter für deutsche & internationale Politik*, Juni, 2009 , 19-22

Bereits vor Ausbruch der globalen Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise war überdeutlich, dass die neoliberale Deregulierungspolitik der letzten zwei Jahrzehnte die globalen Ungleichheiten erheblich vertieft hat, statt sie zu verringern. Allerdings waren die dramatischen sozialen Folgen der forcierten Deregulierung lange Zeit vor allem im globalen Süden spürbar. In Zeiten der Krise sieht sich nun auch der globale Norden mehr und mehr ungesicherter Arbeit, wachsender Ausbeutung und zunehmender Armut ...



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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system*

Milanovi&#263; Marko, Papi&#263; Tatjana

**As Bad As It Gets: The European Court Of Human Rights's Behrami And Saramati Decision And General International Law**

in *International & Comparative Law Quarterly* , Volume 58 - Issue 02 , 267-296

This article examines the European Court of Human Rights's encounter with general international law in its Behrami and Saramati admissibility decision, where it held that the actions of the armed forces of States acting pursuant to UN Security Council authorizations are attributable not to the States themselves, but to the United Nations. The article will try to demonstrate that the Court's analysis is entirely at odds with the established rules of responsibility in international law, and is equally dubious as a matter of policy. Indeed, the article will show that the Court's decision can be only be explained by its reluctance to decide on questions of State jurisdiction and norm conflict, the latter issue becoming the clearest when Behrami is compared to the Al-Jedda judgment of the House of Lords.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system*

Pellet Alain

**Constitutionnalisation du droit des Nations Unies ou triomphe du dualisme?**

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, n. 529, juin , 415-418

The Kadi ruling dated September 3, 2008 is the first CEDH ruling to cancel measures implementing sanctions decided by the Security Council. The untainted reasoning of the Court clearly consecrates the victory of dualism. Unlike the First Instance Court, which relied on jus cogens to control, on the side, the lawfulness of the Security Council's resolutions, the court refused to check the lawfulness of the orders of that international body. Describing the reasoning followed by General Prosecutor Polares Maduro, in accordance with the dualist logic, it assessed the validity of the community's regulation implementing the resolutions, not with regard to international law but in relationship to basic rights. The ruling is all the more important that the lessons that can be drawn can be transposed to the relationship between internal law and international law.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system*

Bechtold Peter K.

**Darfur, the ICC and American Politics**

in *Middle East Policy*, Volume 16, Issue 2, Summer , 149-163

No abstract available



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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system*

David Hine

**Dueling ideals: bridging the gap between peace and justice**

in *Boston College International and Comparative Law Review*, Vol. 32, issue 1 , 129-141

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system*

O'Driscoll Mervyn

**Explosive Challenge: Diplomatic Triangles, the United Nations, and the Problem of French Nuclear Testing, 1959–1960**

in *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Volume 11, Issue 1 - Winter , 28 - 56

France's first nuclear tests in Algeria in 1960 occurred at a critical moment in the Cold War. The United States, Great Britain, and the USSR had suspended their tests in 1958 and had been holding test ban talks in Geneva. British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan faced a vociferous anti-nuclear movement at home and wanted to foster East-West détente. The U.S. State Department wished to prevent Soviet propaganda in the Third World, including the newly independent African and Asian states that strongly opposed French testing. Nonetheless, both Britain and the United States adopted a sympathetic stance toward France in the run-up to the first test in February 1960. Macmillan hoped to move Britain into the European Economic Community and therefore wanted to avoid antagonizing France, whose support for British membership would be crucial. Macmillan also wanted France's backing for a four-power summit to try to achieve East-West détente. Similarly, the United States did not want to alienate France, a key member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system*

Ippoliti Fernando

**Il ruolo dell'Unione Africana nella crisi somala: la Missione AMISOM e i rapporti con il Consiglio di Sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite**

in *Comunità Internazionale (La)*, vol. LXIII, n. 4, quarto trimestre

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system*

Sandholtz Wayne

**L'Europe, les Etats-Unis et la Cour pénale internationale**

in *Politique Etrangère*, n. 1, printemps



"Les Etats qui respectent les droits de l'homme, partagent les valeurs d'une culture des droits de l'homme et ont l'expérience de tribunaux régionaux efficaces en la matière, sont les plus enclins à rejoindre la Cour pénale internationale."

Les théories des relations internationales expliquent avec leurs arguments propres l'adhésion plus ou moins rapide des pays au statut de la Cour pénale internationale. Une analyse stricte montre que l'acceptation de la norme internationale comme supérieure au droit interne et l'existence d'autres cours internationales, dont les arrêts s'imposent aux cours internes, expliquent largement la divergence de posture face à la CPI, entre les pays européens d'une part, et les États-Unis de l'autre.

"States that respect human rights, share the values of a human rights culture and experienced the efficiency of regional tribunals on the matter are the most likely to join the International Criminal Court."

International relations theories intend to explain why countries subscribe more or less quickly to the statute of the International Criminal Court. However, a rigorous analysis shows that to do so, a country must accept the idea that the international rule is superior to the national rule and furthermore, that judgements by international courts supersede national ones. These criteria explain why the United States and the European countries have different positions in respect to the International Criminal Court.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system*

Beulay Marjorie

**La mise en œuvre des "smart sanctions" des nations unies par les états membres et la Communauté européenne**

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, n. 529, juin , 367-372

The implementation of the Security Council's resolutions, which include the smart sanctions, requires the help of other players of international law, including states and regional organisation. This finding requires wondering about the guarantee of the binding nature of such measures. If the question calls for a positive reply, the fact remains that the direct effect of those resolutions on the internal legal systems of the states or regional organisations has no single answer. The implementation of smart sanctions in internal law refers to multiple attitudes and behaviours likely to harm their efficiency.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system*

Hamonic Anne

**La représentation de l'Union européenne au sein de la commission de consolidation de la paix des Nations Unies : entre anticipation et continuité**

in *Les Cahiers de droit européen*, Vol.44, issue 5-6 , 591-628

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system*



Hamonc Anne

**La représentation de l'Union européenne au sein de la commission de consolidation de la paix des Nations Unies: entre anticipation et continuité**

in *Cahiers de Droit Européen*, n. 5-6 , 591-628

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system*

Thouvenin Jean-Marc

**Le juge international peut-il contrôler la légalité des sanctions adoptées par le Conseil de Sécurité?**

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, n. 529, juin , 373-379

In the Kadi ruling, the CJCE checked and then cancelled a community regulation that only transposed in the community's legal system a decision by the United Nation's Security Council. Would it have considered that check to be essential if an international judge has been asked before it to carry out a satisfactory check? One can think not. But this poses the following three questions: what law would be opposed to the Security Council? Could an international judge rule under such law? What could be the procedure to go such a judge?

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system*

Miron Alina

**Les "sanctions ciblées" du Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies. Réflexions sur la qualification juridique des listes du Conseil de Sécurité**

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, n. 529, juin , 355-366

The lists used by the Security Council to designate namely those individuals targeted by a sanction have become ordinary instruments of section VII of the Charter. Internationalists are nonetheless confused as to their exact nature. The comparatist method then comes in handy it shows a certain administration of the council's practice and of its sanction committee. Keeping in mind the political purpose of the resolutions initiating sanction systems, the purpose of this analysis is to demonstrate that the lists are the expression of an individual, administrative type sanctioning power. This is shown by the successive reforms of the decision making practice of the sanctioning committees, which are aimed both to protecting defence rights and monitoring the states's arbitrary.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system*

Mützenich Rolf

**Liga der Demokratien - Ergänzung oder Umgehung der UN?**

in *Vereinte Nationen*, vol. 57, issue 1 , 17-23

No abstract available



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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system*

Maurel Chloé

**L'Unesco aujourd'hui**

in *Vingtième Siècle*, n. 102 , 131-144

Unesco, which celebrated its 60th anniversary in 2005, appears to have been in decline for many years. It no longer appears as an international leader in the cultural, educational and scientific fields. This failure is caused by its administrative red tape and opacity, the incoherence of its budgetary choices, and above all by its lack of independence from the main countries that finance it. Nevertheless, there have been significant new developments which might help the institution regain its role on the international arena. The US re-joined Unesco in 2002, and the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions was negotiated and signed within this organization, and entered into force in March 2007. This suggests a possible revival of the role of this organization. Unesco managed to impose itself for the elaboration of this convention, against other institutions such as the WTO. It constitutes a successful attempt to restore to Unesco fields of activity which used to belong to it but which it has tended to lose over the last decades

L'Unesco, qui a fêté en 2005 son 60e anniversaire, semble depuis plusieurs années en perte de vitesse. Elle n'apparaît plus comme un leader dans le domaine de l'action culturelle, éducative, scientifique au niveau international. Cet échec s'explique par la lourdeur et l'opacité de son fonctionnement l'irrationalité de ses choix budgétaires, et surtout par son manque d'indépendance politique par rapport aux États qui la financent le plus. Cependant, après le retour des États-Unis en son sein en 2002, l'entrée en vigueur – en mars 2007 – de la Convention sur la protection et la promotion de la diversité des expressions culturelles, négociée et signée à l'Unesco, laisse s'interroger sur un possible regain du rôle de cette institution. Le cadre de l'Unesco, imposé non sans peine face à d'autres instances comme l'OMC, constitue une tentative réussie de remettre aux mains de cet organisme des domaines qui sont de sa compétence mais qui, au fil des années, ont eu tendance à lui échapper.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system*

Spornbauer Martina

**Musical Chairs Revisited: Status and Terms of Participation of the European Union in the UN Peacebuilding Commission**

in *International Organizations Law Review*, vol. 5, n. 2 , 299-322

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system*

Abebe Allehone Mulugeta

**Of Shaming and Bargaining: African States and the Universal Periodic Review of the United Nations Human**



## **Rights Council**

in *Human Rights Law Review*, Vol.9, n.1 , 1-35

The Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of the United Nations Human Rights Council promises to be a useful tool for examining human rights situations in states in an objective, non-selective, universal and transparent manner. It is an undertaking imbued with a shift from the former Commission's policies and practice of shaming to a new consensual and cooperative model of human rights evaluation. The experience of African countries, both during the negotiation over its normative and institutional framework and in the two sessions of the Working Group on UPR, lays bare the challenges to the new human rights body and its unique peer review mechanism. The article critically examines the participation of African countries in the UPR and highlights some of the issues that deserve, at this early stage, the attention of all those who mind to see the objectives of the UPR fully realised.

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### **Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system*

Weckel Philippe

**Point de vue - "La justice internationale et le sixantième anniversaire de la Déclaration universelle des droits de l'homme"**

in *Revue générale de droit international publique*, Vol.113, n.1 , 5-17

No abstract available

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### **Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system*

Gómez del Prado José L.

**Private Military and Security Companies and the UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries**

in *Journal of Conflict and Security Law*, Volume 13, Number 3, Winter , 429-450

The Working Group on Mercenaries, one of the special procedures of the UN Human Rights Council, has been entrusted to monitor the impact of the activities of private military and security companies (PMSCs) on the enjoyment of human rights and to prepare draft international basic principles that encourage respect for human rights on the part of those companies. The number of private security and military companies which operate domestically and internationally is increasing due largely to the outsourcing of governmental functions. They have been operating without proper supervision and accountability in countries with ongoing conflicts, such as Afghanistan, Colombia and Iraq. They recruit former policemen and soldiers from developing countries as 'security guards', but in fact they are 'militarily armed private soldiers', or mercenaries. Employees of PMSCs have committed serious human rights violations, but have also been subject to abuse by their employers. Member states of the United Nations should identify those military and security functions that cannot be privatised, contracted out or 'outsourced' and should remain a prerogative of the state. New international regulations, most likely in the form of a new UN Convention with an accompanying Model Law, are needed in order to bring PMSCs fully out of the legal 'grey zone' in which they have been operating.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

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Asad Masahiko

**Security Council Resolution 1540 to Combat WMD Terrorism: Effectiveness and Legitimacy in International Legislation**

in *Journal of Conflict and Security Law*, Volume 13, Number 3, Winter , 303-332

Faced with the urgent and grave threat of WMD terrorism, the international community has responded with a new approach of international legislation by adopting Security Council Resolution 1540. The traditional approach of multilateral treaties on WMD has primarily been aimed at the prevention of proliferation of such weapons to states and not to non-state actors. Another traditional approach of utilising anti-terrorism treaties has been a sort of patchwork, and thus provides no guarantee that a new treaty is made in a timely manner in response to a newly emerging type of terrorism. By contrast, the new approach of international legislation through Council resolutions makes it possible to enact rules that legally bind all UN members immediately and automatically without exception and are equivalent to those in a treaty instantly ratified by all UN members. Indeed, a new thinking is necessary to effectively respond to a new, urgent and grave threat to the international community. In that sense, Resolution 1540 is welcome. This does not, however, mean that everything is allowed if it is effective to deal with the present or imminent threat. Not only from the viewpoint of legitimacy, which guarantees the long-standing effectiveness, but also from that of the rule of law in the international community, it seems of fundamental importance to establish some kind of understanding that we discuss in this article, if international legislation by the Security Council is destined to become inevitable in the future and is to be better implemented.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system*

Rachael Lorna Johnstone

**State Responsibility: A Concerto For Court, Council And Committee**

in *Denver Journal of international law and policy*, vol. 37, issue 1 , 63-118

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Coate Roger

**The John W. Holmes Lecture: Growing the “Third UN” for People-centered Development—The United Nations, Civil Society, and Beyond**

in *Global Governance*, vol. 15, n. 2, april-june , 153-168

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

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Thirlway Hugh



**The Recommendations Made By The International Court Of Justice: A Sceptical View**  
in *International & Comparative Law Quarterly* , Volume 58 - Issue 01 , 151-162

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

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Dastoor Neville

**The Responsibility to Refine: The Need for a Security Council Committee on the Responsibility to Protect**  
in *Harvard Human Rights Journal*, vol. 22, issue 1 , 25-62

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

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Kerim Srgjan

**The role of the United Nations in the globalized world: promoting a new culture of international relations**  
in *Estudios internacionales : revista del Instituto de Estudios Internacionales de la Universidad de Chile*, Vol. 41 /  
2008 / Nr 161 , 213

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

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Fraschina Andrea

**Una nueva jurisdicción penal de carácter internacional: el Tribunal Especial para el Líbano**  
in *Revista Electrónica de Estudios Internacionales*, Numero 16/2008

Sumario: I. INTRODUCCIÓN. II. ANTECEDENTES: RESOLUCIONES DEL CONSEJO DE SEGURIDAD E INFORMES DEL SECRETARIO GENERAL DE NACIONES UNIDAS. III. PRINCIPALES CARACTERÍSTICAS DEL ESTATUTO DEL TRIBUNAL ESPECIAL Y DEL ACUERDO ENTRE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS Y EL GOBIERNO DEL LÍBANO. IV- CONCLUSIONES.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations*

Maul Daniel

**"Help Them Move the ILO Way": The International Labor Organization and the Modernization Discourse in the**



### **Era of Decolonization and the Cold War**

in *Diplomatic History*, vol. 33, n. 3, June , 387-404

In 1953 Jef Rens, assistant director-general of the International Labor Organization (ILO), the UN specialized agency for social and labor affairs, returned to Geneva from an official mission to Egypt. Rens was both fascinated and shocked by the profound changes taking place in the country as a result of the government's efforts to manage what he described as the transition from a traditional rural into a modern industrialized society. In terms of the broader social consequences this transition would inevitably bring about, the future seemed still an open book. This was in Rens's view exactly the point where the ILO came in. "This part of the world and similar areas are moving—that's certain," he noted enthusiastically in his report, "so let's not miss the chance to help them move the ILO way!"

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### **Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations*

Eriksen Silja, de Soysa Indra

#### **A Fate Worse Than Debt? International Financial Institutions and Human Rights, 1981—2003**

in *Journal of Peace Research*, Volume 46, Number 4, July , 485-503

Some report that human rights are likely to be violated when poor countries sign up to structural adjustment programmes (SAPs). These violations apparently occur because ordinary people revolt against the neo-liberal policies that SAPs push. This study examines the effect of the actual flow of finances from the World Bank and the IMF, holding constant all other bank-based financial flows, on government respect for human rights. The authors find that pay-in periods are beneficial for human rights, whereas loan dry-ups correlate with violations. Loan dry-ups are likely to occur because of noncompliance with SAPs rather than implementation, since the international financial institutions (IFIs) release loans in tranches to solve the time inconsistency problem. The overall level of indebtedness is robustly related to human rights abuses, but the higher the stock of debt owed to IFIs relative to total debt, the lower the human rights violations. Accumulating debt to IFIs, thus, seems to improve the level of human rights. Additionally, a higher government consumption to GDP ratio reduces human rights, a result that does not suggest that governments that are capable of commanding a higher share of the country's wealth are less likely to face threatening social dissent. Moreover, a proxy for neo-liberal policies, the index of economic freedom, correlates strongly with better human rights. These results do not square well with the view that neo-liberal policy reforms and the attendant austerity measures drive dangerous dissent.

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### **Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations*

Melaku Geboye Desta

#### **Accession for What? An Examination of Ethiopia's Decision to Join the WTO**

in *Journal of World Trade*, Volume 43 2 , 339-362

Ethiopia, a founding member of many of the international and regional organizations today and the second most populous country in the UN list of least-developed countries (LDCs), is currently in the early stages of negotiating its accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). This article asks the basic questions of why Ethiopia uncharacteristically stayed out of such an important multilateral endeavour for so long and why it wants to join now, and what the potential implications of the decision to join the system will be for



the legal, institutional and economic policy landscape of the country both during the accession process as well as after achieving membership. The Ethiopian Government argues that WTO accession would help facilitate economic growth, attract foreign investment, secure predictable and transparent market access, and allow it to have a say on the direction of globalization. While many of these are in line with the conventional explanations about the benefits of WTO accession, this article argues that the balance of rights and obligations contained in the WTO legal framework and its enforcement mechanism mean that Ethiopia's ability to make use of the system to realize these ambitions is, at best, limited. However, the article concludes with a positive note that, if the accession process is handled carefully and final membership obligations carried out in good faith, WTO accession is likely to contribute to those goals indirectly through, inter alia, the review and reform of national laws and policies, the establishment of objective, impartial and effective administrative procedures and implementing institutions, and its potential overall contribution to the establishment of a system of rule of law, administrative transparency and accountability in the country.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations*

Agarwal Manhoman

**Africa, the economic crisis, and international economic governance**  
in *South African Journal of International Affairs* , vol. 16, n. 1, april , 1-15

ABSTRACT: The turmoil in the developed economies has hit the developing world hard. Export earnings have tumbled. African countries have again seen their terms of trade worsen, and cannot depend for high growth on conditions in the developed world. The development strategy of the African countries then has to rely either on investments by the domestic private sector or increased demand from other developing countries. The former requires infrastructure investment by governments and policies that raise the profitability of private investment. Infrastructure investments, because of budgetary constraints, require support from international institutions. Negotiations could further enhance South-South trade and financial flows. For instance, Indian imports of foodgrains have risen, but agricultural productivity must rise for an increase in African exports to India. This requires African countries and their developing country allies to press in the G20 and other fora that research encouraged by such entities as the Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research benefit more African countries.

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Schäfer Dorothea

**Agenda for a New Financial Market Architecture.**  
in *Economic Bulletin*, 7/2009 , 41-49

Since the summer of 2007, participants in financial markets have been confronted by a crisis of their own making. In order to prevent the recurrence of a similar crisis in the future, the G-20 nations, at their finance summit in Washington on 15 November 2008, resolved to "ensure that all financial markets, products and participants are regulated or subject to oversight, as appropriate to their circumstances." However, the elimination of loopholes as a matter of principle does not in itself provide a roadmap for the reconfiguration of financial markets. DIW Berlin is promoting an agenda of nine principles for regulatory reform. Item 1 through 3 focus on the prevention of coordination failures at the micro and the macro level as well as establishing appropriate incentives front and center; item 4 through 6 sketch out opportunities and



limits for the future role of government; item 7 and 8 focus on oversight. Finally, item 9 calls for a stronger emphasis on equity financing and makes an appeal for the insight that financing constraints based upon credit worthiness ultimately serve to protect the financial system.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations*

Voituriez Tancredi

**Agriculture et développement : impasse à l'OMC**

in *Politique Etrangère*, n. 2, été

Ce ne sont pas tant les questions des subventions et du protectionnisme agricoles, pourtant inlassablement mis en cause dans le débat international, que les contradictions inhérentes au cycle de négociations lui-même, qui sont responsables de l'échec des négociations de l'OMC à Genève. En rebaptisant cette négociation « cycle du développement » peu après son ouverture à Doha, on a tenté de lui donner une nouvelle rationalité, qui s'est avérée largement contre-productive.

The causes of the failure of the WTO negotiations in Geneva are the contradictions embedded in the negotiations cycle itself, and not the question of subsidies and protectionism, as it has generally been portrayed. By renaming this negotiation "development cycle" soon after its opening in Doha, a new rationale has been sought, that has nevertheless proven highly counterproductive.

[http://www.ifri.org/files/politique\\_etrangere/PE\\_2\\_2009\\_Voituriez.pdf](http://www.ifri.org/files/politique_etrangere/PE_2_2009_Voituriez.pdf)

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

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Evenett Simon

**Aid for Trade and the “Missing Middle” of the World Trade Organization**

in *Global Governance*, vol. 15, n. 3, july-september , 359-374

ABSTRACT: As part of the Doha Development Agenda, many members of the World Trade Organization and, in particular, its director-general have actively promoted the so-called Aid for Trade initiative. Rather than offer a comprehensive account of this initiative, the purpose here is to consider its implications for proposals to fill in the WTO's "missing middle," that is, for suggestions to develop the WTO's non-negotiating, nonjuridical, deliberative functions.

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Campos Taiane Las Casas

**An evaluation of institutional effects of WTO members' behavior from an analysis of convergence and divergence on the negotiation of GATT, GATS and TRIPS**

in *Revista Brasileira de Política internacional* , vol.51 – No 2/2008 , pp. 117-135

The paper intends to evaluate the behavior of states before the rules negotiated in WTO in the GATT, GATS and TRIPS



agendas. Using the concepts proposed by Botcheva and Martin (2001) of convergence and divergence as well as success and non success of the rules negotiated, we analyze a sample of 30 states.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations*

Xiaomei E

**China's WTO Accession and Sustainable Development: Challenges and Policy Responses**

in **Journal of World Trade**, Volume 43 Issue 3 , 541-569

China formally joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) on 11 December 2001, during the organization's ministerial meeting in Doha. On the same occasion, trade ministers, including those of China, reaffirmed their commitment to the objective of sustainable development. Reflecting that the three pillars generally accepted to define sustainable development, this paper conducts an integrated analysis of the economic, environmental, and social effects of China's WTO accession and the linkages between them. Through this analysis, it tries to identify the challenges that China faces today in achieving sustainable development. It also proposes a set of policy responses that could be adopted by the Chinese government to offset harmful effects of the country's accession to the WTO and to promote its positive outcomes in the context of sustainable development.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

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Gallagher Peter, Stoler Andrew

**Critical Mass as an Alternative Framework for Multilateral Trade Negotiations**

in **Global Governance**, vol. 15, n. 3, july-september , 375-392

ABSTRACT: The article posits that, over time, the sense of the World Trade Organization's so-called Single Undertaking has been perverted, and that the current interpretation requiring every WTO member to be obligated by all new Doha Round agreements is a major problem in the stalled negotiations. The authors' preliminary research supports the idea of conducting international trade negotiations in agriculture on the basis of a critical mass framework, where only those WTO members accounting for some nominated major percentage of trade would take on new obligations. The article recounts how this approach has worked before in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the WTO, and suggests areas of further research in order to test the proposition with respect to agricultural trade.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations*

Duchastel Jules, Audet René

**Démocratie, société civile et institutionnalisation de la gouvernance transnationale à l'OIT et à l'OMC**

in **Etudes Internationales**, 4, Decembre 2008

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

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11-31

**Free Trade: What is it Good For? Globalization, Deregulation, and 'Public Opinion'**

in *Journal of Law and Society*, Volume 36 Issue 1 - March , Reid Emily, Steele Jenny

Deliberation is an essential element in legitimate and sound decision making. The deliberative ideal has much resonance with ideas of 'localization', employing the value of local and applied knowledge. Participation is also of particular value under globalization. We argue that the capacity of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to absorb and reflect participatory aspects of decision making is crucial to its future legitimacy and status. Should the WTO be seen as one of the darker forces of globalization? Or as an emerging institution of global accountability? The latter depends upon recognition that the potential deregulatory effect of the WTO is contingent, and that the liberalization of international trade should enhance welfare, rather than be a goal in its own right. Deliberative solutions require a strong public sphere, and we therefore consider whether solutions based on 'empowered consumer choice', rather than public deliberation, are unsatisfactory responses to the deregulatory impact of international trade disputes and their outcomes

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Enderlein Henrik

**Global Governance der internationalen Finanzmärkte**

in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, Band 8, 2009

Die aktuelle Finanzkrise führt uns vor Augen, welche Folgen eine Entkopplung von Real- und Finanzwirtschaft nach sich ziehen kann: Wenn Volumina und Bedeutung von Finanzanlagen in keinem Verhältnis mehr zu ihren zu Grunde liegenden volkswirtschaftlichen Transaktionen stehen, sind eine finanzwirtschaftliche Überhitzung, Blasenbildungen und letztlich der Zusammenbruch sowohl des Finanzsystems als auch der Realwirtschaft kaum vermeidlich. Die besondere Tragweite der aktuellen Krise ergibt sich daraus, dass sich die Entkopplung in einem hoch komplexen System globaler Transaktionen vollzogen hat. Die transnationalen Verflechtungen im globalen Finanzsystem und die aus ihr resultierenden Kettenreaktionen im Krisenfall haben einen ökonomischen Problemdruck hervorgebracht, der in dieser Form historisch wohl einzigartig ist.

<http://www.bpb.de/publikationen/9ZY6SP.html>

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

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European Economy News

**Global plan for recovery and reform: the G20 London summit**

in *European Economy News*, April 2009 - Issue 13

With the EU at the forefront, leaders from the world's largest 20 economies met in London at the latest G20 summit on 2 April to agree a coordinated action plan to put the world economy back on a growth path and to reform global financial institutions.

Both the financial crisis and its economic fallout have gone from local to global. Despite the rapid and coordinated global



responses so far, the world is not out of the woods yet. Most forecasters predict that the global economy will shrink in 2009, to an extent which has not occurred since World War II, and the International Labour Organisation forecasts that 50 million jobs could be lost by the end of the year. The situation has become so serious that the International Monetary Fund chief Dominique Strauss-Kahn is calling it the 'Great Recession'.

Against this backdrop, the leaders of the so-called Group of Twenty, a group of the world's largest 20 economies who together represent 85% of the global economy, met in London. Hosted by UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown, the assembled leaders included US President Barack Obama, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, European Commission President José Manuel Barroso, China's President Hu Jintao, as well as the leaders of Japan, Russia, India, Brazil and the other G20 members. They gathered to hammer out the next phase of their coordinated approach to charting a course out of the current crisis.

The G20 agreed a bold US\$1 trillion (€800 billion) package to help the global economy turn the corner. "The decisions taken today are much more ambitious than was expected," commented Commission President José Manuel Barroso. "That is the result of hard work but also of the spirit in which the discussions were conducted."

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### **Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

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Smith Andy

#### **How the WTO Matters to Industry: The Case of Scotch Whisky**

in **International Political Sociology** , Volume 3, Issue 2, June 2009 , 176-193

Although the World Trade Organization (WTO) has spawned a considerable academic literature, as yet research on this organization has rarely been problematized around clear theories of the relationship between law, economics, and politics. Building upon institutionalist premises and concepts drawn from political sociology and industrial economics, this article suggests a means of filling this gap by grasping the "political work" involved in the regulation of specific industries. Illustrated through the case of Scotch whisky, a focus is developed on how the WTO matters to contemporary industry. This reveals that the most powerful actors in industries such as Scotch have developed resources which legitimize their simultaneous engagement in a range of decision-making arenas. These include, but are not necessarily dominated by, the WTO.

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### **Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

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Asif H. Qureshi

#### **International Trade for Development: The WTO as a Development Institution?**

in **Journal of World Trade**, Volume 43 Issue 1 , 173-188

This article explores the development dimension of international trade through a focus on the institutional character of the World Trade Organization (WTO). In particular it challenges the assumptions upon which the assertion that the WTO is not a development institution has been made. This analysis is developed through a focus on the underlying logic and legal basis of the assertion that the WTO is not a development institution.

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Capling Ann, Higgott Richard

**Introduction: The Future of the Multilateral Trade System— What Role for the World Trade Organization?**

in *Global Governance*, vol. 15, n. 3, july-september , 313-326

No abstract available

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Sant'Ana Lima Liza

**L'échec des négociations du cycle de Doha de juillet 2008 - Vers le triomphe des intérêts européens dans la nouvelle réglementation du commerce agricole internationale?**

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, n. 524, janvier , 48-53

If it is true that the outcome of the Doha Development Round negotiations has become more difficult after the new failure they suffered in Geneva in July of 2008, the fact remains that the progress made up until now, particularly on the thorny agricultural matter, indicates the triumph of European interests. This is why the European Union has to fight more for the success of the Development Round.

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Plutino Guido

**La lezione della crisi per le istituzioni di vigilanza**

in *Affari Esteri*, Anno XXXIX, n. 153 , 371-377

No abstract available

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Hervé Alan

**Le mécanisme de règlement des différends de l'OMC – L'interminable contentieux transatlantique sur le bœuf aux hormones**

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, n. 527, avril , 246-256

On November 14, 2008, the Dispute Settlement Body (ORD) of the World Trade Organisation passed the reports of the Special Group and of the Permanent Appeal Body (OAP) in the case opposing the European Community and the United States and Canada as to whether the duty suspension in the EC - Hormone dispute should be maintained. The reports certainly constitute just one of the many episodes of the never ending cross-ocean hormone beef dispute. Yet far from being trivial, the findings of the board members and of the Appeal Body are full of lessons both in terms of multilateral trade dispute settlements proceedings systems and on the way in which the rules of the multilateral standard body, centered on free trade, can now cohabit or even be compatible, with the growing concerns of the WTO members



regarding public health protection.

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Rudolf Adlung, Antonia Carzaniga

**MFN Exemptions Under the General Agreement on Trade in Services: Grandfathers Striving for Immortality?**

in *Journal of International Economic Law*, Volume 12, Number 2 , 357-392

WTO Members have more leeway under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) to elude the WTO's basic most favoured nation (MFN) obligation than in merchandise trade under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. In particular, under the Annex on Article II Exemptions, each Member had the one-off opportunity—at the GATS' entry into force in 1995 or, if later, the date of WTO accession—to seek cover for the retention of whatever departures from MFN treatment. Such MFN exemptions are subject to relatively soft disciplines only. The relevant Annex provides that their duration should not exceed 10 years in principle, and that they be subject to negotiation in any subsequent trade round. In addition, the GATS allows for departures from MFN treatment, which are not subject to time constraints, including for Economic Integration Agreements and recognition measures related to standards, certificates and the like. Over 90 WTO Members (counting EC12 as one) have listed MFN exemptions for close to 500 measures in total. This article discusses their role within the structure of the GATS as well as governments' underlying policy intentions: grandfathering clause or active/offensive policy tool? It further traces the sectoral and modal patterns of current exemptions, their use by different groups of Members and the—limited—changes offered in the services negotiations to date. The authors submit that the non-availability of new exemptions, including for measures that had escaped Members' attention at the relevant point in time, could have added to the popularity of potential substitutes (including in the context of Economic Integration Agreements), promoted an excessively broad interpretation of existing exemptions and discouraged governments from rescinding those that had served their initial purpose. A more flexible approach might thus be warranted; possible options are being discussed.

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Ferreira Ribeiro Gustavo

**Navigating the Turbulent Waters Connecting the World Trade Organization and Corporate Social Responsibility**

in *Indiana Journal for Global Legal Studies*, Volume 16, issue 1, winter , 249-273

ABSTRACT: This paper uses the metaphor of a fisherman's journey into the World Trade Organization (WTO) and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) "seas" to explore the relationship between them. It is intended to provide the reader with a basic understanding of this relationship. An argument can be made that the WTO and CSR waters are not connected at all: the WTO is an intergovernmental organization regulating rights and duties of its members (mainly states), while CSR concerns primarily non-governmental initiatives dealing with corporate behavior, such as voluntary codes of conduct and certification processes involving social and environmental standards. However, this paper explores the straits potentially connecting the seas and the sea creatures that represent the relevant jurisprudence informing the debate.

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Mitchell Andrew, Voon Tania

**Operationalizing Special and Differential Treatment in the World Trade Organization: Game Over?**

in **Global Governance**, vol. 15, n. 3, july-september , 343-357

ABSTRACT: The notion of providing special and differential treatment to developing countries has a long history in the World Trade Organization, but some commentators continue to question its rationale and practical effectiveness in supporting development and integration into the multilateral trading system. In particular, while operationalizing special and differential treatment is one of the important tasks of negotiators in the ongoing Doha Round, some argue that this will be not merely difficult, but in fact impossible to achieve. Doubtless, special and differential treatment cannot of itself solve the problems of the developing world, and relying too heavily on this kind of discrimination will ultimately disadvantage developing country WTO members. Nevertheless, in achieving a successful conclusion to the Doha Round, members must take greater account of the different needs of developing countries and adopt more concrete provisions in this regard than are currently contained in the Uruguay Round agreements. In general, WTO members themselves appear to have accepted this responsibility, despite the slow progress in this as in many other areas of the negotiations. Ideally, this process should involve in-depth economic analysis to identify measurable criteria for granting special and differential treatment to particular countries under specific provisions. If these criteria can be agreed and incorporated into the WTO agreements, no new independent bodies will be required to assess individual cases separate from the established WTO dispute settlement system.

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Alexandre S. de Crombrughe

**Opportunities of Reforming the WTO: Resistance and Potentials of Change**

in **Public Organization Review**, Volume 9, Number 2 , 139-156

This paper intends to show both that a reform of the WTO is severely needed in order to establish a fairer international trade order but also that it is possible. The first section of this paper analyzes the functioning and the most controversial rules of the organization. The second and third sections intend to look for current opportunities of reforming the WTO by analyzing the main existing critical responses to the institution's deficiencies—namely coalitions of southern Nation-States and global civil society movements—and their potential to achieve some change. It is concluded that these two key group actors, while playing different roles, do have common goals on selected issues of international trade and if so, their combined negotiating power is considerably increased for achieving a progress in the direction of a positive reform of the WTO for the developing world.

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Davis Christina

**Overlapping Institutions in Trade Policy**

in **Perspectives on Politics**, vol. 7, issue 1, march , 25-31

ABSTRACT: This article examines the effect of overlapping institutions in trade policy, where the World Trade Organization, preferential trade agreements, and other economic negotiation venues give states many options for



negotiating rules and settling disputes. This article argues that overlapping institutions influence trade politics at three stages: selection of venue, negotiation of liberalization commitments, and enforcement of compliance. First, lobby groups and governments on both sides of a trade negotiation try to choose the set of rules that will favor their preferred outcome. WTO rules that restrict use of coercive tactics outside of the WTO generate a selection process that filters the most difficult trade issues into WTO trade rounds or dispute adjudication while easier issues are settled in bilateral and regional fora. This selection dynamic creates a challenge at the negotiation stage by disaggregating interest group pressure for liberalization commitments. The narrowing of interest group lobbying for the multilateral process may impede negotiation of liberalization agreements that could only gain political support through a broad coalition of exporter mobilization. At the enforcement stage international regime complexity creates the potential for contradictory legal rulings that undermine compliance, but also adds greater penalties for noncompliance if reputation effects operate across agreements.

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Low Partick

**Potential Future Functions of the World Trade Organization**

in **Global Governance**, vol. 15, n. 3, july-september , 327-334

No abstract available

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Foster Caroline E.

**Precaution, Scientific Development and Scientific Uncertainty under the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures**

in **Review of European Community & International Environmental Law**, Volume 18, Issue 1, April , 50-58

The World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate Body has noted that the precautionary principle will be relevant to the interpretation of the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures in various ways, although the Appellate Body has declined to determine the status of the precautionary principle for international law or to find that it has been written into the SPS Agreement. The Appellate Body's awareness of precaution, the dynamics of scientific research and the nature of scientific uncertainty is to be welcomed. This awareness is helpful in dealing with new and emerging issues, such as the question of when a risk assessment relied upon by a WTO member becomes outdated by virtue of subsequent scientific developments. If maintained, an overly rigid approach to risk assessment, with a tight temporal focus, will inadequately acknowledge the natural processes of flux in the development of scientific knowledge.

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Islam Md. Rizwanul, Alam Shawkat

**Preferential Trade Agreements and the Scope of GATT article XXIV, GATS article V and the enabling clause: an appraisal of GATT/WTO Jurisprudence**

in **Netherlands International Law Review**, Volume 56, Issue 1 , 1-34



Despite being contradictory to the World Trade Organisation's (WTO) core objective of freer trade, its rules permits execution of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) provided certain conditions are complied with. WTO mechanism to oversee compliance of these conditions on PTAs is continuously evolving from somewhat tentative approach of earlier General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Panels to more willingness of active judicial interpretation by WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). This article critically analyses the WTO provisions on PTAs taking into account the reports of GATT panels and WTO. It also sheds light on WTO member states views on controversial and hazy issues of the GATT/WTO jurisprudence on PTAs. The article in its concluding part suggests several recommendations designed to ensure greater compliance of the PTAs with rules of the WTO.

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Islam Md Rizwanul, Alam Shawkat

**Preferential Trade Agreements and the Scope of. GATT Article XXIV, GATS Article V and the Enabling Clause: An Appraisal of GATT/WTO Jurisprudence**

in *Netherlands International Law Review*, vol.56, issue 1 , p. 1-34

No abstract available

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Edwards Martin

**Public support for the international economic organizations: Evidence from developing countries**

in *Review of International Organizations (The)* , vol. 4, n. 2, june , 185-209

ABSTRACT: Public opinions regarding the international economic organizations (IEOs; the IMF, World Bank, and WTO) are understudied. I contrast five lines of argument using a multi-country survey of developing countries, focusing on evaluations of the economy, skills, gender, and ideology and measures of involvement with the organizations themselves. At the individual level, respondents have negative views if they have negative views of the state of the economy. More educated respondents are more likely to have negative views of the IEOs. Women are more likely to have positive views of the IEOs than men. National levels of engagement with the IEOs also affect public evaluations of them. Evaluations of the state of the economy are more influential determinants of IEO evaluations in states that receive IMF and World Bank loans, as well as in states that are active in WTO dispute resolution.

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Lane Philip R.

**Reforming the international financial system. Forum. Global Imbalances and Global Governance**

in *Intereconomics*, Volume 44, Number 2 / March, 2009 , 77-81

No abstract available

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Gros Daniel, Klüh Ulrich, Weder Di Mauro Beatrice

**Reforming the international financial system. Forum. Reforming Global Governance: How to make the IMF More Independent**

in *Intereconomics*, Volume 44, Number 2 / March, 2009 , 72-76

No abstract available

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Griesgraber Jo Marie

**Reforms for Major New Roles of the International Monetary Fund? The IMF Post–G-20 Summit**

in *Global Governance*, vol. 15, n. 2, april-june , 179-186

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

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Lavigne Robert, Maier Philipp, Santor Eric

**Renewing IMF surveillance: Transparency, accountability, and independence**

in *Review of International Organizations (The)* , vol. 4, n. 1, march , 29-46

ABSTRACT: In this paper, we present a vision for IMF surveillance that seeks to produce a more accountable, transparent, and independent surveillance process. First, to make surveillance more focused, the IMF's assessment should be principles-based; that is, the Fund should assess the overall coherence of exchange rate, monetary, fiscal and financial policies, with a view to analyzing their effects on external stability. Second, the IMF should have a governance structure that increases incentives to support candid, transparent assessments of surveillance. In practice, this entails a different role for the Executive Board: the Board will set out the Fund's strategic framework for surveillance; the Managing Director and the staff will conduct surveillance. These reforms clarify the roles and responsibilities of the IMF and its member countries in the surveillance process. Also, our proposed reforms aim at making surveillance more even-handed and objective. We believe that this principles-based approach can bolster the credibility and legitimacy of surveillance, giving the Fund greater influence on the economic policies of members.

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Thimann Christian, Just Christian, Ritter Raymond

**Strengthening the Governance of the International Monetary Fund: How a Dual Board Structure Could Raise the Effectiveness and Legitimacy of a Key Global Institution**

in *Global Governance*, vol. 15, n. 2, april-june , 187-194



No abstract available

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Lang Andrew, Cooney Rosie

**Taking Uncertainty Seriously: Adaptive Governance and International Trade: A Rejoinder to Mónica García-Salmones**

in *European Journal of International Law*, Vol.20, n.1 , 187-192

It is always a pleasure and an honour to have a colleague engage with one's work in detail. We are grateful, therefore, to Mónica García-Salmones for her response to our article, and are pleased to have this opportunity to clarify some aspects of our thinking and our approach that may not have been explicit enough in the original piece. Given the limitations of space available, we have decided to put to one side the many points of detail on which we may differ from García-Salmones, and provide simply the broad outlines of a response to the three primary lines of criticism which we understand García-Salmones to be offering.

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García-Salmones Mónica

**Taking Uncertainty Seriously: Adaptive Governance and International Trade: A Reply to Rosie Cooney and Andrew Lang**

in *European Journal of International Law*, Vol.20, n.1 , 167-186

The use of experts' power in global networks is often concealed by describing it in the register of scientific truths. This text seeks to illustrate the phenomenon by reference to the recent article by Cooney and Lang, 'Taking Uncertainty Seriously: Adaptive Governance and International Trade', which appeared in this journal. The account those authors give of WTO law goes beyond a purely legitimacy-based structure focused on effectiveness. Instead, the question is framed in terms of cognitive achievements by regulators in the member states. The present article uses Cooney and Lang's project and the same example of the WTO in order to evaluate global governance. In so doing it analyses the functionalist style of public law, together with neofunctionalism and the historical phenomena by which increasing areas in the public sphere are attributed to regulators, both national and international. With this article, the author hopes to contribute to the debate about the tensions caused by the legal activity of international organizations in a world of equal sovereigns with unequal access to power. In conclusion it is suggested that, so far as contemporary global governance is concerned, the distribution of jurisdiction through regulation is the sphere in which the usual political struggles between international actors take place.

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Alvarez-Jimenez Alberto

**The WTO Appellate Body's Decision-Making Process: A Perfect Model For International Adjudication?**

in *Journal of International Economic Law*, Volume 12, Number 2 , 289-331



The functioning of the Appellate Body (AB) is virtually perfect in terms of collegial decision-making. During its first 12 years, it has produced more than 70 reports dealing with controversial trade and non-trade issues with results that are astonishing. First of all, the AB has usually met the strict 90-day deadline to render its decisions, established by the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). Second, despite the fact that the AB has dealt with issues of paramount domestic and international relevance, which could lead to internal divisions among AB Members, the collegial decision-making process of the AB has managed to decide all cases so far with only three separate opinions. And third, even though the AB decides by Divisions, its case law has been coherent through all of them. How has the AB's; collegial decision-making process been able to achieve these results? Former AB Members have provided some descriptions of the AB's; decision-making process. However, they face limitations on the scope of the disclosure of how the AB decides appeals and therefore can provide partial explanations for the success of the institution. This article seeks to fill in this gap using theoretical and comparative analyses to reveal the formal features and informal practices of the AB that allow it to achieve the aforementioned outcomes.

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Pallas Christopher L. , Wood Jonathan

**The World Bank's Use of Country Systems for Procurement: A Good Idea Gone Bad?**  
in *Development Policy Review* , Volume 27 Issue 2 , 215 - 230

The World Bank's newest country-systems policy, adopted in 2008, allows borrowers to use their national systems to conduct procurement and manage finances for Bank-funded projects. In principle, it will incentivise institutional reform, increase local ownership, and facilitate donor harmonisation. In practice, its content and the handling of stakeholder input seem to indicate that the Bank's dominant desire has been to preserve its market share. This article demonstrates (i) how deficiencies in the policy may reverse the Bank's work on governance and undercut aid efficiency, and (ii) how its handling of public consultations on the policy ignored the Bank's best practices. It concludes with steps for improving the policy, including re-opening dialogue with key stakeholders.

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Mosconi Antonio

**The World Supremacy of the Dollar at the Rendering (1917-2008)**  
in *Federalist Debate (The)*, Year XXII, n. 1, March , 12-16

The "double entry" accounting system by Luca Pacioli<sup>1</sup>, that of the "patrimonial system", (before the "revenue accounting system" began to give to the most talented accountants, to the most refined mathematicians and to the most clever financiers the possibility to let the destruction of assets pass for creation of profits), has finally rendered its arithmetic verdict on the end of the world supremacy of the dollar, which lasted for ninety years. Committed for trial for fraudulent bankruptcy. Waiting for the markets and the Courts to emit their respective judgements, it can be useful to go back over this currency in its two lives: currency of a creditor powerful country from the Twenties to the Sixties, currency of an "empire of debt"<sup>2</sup> from the Seventies up to now.

Three different Keynes allowed us to preview its evolution: the young officer of the English Treasury, who in 1919 resigned from the financial delegation at the peace table in protest against the reparations imposed on Germany<sup>3</sup>; the



aged professor who, in 1936, introduced in the economic science expressions as animal spirits, state of expectations, liquidity traps and other strange things corresponding to observable real behaviours and able to give theoretical explanations to the experience of massive and long lasting unemployment<sup>4</sup>; finally, the plenipotentiary who at Bretton Woods in 1944, old and sick, was defeated, together with the British Empire, in his extreme attempt to avoid, with his bancor, the predominance of the dollar<sup>5</sup>. In the post-war period, the goal indicated by Keynes, namely to create an international monetary base linked to a non-inflationary development of the world more than to the needs of a single powerful country, was pursued by Robert Triffin<sup>6</sup>.

According to the masterly reconstruction made by Hudson<sup>7</sup>, the dollar supremacy began in 1917, when the US Government financed the war efforts of Great Britain, France and Italy against the Central Empires, imposing the intergovernmental financing model instead of the private bank loans and of the friendly aids from allies, until then commonly used to tackle the financial needs of wars. The European States, to combat against each other, bought armaments from their ex-colony, got into debt with the American Government and were not even able to win the conflict by themselves. The final intervention of the US, when the European States were almost at the end of that horrible carnage, made it the real winner of the war.

The problem of the inter-alliance debt got intertwined with that of the German reparations. Germany, argued Keynes at Versailles, could not pay the reparations to Great Britain and to France without selling goods and services to the winners, who, nonetheless, did not mean to make room for that in their markets. At the same time, the “winning” European powers were not able to reimburse the debt contracted with the American Government without collecting the German reparations or getting the means needed through a commercial surplus. The reparations, in short, could and did eventually lead to a second world war. Ignored, Keynes resigned and wrote *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*. The prophecy was understood only when it came true, but at least it was useful for managing the second post-war period better than the first.

Roosevelt, just in office, was responsible for the failure of the 1933 London Conference, from which Great Britain and France expected, as the Hoover administration had let them hope, the remission of their debt or at least a moratorium, and therefore the possibility to come to a transaction with Germany. The formal explanation offered by the Roosevelt administration was that the US in 1917 was not yet an ally but only an “associate” in the war. The New Deal, which within the US was envisaging policies favourable to debtors, applied towards the European States a most rigorous creditor policy, together with protectionist measures. The debtor Countries, which wanted to honour their commitment towards the US, as the possibility of exports was excluded, asked more pressingly for the payment of the German reparations. This greatly favoured Hitler’s campaign and pushed Europe towards its own destruction.

In 1936 Keynes published his *General Theory* and sided for the imitation of the New Deal by Great Britain. Undoubtedly, the New Deal, launched already some years before, put into place for the first time policies supporting the monetary demand and direct public interventions in the economy, that Keynes deemed essential to guarantee a stable level of income and an almost full employment in the capitalistic system characterized by complex financial institutions, whose instability was intrinsic in their investment-financing models<sup>8</sup>. However, the application of policies similar to those of the New Deal, therefore of a “beggar your neighbour” type, by the single national States could lead directly to war. This contradiction could be less visible to Roosevelt and Keynes, thanks to the size and richness of the internal market for the former and to the imperial space for the latter, but for the other European States its undervaluation was the most ruinous mistake of their economic nationalism. English federalists saw the contradiction, denounced it and supported a new international order, but the world had taken another path and Lionel Robbins himself, in the post-war period, regretted that he had opposed the “reflation” suggested by Keynes<sup>9</sup>.



The financial tools with which the US Government supported the Allies before and during the Second World War (cash and carry and lend-lease) added a new and unsustainable weight to the previous debt, allowed the Americans to impose to Great Britain the renunciation to her imperial status, definitely strengthened the American position in the world and sanctioned the US succession to Great Britain as the hegemonic power. Therefore, the European national States' division handed the entire continent over to the US.

The agreement reached at Bretton Woods with the adoption of the White Plan (a gold exchange standard founded on the convertibility of the dollar in gold at the price of 35 US\$ per ounce) and the rejection of the proposal put forward by Keynes (an international currency denominated *bancor*), sealed the success of the American project of a unilateral dominance on the Western world. The success of the dollar as the international currency, the American power of veto at the International Monetary Fund, the use of the World Bank to support an international division of labour favourable to American exports, the double standard which became the GAAP rule in commercial matters, made up the bone structure of the economic system corresponding to the American hegemony.

The US obtained Europe's final renunciation to any colonial ambition during the Suez crisis (1956), when it asked the IMF to make its support to the pound conditional on the retreat of the Anglo-French troops from the Canal. The Americans, as illustrated by Hudson, were aiming at taking over the English Empire since the times of the first intergovernmental loan in 1917. The crisis of the pound in 1956 was caused mainly by the conversion of the sterling balances into dollars. They were Great Britain's debts vis-à-vis its Colonies for the supply of groceries to the US, the main British contribution to the war. At Bretton Woods, Keynes asked for a bilateral clearing regarding these "deposits" between Great Britain and its Colonies, in order to reimburse them gradually with the income coming from exports, but the US asked and obtained, together with the abandonment of the imperial status, the multilateralization of those British debts.

More than once (with regard to the 1917 loan, the London Conference and Bretton Woods) Hudson reflects on the reasons at the root of the British acquiescence to the American requests, and tries different answers. Firstly, that Great Britain was convinced of the need to keep the creditor policy strong, honouring the commitments even in a debtor position, because that policy, as well as private property, was a pillar of capitalism, and the British leading classes of the time, amongst which there were also supporters of fascism and nazism, feared communism more than anything else. Secondly, Hudson's hypothesis is that Great Britain resigned itself to pass the baton to the US, in order to realize through them the diffusion of the English language and culture (that is, their "race") worldwide. Each of these explanations includes relevant aspects, but one cannot forget that in reality Great Britain did not have other possibilities: the division of the national sovereign States and their wars delivered the entire Europe in the hands of the US.

The acceptance of the dollar as the international currency, when the US was in a leading position during the "golden years" between 1946 and 1965, can therefore be easily understood. The Bretton Woods monetary system had reorganized the "free world" around the dollar, as the British Empire had been organized around the pound. The US represented more than half of the world's gross product, had almost the totality of the gold reserves and was the only one able to finance the reconstruction and the economic recovery in the post-war period. It did it in a masterly manner, for the clear correspondence between reconstruction and the American reason of State, for the improvement in the way economy was perceived (a quarter of a century had passed since the Economic Consequences), and finally, perhaps, for its idealism (at least in a minority always present in American history). The US was nevertheless able to prolong the international role of the dollar until today, forty years after the end of the gold convertibility (in 1968 it was limited to the Central Banks and in 1971 it was abolished by Nixon). The power exercised by the US as creditor is evident, but the one



exercised as debtor needs some explanation. As guessed by Triffin, the adoption of the dollar as the international currency could end up in two opposite situations (the Triffin dilemma): a shortage of the international currency in the case of a surplus of the American balance of payments, and an excess of dollars in the opposite case. After the dollar-shortage of the Fifties, there came the dollar-inflation with the wars in Korea and above all in Vietnam. After the declaration of the end of the dollar convertibility in gold, the gold-exchange standard became, even formally, a dollar standard, which allowed the US to finance a series, until today almost uninterrupted, of export-balance deficits.

Until 1982, the deficits were caused by capital flows: the US bought, getting into debt, the companies of the rest of the world, gained high profits and capital gains on its investments, and paid low interests on its Treasury Bills and on its Treasury Bonds. The balance of current payments did not present unbalances. Europe and Japan were in this phase the main investors in the US. However, from 1982, the deficit involved the current account balance of goods and services, and it worsened until it reached 5-7% of the GDP, not very affected by the changes in the dollar exchange rate (also because the dollar was devalued vis-à-vis the wrong currencies: too much versus the euro, too little versus the yuan). The military costs, continuously increasing, were financed with foreign debt without a corresponding increase in tax rates, which were on the contrary lowered for the upper classes. The Government therefore avoided to ask Congress, and the American people, to support the war costs. The "deficit without tears", opposed in vain by De Gaulle and Rueff, allowed to finance the cannons without renouncing to the butter.

Europe brought itself to safety with the creation of the euro, a process which lasted for thirty years. The main investors in the US were in this second phase the oil-exporting countries and the Asian countries, which were exporting industrial products (with extensive use of low-cost labour, without social dues, without environmental restrictions, with a strong State-control on the exchange rate). The export revenues of these countries, deposited in US banks and mainly reinvested in US Treasury bonds, made the US the largest world debtor. But the accumulation of the deficit made the debt unsustainable.

It would be really surprising if the American Government and the too many authorities in charge of controlling the US financial system, every day under pressure for the need to renew the old debts and to place new ones, were worried about exercising more stringent controls, about impeding the most dangerous financial experiments, about limiting the creation of financial institutions not subject to the Fed's rules, and about putting at last a limit to the leverage levels, tending to infinity. As illustrated by Minsky, in a capitalist system like ours (the true one, not that of the Chicago boys' books) instability is intrinsic, because the physiological financing phases (hedge financing) cause an increase in profits, and consequently an increase in the value of capital assets, which pushes towards a speculation on their prices through speculative financing tools, which can end up in the need to make new debts to just finance the interests alone on previous debts (the Ponzi financing). This is the path to bankruptcy. This is a different explanation from that given by Galbraith<sup>10</sup> or Shiller<sup>11</sup>, of an irrational expectation of a continuous increase in the stock exchange, because Minsky underlined the endogenous character of instability: even if all the operators behave rationally, the sum of their rational behaviours is not sustainable by the economy as a whole.

The fundamental issue is therefore the international role played by a domestic currency: with the US Government busy with the placement of debts, and the controlling Authorities willing to take no notice, bankruptcy is not an enigma any more<sup>12</sup>. Market fundamentalism, deregulation, privatisation/expropriation of public properties and of natural monopolies, all the Chicago paraphernalia talked about by Reagan and his successors served only as a smokescreen to cover the US, while it was putting in place the most ruthless debtor policy, according to which debts are not to be paid.

This crisis is not like the others, but it is the last convulsion of the international role of the dollar. The world economic



recovery cannot be pursued and the relapse into protectionism and war cannot be avoided without radical reforms:<sup>13</sup>, the creation of a world currency unit, with functions similar to those of the European currency unit (ecu) in the phase preceding the creation of the euro;  
the entrusting of the world economic and financial supervision powers to the IMF, transformed into a true economic Council of Ministers of the UN (corresponding to the European Ecofin), as already suggested by Delors;  
the entrusting to the Bank of International Settlements of the functions of Central Bank of the world system (or of the system of monetary systems);  
the entrusting to the European Central Bank of banking and financial supervision functions in the Eurozone, and to the BIS of the corresponding functions at the world level;  
the institution of independent authorities, in Europe and worldwide, with the functions today entrusted, with a conflict of interests, to the rating agencies;  
the institution of a public insurance company at world level for the coverage of global risks, or, at least, of an authority for the independent evaluation of risks, to be a reference for the insurance market;  
the commitment to a common struggle against illegal financial flows, disguised and secret, which make drugs, international crime and terrorism possible and profitable, to be pursued even in their off-shore havens;  
the use of the World Bank to pursue goals of human development and for the battle against poverty.

1 Fra' Luca Pacioli (Borgo San Sepolcro 1445 - Rome 1517), pupil of Piero della Francesca, mathematician and Franciscan, is the inventor of the "double entry".

2 Bill Bonner and Addison Wiggin, *Empire of Debt. The rise of an Epic Financial Crisis*, 2006, Hoboken.

3 John Maynard Keynes, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, 1919, Cambridge.

4 J.M.K., *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money*, 1936, London.

5 Robert Skidelsky, *John Maynard Keynes. Volume Three. Fighting for Freedom 1937-1946*, 2000, New York.

6 Triffin's works, from 1935 to 1988, were translated in Italian and collected in the volume "Dollaro, euro e moneta mondiale", with a preface by Alfonso Iozzo, 1997, Bologna. For this article, I make particular reference to: Robert Triffin, *Our International Monetary System: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow*, 1968, New York.

7 Michael Hudson, *Super Imperialism. The Origin and Fundamentals of U.S. World Dominance*, second edition, 2003, London; first published in 1972.

8 The introduction of financial instability is the most innovative aspect of the Keynesian economy. However, it is ignored by the neo-classical synthesis and it is seen as banal by the same neo-Keynesian models. A deeper examination of the Keynesian Theory, compared to the simplistic general opinion, was necessary only at the end of the golden years (1946-66) with the recurrence of longer and stronger financial crises. See the two main works by Minsky: Hyman P. Minsky, *John Maynard Keynes*, 1975, New York; *Stabilizing an Unstable Economy*, 2008, New York, first published in 1986.

9 Lionel Robbins, *Economic Planning and International Order*, 1937, London. On Robbins and Keynes, see Guido Montani, *Introduction to the Italian edition of Robbins' works, Il federalismo e l'ordine economico internazionale*, 1985, Bologna. On Robbins and the British federalists, see Lucio Levi, *Federalist Thinking*, chapter 6, *English Constitutional Federalism and the Crisis of the European System of States between the World Wars*, 2008, Lanham.

10 John Kenneth Galbraith, *The Great Crash*, 1961, Boston.

11 Robert J. Shiller, *Irrational Exuberance*, 2000, Princeton N.J.

12 A timeless reconstruction is given by Morris: Charles R. Morris, *The Trillion Dollar Meltdown: Easy Money, High Rollers, and the Great Credit Crash*, 2008, Public Affairs.

13 The suggested proposals can be found in the article by Alfonso Iozzo and Antonio Mosconi, *The Foundation of a Cooperative Global Financial System. A new Bretton Woods to confront the crisis of the international role of the US dollar*, in *The Federalist Debate*, 2/2006.



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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations*

Zang Michelle Q

**The Wto Contingent Trade Instruments Against China: What Does Accession Bring?**  
in *International & Comparative Law Quarterly* , Volume 58 - Issue 02 , 321-351

As part of the conditions for WTO accession, China is committed to a number of additional obligations stipulated in the accession documents. This article will mainly focus on the contingent trade instruments in this context, which WTO Members are entitled to take against products of Chinese origin. In this regard, the WTO rules to be examined include the buffering mechanism under Sections 15 and 16 of the Accession Protocol and the textile-specific safeguard mechanism under paragraph 242 of the Working Party Report. The discriminatory and non-beneficial nature of the latter makes it the most unfair component in China's accession. In some cases, these China-only instruments also go against some fundamental WTO principles. For example, revivals of grey-area measures and the bilateral approach are fairly evident therein, which are no longer advocated and even prohibited under the WTO system.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations*

Jones Kent

**The political economy of WTO accession: the unfinished business of universal membership**  
in *World Trade Review*, Volume 8, Issue 2, April 2009

While the WTO now represents most of the world's population, GDP, and trade, the accession process since its founding has been lengthy, and it is getting longer. Compared to its predecessor, the GATT, the WTO applies a much more detailed and legalistic approach to accession, due to its broader scope of policy coverage and the enforcement powers of the Dispute Settlement Understanding. In WTO accession cases, WTO incumbent members have a superior bargaining position. The present study provides evidence that the elapsed time from WTO application to accession has increased with the number of completed accessions, suggesting a process of learning by WTO members to bargain for more demanding concessions from applicants. Regarding the terms of accession, the number of rules commitments has increased, and the level of bound tariffs has fallen, as the number of completed accessions has increased. In view of the difficult cases remaining in order to complete universal WTO membership, the author proposes more flexibility in accession requirements, along the lines of the GATT tradition.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations*

Mercurio Bryan

**Why compensation cannot replace trade retaliation in the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding**  
in *World Trade Review*, Volume 8, Issue 2, April 2009



Throughout the course of the DSU Review, Members and commentators alike have proposed numerous modifications to the WTO DSU covering a wide range of areas. One area which has received quite a bit of attention is that of retaliatory measures in the implementation phase of the dispute settlement process. This article does not attempt to recap the debate over the appropriateness of trade retaliation or even to discuss all potential amendments targeting this issue. It does, however, identify some of the key criticisms of trade retaliation before analyzing and evaluating the worthiness of trade and/or financial compensation as an alternative. The article finds that neither trade nor financial compensation will do much to resolve the prominent criticisms of trade retaliation while also finding both options would add several uncertainties to the system and, far from increasing compliance with the rulings and recommendations of the DSB, could in fact increase the instances of non-compliance.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations*

**Bartels Lorand**

**'Interim agreements' under Article XXIV GATT**

in *World Trade Review*, Volume 8, Issue 2, April 2009

This note looks at the WTO rules and procedures applicable to the implementation period of regional trade agreements on trade in goods. In addition, it highlights some differences between law and practice and explores the implications of these divergences. Where the GATT and subsequent instruments draw a distinction between 'full' regional trade agreements and 'interim' agreements, in practice all agreements are notified as 'full' agreements with an implementation period. It analyses the possibility that this deviation from the law, now sanctioned in the 2006 Transparency Decision, might have some practical implications for the regulation of regional trade agreements in the WTO.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations*

**Girard Michel, Milner Helen V.**

**Turbulences et stabilités**

in *Politique Etrangère*, n. 1, printemps

"Depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale, l'Alliance transatlantique suggère une question centrale : les relations États-Unis/Europe sont-elles caractérisées par la coopération sur la poursuite d'objectifs communs, ou par le conflit, chacun cherchant son propre avantage ?"

"Since World War II, the Transatlantic Alliance raises a central question: is the US-Europe relationship based on cooperation aimed at reaching common objectives, or on an endless clash of interests?"

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations*

**Halimi**

**A quoi sert l'OTAN ?**

in *Monde Diplomatique (Le)*, Mars



Monsieur Nicolas Sarkozy voulait que sa présidence marque la rupture avec un « modèle social français » auquel la faillite du capitalisme financier à la mode américaine vient de rendre des couleurs. A-t-il alors résolu d'en finir avec une autre tradition française, celle de l'indépendance nationale ? Bien qu'il n'ait jamais évoqué une telle « rupture » au cours de sa campagne électorale, et qu'il ait ensuite conditionné un retour de la France dans le commandement intégré de l'Organisation du traité de l'Atlantique nord (OTAN) à un renforcement de la défense européenne, M. Sarkozy a néanmoins annoncé que la décision du général de Gaulle avait vécu.

<http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2009/03/HALIMI/16872>

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### **Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations*

**S. Haggard; M. Noland**

#### **A security and peace mechanism for Northeast Asia: the economic dimension in *Pacific Review (The)*, Volume 22 Issue 2, 119 - 137**

Northeast Asia is notable for the relative absence of regional institutions. The Six Party Talks could constitute an embryonic starting point for the development of such institutions. The path toward greater institutionalization is likely to begin in a modest fashion. Functional working groups on topics such as the environment, maritime transport, technical barriers to trade, road and rail links, and energy could provide the locus for integrating North Korea into the broader regional and global economies. Foreign ministries will inevitably take the lead in developing the Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism (NEAPSM), but meaningful economic achievements will require the involvement of other ministries. North Korea has proved problematic in this regard thus far. Moreover, given the importance of private-sector involvement in achieving sustainable economic development in North Korea, modalities will have to be developed to integrate private-sector actors when possible. The governments of the region, and particularly China and South Korea, may continue support on a bilateral basis as a hedge against North Korea's collapse or as inducements in the context of the nuclear talks. But the development of more permanent multilateral structures is unlikely until the nuclear issue is resolved.

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### **Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations*

**Varwick Johannes**

#### **Auf dem Weg zum Weltpolizisten?**

in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, Band 15-16, 2009

Die Nordatlantische Vertragsorganisation (North Atlantic Treaty Organization/NATO) blickt im Frühjahr 2009 auf ihren 60. Gründungstag zurück. Bereits im März 1948 hatten Verhandlungen über den Nordatlantikpakt zwischen den Botschaftern Großbritanniens, Kanadas und Vertretern des US-Außenministeriums begonnen. Erstmals öffentlich vorgetragen wurde die Vorstellung einer formalisierten atlantischen Verteidigungsgemeinschaft am 29. April 1948, als der kanadische Außenminister Louis Saint Laurent im heimischen Unterhaus den Vorschlag eines auf gegenseitiger Hilfeleistung beruhenden Verteidigungssystems einbrachte, das neben den beiden nordamerikanischen Staaten auch europäische Partner umfassen sollte. Dänemark, Island, Italien, Norwegen und Portugal wurden eingeladen, sich den Verhandlungen über ein Militärbündnis anzuschließen.



<http://www.bpb.de/publikationen/VUIUQV.html>

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations*

**Nourzhanov Kirill**

**Changing security threat perceptions in Central Asia**

in *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 63, n. 1 / March , 85-104

This article discusses the current process of securitisation in Central Asia and identifies its convoluted and faulty nature as a factor impeding collective security action in the region. It uses the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) as an explanatory tool and posits that security discourse in — and about — the five former Soviet republics is dominated by geopolitical grand strategy on the one hand and by particularist concerns about lack of democracy or transnational threats on the other. Issues of conventional security involving two or more states, such as territorial disputes or resource management, are pushed aside and rarely securitised at the official level. The article outlines conceptual and institutional reasons for this bias, and argues that unless inter-state tensions are properly analysed, debated and addressed, the prospects for security and stability in the region will remain grim.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations*

**Santin Ilenia**

**Dall'Europa all'Atlantico. Il progetto comunitario di Paul-Henry Spaak segretario generale della Nato**

in *Nuova Storia Contemporanea*, a. XIII, n. 2, marzo-aprile

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations*

**Detke Dieter**

**Deutschland als europäische Macht und Bündnispartner**

in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, Band 15-16, 2009

Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland ist noch immer weit entfernt von einer zukunftsfähigen strategischen Kultur. Aber keine deutsche Regierung wird sich auf Dauer dem Zwang zur "Normalisierung" im Umgang mit militärischer Gewalt entziehen können, so verständlich die Abneigung gegen Kampf-einsätze der Bundeswehr im Ausland aufgrund der deutschen Geschichte auch sein mag. Die gegenwärtige Struktur der Bundeswehr ist ungeeignet, die sicherheitspolitischen Herausforderungen der Zukunft zu bestehen.

The full text is free:

<http://www.bpb.de/publikationen/AUH6CP.html>

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**



*Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations*

Gyárfásová Olga

**Die Zukunft der NATO in Mitteleuropa**

in **Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte**, Band 15-16, 2009

Wenn man sich über die Zukunft der NATO Gedanken machen will, muss man mit der Vergangenheit beginnen. Wir müssen beim historischen Wendepunkt im Jahr 1989 ansetzen und uns das Ende des Kalten Krieges und den Zusammenbruch der kommunistischen Regime in Erinnerung rufen. Der Traum von der Rückkehr "von der falschen Seite des Vorhangs", den die Bewohner Mittel- und Osteuropas 40 lange Jahre geträumt hatten, drückte sich nach dem Fall des Eisernen Vorhangs in der Parole "Zurück nach Europa" aus. Er umfasste auch den Wiedereintritt in die westliche Staatengemeinschaft - transatlantische Zusammenarbeit und volle NATO-Mitgliedschaft inbegriffen. "Der Westen" war Symbol der Freiheit und des Wohlstands.

<http://www.bpb.de/publikationen/C6I5QP.html>

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations*

Mitchell A. Wess

**Europe Policy 3.0: New Ideas for an Old Continent**

in **Heartland – Eurasian Review of Geopolitics**, n. 1, "Obama's Challenges"

After the Cold War and unilateral expansionism phase, it is time for the United States to consolidate its positions in European space. NATO should not expand further east, if ever we should push north. Impede the Euro-Russian marriage. The Nabucco priority.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations*

Buro Andreas, Singe Martin

**Expansion und Eskalation: 60 Jahre NATO**

in **Blätter für deutsche & internationale Politik**, April, 2009 , 53-63

Full Text is free:

<http://www.blaetter.de/artikel.php?pr=3059>

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

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Dustin Dehéz

**Finally at Certain Crossroads? Three Critical Challenges to NATO**

in **American Foreign Policy Interests**, Vol. 31, Issue 2 , 120-130



This article presents an analysis of the kinds of challenges facing NATO by conceptualizing them as crossroads that will require the organization to pause long enough to redefine the current debate about enlargement and its relations with partners, enemies, and foes alike.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

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Kupchan Charles A.

**Géopolitique des relations transatlantiques**

in *Politique Etrangère*, n. 1, printemps

La fin de la guerre froide et de la menace centrale, l'affirmation de puissance des États-Unis et la politique étrangère de George W. Bush, les avancées de la construction européenne enfin, ont fortement distendu les liens transatlantiques. Le partenariat doit aujourd'hui être reconstruit sur de nouvelles bases. Et les États-Unis ont à nouveau intérêt à encourager la formation d'une Europe puissante, en particulier en matière de politique étrangère.

Several factors have contributed to make transatlantic relations looser: the end of the Cold War and its threats, the strengthening of US power and changes in American foreign policy under George W. Bush, the progress made in the building of the European Union. A new partnership has to be founded on new bases; the United States should give support to the constitution of a strong European Union, especially in the field of foreign policy.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

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Rogozin Dmitry

**How NATO could improve its relations with Russia**

in *Europe's World*, Issue 11, Spring

By demonstrating the fault-lines in European security, last year's crisis over Georgia could mark a turning point in post-Cold War international relations, says Dmitry Rogozin, Russia's ambassador to NATO. All it takes now, he adds, is for NATO to be on board.

<http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/21335/Default.aspx>

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations*

Di Paola Giampaolo

**I sessanta anni di attività della NATO**

in *Affari Esteri*, Anno XLI, n. 162, 262-273

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**



*Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations*

**Braml Josef**

**Im Westen nichts Neues?**

in **Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte**, Band 15-16, 2009

Voraussagen, nach denen mit dem Untergang der Sowjetunion auch die transatlantische Allianz ihre Mission erfüllt habe, waren verfrüht. Die NATO hat das Ende des Kalten Kriegs überlebt. Gleichwohl muss sich die "großartigste Allianz, die je gebildet wurde, um unsere gemeinsame Sicherheit zu verteidigen" - wie US-Präsidentschaftskandidat Barack Obama die NATO an der Siegestsäule in Berlin pries - den neuen geopolitischen Rahmenbedingungen und den strategischen Herausforderungen des 21. Jahrhunderts anpassen.

<http://www.bpb.de/publikationen/C6I5QP.html>

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations*

**Parkanova Vlasta**

**In some ways, the European Defence Agency is stronger than NATO**

in **Europe's World**, Issue 11, Spring

The fledgeling EDA is not yet five years old, whereas NATO is 60. But Vlasta Parkanová, Defence Minister of the Czech Republic, points out to the areas where the agency is achieving things the alliance never could, and calls for greater synergies between the two.

<http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/21340/Default.aspx>

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations*

**Anupam Jha**

**Indo-US Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Co-operation, 2007: How Safe is the New Born Baby of Indo-US Love Affairs?**

in **Indian Journal of International Law**, volume 48, issue 3 , 435-448

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

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**Larik Joris**

**Kennedy's 'Two Pillars' Revisited: Does the ESDP Make the EU and the USA Equal Partners in NATO?**

in **European Foreign Affairs Review**, Volume 14, Issue 2 , 289-304

This essay takes President John F. Kennedy's visionary 'Declaration of Interdependence' of 1962, in which he called for a concrete transatlantic partnership on equal footing as the benchmark to assess today's relationship between the USA



and the European Union in defence matters. The central question is: can the European Union with its emerging security and defence policy be seen as one of the two supporting pillars of NATO next to the USA? To this end, the general security strategies, the institutional frameworks and capabilities, as well as the defence industries of both sides are compared. The result is that, although the strategies and initiatives taken by the EU point towards a more equitable partnership, the current state of capabilities and defence industries make it impossible to conclude that NATO rests on two equal pillars. Nevertheless, in view of the history of European integration and in anticipation of the fresh impetus to be given by the Obama administration, the author closes by suggesting a less static image of the transatlantic partnership, namely that of an ever-changing, yet ever-closer partnership.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations*

**Petrignani Rinaldo**

**Le sfide dell'Occidente: di ieri, oggi, domani**

in *Affari Esteri*, Anno XLI, n. 163, 509-522

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations*

**Palmas Francesco**

**L'Otan dans la Méditerranée élargie**

in *Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali*, Volume 76, n. 1, gennaio-marzo, 80-95

This article talks about Nato policies in the so-called 'enlarged Mediterranean sea', focusing on the 'Mediterranean dialogue' and the 'Istanbul cooperation initiative'. Its first part takes the reader for a short trip through the Mediterranean history, which tells us of a natural basin and border-area for ever considered both as a vehicle of commercial and cultural exchanges and as a theatre of battles and clashes. Particular attention is given to the complexity of the variables in play and to the interests of the various regional actors, in order to better understand the scenario in which the Atlantic Alliance acts. The second part of the work dwells in detail upon Nato's Mediterranean policy, underlining the outcomes already attained and those expected from the dialogue and the initiative. Obviously, it does not abstain from highlighting the limits and perils that threaten to impair the action of both institutions. Finally, the various strands are weaved into a synthesis and the initial questions are answered.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations*

**Barany Zoltan**

**NATO at Sixty**

in *Journal of Democracy*, Volume 20, Number 2, April, 108-122

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization played a key role in safeguarding Western democracy during the Cold War. With



that conflict over, NATO must continually adapt and evolve in a fast-changing world.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations*

Hunter Robert E.

**NATO's Strategic Focus: Satisfying All of the Allies**

in *American Foreign Policy Interests*, Vol. 31, Issue 2 , 78-89

The analysis concludes that the issues raised in this article will provide an appropriate agenda for debate about strategic interests relating to areas beyond Europe and Europe proper, sorting out the meaning and extent of the enlargement of NATO as a function of the allies' willingness to honor Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the need for a genuine comprehensive approach linking military to nonmilitary activities and the development of effective relations between NATO and the European Union.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations*

Webber Mark

**NATO: The United States, Transformation and the War in Afghanistan**

in *British Journal of Politics & International Relations* , Vol. 11, Issue 1, February , 46-63

During the Bush years, NATO exhibited in stark form two trends which have long characterised its development: periodic exposure to crisis and division, and a subordination to American leadership. Despite signs of American indifference towards the alliance, talk of the Bush administration levering a break with NATO was always overstated, particularly so during its second term of office. Views of NATO after 2004 were shaped by Afghanistan giving rise, in fact, to a return to the alliance on America's part. NATO remains important to Bush's successor but on terms which are as demanding as those of his predecessors. NATO, in other words, is valued in so far as it accords with current US foreign policy priorities. The safest assumption in this regard is that Obama will continue to favour the trend towards a global NATO pursued by the Bush administration. However, retreat (or defeat) in Afghanistan could hasten a contrary trend towards a consolidating NATO with a renewed concentration on the wider Europe.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

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Toje Asle

**New Patterns of Transatlantic Security: The Challenge of Multipolarity**

in *International Spectator (The)*, Vol. XLIV, n. 1, January-March , 33-49

Transatlantic relations are in flux: NATO's struggle for self preservation; the diminished importance of Europe in American geopolitics; the semi-failure of European foreign policy integration; and the absence of a grand bargain among Europe's leading powers. These four trends are making the current transatlantic order unsustainable. But if the international system becomes multipolar, will the "West" be one of the poles? These developments can be assessed by applying the "transatlantic bargain" as a conceptual lens through which to select and assess information. The result is that the dynamics of multipolarity could spell the end for the "transatlantic West".



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Canuel Hugues

**Of ambiguous symbolism and variable geometry: NATO's relevance to national security in the twenty-first century**

in *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* , vol. 7, n. 1, March , 73-91

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

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Smith Martin A.

**Partnerschaft, Kalter Krieg oder Kalter Frieden?**

in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, Band 15-16, 2009

Russland ist für die NATO als "wichtigstes Gegenüber" in einem umfassenden europäischen Sicherheitskontext von nicht zu überschätzender Bedeutung. Der Aufbau und Erhalt einer funktionierenden Beziehung zu Russland wird insofern als wichtiger Faktor erachtet, als sie den Legitimitätsanspruch der NATO als zentraler Bestandteil des europäischen Sicherheitsgefüges nach dem Kalten Krieg untermauert. Im Laufe der Zeit haben die NATO-Mitgliedstaaten die Vorzüge einer Einbeziehung Russlands erkannt, auch weil sie hoffen, Russland könnte bereit sein, wenn auch nicht als Partner, so doch zumindest auf Grundlage als gemeinsam erkannter Interessen hinsichtlich wichtiger Sicherheitsthemen zu agieren. Das bedeutet nicht, dass die Beziehungen zwischen der NATO und Russland seit 1991 reibungslos verlaufen sind. Der Weg war oftmals steinig, und zweimal schien es, als ob die Beziehungen völlig zusammenbrechen würden. Das war während der Kosovo-Krise 1999 und in Folge der russischen Militärintervention in Georgien 2008 der Fall.

<http://www.bpb.de/publikationen/4VEIRC.html>

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations*

Kaim Markus

**Präsident Obama und die transatlantischen Sicherheitsbeziehungen**

in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, Band 15-16, 2009

Wohl selten zuvor ist der Amtsantritt eines amerikanischen Präsidenten in Europa mit solch hohen Erwartungen begleitet worden wie der von Barack Obama. Dies hat verschiedene Ursachen, die miteinander verwoben sind: Zum einen fühlen sich viele Europäer dem neuen Amtsinhaber auf Grund seiner Person und seines Lebenslaufs offensichtlich nahe; zum anderen sprechen diejenigen Äußerungen aus dem Wahlkampf, die auf das politische Programm des neuen Präsidenten schließen lassen, in vielen Staaten Europas die Politik wie die öffentliche Meinung gleichermaßen an und verheißen ein großes Maß an Übereinstimmung und künftiger Zusammenarbeit. Schließlich profitiert das Ansehen Obamas von der - vorsichtig formuliert - geringen Wertschätzung der europäischen Öffentlichkeit



für die außen- und sicherheitspolitische Bilanz der Regierung George W. Bush.

<http://www.bpb.de/publikationen/0TJYTR.html>

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

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Leymarie Philippe

**Reddition française au cœur de l'OTAN  
in Monde Diplomatique (Le), Avril**

En annonçant, le 11 mars, la réintégration de la France dans le commandement militaire intégré de l'Alliance atlantique (OTAN), le président Nicolas Sarkozy a voulu « officialiser » un retour déjà largement effectif. Cette décision tire-t-elle un trait sur la politique européenne de défense ?

<http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2009/04/LEYMARIE/17027>

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

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P. Rangsimaporn

**Russian perceptions and policies in a multipolar East Asia under Yeltsin and Putin  
in Journal of Asian Studies (The), Volume 68 - Issue 01 , 207-244**

While the desire to counterbalance US unilateralism informed Russian perceptions and advocacy of multipolarity globally, the complex and fluid balance of power in a multipolar East Asia complicates Russian perceptions and policies of multipolarity regionally and counterbalancing US power became not the sole goal. Russia's aim in East Asia was to reassert its influence while ensuring a stable regional environment in order for Russia to restore itself as a great power. However, the relatively stabilizing US regional role, the rise of neighboring China, the prospects of Japanese remilitarization and strengthened US–Japanese military alliance, and the lack of a Northeast Asian security structure are factors that pose both challenges and opportunities for Russian policymakers in pursuing Russian interests and great-power aims. Such factors have served to make Russian perceptions and policy in East Asia somewhat contradictory. While Russia's great-power aspiration was relatively clear, the policies to achieve this remained vague and inconclusive.

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Rodionow Iwan

**Russland und die NATO: Grenzen der Gemeinsamkeit  
in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, Band 15-16, 2009**

Die Kaukasus-Krise im vergangenen Jahr war der Lackmus-Test. Unter anderem leuchtete sie die Grenzen der Einflussmöglichkeiten auf Russland aus und belegte die russische Bereitschaft, die transatlantische Allianz zu



verprellen. Es hatte sich zu dem Zeitpunkt, als der Fünftagekrieg begann, schon vieles zwischen Russland und der NATO angestaut, was die Beziehungen arg strapazierte: die NATO-Osterweiterung, die Balkan-Kriege, die Unabhängigkeit des Kosovo und zuletzt die Beitrittsavancen der NATO an die Ukraine und Georgien. Doch hatten die beiden - wie ein alterndes Ehepaar, das sich weitgehend auseinandergeliebt hat - bis dahin gute Miene bewahrt. Nun aber schienen die Dämme gebrochen: Russland aus der G8 ausschließen, russische Studenten aus westlichen Universitäten exmatrikulieren, Bankkonten russischer Inhaber sperren, Kooperationsverträge kündigen, die Olympischen Spiele 2014 in Sotschi absagen und den Eurovision Song Contest in Moskau boykottieren - so lauteten nur einige Vergeltungsvorschläge des Westens.

<http://www.bpb.de/publikationen/VFWHXP.html>

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

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Hönke Jana

**Sicherheit in Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit**

in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, Band 8, 2009

Dieser Artikel beschäftigt sich mit der Governance von Sicherheit in Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit, einem Bereich, der in der liberalen Staatstheorie der Polizei zugeschrieben wird. Das staatliche Gewaltmonopol ist das zentrale Argument zur Legitimierung des Staates und gilt als Kernaufgabe moderner Staatlichkeit. In vielen Staaten wird Sicherheit jedoch kaum von offiziellen Sicherheitskräften erbracht; der Staat verfügt über kein Gewaltmonopol. Es wäre aber falsch, anzunehmen, dass dort, wo es kein oder nur schwaches staatliches Policing gibt, allgemeine Unsicherheit herrscht. Zum einen zeichnet sich begrenzte Staatlichkeit dadurch aus, dass das Feld der Sicherheits-Governance andere Akteure als die Polizei umfasst. Zum anderen ist es oft die Polizei selbst, die als Unsicherheitsproduzent und Gewaltakteur auftritt.

<http://www.bpb.de/publikationen/OWD5BL.html>

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Jentleson Bruce W.

**The Atlantic Alliance in a post-American world**

in *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, vol. 7, n. 1, March, 61-72

No abstract available

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Merlini Cesare

**The Lessons of Ancient History and the Future of Transatlantic Relations**

in *International Spectator (The)*, Vol. XLIV, n. 1, January-March, 23-31



While a global recession of uncertain duration plagues the planet, the Atlantic countries are faced with an agenda of complicated, almost intractable international challenges. The surge of new protagonists on the world scene has been largely the result of a long period of relative stability and extraordinary economic growth thanks to the prevalence of Western paradigms. And yet they mark another step in the shrinking of the West's geostrategic relevance. Obama's America and half-integrated Europe should deal with this new multipolar world with a consistent and synergic approach, made up of a mix of traditional balance-of-power skills and systemic innovations. Over the past two decades, the US' solitary position at the apex of global power has made the analogy with imperial Rome common currency. While this is the wrong lesson to learn from classical history, the achievements and mistakes of ancient Greece and republican as well as imperial Rome may still help us, third millennium Europeans and Americans, sail through the stormy waters of today's planetary Mediterranean.

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Gonczi Kinga

**The Most Successful Alliance: Sixty Years of Collective Defense  
in American Foreign Policy Interests**, Vol. 31, Issue 2 , 90-99

This article contains a brief, comprehensive history of NATO in the context of an analysis of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and identifies the effects that the invocation of this article have had on the stability, functions, credibility, and growth of NATO since it was appealed to for the first time in response to the 9/11 attacks against the United States.

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Aris Stephen

**The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: 'Tackling the Three Evils'. A Regional Response to Non-traditional Security Challenges or an Anti-Western Bloc?**  
in *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 61, n. 3, May , 457-482

This article examines how, despite the initial scepticism about its viability, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) has become the primary security organisation in Central Asia. Two major factors are identified. Firstly, the focus of the SCO on tackling the so-called 'three evils' (terrorism, extremism, separatism) has won it favour with the prevailing leaderships of its member states. Secondly, the specific organisational framework adopted is appropriate for the region. The article concludes that the SCO is best characterised as a regional organisation concerned with non-traditional security and not as a hostile new 'Warsaw Pact' as suggested by some.

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Hallams Ellen

**The Transatlantic Alliance renewed: the United States and NATO since 9/11**  
in *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* , vol. 7, n. 1, March , 38-60

Following NATO's historic invocation of Article V in the aftermath of the September 11 (9/11) terrorist attacks, the United



States was inundated with Allied offers of moral and practical support for the 'War on Terrorism' declared by the Bush Administration. For the most part such offers were spurned, as the United States chose instead to build ad hoc coalitions on a case-by-case, mission-by-mission basis. The Bush Administration's decision to bypass the alliance reignited a simmering debate over its future, prompting many to once again speak of NATO's imminent 'demise'. This paper suggests that while the US emerged from NATO's two Balkans missions with a belief that its operational freedom and flexibility had been hampered by operating within alliance constraints, coalition operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have raised key questions about whether ad hoc coalitions are the most appropriate mechanisms for conducting such operations. NATO's contributions to post-combat reconstruction and stabilisation have highlighted some of the core advantages to be derived from working through the alliance, but the difficulties it has experienced have also reinforced the urgent need for an accelerated process of transformation and reform. Such a process is likely to be critical to ensuring that NATO can meet the demands of the current security environment, and no longer function simply as a 'toolbox' from which the US will pick and choose.

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Fox Liam

**The case for financial reform of both NATO and the ESDP  
in Europe's World**, Issue 11, Spring

Collective security means collective responsibility, says Liam Fox, but the present funding rules for NATO and EU military missions put an unfair financial burden on pro-active nations like Britain. He urges both NATO allies and EU partners do their share of the funding and the fighting.

<http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/21341/Default.aspx>

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Etzioni Amitai

**Tomorrow's Institution Today. The Promise of the Proliferation Security Initiative  
in Foreign Affairs**, May/June 2009 Volume 88, Number 3

Old international institutions must be updated to tackle transnational challenges. The most promising model for doing so is the Proliferation Security Initiative, a recent cooperative effort to interdict weapons of mass destruction.

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Peterson John, Steffenson Rebecca

**Transatlantic Institutions: Can Partnership be Engineered?**

**in British Journal of Politics & International Relations** , Vol. 11, Issue 1, February , 25-45

The transatlantic alliance is widely viewed as being in a state of decline. Conflict over the war in Iraq highlighted a growing divergence between the Bush administration and European Union governments in their attitudes towards



multilateralism. The rift severely tested institutions created to manage bilateral EU–US relations in the aftermath of the cold war. This article examines how well this institutional architecture has held up. It scrutinises the limitations of networked governance in transatlantic relations and acknowledges the quandary of trying to manufacture partnership using imperfect institutions. The Brussels–Washington channel is only one among many through which transatlantic relations flow, but we argue that it continues to gain in importance. Despite the limits of institutional engineering, we conclude that the US and the EU remain each other's most important ally.

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Aldrich Richard J.

**US–European Intelligence Co-operation on Counter-Terrorism: Low Politics and Compulsion**  
in *British Journal of Politics & International Relations* , Vol. 11, Issue 1, February , 122-139

Since 9/11, intelligence has been viewed as an integral part of a controversial 'war on terror'. The acrimonious public arguments over subjects such as Iraqi WMD assessments, secret prisons and the interrogation of detainees suggest intense transatlantic discord. Yet improbably, some of those countries that have expressed strident disagreement in public are privately the closest intelligence partners. It is argued here that we can explain this seeming paradox by viewing intelligence co-operation as a rather specialist kind of 'low politics' that is focused on practical arrangements. Intelligence is also a fissiparous activity, allowing countries to work together in one area even while they disagree about something else. Meanwhile, the pressing need to deal with a range of increasingly elusive transnational opponents—including organised crime—compels intelligence agencies to work more closely together, despite their instinctive dislike of multilateral sharing. Therefore, transatlantic intelligence co-operation will continue to deepen, despite the complex problems that it entails.

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Caligaris Luigi

**Una credibile strategia per la NATO**  
in *Affari Esteri*, Anno XLI, n. 162 , 274-288

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

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Natasha Hamilton-Hart

**War and other insecurities in East Asia: what the security studies field does and does not tell us**  
in *Pacific Review (The)* , Volume 22 Issue 1 , 49 - 71

Security studies of East Asia focus on questions of inter-state war and peace, the distribution of power in the region, and the ways regional institutions mitigate the role of relative power balances and alliance structures. Debate on these issues has become increasingly sophisticated and has evolved theoretically, a process to which *The Pacific Review* has contributed by providing an important outlet for discussion of specifically Asian issues and by fostering the discussion of



regional institutions. The security studies debate on East Asia, however, remains centred on examination of a relatively limited range of independent variables and security threats. Although the field has been redefined to include consideration of so-called 'non-traditional' security issues, work on East Asia has often made the case for non-traditional security studies largely on normative grounds. Further, much of the actual organized violence that has claimed and threatened lives, in particular the region's extensive civil conflicts and state violence against civilians, remains outside the purview of mainstream security studies of the region.

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Adler Emanuel, Greve Patricia

**When security community meets balance of power: overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance in Review of International Studies (The)**, Vol. 35, S1, February , 59-84

By now arguments about the varieties of international order abound in International Relations. These disputes include arguments about the security mechanisms, institutions, and practices that sustain international orders, including balance of power and alliances, hegemony, security regimes based on regional or global institutions, public, private, and hybrid security networks, as well as different kinds of security communities. The way these orders coexist across time and space, however, has not been adequately theorised. In this article we seek to show (A) that, while analytically and normatively distinct, radically different orders, and in particular the security systems of governance on which they are based (such as balance of power and security community), often coexist or overlap in political discourse and practice. (B) We will attempt to demonstrate that the overlap of security governance systems may have important theoretical and empirical consequences: First, theoretically our argument sees 'balance of power' and 'security community' not only as analytically distinct structures of security orders, but focuses on them specifically as mechanisms based on a distinct mixture of practices. Second, this move opens up the possibility of a complex (perhaps, as John Ruggie called it, a 'multiperspectival') vision of regional security governance. Third, our argument may be able to inform new empirical research on the overlap of several security governance systems and the practices on which they are based. Finally, our argument can affect how we think about the boundaries of regions: Beyond the traditional geographical/geopolitical notion of regional boundaries and the social or cognitive notion of boundaries defined with reference to identity, our focus on overlapping mechanisms conceives of a 'practical' notion of boundaries according to which regions' boundaries are determined by the practices that constitute regions.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Rey-Valette Helene, Lardon Sylvie, Chia Eduardo

**Editorial: governance – institutional and learning plans facilitating the appropriation of sustainable development**

**in International Journal of Sustainable Development**, Volume 11, Issue 2-3-4 , 101-114

This editorial introduces the special issue which aims to clarify, from a theoretical as well as applied point of view, and above all based on a multi-discipline approach (economics, geography, management science, political science, information sciences, psychology and geomatics), the partnerships existing between governance and sustainable development so as to understand the interest and dimensions of territorial governance.



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Carraro Carlo, Marchiori Carmen, Orefice Sonia

**Endogenous Minimum Participation in International Environmental Treaties  
in Environmental & Resource Economics**, Volume 42, Number 3, March , 411-425

Many international treaties come into force only after a minimum number of countries have signed and ratified the treaty. Minimum participation constraints are particularly frequent in the case of environmental treaties dealing with global commons, where free-riding incentives are strong. Why do countries that know they have an incentive to free-ride accept to “tie their hands” through the introduction of a minimum participation constraint? This article addresses the above issues by modeling the formation of an international treaty as a three-stage non-cooperative coalition formation game. Both the equilibrium minimum participation constraint and the number of signatories—the coalition size—are determined. This article, by showing that a non-trivial partial coalition, sustained by a binding minimum participation constraint, forms at the equilibrium, explains the occurrence of minimum participation clauses in most international environmental agreements. It also analyses the endogenous equilibrium size of the minimum participation constraint.

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McEvoy David M., Stranlund John K.

**Self-enforcing International Environmental Agreements with Costly Monitoring for Compliance  
in Environmental & Resource Economics**, Volume 42, Number 4, April , 491-508

Theoretical analyses of international environmental agreements (IEAs) have often employed the concept of self-enforcing agreements to predict the number of parties to such an agreement. The term self-enforcing, however, is a bit misleading. The concept refers to the stability of cooperative agreements, not to enforcing compliance with these agreements once they are in place. In this paper we analyze an IEA game in which parties to an agreement finance an independent monitor who audits the compliance performance of the members of an agreement. These audits reveal instances of noncompliance so they can be sanctioned. We find that costly monitoring of compliance limits the circumstances under which international cooperation to protect the environment is worthwhile, but when IEAs do form they will often involve greater participation than IEAs that do not require costly monitoring. Consequently, costly monitoring of IEAs can produce higher international environmental quality. Moreover, under certain conditions, aggregate welfare is higher when IEAs require costly monitoring.

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Waters Timothy William

**"The Momentous Gravity of the State of Things Now Obtaining": Annoying Westphalian Objections to the Idea of Global Governance**

**in Indiana Journal for Global Legal Studies**, Volume 16, issue 1, winter , 25-58

ABSTRACT: Are there situations in which otherwise attractively complex, sub- and cross-national networks are unlikely



to replace the hoary old Westphalian state? Perhaps, but whatever the answer, global governance as a discipline seems to have a hard time fully considering the question. One of the problems with operationalizing global governance may be the simultaneous profligacy and poverty of the idea itself: its definitional overemphasis on change and consequent inattention to the state's capacity to reconstitute its core functions and thus to achieve a predictable continuity. As a result, for all the excellent work done under its name, global governance as a unifying concept may actually contribute very little, and be less than the sum of its parts. Thinking about limits is not necessarily skepticism about the processes that collectively constitute global governance, but a way to give more meaningful shape to ideas which, as yet, are as problematically defined as they are fashionable.

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Pariotti Elena

**'Soft law' e ordine giuridico ultra-statutale tra 'rule of law' e democrazia  
in *Ragion Pratica*, numero 1, giugno 2009 , 87-106**

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Szporluk Michael

**A Framework for Understanding Accountability of International NGOs and Global Good Governance  
in *Indiana Journal for Global Legal Studies*, Volume 16, issue 1, winter , 339-361**

ABSTRACT: International non-governmental organizations (INGOs) promote good governance through global advocacy and through relief and development work. This article focuses on the latter role. While there are legitimate criticisms of INGOs' lack of accountability, this article argues that a review of the different stakeholders in the relief and development sector and their relationships with one another reveals valuable information about what accountability means and to whom stakeholders should be accountable. The article posits that INGOs should be accountable, above all, to the communities where they are implementing projects. Finally, the article points to many efforts being undertaken by INGOs to improve their accountability to communities but asserts that INGOs' efforts would be significantly enhanced if other stakeholders, including donor governments and intergovernmental, organizations addressed their own accountability to communities as well.

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*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Puddington Arch

**A Third Year of Decline  
in *Journal of Democracy*, Volume 20, Number 2, April , 93-197**

Although 2008 was marked by democratic setbacks as well as authoritarian "pushback" against reformers, democracy remains the only system of government that commands global respect.



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*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Helly Damien

**Africa, the EU and R2P: Towards Pragmatic International Subsidiarity?**

in *Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft*, Heft 1, 2009 , 45-58

ABSTRACT: The EU has to play a role in implementing the »responsibility to protect« doctrine. In Africa the EU has tried to do a lot in conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction. But current EU engagement is not enough if it is not backed up by strong political will from African leaderships.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

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Smith Mick

**Against ecological sovereignty: Agamben, politics and globalisation**

in *Environmental Politics*, Volume 18, Issue 1, February , 99-116

Several recent texts have argued that, given the ecologically destructive effects of unfettered economic globalisation, there are good pragmatic arguments for environmentalists to advocate and support a form of green state sovereignty. However, the key question concerning this strategy is not necessarily the plausibility or implausibility of 'greening' state institutions but rather the dangers to ecology and politics that sovereignty itself represents. Schmitt argues that the principle of sovereignty rests in the self-awarded power to declare a state of emergency (exception) that suspends all political activity, a condition Agamben argues is now becoming a global biopolitical norm. Unfortunately, both norm and exception threaten the very existence of ecological politics.

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Papisca Antonio

**Autonomia locale nella multi-level governance: «City Diplomacy» e «Gruppo Europeo di Cooperazione Territoriale», GECT**

in *Pace Diritti Umani*, anno 5, n. 2, maggio-agosto

No abstract available

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Spagnuolo Francesca

**Beyond Participation: Administrative–Law Type Mechanisms in Global Environmental Governance. Toward a New Basis of Legitimacy?**



in *European public Law*, Volume 15 (2009) Issue 1 , 49-62

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

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Hobson Christopher

**Beyond the End of History: The Need for a `Radical Historicisation' of Democracy in International Relations in Millennium: Journal of International Studies**, vol. 37, n. 3, may , 631-657

ABSTRACT: To properly comprehend democracy's present and future role in politics, particularly in regards to processes of democratisation and democracy promotion, we must cultivate a more nuanced reading of democracy's past. Needed is `a radical historicisation of democracy', in Frank Ankersmit's words, which foregrounds that democracy is a contingent historical fact, necessarily conditioned by its past. This position is contrasted to the standard account of democracy and its history provided by liberalism. Rather than comfortably accepting the current prominence of liberal democracy and the widespread normative agreement on this form of rule, this article instead considers the much longer tradition of thought which regarded democracy as something negative and very distinct from liberalism. In so doing, a sensitive reading of democracy's past promotes a much more reflexive position, which opens space for considering whether the present state of affairs is actually much less secure and more fragile than many liberal proponents of democracy tend to suggest. At the same time, this approach also points the way towards a more considered case for democracy.

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*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Hobson Christopher

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Sloane Robert D.

**Breaking the Genuine Link: The Contemporary International Legal Regulation of Nationality**

in **Harvard International Law Journal**, Volume 50, Issue 1 (Winter 2009)

The concept of nationality traditionally mediated the relationship between the individual and the state in a bygone era in which international law regarded only the latter as a genuine subject of the law; today, its international legal functions have expanded. Yet, as in the past, it remains unclear whether and how international law limits the otherwise almost plenary competence of states to confer their nationality by their internal laws in a way entitled to international recognition. After the International Court of Justice's ("ICJ") 1955 judgment in *Nottebohm*, however, lawyers began to express this limit with a kind of doctrinal mantra: a state's national, to be a bona fide national entitled to recognition as such at the international level, must have a "genuine link" to that state. This Article critiques the genuine link theory and proposes a functional account of nationality, which, it argues, is descriptively more accurate and normatively more appealing. *Nottebohm* is properly read as a narrow decision in which the ICJ tacitly invoked a general principle of law, viz., abuse of rights, to prevent what it saw as a manipulative effort by the claimant to evade a critical part of the law of war. But whatever the merit of this revisionist reading of *Nottebohm*, the genuine link theory proves anachronistic today in view of profound changes in the manifold functions that nationality serves in contemporary international law. To illustrate, the Article suggests that the abuse-of-rights principle would also be more appropriate and effective than the genuine link theory to regulate nationality in one contemporary context that has provoked debate recently: investor-state arbitration. But the abuse-of-rights principle is no panacea. An atomized conception of nationality, which has been liberated from the genuine link theory and regulated by its functions, would best serve the policies of contemporary international law in diverse subfields.

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Roberge Ian

**Bringing the United States Back In: A Response to Rainer Hesse's "Creating Demand for Global Governance ..."**

in **Global Society**, Volume 23, Issue 2, April , 177-181

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

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Kern Kristine, Bulkeley Harriet

**Cities, Europeanization and Multi-level Governance: Governing Climate Change through Transnational Municipal Networks**

in **Journal of Common Market Studies**, Volume 47, Issue 2, March 2009 , 309-332

This article focuses on a variant of multi-level governance and Europeanization, i.e. the transnational networking of local authorities. Focusing on local climate change policy, the article examines how transnational municipal networks (TMNs) govern in the context of multi-level European governance. We find that TMNs are networks of pioneers for pioneers.



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**Simmons Beth**

**Civil Rights in International Law: Compliance with Aspects of the "International Bill of Rights"**

**in *Indiana Journal for Global Legal Studies*, Volume 16, issue 2, summer , 437-481**

ABSTRACT: International law has developed what many might consider a constitutional understanding of individual civil rights that individuals can claim vis-à-vis their own governments. This article discusses the development of aspects of international law relating to civil rights and argues that if this body of law is meaningful, we should see evidence of links between acceptance of international legal obligation and domestic practices. Recognizing that external forms of enforcement of civil rights is unlikely (because doing so is not generally in the interest of potential "enforcers"), I argue that international civil rights treaties will have their greatest effect where stakeholders—local citizens—have the motive and the means to demand treaty compliance. This is most likely to be the case not in stable autocracies, where such demands are likely to be crushed, nor in stable democracies, where the motive to mobilize is attenuated due to rights saturation, but in transitional countries where the expected value of mobilization is maximized. Thus, I test the hypothesis that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is likely to have its greatest positive effects in transitional countries—those that have had some fleeting experience with democratic governance. This proposition is tested quantitatively with indicators for freedom of religious practice and fair trials. The proposition is weakly supported by extremely stringent statistical models that control for the endogeneity of the treaty commitments, country- and year-fixed effects, and other obvious influences on civil rights practices. I conclude that the "International Bill of Rights" has the power to influence the direction of rights practices in fluid political situations, but it cannot magically transform autocracies into liberal guarantors of civil liberties. Still, these effects are important and are the most we can expect from scraps of paper that the international community has been reluctant to enforce.

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**Lövbrand Eva, Rindeljäll Teresia, Nordqvist Joakim**

**Closing the Legitimacy Gap in Global Environmental Governance? Lessons from the Emerging CDM Market**

**in *Global Environmental Politics*, Volume 9, Issue 2, May , 74-100**

The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is a prominent example of the contemporary turn towards more hybrid modes of global environmental governance. It epitomizes the trend away from hierarchical state regulation towards softer forms of steering along the public-private frontier. In this article we analyze the legitimacy of this novel governance arrangement. While we approach input legitimacy as a procedural ideal that guarantees actors affected by a CDM project voice in the project design and implementation, we relate output legitimacy to the effectiveness or problem solving capacity of the CDM institutions. In contrast to the mainstream understanding of the CDM as a policy mechanism that will secure both goals at the same time and thus reduce the legitimacy gap in global environmental governance, our study points to central trade-offs between the procedural quality and the effectiveness of the CDM project cycle. These trade-offs are illustrated by three carbon projects in Chile, China and Mexico and raise questions for the continued study of legitimacy in global environmental governance.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Okereke Chukwumerije, Bulkeley Harriet, Schroeder Heike

**Conceptualizing Climate Governance Beyond the International Regime**

*in Global Environmental Politics*, Volume 9, Issue 1, February , 58-78

The governance of climate change has traditionally been conceived as an issue of international co-operation and considered through the lens of regime analysis. Increasingly, scholars of global governance have highlighted the multiple parallel initiatives involving a range of actors at different levels of governance through which this issue is being addressed. In this paper, we argue that this phenomenon warrants a re-engagement with some of the conceptual cornerstones of international studies. We highlight the conceptual challenges posed by the increasing involvement of non-nation-state actors (NNSAs) in the governance of climate change and explore the potential for drawing from alternative theoretical traditions to address these challenges. Specifically, the paper combines insights from neo-Gramscian and governmentality perspectives as a means of providing the critical space required to generate deeper understanding of: (a) the nature of power in global governance; (b) the relationship between public and private authority; (c) the dynamics between structure and agency; and (d) the rationalities and practices of governance.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Stone Sweet Alec

**Constitutionalism, Legal Pluralism, and International Regimes**

*in Indiana Journal for Global Legal Studies*, Volume 16, issue 2, summer , 621-645

ABSTRACT: The international legal order, although pluralist in structure, is in the process of being constitutionalized. This article supports this claim in several different ways. In the Part I, I argue that most accepted understandings of "constitution" would readily apply to at least some international regimes. In Part II, I discuss different notions of "constitutional pluralism," and demonstrate that legal pluralism is not necessarily antithetical to constitutionalism. In fact, one finds a great deal of constitutional pluralism within national legal orders in Europe. Part III puts forward an argument that the European Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights, and the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization are constitutional jurisdictions. In the Conclusion, I respond what I take to be the most important objections to these claims.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Nollkaemper André

**Constitutionalization and the Unity of the Law of International Responsibility**

*in Indiana Journal for Global Legal Studies*, Volume 16, issue 2, summer , 535-563

ABSTRACT: The law of international responsibility fulfills essentially two functions: reparation for injury and protection of the rule of law and global order. Notwithstanding the fundamental difference between these objectives, the law of international responsibility traditionally has been conceived in unitary norms consisting of a single set of principles that applies to all breaches of rules of international law. With the further development of international law that unity becomes difficult to maintain. On the one hand, there is an increasing need for a further refinement of liability principles for the



determination of compensation for injury. On the other hand, the process of constitutionalization of international law poses entirely different accountability requirements to which the law of international responsibility should contribute. Maintaining unity may lead to inconsistencies and hinder the refinement of the law of international responsibility that is necessary to deal with the various types of responsibility and accountability issues of modern international law, thereby marginalizing the law of responsibility.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

**Tambakaki Paulina**

**Cosmopolitanism or agonism? Alternative visions of world order**

**in Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy**, Vol. 12, n. 1, March , 101-116

In The divided west and in On the political Jurgen Habermas and Chantal Mouffe transpose their political philosophies into the realm of contemporary international politics and put forward two different models for a more equitable order. Habermas defends a legal cosmopolitanism, while Mouffe supports a multipolar order which acknowledges the ever present possibility of conflicts and antagonisms. The paper examines the arguments which Habermas and Mouffe make in support of their models, identifies their differences and assesses their strengths and weaknesses. It argues that although Mouffe's idea of pluralising hegemony by constructing counter hegemonic projects is certainly, critically, more powerful than Habermas's legal cosmopolitanism, it stresses that Habermas's model is by no means without its merits. For it builds reconstructively on what is at hand, global institutions and international law. The problem, however, with Habermas' reconstructive project, argues the paper, is that it is heavily dependent upon philosophical presuppositions, which are convincingly exposed by Mouffe's understanding of the political.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

**Luciani Massimo**

**Costituzione, integrazione europea, globalizzazione**

**in Questione giustizia**, fasc. 6

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

**De Giovanni Biagio**

**Costruzione europea e deglobalizzazione**

**in ItalianiEuropei**, n. 2

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*



Chandler David

**Critiquing Liberal Cosmopolitanism? The Limits of the Biopolitical Approach  
in *International Political Sociology*** , Volume 3, Issue 1, March 2009 , 53-70

Today there is a widespread recognition of the erosion of political community on the territorial basis of the nation-state. Instead, alternative framings of "being" political or of engaging in politics have argued for a more radical post-territorial space of political possibilities, of what it means to be political, and of how we envision political community. Through focusing on the two dominant articulations of post-territorial political community, liberal cosmopolitan and radical poststructuralist approaches, this article seeks to analyze the possibilities and limitations inherent in the search for political community beyond the boundaries of the nation-state. The aspiration to engage in, construct, or recognize the existence of a post-territorial political community, a community of broader humanity, has been articulated in liberal terms as cosmopolitanism, driven by global civil society, and in poststructuralist terms as "political cosmopolitanism," "cosmopolitanism-to-come" or the "solidarity of the governed," given its force by the creativity of the resistance to liberal universalism of the "multitude." This article seeks to draw out the similarities between these two contrasting approaches, ostensibly based upon either the extension of or the critique of liberal political ontologies.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Baker Andrew

**Deliberative Equality and the Transgovernmental Politics of the Global Financial Architecture  
in *Global Governance***, vol. 15, n. 2, april-june , 195-218

ABSTRACT: Revisiting the concept of transgovernmentalism, originally developed by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, can shed considerable light on the nature of interstate cooperation in contemporary global financial governance. Transgovernmentalism highlights how certain technocratic policy communities, composed of finance ministries, central banks, and regulators, dominate the global financial architecture. It also provides insights into the political and social basis of these actors' interactions and deliberations. Most importantly, renovating the concept of transgovernmentalism brings the participatory deficits in the current global financial architecture into sharp focus and points us in the direction of a workable reform agenda that would expand inclusion and participation. This article advocates basing future reform on efforts to achieve a closer realization of the principle of "deliberative equality." Unfortunately, "transgovernmentalism" is incompatible with deliberative equality, meaning that it is precisely the transgovernmental characteristics of the current global financial architecture that have to be challenged and overturned if we are to arrive at anything approximating deliberative equality.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Philp Mark

**Delimiting Democratic Accountability  
in *Political Studies***, Volume 57, Issue 1, March , 28-53

This article discusses the concept of accountability in relation to those holding public office in democratic states. It



argues that the concept of accountability requires careful specification and that it is frequently distorted when put to the service of theoretical models and normative principles. The article develops a definition of accountability and a range of distinctions between forms of accountability, asks what forms of accountability might be appropriate to modern democratic systems and argues that some combinations of democracy and accountability can have serious negative consequences for politics. The article concludes by discussing the types of accountability that are pertinent to recent claims that international institutions should be made more democratically accountable. In each case, the common tendency to inflate the concept of accountability is associated with demands for accountability that threaten both democratic consolidation and the distinctive character of accountability itself.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Wedgwood Ruth

**Democracies, Human Rights, and Collective Action**

in *Ethics and International Affairs*, vol. 23, n. 1, spring , 27-37

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Russett Bruce

**Democracy, War and Expansion through Historical Lenses**

in *European Journal of International Relations* , vol. 15, n. 1, march , 9-36

ABSTRACT: This article examines various implications of democratic peace theory in both the contemporary era and in Greece during the Peloponnesian War era. It considers the evidence for various hypotheses in both contexts, to understand why those hypotheses — especially those concerning institutions — find much better support in the contemporary era. It also addresses the causes and possible consequences of expansionist policies, including hypotheses that democracies are more effective war-fighters and thus better able to pursue successful expansion by military means.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Grävingsholt Jörn, Leininger Julia, Schlumberger Oliver

**Demokratieförderung: Quo vadis?**

in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, Band 8, 2009

Inhalt

In den 1990er Jahren entwickelte sich Demokratieförderung zu einem zentralen Paradigma westlicher Entwicklungs- und Außenpolitik, das für wichtige globale Herausforderungen die Lösung bieten sollte. Sie sollte zur Verringerung der weltweiten Armut ebenso beitragen wie zur Verhinderung von Staatszerfall, zur Verhütung gewaltsamer Konflikte oder zur Bekämpfung des internationalen Terrorismus. Ausgehend von der Unterstützung für die Demokratisierungen der



1970er und 1980er Jahre in Südeuropa und Lateinamerika entwickelte sich Demokratieförderung nach dem Zusammenbruch der sozialistischen Systeme Osteuropas zur Boom-"Industrie" der internationalen Zusammenarbeit.[1] Heute umfasst Demokratieförderung ein jährliches Volumen von rund zehn Milliarden Euro oder knapp einem Zehntel der weltweiten Entwicklungshilfe.

<http://www.bpb.de/publikationen/IR9APL.html>

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Künzli Jörg

**Demokratische Partizipationsrechte bei neuen Formen der Begründung und bei der Auflösung völkerrechtlicher Verpflichtungen**

in *Zeitschrift für Schweizerisches Recht*, Vol. 128, issue 1/1, 2009 , 47-75

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Papisca Antonio

**Dichiarazione universale dei diritti umani, lievito umanocentrico della civiltà del diritto**

in *Comunità Internazionale (La)*, vol. LXIII, n. 4, quarto trimestre

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Krennerich Michael

**Die Universalisierung der Menschenrechte – die rechtlichen und politischen Dimensionen im Fokus**

in *Zeitschrift für Politik*, Jahrgang 56, Heft 1, 2009 , 51-74

Summary

Human rights are complex rights. They can be morally justified, become positive rights by way of political decisions and must in turn be implemented. The article deals primarily with the legal as well as the political »universalisation« of human rights. It demonstrates that, going beyond the ratification of international human rights treaties there are other important aspects of the legal recognition and implementation of human rights still to be considered, and points out the importance of the protection of human rights on a national level. Against the background of a review of the situation as regards worldwide human rights violations democracy, the rule of law, and a strong, internationally linked civil society will be put forward as important prerequisites for an effective human rights protection. Further, a number of approaches to the promotion of human rights will be proposed.



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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

**Buchanan Allen**

**Diritti umani: i limiti del ragionamento filosofico**

in *Ragion Pratica*, numero 1, giugno 2009 , 29-66

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

**Croce Mariano**

**Diritti, confini e cosmopolitismo Un dialogo tra D. Archibugi e S. Benhabib**

in *Reset*, Numero 112, Marzo / Aprile

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

**Amato Giuliano**

**Editoriale**

in *ItalianiEuropei*, n. 2

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

**Winchester Brian**

**Emerging Global Environmental Governance**

in *Indiana Journal for Global Legal Studies*, Volume 16, issue 1, winter , 7-23

ABSTRACT: Environmental thinking and activism are steadily gaining widespread, even global acceptance, but are often in conflict with economic interests and international politics. Environmental priorities are further challenged by scientific uncertainty involving effects that in some cases will only become manifest far into the future. Nonetheless, accompanying this global environmental awakening has been an extraordinary number of international agreements on a wide range of critical environmental issues. While many of these environmental regimes lack adequate financial support and sanctions for non-compliance, they involve a variety of non-state actors, suggesting meaningful movement towards an evolving, complex form of global environmental governance. Indeed, there are already examples of shared global governance where states have ceded some power to intergovernmental organizations to govern specific environmental issues, and this is almost certain to expand in the future.



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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Milewicz Karolina

**Emerging Patterns of Global Constitutionalization: Toward a Conceptual Framework**

in *Indiana Journal for Global Legal Studies*, Volume 16, issue 2, summer , 413-436

ABSTRACT: Global constitutionalization is a recent phenomenon that is decisively changing the character of the international order. This argument was put forward recently by scholars of international law and has gained significance in the institutional school of thought. However, the notion of "global constitutionalization" is often used imprecisely and has so far been largely neglected in the field of international relations. It still lacks a consistent and operational definition, which would enable political scientists and international relations scholars to conduct empirical research. This article explores a preliminary framework for the concept of global constitutionalization.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Lee Robert, Stokes Elen

**Environmental Governance: Reconnecting the Global and Local**

in *Journal of Law and Society*, Volume 36 Issue 1 - March , 1-10

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Mason Andrew

**Environmental Obligations and the Limits of Transnational Citizenship**

in *Political Studies*, Volume 57, Issue 2, June , 280-297

Notions of cosmopolitan and environmental citizenship have emerged in response to concerns about environmental sustainability and global inequality. But even if there are obligations of egalitarian justice that extend across state boundaries, or obligations of environmental justice to use resources in a sustainable way that are owed to those beyond our borders, it is far from clear that these are best conceptualised as obligations of global or environmental citizenship. Through identifying a core concept of citizenship, I suggest that citizenship obligations are, by their nature, owed (at least in part) in virtue of other aspects of one's common citizenship, and that obligations of justice, even when they arise as a result of interconnectedness or past interactions, are not best conceived as obligations of citizenship in the absence of some other bond that unites the parties. Without ruling out the possibility of beneficial conceptual change, I argue that Andrew Dobson's model of ecological citizenship is flawed because there is no good reason to regard the obligations of environmental justice which it identifies as obligations of ecological citizenship, and that other models of cosmopolitan or global citizenship face a similar objection.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**



*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Hof Andries F., den Elzen Michel G. J., van Vuuren Detlef P.

**Environmental effectiveness and economic consequences of fragmented versus universal regimes: what can we learn from model studies?**

in *International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics*, Volume 9, Number 1, February , 39-62

A post-2012 regime aimed at reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions could develop towards a universal or fragmented regime. The fundamental difference between a universal and a fragmented regime is that the first involves a single comprehensive climate regime in which all countries participate, whereas the second involves either multiple treaties or a single treaty in which not all countries participate. This study assesses the literature on a wide range of different model studies concerning the environmental effectiveness and economic consequences of various universal and fragmented climate regimes. The most important conclusions (e.g. relative position of regions in terms of costs) are generally consistent across different studies, despite the differences in methodology. We conclude that stabilising GHG concentrations at low levels is more costly with a fragmented regime than with a universal regime, because reduction targets must be achieved by a smaller number of countries or because fragmented treaties may prevent reducing GHGs where it is cheapest to do so. However, establishing a universal regime will be challenging due to cost differences between regions if emissions are allocated based on specific allocation rules and incentives to free-ride on a universal regime. Even though alternative behaviours such as responsibility, the implementation of transfer schemes or exclusive membership can increase the likelihood of achieving a universal regime, a fragmented regime seems more feasible. Therefore, a transitional fragmented 'coalition of the willing' could be established first, which could provide the basis for a larger, universal regime in the long term.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Newig Jens, Fritsch Oliver

**Environmental governance: participatory, multi-level - and effective?**

in *European Environment/Environmental Policy and Governance*, Volume 19, Issue 3, May-June , 197-214

Current political trends and scholarly research increasingly promote collaborative and participatory governance in multi-level systems as a way to more sustainable and effective environmental policy. Yet empirical findings as well as conceptual works from different academic fields remain ambiguous about this claim. This paper explores whether and to what extent the existence of multiple levels of governance affects the ability of participatory decision-making to deliver high quality environmental policy output and to improve implementation and compliance. To this end, findings from the literature on multi-level governance, public participation and policy implementation as well as on complex systems are integrated in five sets of hypotheses. In order to put these to a plausibility probe, a meta-analysis of 47 case studies from Northern America and Western Europe is conducted. These cases provide qualitative insights and allow for some generalization in the form of correlation analysis. The study finds that, predominantly, environmental preferences of the involved actors determine the environmental outputs (and outcomes) of decision-making. Further, face-to-face, but not mere two-way, communication appears to positively influence the ecological standard of decisions. The analysis also suggests that a highly polycentric governance system comprising many agencies and levels of governance yields higher environmental outputs than rather monocentric governance. However, correlations between governance effectiveness and decision-making scale, as well as policy delivery and institutional fit to ecosystem, could not be identified. The paper concludes by outlining pathways for more systematic comparative research on these pressing research questions.



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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Van den Erik Larissa, Schrijver Nico

**Eroding the Primacy of the UN System of Collective Security: The Judgment of the European Court of Justice in the Cases of Kadi and Al Barakaat**

in *International Organizations Law Review*, vol. 5, n. 2 , 329-338

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Buckley-Zistel Susanne

**Frieden und Gerechtigkeit nach gewaltsamen Konflikten**

in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, Band 8, 2009

There can be no peace without justice, no justice without law and no meaningful law without a Court to decide what is just and lawful under any given circumstance", lauteten die Worte des Anklägers Benjamin B. Ferencz in Nürnberg im Jahre 1946. Damit drückte er bereits aus, was heute den global herrschenden Diskurs bestimmt: Nur die rechtliche Aufarbeitung gewaltsamer Konflikte garantiert eine friedliche Zukunft. So schreibt der ehemalige UN-Generalsekretär Kofi Annan: "Our experience in the past decade has demonstrated clearly that the consolidation of peace in the immediate post-conflict period, as well as the maintenance of peace in the long term, cannot be achieved unless the population is confident that redress for grievances can be obtained through legitimate structures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and the fair administration of justice."

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Tambakaki Paulina

**From citizenship to human rights: the stakes for democracy**

in *Citizenship Studies*, vol. 13, n. 1, february , 7-15

ABSTRACT: A review of the literature on citizenship shows a trend away from anchoring citizenship practices to the nation-state and a move towards recasting the concept in universal terms. The paper examines this trend by focusing on the writings of Held, Bohman, and Benhabib. It distinguishes their 'deliberative' approach to citizenship, and suggests that this leads them to reformulate citizenship in a way which differs little from human rights. Although the paper shares in the view that a move to a human rights politics would pave the way for a more equitable order, it argues that there is also a risk. By drawing on the agonistic perspective on democratic politics, the paper shows that the risk is that we might undermine democratic politics by reducing it to a single principle.



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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

**Pollmann Arnd**

**Für einen neuen Universalismus. Das politische Projekt der Menschenrechte aus philosophischer Sicht**  
in *Zeitschrift für Politik*, Jahrgang 56, Heft 1, 2009 , 35-50

Human rights do not only claim for ›universal‹, but also for ›egalitarian‹, ›categorical‹, ›identical‹ and ›indivisible‹ validity. But the fact that those normative validity claims do belong to the very idea of human rights does not mean, that those claims were already achieved or realized. This would only be the case when human rights were in fact globally enforced – which might not happen in the near Future. Therefore the universalism of human rights should be understood as a ›project‹; as universalism ›in the making‹. Human rights are not universal yet, but they claim to become so. That leads to the conclusion, that the universalism of human rights is best be seen as a political process of ›universalization‹.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

**Prozorov Sergei**

**Generic universalism in world politics: beyond international anarchy and the world state**  
in *International Theory*, Volume 1, Issue 02, July , 215-247

Even though the notion of ‘world politics’ has become increasingly widespread in the discipline of International Relations, its deployment in the disciplinary discourse has been highly problematic. This article argues that the impasse of the discourse on world politics is owing to its commitment to a political ontology of identitarian pluralism, most forcefully articulated in the work of Carl Schmitt, which limits the political imagination to the binary opposition of the preservation of international anarchy and its hierarchical domestication in the world state. As long as politics is cast in identitarian terms, it is impossible to conceive of the universal dimension of political praxis other than in terms of the universalization of some particular content, i.e. as a hegemonic project. We shall then outline the pathway towards a non-identitarian understanding of world politics through an engagement with the universalist themes in the philosophy of Alain Badiou and Giorgio Agamben. We shall reconstitute the authors’ alternative to identity politics that rehabilitates the notion of universalism from ‘postmodern’ criticism and reconstructs the category of the universal in non-identitarian or generic terms of indiscernibility and ‘whatever being’. The paper concludes with a discussion of the practical dimension of generic world politics as a radically egalitarian process of the emergence of the world community of ‘whatever singularities’.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

**Obama Barack**

**Gli Stati Uniti e il G-20 di Londra**  
in *Affari Esteri*, Anno XLI, n. 162 , 250-253

No abstract available



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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Omelicheva Mariya

**Global Civil Society and Democratization of World Politics: A Bona Fide Relationship or Illusory Liaison?**  
in *International Political Science Review* , vol. 30, n. 2, march , 109-132

ABSTRACT: For over a decade, scholars have been studying and debating the role and influence of non-state actors in democratizing global politics. The sheer volume of studies calls for assessing the current state of this area of research. It also invites systematic analysis of differences in the collected evidence on outcomes of the democratizing efforts of global civil society associations. In this review, I (1) expound the concept of global civil society and point to definitional dilemmas surrounding this term; (2) propose a new analytical framework for examining an association between global civil society and democratization; (3) apply the proposed framework for assessing the findings of empirical studies; (4) discuss the nature of differences and the sources of discord in the analysts' conclusions; and (5) make recommendations for advancing our knowledge in this important area of research. A principal theme that runs throughout this essay is that the field of global civil society and democratization has ample avenues for further conceptual, theoretical, and empirical work. Our ability to speak credibly of global civil society as a viable democratizing force would be improved with the development of empirical theory, conceptual elaboration, and more rigorous methodologies of research.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Argitis George, Pitelis Christos

**Global Finance and Systemic Instability**

in *Contributions to Political Economy*, Volume 27, Number 1 , 1-11

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Lévy-Lang André

**Globalisation, crise financière et gouvernance mondiale**

in *Politique Etrangère*, n. 1, printemps

"La plus grande incertitude règne sur les perspectives économiques mondiales, qui dépendent encore de la crise financière : les mesures de relance pourront-elles être efficaces avant fin 2009, ou sommes-nous au début d'une récession mondiale longue?"

Ces vingt dernières années, la globalisation de la finance a beaucoup contribué à la croissance mondiale. Elle a pourtant eu pour conséquence négative de permettre la propagation de la crise à l'ensemble du système financier mondial. Cette crise a mis en évidence la nécessité d'une nouvelle gouvernance mondiale, tant économique pour limiter la durée et l'ampleur de la récession, que monétaire et financière pour éviter, ou tout du moins limiter, les crises futures.



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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Miller Alan

**Globalization, Terror, and Ethics: A Human Rights Perspective?**

in **Globalizations** , Volume 6, Issue 1, March 2009 , 145-149

This article offers a human rights perspective on a possible relationship between the 'war on terror', ethics and globalisation. In addressing the need for a modernised global governance it outlines the merits of a 'rights-based approach' towards meeting the challenges posed by the 'war on terror' and globalisation. References are made to the 60th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Millennium Development Goals and the presentation by Kofi Annan to the World Summit of 2005 of his report 'In Larger Freedom' in which he outlines the three pillars of the UN role for this century.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

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Pentassuglia Gaetano

**Gruppi minoritari, diritto internazionale dei diritti umani e discorso giudiziale**

in **Ragion Pratica**, numero 1, giugno 2009 , 165-202

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Hockett Robert

**Human Persons, Human Rights, and the Distributive Structure of Global Justice**

in **Columbia human rights law review**, vol.40, issue 2 , 343-424

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Trujillo Isabel

**I diritti umani e il problema della legittimità e della giustizia dell'ordine internazionale**

in **Ragion Pratica**, numero 1, giugno 2009 , 15-28

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**



*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Monteleone Carla

**Il multilateralismo nell'organizzazione del sistema politico globale**

in **Ragion Pratica**, numero 1, giugno 2009 , 67-86

No abstract available

**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Addis Adeno

**Imagining the International Community: The Constitutive Dimension of Universal Jurisdiction**

in **Human Rights Quarterly**, Volume 31, Number 1, February 2009 , pp. 129-162

The assertion of prescriptive and adjudicative universal jurisdictions by some countries in relation to a handful of offenses that are classified as international or universal crimes (e.g. genocide) has led to a great deal of controversy. Those who favor universal jurisdiction argue that certain acts (often crimes) affect all of us, not just the specific individual or group of victims or the country of which the victims are nationals. It is therefore legitimate, they argue, for any state to punish or suppress such acts regardless of any traditional jurisdictional connection between the alleged acts and the state asserting jurisdiction. The availability of universal jurisdiction is premised on the presumed effect of certain crimes on humanity as a whole. Those who commit these offenses are referred to as *hostis humani generis*—enemies of human kind. Skeptics argue that the idea of universal jurisdiction is conceptually incoherent, inconsistent with the principle of political self-determination, and has great potential to be an instrument of political mischief. While they disagree on the conceptual coherence and utility of the notion of universal jurisdiction, both proponents and opponents view its function in purely instrumental terms, to provide the condition for punishing or suppressing certain offenses that affect all of us. This article argues that universal jurisdiction also serves another, less articulated purpose. It has a constitutive function as well. It is partly a process through which the identity of the international community is imagined and enacted. It is an expression of a sense of ourselves (a community of humankind) at given moments of time. This article argues that neglect of this constitutive dimension leads to an incomplete analysis of universal jurisdiction.

**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Ayers Alison J.

**Imperial Liberties: Democratisation and Governance in the 'New' Imperial Order**

in **Political Studies**, Volume 57, Issue 1, March , 1-27

Notions of empire and imperialism have increasingly returned to the lexicon of mainstream theorisation of the international. Much of this literature identifies a 'new' imperialism, distinct from the supposed post- and non-imperial global(ising) order of the Westphalian state system. The article contends that such accounts occlude our understanding of the 'long' history of imperialism. It argues that the putatively post-imperial institutions and discourses of 'global governance' are internally related to 'post-colonial' imperialism. In particular the regime of 'democratisation' and the curtailing of democratic freedom constitute a principal means through which imperial rule is articulated. Despite a vast literature on 'democratisation', there has been a paucity of analysis which interrogates the Great Power-defined agenda of democratisation. Mainstream accounts presuppose what requires explanation, taking for granted the non-imperial



character of this global project, the hegemony of a specific and impoverished model of (neo)liberal democracy, highly problematic, de-historicised notions of state, society and self and the categorical separation of the 'domestic' and the 'international'. The article provides detailed substantive analysis of the endeavour by the dominant social agents of the democratisation project to constitute a (neo)liberal procedural notion of democracy in the 'post-colonial' world. It identifies the dominant social agents of this project and explores the theoretical underpinnings of the dominant model being propounded. Informed by this, the article examines the democratisation project according to coveted transformations in three domains: the minimal, 'neutral' state, the constitution of 'civil society' and the promotion of the liberal 'self'. The article contends that far from an alternative to imperialism, 'democratisation' involves the imposition of a Western (neo)liberal procedural form of democracy on imperialised peoples. The character of the 'informal' imperial order is such that self-determination does not mean autonomy. Rather it means the 'freedom' to embrace the rules, norms and principles of the emerging (neo)liberal global order.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

**Betts Alexander**

**Institutional Proliferation and the Global Refugee Regime**

**in Perspectives on Politics**, vol. 7, issue 1, march , 53-58

ABSTRACT: This article explores the impact of institutional proliferation on the politics of refugee protection. The refugee regime mainly comprises the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Recently, however, new parallel and overlapping institutions have emerged in relation to two previously unregulated areas: internally displaced persons (IDPs) and international migration. This institutional proliferation has affected both state strategy and IO strategy in relation to refugee protection. It has enabled Northern states to engage in regime shifting. They have used the new institutions to prevent refugees reaching their territory, thereby avoiding incurring UN rules on refugee protection, and transferring burdens to Southern states. The resulting reduction in international cooperation in the refugee regime has contributed to UNHCR fundamentally redefining its strategy in order to become more relevant to Northern states. In particular, it has pursued states into the migration and IDP regimes into which they have shifted through a combination of stretching its mandate, engaging in the politics of the emerging regimes, and issue-linkage. The article's analysis draws attention to the potentially significant relationship between institutional proliferation and IO adaptation and change.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

**Betts Alexander**

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**in Perspectives on Politics**, vol. 7, issue 1, march , 53-58

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institutional proliferation has affected both state strategy and IO strategy in relation to refugee protection. It has enabled Northern states to engage in regime shifting. They have used the new institutions to prevent refugees reaching their territory, thereby avoiding incurring UN rules on refugee protection, and transferring burdens to Southern states. The resulting reduction in international cooperation in the refugee regime has contributed to UNHCR fundamentally redefining its strategy in order to become more relevant to Northern states. In particular, it has pursued states into the migration and IDP regimes into which they have shifted through a combination of stretching its mandate, engaging in the politics of the emerging regimes, and issue-linkage. The article's analysis draws attention to the potentially significant relationship between institutional proliferation and IO adaptation and change.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Caspary Georg

**Integrating responses to global environmental threats into policies and projects in developing countries**  
in *International Journal of Sustainable Development*, Volume 11, Issue 1 , 24-44

This paper provides practical suggestions on how to integrate responses to global environmental threats into policies and projects in developing countries. It does so on the basis of an expert survey both among general development policy practitioners who have in the past been involved in efforts at such 'integration'; and among sectoral experts in two sectors where it will be crucial to integrate responses to global environmental threats: agriculture and energy. The focus is on how to deal with both potential synergies and trade-offs. The paper aims to fill two gaps that remain despite there having been much writing on the practical steps required to address global environmental threats. Firstly, policy makers and project managers in developing countries often lack knowledge on what key generic approaches and instruments could help them address a range of global environmental threats in their work. Secondly, policy makers and project managers face multiple goals between the various global environmental conventions, as well as between the goals of these conventions and other key objectives (notably of an economic kind), resulting in a need to understand how to deal with these multiple (and at times conflicting) goals.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Monteiro Nuno P., Ruby Keven G.

**International Relations and the false promise of philosophical foundations**  
in *International Theory*, Volume 1, Issue 01, March , 15-48

International Relations (IR) is uneasy about its status as a 'science'. Throughout a long history of attempts to legitimate the field as 'scientific', IR scholars have imported multifarious positions from the Philosophy of Science (PoS) in order to ground IR on an unshakable foundation. Alas, no such unshakable foundation exists. The PoS is itself a contested field of study, in which no consensus exists on the proper foundation for science. By importing foundational divisions into IR, the 'science' debate splits the discipline into contending factions and justifies the absence of dialogue between them. As all foundations require a leap of faith, imperial foundational projects are always vulnerable to challenge and therefore unable to resolve the science question in IR. In this article, we seek to dissolve rather than solve the 'science' debate in IR and the quest for philosophical foundations. We argue that IR scholars should adopt an 'attitude towards' rather than



a 'position in' the irresolvable foundational debate. Specifically, we advocate an attitude of 'foundational prudence' that is open-minded about what the PoS can offer IR, while precluding imperial foundational projects, which attempt to impose a single meta-theoretical framework on the discipline. This requires knowing what PoS arguments can and cannot do. As such, foundational prudence is post-foundational rather than anti-foundational. A prudent attitude towards philosophical foundations encourages theoretical and methodological pluralism, making room for a question-driven IR while de-escalating intra-disciplinary politics.

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### **Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

#### *Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

**Koller Peter**

#### **Internationale Ordnung und globale Gerechtigkeit in Information Philosophie, Band 37, Heft 1, 2009**

Das bestehende System des Völkerrechts fördert Ungleichheiten

Zwar konnten in einigen der Regionen, die gewöhnlich als „Dritte Welt“ angesprochen werden, in den letzten Jahrzehnten beachtliche ökonomische Fortschritte erzielt werden, durch die sich die Lebensbedingungen vieler ihrer Einwohner erheblich verbessert haben. Dennoch haben sich die Ungleichheiten zwischen den reichsten und ärmsten Ländern der Welt nicht verringert, sondern sogar verschärft. Dabei ist offensichtlich, dass wirtschaftliche Rückständigkeit eng mit defekten politischen und rechtlichen Verhältnissen zusammenhängt. In den meisten armen Ländern ist das Eigentum extrem ungleich verteilt, mangelt es an Bildungseinrichtungen, fehlt eine öffentliche Gesundheitsversorgung, werden die Frauen in Unmündigkeit gehalten und sind die Geburtenraten hoch. Vielerorts sehen sich große Teile der Bevölkerung des Schutzes ihrer Rechte durch korrupte Gerichte und Behörden beraubt und rücksichtsloser Ausbeutung ausgesetzt. Und in vielen dieser Länder herrschen repressive und räuberische Regime, die jede politische Opposition unterdrücken und ihre Macht zum eigenen Vorteil missbrauchen. Wirken mehrere dieser Umstände zusammen, so gerät ein Land leicht in einen „Teufelskreis der Armut“, dem es nur schwer enttrinnen kann. Ebenso hängen die sozialen Auswirkungen der wirtschaftlichen Unterentwicklung eines Landes wesentlich von dessen politischen Verhältnissen ab, insbesondere den bürgerlichen und politischen Rechten seiner Bürger.

So zeigt sich, dass die Regierungsform eines Landes für die Verteilung und das Ausmaß gesellschaftlicher Armut von entscheidender Bedeutung ist: In demokratisch verfassten Staaten, wie Indien, mündet Armut viel seltener in verheerende Hungersnöte als in diktatorisch regierten Ländern, weil demokratische Regierungen schon im Interesse ihres Machterhalts genötigt sind, die Bürger zumindest gegen die schlimmste Not zu sichern. Umgekehrt treten Hungersnöte auch in Ländern auf, die große Reichtümer besitzen, wenn sie von räuberischen Gruppen beherrscht werden, die sich die Mittel ihrer Machtausübung durch den Export von Bodenschätzen oder durch internationale Kredite beschaffen können.

Diese Befunde mögen die Ansicht nahe legen, das Elend der Dritten Welt sei im Wesentlichen hausgemacht und liege darum jenseits der Verantwortung der entwickelten Länder. Doch diese Ansicht erweist sich bei näherer Betrachtung als ganz und gar verfehlt. Wer auf der Suche nach den Gründen der andauernden, ja wachsenden Disparitäten unserer Welt etwas tiefer schürft, wird bald erkennen, dass diese Disparitäten nicht zuletzt durch das bestehende internationale System, nämlich das System des Völkerrechts und die damit verbundene Praxis internationaler Politik, befestigt und gefördert werden. Und wer nicht der abwegigen Meinung ist, Moral und Gerechtigkeit hätten in der internationalen Politik keinen Platz, wird sich des Eindrucks kaum erwehren können, dass dieses System, das sich in den letzten



Jahrhunderten unter dem bestimmenden Einfluss der mächtigen und reichen Staaten entwickelt und weltweit durchgesetzt hat, in hohem Maße ungerecht ist. Obwohl diese allgemeine Einschätzung zunehmend an Boden zu gewinnen scheint, besteht wenig Übereinstimmung im Detail. Die breite Debatte über internationale Ethik und globale Gerechtigkeit, die derzeit weltweit geführt wird, zeigt tiefgehende Meinungsverschiedenheiten über so gut wie alle Fragen, die für eine fundierte Bewertung des bestehenden internationalen Systems von Interesse sind. Gegenstand von Kontroversen ist schon die grundlegende Frage, welche Gebote der Gerechtigkeit für die Beziehungen zwischen einzelnen Nationen und für die globale Ordnung im Ganzen Geltung besitzen.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

**Paavola Jouni, Gouldson Andrew, Kluvánková-Oravská Tatiana**

**Interplay of actors, scales, frameworks and regimes in the governance of biodiversity**

**in *European Environment/Environmental Policy and Governance*, Volume 19, Issue 3, May-June , 148-158**

This article examines the key contributions of the political science and systems theory based literatures on environmental governance, and uses them to analyse the governance of biodiversity in Europe. The article suggests that the key insights of the two bodies of literature are a distinction between governance frameworks and regimes on one hand, and the importance of multifaceted and multiple scales on the other. These key insights draw attention to horizontal and vertical forms of interplay. The article suggests that interplay, both between actors and levels and between frameworks and regimes, is ubiquitous and ambivalent: it can either foster or hinder environmental governance. The article illustrates this discussion in the context of governance of biodiversity in Europe, highlighting how vertical and horizontal interplay between the governance framework for biodiversity and the broader institutional setting or regime have characterized the implementation of the Habitats Directive, both complicating and fostering the governance of biodiversity in Europe.

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**Marchetti Raffaele**

**Inventare una politica globale**

**in *Reset*, Numero 112, Marzo / Aprile**

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

**Bodansky Daniel**

**Is There an International Environmental Constitution?**

**in *Indiana Journal for Global Legal Studies*, Volume 16, issue 2, summer , 565-584**

ABSTRACT: The surge of interest among international lawyers in "constitutionalism" represents one of several efforts to



reconceptualize international governance; others include the research projects on global administrative law and legalization. The article applies the constitutionalist lens to international environmental law—one of the few fields of international law to which constitutionalist modes of analysis have not yet been applied. Given the protean quality of the terms "constitution" and "constitutionalism," the article begins by unpacking these concepts. By disaggregating these concepts into a number of separate variables, which have more determinate, unambiguous meanings, we can answer the question, "Is there an international environmental constitution?", in a more nuanced way—not in an all or nothing fashion, but by considering the extent to which international environmental law has constitutional dimensions. The article concludes that, although individual treaty regimes have constitutional features, international environmental law as a whole lacks the hallmarks of a constitutional order.

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*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

**Benhabib Seyla**

**Kosmopolitismus und Demokratie: Von Kant zu Habermas**

in **Blätter für deutsche & internationale Politik**, Juni, 2009 , 65-74

Full Text is free:

<http://www.blaetter.de/artikel.php?pr=3101>

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

**Garibo Ana Paz**

**La convenzione internazionale sui diritti del fanciullo: diritto cosmopolita?**

in **Ragion Pratica**, numero 1, giugno 2009 , 153-164

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

**Ikenberry John**

**Liberal Internationalism 3.0: America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World Order**

in **Perspectives on Politics**, vol. 7, issue 1, march , 71-87

ABSTRACT: Liberal international order—both its ideas and real-world political formations—is not embodied in a fixed set of principles or practices. Open markets, international institutions, cooperative security, democratic community, progressive change, collective problem solving, the rule of law—these are aspects of the liberal vision that have made appearances in various combinations and changing ways over the last century. I argue that it is possible to identify three versions or models of liberal international order—versions 1.0, 2.0, and 3.0. The first is associated with the ideas of Woodrow Wilson, the second is the Cold War liberal internationalism of the post-1945 decades, and the third version is a sort of post-hegemonic liberal internationalism that has only partially appeared and whose full shape and logic is still uncertain. I develop a set of dimensions that allow for identifying different logics of liberal international order and identify variables that will shape the movement from liberal internationalism 2.0 to 3.0.



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Viola Francesco

**Luci e ombre del principio di sussidiarietà**

in *Ragion Pratica*, numero 1, giugno 2009 , 107-132

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Marchetti Raffaele

**Mapping Alternative Models of Global Politics**

in *International Studies Review*, vol. 11, issue 1, march , 133-156

ABSTRACT: This paper investigates the principal competing visions of global politics that are currently advanced in the public discourse about globalization in opposition to the traditional state-centered perspective. The first part of the paper develops an analysis of ideal models as cultural resources that grounds the different reading of human bonds. The second part applies the notion of ideal models to the new scenario of globalization, and identifies four alternative interpretations of the notion of global politics: namely Neo-liberalism, Cosmopolitanism, Alter-globalism, and Dialogue among Civilizations. The principal characteristics of these four notions are presented in order to map the current debate on the future of global politics.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

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Aradau Claudia, Huysmans Jef

**Mobilising (Global) Democracy: A Political Reading of Mobility between Universal Rights and the Mob**

in *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, vol. 37, n. 3, may , 583-604

ABSTRACT: This article argues that a political reading of mobility is instrumental for understanding the role of democracy within globalised structures of power. Relegated to a socio-economic background that prompts new engagements with democracy, mobility has been neglected as a condition of possibility and as a form of political democratic practice. Drawing on Georg Simmel's sociology of money, we show that practices of mobility become democratic moments in relation to structures of power that are constituted across the territorial circumscription of national states. Understood as a particular form of sociality, mobility can work upon structures of power through universal rights and the politics of the 'mob'. In this sense, practices of mobility are also democratic inscriptions of equality.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

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Piattoni Simona



**Multi-level Governance: a Historical and Conceptual Analysis**

in *Journal of European Integration*, Volume 31, Number 2 / March , 163-180

In this paper I perform a historical and conceptual analysis of multi-level governance (MLG) in order to tease out its characterizing traits and allow for its utilization for both empirical and normative purposes. MLG is a dynamic three-dimensional concept that blurs and problematizes three analytical distinctions that have been central to the conventional reflection on the European modern state: (1) that between centre and periphery, (2) that between state and society and (3) that between the domestic and the international. Each dimension or axis involves, in its turn, changes that occur at three analytical levels: political mobilization, policy-making and polity restructuring. Through the combination of these dimensions I generate a three-dimensional conceptual space within which the empirical scope and reach of MLG can be gauged and its desirability in normative terms assessed.

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Barbé Esther

**Multilateralism Matters More than Ever**

in *Global Society*, Volume 23, Issue 2, April , 191-203

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Harsch Michael

**NATO and the UN**

in *Survival*, vol. 51, n. 2, april , 5-12

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

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Bättig Michèle, Bernauer Thomas

**National Institutions and Global Public Goods: Are Democracies More Cooperative in Climate Change Policy?**

in *International Organization*, vol. 63, issue 2, april , 281-301

ABSTRACT: This article examines whether democracies contribute more to the provision of global public goods. It thus contributes to the debate on the effects of domestic institutions on international cooperation. The focus is on human-induced climate change, in Stern's words "the biggest market failure the world has ever seen." Using new data on climate change cooperation we study a cross-section of 185 countries in 1990–2004. The results show that the effect of democracy on levels of political commitment to climate change mitigation (policy output) is positive. In contrast, the effect on policy outcomes, measured in terms of emission levels and trends, is ambiguous. These results demonstrate that up until now the democracy effect has not been able to override countervailing forces that emanate from the free-rider problem, discounting of future benefits of climate change mitigation, and other factors that cut against efforts to



reduce emissions. Even though democracies have had a slow start in moving from political and legal commitments (policy output) to emission reductions (policy outcomes), particularly in the transportation sector, we observe some encouraging signs. The main implication of our findings for research on international politics is that greater efforts should be made to study policy output and outcome side by side. This will help in identifying whether more democratic countries experience larger “words-deeds” gaps also in other policy areas, and whether there are systematic differences of this kind between domestic and international commitments and across different policy areas.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

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**Dobner Petra**

**On the Constitutionability of Global Public Policy Networks**

**in *Indiana Journal for Global Legal Studies*, Volume 16, issue 2, summer , 605-619**

ABSTRACT: Global Public Policy Networks (GPPNs) are increasingly influential in the global policy-making process. According to the Global Public Policy Institute, GPPNs are cross-sectoral coalitions of actors from governments, international organizations, civil society, and private industry. In structure, these networks differ from traditional hierarchical organizations, but their primary functions—negotiation, coordination, rule-making, and implementation—pick up the classic tasks of formal international organizations and intergovernmental cooperation.

The power and acceptance of these networks are based on the real or alleged expertise of their members, their former or current formal positions in national or international organizations or private industry, and their personal connections. Although these features nourish the assumption that GPPNs are efficient problemsolvers, there is no empirical proof of this belief. Potential sources of their legitimacy await grounding in a solid normative theory. Efficiency cannot be considered a ready substitute for the formal democratic legitimacy that these networks are lacking in either empirical or theoretical regard. The phenomenon of GPPNs, therefore, touches some core problems of the global constitutionalism project—the idea of subjecting transnational, non-state actors to the rule of a global constitutional agreement.

As powerful actors in the transnational sphere, GPPNs must address three challenges relating to the future of constitutionalism. First, is it possible to put non-state political actors under a constitutional regime? Second, if it is possible, how does one do so? Third, in what ways can the project of constitutionalism be expanded beyond the frame of the nation-state, if at all? The answers to these questions must address the central problem of global constitutionalism: how the traditional bond between the nation-state and its constitution can be dissolved without abandoning the accomplishments that the project of the modern state constitution stands for—founding, legitimizing, and confining democratic governance.

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**Ellis David**

**On the Possibility of "International Community"**

**in *International Studies Review*, vol. 11, issue 1, march , 1-26**

ABSTRACT: The term "international community" has recently become commonplace in leaders' and academics' discourse and the subject of some analysis. While scholars have begun to explore its usage, there has not yet been a



modern theoretical evaluation of the prerequisites for creating an international community. This article conducts a theoretical analysis on the types of international communities that can be generated in international politics and the structural factors necessary for their manifestation. It continues by investigating the possibility of forming a unitary actor, called the "International Community," tasked with resolving global commons issues through an international organization, such as the United Nations. The article concludes by arguing that the conditions do not yet exist for a meaningful "International Community."

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Ewing-Chow Michael, Soh Darryl

**Pain, Gain, or Shame: The Evolution of Environmental Law and the Role of Multinational Corporations in Indiana Journal for Global Legal Studies**, Volume 16, issue 1, winter , 195-222

ABSTRACT: The evolution of environmental law in the past century has been linked to the growing acceptance of the notion of collective global responsibility, which entails the notion of sustainable development. At the turn of this century, the focus in environmental law has shifted from the creation of a global framework to deal with environmental problems to that of compliance with these frameworks. As a result, the primary actor of environmental policy has shifted from the state to the corporation. How has environmental law developed so as to encourage compliance by this new primary actor? Conversely, how has the corporation been changed by these developments? This article will trace the historical shift in environmental actors from the early beginnings of environmental law to the challenges faced today. As the multinational corporation has become the primary actor, this article also considers ways in which incentives can be created for multinational corporations to behave in environmentally responsible ways.

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Dawes Anthony, Kunoy Bjørn

**Plate tectonics in Luxembourg: The ménage à trois between EC law, international law and the European Convention on Human Rights following the UN sanctions cases in Common Market Law Review**, vol. 46, issue 1 , 73-104

ABSTRACT: In a series of judgments over the last few years, the CFI declined jurisdiction to determine whether EC regulations which transposed UN Security Council resolutions into the EC legal order were contrary to fundamental rights. These judgments thus called into question the traditional relationship between European law and international law and the oft-repeated mantra that the EC Treaty has established a complete system of legal remedies. However, on appeal in Kadi and Al Barakaat, the ECJ overturned the CFI's findings and reinstated the "traditional" position of the Community Courts

This article analyses the reasons for the CFI's apparent break with previous orthodoxy and the justifications put forward by the CFI to support such a move. It starts by briefly recalling how fundamental rights were introduced by the ECJ into the EC legal order. It then discusses the interaction between the Community Courts and the European Court of Human Rights and how the ECJ's judgment in Kadi and Al Barakaat takes this interaction a step further. Finally, the article reviews the traditional relationship between EC law and international law, how the CFI's judgments modified that relationship in relation to UN law, and why the ECJ was right to reject such a change.



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Bray Daniel

**Pragmatic Cosmopolitanism: A Deweyan Approach to Democracy beyond the Nation-State**

**in Millennium: Journal of International Studies**, vol. 37, n. 3, may , 683-719

ABSTRACT: Contemporary normative debates about democracy beyond nation-states have largely centred on the claims of two broad camps: the 'liberal cosmopolitans' and the 'deliberative democrats'. This article offers an alternative perspective developed from the work of philosopher John Dewey that I call 'pragmatic cosmopolitanism'. First, my argument for pragmatic cosmopolitanism briefly outlines the Deweyan ethical ideas that serve as my normative grounding for the transnationalisation of democratic life. This grounding is primarily based on an ethic of growth that sees the use of critical intelligence and imaginative representation as the key basis for extending moral and political boundaries beyond nation-states. In the second part, I flesh out this framework by providing normative responses to what I identify as the four problems of transnational democracy: problems of constituency, democratic scope, social prerequisites and practical institutionalisation. These responses focus attention on the important roles of leadership and representation in constituting the political agency of transnational democratic publics. The role of leaders and representative practices is emphasised because they are central elements in the development of transnational democracy that are neglected by the liberal cosmopolitan and deliberative approaches.

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Kreide Regina

**Preventing Military Humanitarian Intervention? John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas on a Just Global Order**

**in German Law Journal**, Vol.10, n.1 , 93-114

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Bellamy Alex

**Realizing the Responsibility to Protect**

**in International Studies Perspectives** , vol. 10, issue 2, may , 111-128

ABSTRACT: Written prior to the release of the UN Secretary-General's report on implementing the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), this article examines the effort to translate the principle from words into deeds. It begins by noting a post-2005 "revolt" against the principle in which a number of states expressed skepticism about the principle and its use in different settings. This revolt, the article contends, was largely a product of the continuing association between R2P and humanitarian intervention. This association was, in turn, caused by a combination of misplaced commentary and the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty's focus on the intervention question. This article maintains that building consensus on the R2P requires a shift in emphasis and proposes three avenues: clarifying the nature of prevention, developing practical measures, and proposing modest proposals for institutional reform.



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**Slaughter Steven**

**Reconsidering institutional cosmopolitanism: global poverty and the importance of the state in international political theory**

in **Global Change, Peace & Security**, vol. 21, n. 1, february , 37-52

ABSTRACT: Cosmopolitan scholarship has been at the forefront of efforts to consider political structures capable of realising justice in a more robust manner than prevailing global governance arrangements. In particular, the arguments of Thomas Pogge have contributed significantly to scholarly thinking about global poverty and his scheme of 'institutional cosmopolitanism' aspires to institutionalise human rights in the structures of global governance. This essay critiques the capacity of Pogge's cosmopolitan approach to productively guide political action in relation to global poverty by questioning whether global institutions generated by human rights are sufficient to address global poverty. The argument in this essay is that a viable guide to political action which alleviates global poverty must also take account of the potential utility of the state. This essays draws upon republican ideas to contend that cosmopolitanism needs to encompass a robust account of local institutions such as the state.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

**Buhmann Karin**

**Regulating Corporate Social and Human Rights Responsibilities at the UN Plane: Institutionalising New Forms of Law and Law-making Approaches?**

in **Nordic Journal of International Law**, vol. 78, issue 1 , 1-52

ABSTRACT: Globalisation's unprecedented growth and transborder activities of business coupled with increasing awareness of the impact of business on societies and human rights has resulted in demands for the international society to regulate corporate social and human rights responsibilities. This not only challenges traditional notions of duty bearers under international law, but also calls for novel approaches for the United Nations (UN) to implement central parts of the Charter's human rights aims and to address corporate behaviour in a state-centred international law-making order that lacks the willingness of States to regulate business. This article explores recent UN responses and argues that in the absence of States acting through ordinary international law-making, the UN as an intergovernmental organisation draws on participatory modes of law-making and new forms of law in order to normatively influence businesses' impact on human rights. The pattern of using these forms suggests an institutionalisation of reflexive regulation as a regulatory process drawing on public-private regulation, and of an emerging UN based 'Global Administrative Law' in order to meet regulatory challenges in living up to the human rights aims embodied in the UN Charter under the conditions posed by globalisation of the economy and emergence of strong transnational non-state actors. The analysis is based on the UN Global Compact, the draft Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights and the process of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and business (SRSG).

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**



*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Held David

**Restructuring Global Governance: Cosmopolitanism, Democracy and the Global Order**

in *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, vol. 37, n. 3, may , 535-547

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Kersten Charles M.

**Rethinking Transboundary Environmental Impact Assessment**

in *Yale Journal of International Law (The)*, Vol. 34 N. 1 , 173-205

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Donnelly Jack

**Rethinking political structures: from 'ordering principles' to 'vertical differentiation' – and beyond**

in *International Theory*, Volume 1, Issue 01, March , 49-86

Structure' in the discipline of International Relations, for all the criticism of Kenneth Waltz' work, still typically means the Waltzian triad of ordering principles, functional differentiation, and distribution of capabilities. I argue, however, that this triad not only does not in Waltz' particular presentation but cannot provide an adequate account of political structures. In its place I sketch a five-part framework of the elements of political structures. Three types of structural differentiation are identified: vertical differentiation, which establishes hierarchical ranking; horizontal differentiation, which establishes non-hierarchical segmentation; and unit differentiation, which assigns certain types of actors a privileged status. Two dimensions of structural elaboration are also identified: norms and institutions and technology and geography. This framework highlights the central place of ranking in international political structures, developing a tripartite account of 'ordering principles' that identifies autarchic, single-hierarchic, and heterarchic systems. It also draws attention to the diversity of international orders and opens structural analysis to the concerns and contributions of constructivism.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Dinar Shlomi

**Scarcity and Cooperation Along International Rivers**

in *Global Environmental Politics*, Volume 9, Issue 1, February , 109-135

Scarcity is often argued to be an important variable associated with explaining both conflict and cooperation over international freshwater. Yet it is the relationship between scarcity and cooperation that deserves additional scrutiny and, subsequently, rigorous empirical investigation. Building on existing literature, this article highlights the relationship between water scarcity and interstate cooperation. A model is introduced hypothesizing that cooperation is most likely to



take place when the resource is neither abundant (when there is no real impetus for cooperation) nor highly scarce (when there is little of the resource to divide among the parties or the degradation too costly to manage). Rather, formal coordination in the form of an international water treaty is most likely to ensue at levels of moderate (or relative) scarcity. An inverted U-shaped curve, rather than a linear interaction, is consequently suggested for the relationship between water scarcity and cooperation. To illustrate this relationship, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) test is conducted using seventy-four country dyad observations, an associated scarcity index, and corresponding international treaty observations. Overall, results support the scarcity-cooperation assertion. Future research is needed to investigate this relationship in a more empirical and econometrically rigorous fashion.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Abrahamsen Rita, Williams Michael C.

**Security Beyond the State: Global Security Assemblages in International Politics  
in International Political Sociology**, Volume 3, Issue 1, March 2009, 1-17

To date, most discussion of security privatization in international politics has been focused on the role of private military companies and mercenaries. This article seeks to shift the focus away from the battlefields and toward the less spectacular privatization and globalization of commercial private security. Drawing on Saskia Sassen's notion of state "disassembly," we situate the growth of private security within broader shifts in global governance. Pointing to the weakness of seeing the rise of private security as an erosion of state power and authority, we show instead a re-articulation of the public/private and global/local distinctions and relationships into what we term "global security assemblages." Analyzing the role of private security in two such assemblages in Sierra Leone and Nigeria, we show how a range of different security agents and normativities interact, cooperate and compete, to produce new institutions, practices and forms of security governance. Global security assemblages thus mark important developments in the relationship between security and the sovereign state, structures of political power and authority, and the operations of global capital.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Child Richard

**Should We Hold Nations Responsible?**

in *Res Publica*, Volume 15, Number 2, May, 195-202

Review article (David Miller, *National Responsibility and Global Justice*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, 298 pp.)

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Cherny Philip

**Some Pitfalls of Democratisation in a Globalising World: Thoughts from the 2008 Millennium Conference**



in *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, vol. 37, n. 3, may , 767-790

ABSTRACT: The problems and prospects of the expansion of democracy at international, transnational and/or global levels were the focus of numerous fascinating and penetrating analyses by the participants in the 2008 Millennium Conference. However, there were also a number of gaps and unresolved issues. This article attempts to identify and evaluate several potential pitfalls confronting the expansion of democratic institutions and processes. Five of those potential pitfalls are particularly problematic and interact with each other to reinforce and intensify the obstacles to wider democratisation processes at several levels. The first of these can be illustrated by examining the problematic historical 'roads to democracy' taken within nation states. The second looks at some of the paradoxes in empirical democratic theory, especially questions like democratic stability and the background role of non-democratic infrastructures. The third concerns normative dimensions of democratic theory, in particular the existence of different conceptions of democracy and the gap between procedural democracy and substantive democracy. The fourth asks 'Who democratises?' and considers the democratising potential of different types of various actors and the challenges they face. The fifth focuses on international regimes and institutions — 'global governance' — and argues that this system actually constitutes a major obstacle to wider democratisation. The challenges confronting democratisation are significantly greater than the potential for the spread of genuine democracy across borders, although some niches and relatively circumscribed issue areas may develop limited forms of quasi-democratisation more akin to pluralism.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

**Bremmer Ian, Leverett Flynt**

**The Age of Disorganization**

in *Foreign Policy*, Issue 171, March / April

Don't assume that the rise of new powers will lead to a new world order. The era of U.S. hegemony could be followed by a period of chaotic "nonpolarity" instead.

[http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story\\_id=4894&page=0](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4894&page=0)

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

**Lindsay James**

**The Case for a Concert of Democracies**

in *Ethics and International Affairs*, vol. 23, n. 1, spring , 5-11

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

**Gehring Thomas**

**The Causal Mechanisms of Interaction between International Institutions**

in *European Journal of International Relations* , vol. 15, n. 1, march , 125-156



ABSTRACT: This article develops a conceptual framework for the systematic analysis of the interaction between international institutions as a first step towards building a theory of international interaction. It examines how international institutions may exert causal influence on each other's development and effectiveness and suggests that four general causal mechanisms can elucidate the distinct routes through which influence travels from one institution to another. Institutional interaction can thus rely on transfer of knowledge, commitments established under an institution, behavioural effects of an institution, and functional linkage of the ultimate governance targets of the institutions involved. The article also puts forward hypotheses about the likely effects of specific types of institutional interaction for governance within the international system. The causal mechanisms and types of interaction are mutually exclusive models that help analyse real-world interaction situations. They may also serve as a basis for the systematic analysis of more complex interaction situations.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

**Bordino Giampiero**

**The Challenge of Migration Processes and World Governance**

**in Federalist Debate (The)**, Year XXII, n. 1, March , 27-29

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

**Mahbubani Kishore**

**The Dangers of Democratic Delusions**

**in Ethics and International Affairs**, vol. 23, n. 1, spring , 19-25

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

**Miller Russell A.**

**The Day the Earth Stood Still? – Reading Jürgen Habermas' Essay "February 15" Against Ian McEwan's Novel Saturday**

**in German Law Journal**, Vol.10, n.1 , 81-92

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

**Giegerich Thomas**

**The Is and the Ought of International Constitutionalism: How Far Have We Come on Habermas's Road to a**

**in German Law Journal**, Vol.10, n.1 , 31-62



No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Peters Anne

**The Merits of Global Constitutionalism**

in *Indiana Journal for Global Legal Studies*, Volume 16, issue 2, summer , 397-411

ABSTRACT: Global constitutionalism is an agenda that identifies and advocates for the application of constitutionalist principles in the international legal sphere. Global constitutionalization is the gradual emergence of constitutionalist features in international law. Critics of global constitutionalism doubt the empirical reality of constitutionalization, call into question the analytic value of constitutionalism as an academic approach, and fear that the discourse is normatively dangerous because it is anti-pluralist, artificially creates a false legitimacy, and promises an unrealistic end of politics. This article addresses these objections. I argue that global constitutionalization is likely to compensate for globalization-induced constitutionalist deficits on the national level, that a constitutionalist reading of international law can serve as a hermeneutic device, and that the constitutionalist vocabulary uncovers legitimacy deficits of international law and suggests remedies. Global constitutionalism, therefore, has a responsabilizing and much-needed critical potential.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Kelley Judith

**The More the Merrier? The Effects of Having Multiple International Election Monitoring Organizations**

in *Perspectives on Politics*, vol. 7, issue 1, march , 59-64

ABSTRACT: As the pressure to invite international election monitors rose at the end of the Cold War, states refused to grant the United Nations a dominant role. Thus, today multiple intergovernmental, regional, and international non-governmental organizations often monitor the same elections with equal authority. This article examines the costs and benefits of this complex regime to highlight some possible broader implications of regime complexity. It argues that the availability of many different organizations facilitates action that might otherwise have been blocked for political reasons. Furthermore, when different international election monitoring agencies agree, their consensus can bolster their individual legitimacy as well as the legitimacy of the international norms they stress, and thus magnify their influence on domestic politics. Unfortunately the election monitoring example also suggests that complex regimes can engender damaging inter-organizational politics and that the different biases, capabilities, and standards of organizations sometime can lead organizations to outright contradict each other or work at cross-purposes.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Skjærseth Jon Birger, Wettestad Jørgen

**The Origin, Evolution and Consequences of the EU Emissions Trading System**

in *Global Environmental Politics*, Volume 9, Issue 2, May , 101-122



The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) is the cornerstone of EU climate policy, a grand policy experiment, as the first and largest international emissions trading system in the world. In this article, we seek to provide a broad overview of the initiation, decision-making and implementation of the EU ETS so far. We explore why the EU changed from a laggard to a leader in emissions trading, how it managed to establish the system rapidly, and the consequences to date, leading up to the 2008 proposal for a revised ET Directive for the post-2012 period. We apply three explanatory approaches, focusing on the roles of the EU member states, the EU institutions and the international climate regime, and conclude that all three approaches are needed to understand what happened, how and why. This also reveals that what happened in the early days of developing the system had significant consequences for the problems experienced in practice and the prospects ahead.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Drezner Daniel

**The Power and Peril of International Regime Complexity**

*in Perspectives on Politics*, vol. 7, issue 1, march, 65-70

ABSTRACT: The proliferation of international rules, laws, and institutional forms raises important questions for regime theory. Looking at the theoretical and empirical arguments presented by all the contributors, however, it seems clear that that complexity's effects on actor strategies—particularly powerful actors—remain open to debate. Some of the posited effects of international regime complexity have contradictory or cross-cutting effects. Further effects of regime complexity—cross-institutional strategizing, the asymmetrical distribution of legal and technical expertise, and the fragmentation of reputation—can erode the significance of institutions in complex environments. This contribution considers the effect that regime complexity has on how powerful actors approach world politics—in part by connecting the current debate with past discussions about the significance of international regimes in world politics.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Halberstam Daniel, Eric Stein Eric

**The United Nations, the European Union, and the King of Sweden: Economic sanctions and individual rights in a plural world order**

*in Common Market Law Review*, vol. 46, issue 1, 13-72

ABSTRACT: Reawakened from its long slumber during the Cold War, the UN Security Council has become more active than ever before. Increased UN activity, however, has not always spelled increased accountability and control. This problem becomes particularly acute in the case of UN decisions imposing targeted economic sanctions on individuals who are suspected of sponsoring terrorism. These sanctions, or the process by which the decisions on sanctions are reached, have been in considerable tension with international as well as domestic conceptions of fundamental rights. When the UN enlists regional organizations and States in taking action against such individuals, the resulting multiplicity of institutions may be a blessing or a curse. The plurality of claims to ultimate legal authority may create multiple veto points checking for the protection of fundamental values or may provide myriad opportunities for obstruction, burden shifting, or evasion of responsibility. The difficulty, then, lies in arriving at an approach that can mediate productively between the needs for collective action and the particular perspective of each institutional participant without losing site



of fundamental values, such as human rights.

This Article tackles these questions by examining the international human rights constraints that operate on UN authority, and then turning to a discussion of the UN's economic sanctions regime and the clash of legal orders in recent litigation in the European Courts – especially in the Kadi case – surrounding implementation of that sanctions regime in the European Union and its Member States.

We argue that the UN Security Council should be considered bound by human rights; that the EC Treaty provides the European Community with power to implement targeted sanctions; that the relation between the European legal order and that of the UN lacks an ordered hierarchy; and finally, that this pluralist relationship should be managed neither by usurpation nor simple resistance, but by constructive mutual engagement on constitutional as well as international human rights.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Tinnevelt Ronald, Mertens Thomas

**The World State: A Forbidding Nightmare of Tyranny? Habermas on the Institutional Implications of Moral Cosmopolitanism**

in *German Law Journal*, Vol.10, n.1 , 63-80

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Andonova Liliana B., Betsill Michele M., Bulkeley Harriet

**Transnational Climate Governance**

in *Global Environmental Politics*, Volume 9, Issue 2, May , 52-73

In this article we examine the emergence and implications of transnational climate-change governance. We argue that although the study of transnational relations has recently been renewed alongside a burgeoning interest in issues of global governance, the nature of transnational governance has to date received less attention. We contend that transnational governance occurs when networks operating in the transnational political sphere authoritatively steer constituents toward public goals. In order to stimulate a more systematic study of the diversity and significance of this phenomenon, the article develops a typology based on the actors involved and their authority—public, private, or hybrid—and the primary governance functions performed in order to steer network constituents—information-sharing, capacity building and implementation, or rule-setting. A comparative discussion of transnational governance networks for climate change illustrates each category and the value of the typology in assessing the multiple mechanisms through which transnational governance occurs. In conclusion, we suggest that our typology provides a useful starting point for future research and reflect on the implications for the study of global affairs.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Verdier Pierre-Hugues



**Transnational Regulatory Networks and Their Limits**

in *Yale Journal of International Law (The)*, Vol. 34 N. 1 , 114-172

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

**Bogdandy Armin von, Dellavalle Sergio**

**Universalism Renewed: Habermas' Theory of International Order in Light of Competing Paradigms**

in *German Law Journal*, Vol.10, n.1 , 1-4

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

**Ikeda Daisaku**

**Verso una competizione mondiale umanitaria**

in *Affari Esteri*, Anno XLI, n. 163 , 618-659

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

**Moore Tod**

**Violations of Sovereignty and Regime Engineering: A Critique of the State Theory of Stephen Krasner**

in *Australian Journal of Political Science*, vol. 44, n. 3, september , 497-511

ABSTRACT: With the publication of his 1999 book *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*, and a welter of other publications on sovereignty, Krasner has represented a dominating voice in the recent resurgence of sovereignty discourse. Krasner's intricate discussions of international relations (IR) and US foreign policy have overshadowed the theoretical weaknesses of his account of sovereignty itself, leading to accusations by critics such as Amitav Acharya of 'disorganised hypocrisy'. This paper investigates both the content of his policy prescriptions for the State Department, of which he was a part from 2005 to 2007, and the thin account of sovereignty in his works, and demonstrates a possible relationship between the two. It also seeks to situate his position, as a neorealist with some liberal institutionalist tendencies,<sup>1</sup> within the larger debate on sovereignty in IR. It is argued that Krasner does not satisfactorily resolve the contradictions between sovereignty and extended transitional administrations or similar arrangements, especially the regime established by the US in Iraq.

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Weiss Thomas

**What Happened to the Idea of World Government**

in *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 53, issue 2, June, 2009, 253-271

ABSTRACT: What happened to the idea of world government, so central in the United States to public debate of the 1930s and 1940s, and why has it been replaced by "global governance"? This article reviews the reasons behind that evolution—the need to incorporate interdependence and nonstate actors into analytical frameworks along with a lack of imagination from analysts—as well as the pluses and minuses of both concepts. When states still could solve or attenuate most problems, world government remained a possible objective and not far from the mainstream. Paradoxically, now that states visibly cannot address a growing number of transboundary threats, world government is unimaginable; and even more robust international organizations are often looked upon askance. Could the same far-sighted American political commitment that created a new generation of international organizations after World War II re-emerge under the Obama administration, if not in 2009, then at least by the end of a second term?

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Føllesdal Andreas

**When Common Interests Are Not Common: Why the Global Basic Structure Should Be Democratic**

in *Indiana Journal for Global Legal Studies*, Volume 16, issue 2, summer, 2009, 585-604

ABSTRACT: The global constitution—the fundamental international norms and structures that serve constitutional functions—should include mechanisms of democratic contestation and accountability. This central claim of global constitutionalism faces three objections extrapolated from arguments made by Andrew Moravcsik and Giandomenico Majone in debates about the democratic deficit of the European Union (EU): the global constitution only regulates issues of low salience for citizens; democratic control is explicitly counter to the self-binding system that international regulations aim to achieve; and the EU's track record suggests that democratic control at the international level may be unnecessary to ensure congruence between voters' preferences and actual regulations. These objections miss the profound impact of the global constitution and the complexity of the "common goods" that multilevel regulations are meant to secure. They also overlook some of the reasons to value democratic deliberation and contestation as mechanisms to enhance the trustworthiness of institutions and authorities.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Jason Ralph

**Which Cosmopolitanism? Whose Empire? Or Why the Schmittian Charge of "Liberal Imperialism" is Only Half Right**

in *Global Society*, Volume 23, Issue 3, July, 2009, 207-224

This article examines the Schmittian-inspired charge that liberalism is intrinsically imperialistic and that it dehumanises alternative illiberal political projects in ways that lead to disproportionate and indiscriminate violence. It focuses specifically on the charge that the US war on terror is the latest manifestation of this kind of liberal imperialism. Such an argument only makes sense when liberalism is combined with exclusionary modes of nationalism and realism. This synthesis underpins the "hard Wilsonianism" of American neoconservatism. The article argues that the



Schmittian-inspired charge of imperialism cannot be properly directed at the more inclusionary cosmopolitan forms of liberalism, which is illustrated with reference to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Schlesinger Stephen

**Why a League of Democracies Will Not Work**

in *Ethics and International Affairs*, vol. 23, n. 1, spring , 13-18

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy*

Snidal Duncal, Wendt Alexander

**Why there is International Theory now**

in *International Theory*, Volume 1, Issue 01, March , 1-14

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 5. The Globalization process*

Dennis J. Snower, Alessio J. G. Brown, Christian Merkl

**Globalization and the Welfare State: A Review of Hans-Werner Sinn's Can Germany Be Saved?**

in *Journal of Economic Literature*, Vol. 47, No. 1 , 136–58

What are the challenges that globalization makes on welfare states and how should welfare states respond? How should welfare states be designed to enable countries to reap the benefits of globalization? These are the main themes of Hans-Werner Sinn's book, *Can Germany Be Saved?* We view Germany as a case study of how a welfare state can go wrong in reacting to the pressures of globalization. We present two views of globalization -- the specialization view (of Sinn) and the Great Reorganization view (ours) -- and examine the policy implications of each for the welfare state design.

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*Subsection 5. The Globalization process*

Orsenna Érik

**"Je cherchais du global, et je n'ai trouvé que du local"**

in *Debat (Le)*, N° 154, mars-avril

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 5. The Globalization process*

Leander Anna

**'Globalization Theory': Feeble... and Hijacked**

in **International Political Sociology**, Volume 3, Issue 1, March 2009, 109-112

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 5. The Globalization process*

Jamil E. Jreisat

**Administration, Globalization, and the Arab States**

in **Public Organization Review**, Volume 9, Number 1, 37-50

Globalization involves risks and opportunities for the Arab world. Realistic knowledge of these possibilities is essential for adaptation of governance and reform of public administration to deal more effectively with the unfolding processes of globalization. To be participants rather than mere subjects, the Arab states have to recognize opportunities and limit potential negative consequences. Success requires good governance and professional public management. Public administration in the Arab world has to transform traditional methods of command and control and nepotism into a more collaborative management that relies on institutional capabilities and practicing managerial values of accountability, performance evaluation, transparency, and ethics.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 5. The Globalization process*

Jaeger Hans-Martin

**An A-Cultural, Scientific Supertheory of World Society?**

in **International Political Sociology**, Volume 3, Issue 1, March 2009, 128-132

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 5. The Globalization process*

Peña Ángel

**Argentina: globalización de barco, globalización de ADSL.**

in **Nueva Revista de Política Cultura y arte (Spagna)**, n.122

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 5. The Globalization process*

Ypi Lea, Goodin Robert E., Barry Christian



**Associative Duties, Global Justice, and the Colonies**

in *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Volume 37, Issue 2, Spring 2009 , 103-135

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 5. The Globalization process*

Dinda Soumyananda

**Climate change and human insecurity**

in *International Journal of Global Environmental Issues*, Volume 9, Issue1/2 , 103-109

Recently, the question of link or the relationship between the global climate change and the level of economic activity becomes the major issue and comes to the focal point of research. In this study, we try to find out the linkage between environment and economic growth. Let us consider a certain level of income, up to which one may reasonably expect high green house gas-intensive income growth to affect adversely the climate globally. But beyond a critical level, climatic degradation may, in principle, reach a stage where further income growth becomes difficult. Thus, the human race faces the economic as well as social insecurity due to climate change. Climate may act as a constraint to income growth at this latter stage if the greenhouse gas-intensive income growth process is continued. Thus, the global economy faces a serious challenge from the global climate change. To save the world economy or in other way to protect humanity, proper environmental policy should be adopted at appropriate time such that we may control the vulnerability of the climate change.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 5. The Globalization process*

Calcutt Lyn, Woodward Ian, Skrbis Zlatko

**Conceptualizing otherness: An exploration of the cosmopolitan schema**

in *Journal of Sociology*, Volume 45, No. 2, June 2009 , 169-186

The Australian cosmopolitan is an important symbolic figure in popular discourse and the political landscape. Regardless of the actual scope and scale of 'cosmopolitanness' in Australia, the spectre of cosmopolitanism, and its close relatives such as tolerance of diversity or openness to difference, is a powerful figure in contemporary culture. The cosmopolitan willingness to accommodate otherness is perceived as a betrayal of Australian culture, yet continuing high levels of immigration from diverse sources demand cosmopolitan tolerance. Sociologists know that cosmopolitan people can accommodate diversity, but how this is achieved is the subject of much theoretical debate. It is reasonable to assume that cosmopolitans conceptualize otherness in ways that reduce or eliminate a sense of threat, but how can we reliably access individual conceptualizations? Informed by a cultural sociology approach, this project utilized the concept of cognitive schemas from psychology, and formal semantics from linguistics, to access cosmopolitan conceptualizations. Analysis of focus group data concluded that cosmopolitan schemas are constructed using a repertoire of strategies which compartmentalize categories of otherness into manageable portions. It is argued that, from the cosmopolitan perspective, Australian cultural integrity remains the intact and dominant host of smaller, harmless or manageable cultural fragments.

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*Subsection 5. The Globalization process*

Beck Ulrich

**Critical Theory of World Risk Society: A Cosmopolitan Vision**

in *Constellations*, Vol. 16, Issue 1, March , 3-22

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 5. The Globalization process*

Carmin JoAnn, Bast Elizabeth

**Cross-movement activism: a cognitive perspective on the global justice activities of US environmental NGOs**

in *Environmental Politics*, Volume 18, Issue 3, May , 351-370

Environmental NGOs often create new campaigns or extend their ongoing activities from the principal issue arena in which they work to other substantive domains. Although this is a common practice, scholars have not assessed how NGOs position their work within different arenas or whether these activities represent an extension of or deviation from an organisation's mission and values. To understand the nature of cross-movement activism, the global justice activities of four environmental organisations are examined. All four participated in the global justice movement in ways that reflected their long-standing interpretations of the source of environmental problems and their deeply-held views of how to address these problems. Thus the cross-movement activism of environmental NGOs not only draws on their longstanding repertoires of action, but is consistent with their mission and core values.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 5. The Globalization process*

Hartog François

**De l'histoire universelle à l'histoire globale ? Expériences du temps**

in *Debat (Le)*, N° 154, mars-avril

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 5. The Globalization process*

Boggs Carl

**Democracy, Free Markets, and Other Grand Illusions**

in *New Political Science*, vol. 31, n. 2, june , 221-237

No abstract available

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*Subsection 5. The Globalization process*



Biagioli Mario

**Democrazia e globalizzazione: oltre i fallimenti del mercato e dello Stato**  
in *Nuvole*, anno XIX, n. 38, marzo

No abstract available

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Biagioli Mario

**Democrazia e globalizzazione: oltre i fallimenti del mercato e dello Stato**  
in *Nuvole*, anno XIX, n. 38, marzo

No abstract available

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Robertson Roland

**Differentiation Reductionism and the Missing Link in Albert's Approach to Globalization Theory**  
in *International Political Sociology*, Volume 3, Issue 1, March 2009, 119-122

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

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Dinda Soumyananda

**Environment and economic growth: a convergence approach**  
in *International Journal of Global Environmental Issues*, Volume 9, Issue 1/2, 137-144

The world economy faces a serious challenge from the global environmental degradation and appropriate environmental policy should be adopted in time to save it. The effective environmental policy prescription depends on the actual position of the economy: at what stage of growth/development the economy is. To be specific, we are interested to observe how economic growth is systematically linked to the position of the economy as well as that of the environment. Our model predicts that the average growth rate of output is inversely related to the initial level of output and directly related to the initial level of environmental condition.

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Berger Mark T.

**From Pax Romana to Pax Americana? The history and future of the new American Empire**  
in *International Politics*, Volume 46, Issue 2-3, March, 140-156



This review paper focuses on the most recent cycle in the debate about the history and future of the 'New American Empire,' both in relation to the rise and fall of the Roman Empire specifically, and against the wider backdrop of the extensive debate about the US position in the changing global order more generally. It argues that much of the literature, including some of the books under review, rest on a misreading of history (Roman or otherwise) and a flawed grasp of the fate of the American ascendancy in relation to the contemporary crisis of the nation-state system and the far from unexpected boom–bust cycles of 'genuinely existing' liberal capitalism (globalization) in the twenty-first century. The washout on Wall Street in the latter part of 2008 could only come as a surprise to those who have not been paying attention to the vicissitudes of 'genuinely existing' liberal capitalism over the past 30 years or more. The paper argues that the American ascendancy, contrary to much of the contemporary prognostication, remains in its prime and Pax Americana will only begin a downward spiral when it has been successfully challenged and displaced by an equally powerful and systemic alternative. In the meantime, the New American Empire, especially under new leadership, looks set to continue and even flourish.

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**Albert Mathias**

**Globalization and World Society Theory: A Reply**

**in *International Political Sociology*** , Volume 3, Issue 1, March 2009 , 126-128

No abstract available

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**Youngs Gillian, Widdows Heather**

**Globalization, Ethics, and the 'War on Terror'**

**in *Globalizations*** , Volume 6, Issue 1, March 2009 , 1-6

This article serves as a lead-in to the special issue and reflects on the relationship between globalization, ethics, and the 'war on terror'. It argues that while globalization studies have focused substantially on the marketization of life, including the realms of politics and culture, the current 'war on terror' phase has directed focus in theory and practice back to traditional state-centred security concerns and critical investigation of state-citizen relations, notably in the context of multicultural societies. The article discusses three key areas of ethics. First those connected to the terminology of 'war' in this context and the applicability of just war thinking; second, the challenge of such rhetoric to core values of liberal democracies, such as equality and impartiality; and third, the consequences for the division between the political and public spheres and the supposedly private spheres of religion and culture.

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**Heyvaert Veerle**

**Globalizing Regulation: Reaching Beyond the Borders of Chemical Safety**

**in *Journal of Law and Society*** , Volume 36 Issue 1 - March , 110-128



This article argues that although globalization can benefit both exporters and importers of regulation in absolute terms, it may turn the globalization of regulation into a game with relative winners and losers. Using the EU REACH Regulation of chemicals as a case study, it explores the normative, social, economic, and strategic reasons that push the EU to promote the global adoption of REACH. Notwithstanding its attractions, rules globalization may result in a mismatch between global norms and local priorities, particularly for developing countries. It reduces regulatory diversity, and amplifies the strengths but equally the weaknesses of the dominant regulatory framework. While it can foster international trade through mutual recognition of regulatory decisions and the development of transnational regulatory frameworks, it increases the likelihood of conflict and trade flow disequilibria. The article calls for further careful consideration of rules globalization, so that harmonization does not come at the expense of local interests and values.

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McNeill William H.

**Histoire mondiale : l'essor et le déclin de l'Occident**

in **Debat (Le)**, N° 154, mars-avril

No abstract available

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Burke Edmund III

**Hodgson et l'histoire mondiale**

in **Debat (Le)**, N° 154, mars-avril

No abstract available

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Hindess Barry

**How Useful Is the Concept of Global Society?**

in **International Political Sociology**, Volume 3, Issue 1, March 2009, 122-125

No abstract available

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Parks Bradley C., Roberts J Timmons

**Inequality and the global climate regime: breaking the north-south impasse**

in **Cambridge Review of International Affairs**, Vol. 21, n. 4, December, 621-648



This article explores the hypothesis that global inequality may be a central impediment to interstate cooperation on climate change policy. Conventional wisdom suggests that outcomes in international environmental politics are primarily attributable to material self-interest, bargaining power, coercion, domestic environmental values, exogenous shocks and crises, the existence of salient policy solutions, the strength of political leadership and the influence of nonstate actors. Yet none of these approaches offers a completely satisfactory explanation for the long-standing north-south divide on climate change. Drawing on social inequality literature and international relations theory, we argue that inequality dampens cooperative efforts by reinforcing 'structuralist' world-views and causal beliefs, polarizing policy preferences, promoting particularistic notions of fairness, generating divergent and unstable expectations about future behaviour, eroding conditions of mutual trust and creating incentives for zero-sum and negative-sum behaviour. In effect, inequality undermines the establishment of mutually acceptable 'rules of the game' which could mitigate these obstacles.

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Jones Peter

**International Toleration and the 'War on Terror'**

in **Globalizations** , Volume 6, Issue 1, March 2009 , 7-22

This article examines how the idea of toleration might be deployed in the international domain, especially in relation to the large cultural and social differences that have come to be associated with the 'war on terror'. It distinguishes different possible grounds for toleration and examines the force and implications of the deontological idea of respect for persons as a reason for international toleration. Contrary to Rawls, it argues that the group-based character of societal claims does not require us to substitute peoples for persons as the ultimate objects of respect in the international domain. The idea of equal respect is the most potent justification for the toleration of cultural differences. It is also commonly taken to argue for political and social equality, but, under the right circumstances, it can also argue for toleration of undemocratic political systems and inegalitarian social arrangements.

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Bartelson Jens

**Is There a Global Society?**

in **International Political Sociology** , Volume 3, Issue 1, March 2009 , 112-115

No abstract available

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Beck Ulrich

**Jenseits von Klasse und Nation: Individualisierung und die Transnationalisierung sozialer Ungleichheiten**

in **Soziale Welt**, Jahrgang 59, Heft 4, 2008 , 301-326



No abstract available

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**Calliess Graf-Peter , Hoffmann Hermann B.**

**Judicial Services for Global Commerce – Made in Germany?**

in **German Law Journal**, Vol.10, n.2 , 115-122

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

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**Testart Alain**

**L'histoire globale peut-elle ignorer les Nambikwara ? Plaidoyer pour l'ethnohistoire**

in **Debat (Le)**, N° 154, mars-avril

No abstract available

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**Mengozzi P.**

**L'incidence de la globalisation sur la réglementation de la participation communautaire au système du commerce international**

in **Diritto dell'Unione europea**, Anno: 2008 - Fascicolo: 4 , pag. 671

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

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**Karvar Anousheh**

**La crise mondiale vue de Belém : retour du « Forum social mondial »**

in **Esprit**, n. 353, mars/avril 2009 , 228-230

Full text:

Le mouvement altermondialiste, qui a pris forme dans la contestation contre le forum économique de Davos et les cycles de négociations de l'Omc, s'est d'abord illustré par l'organisation de manifestations gigantesques (Seattle, 1999) et parfois violentes (Gênes, 2001). En parallèle, le mouvement a expérimenté différentes formules de rassemblement dans des forums sociaux mondiaux (Fsm), réunis les premières années à Porto Alegre puis à Mumbai, avant de se déconcentrer en Europe et ailleurs dans le monde (Caracas, Karachi, Bamako<sup>1</sup>) puis de se recentrer à Nairobi en 2007, pour opter en fin de compte, en janvier 2008, pour un forum décentralisé, le même jour partout dans le monde.



Cette dernière initiative, à peine visible, tout comme la mobilisation de juillet 2008, en marge de la conférence de l'Omc à Genève, passée inaperçue dans la presse, a fait croire à un essoufflement durable du mouvement.

Pourtant, en réunissant 133 000 personnes venues de 142 pays, la neuvième édition du Forum social mondial qui se tenait à Belém (Brésil) a été la plus importante en nombre depuis 2001. Le contexte inédit de la crise mondiale, qui a accredité bon nombre des prévisions des altermondialistes, n'est sans doute pas étranger à cette affluence.

À l'origine du succès de ce forum, il faut aussi citer la vitalité du tissu associatif, la popularité des mouvements inspirés de la théologie de la libération comme la bonne implantation des organisations syndicales au Brésil et dans le reste de l'Amérique latine. Autant d'ingrédients qui ont aussi conféré à l'événement une couleur plus régionale que mondiale.

L'édition 2009 du Fsm n'a pas échappé à l'omniprésence de la figure tutélaire de Che Guevara. Le stand consacré aux cinquante ans de la révolution cubaine n'a pas désempilé et l'engouement des jeunes, toutes nationalités confondues, pour des conférenciers comme N. Chomsky ne se dément pas. Pourtant, avec la disparition de l'administration Bush ou encore l'échec prévisible du cycle de Doha pour le commerce mondial, le discours radical s'est trouvé quelque peu orphelin de ses ennemis identifiés. Obama est encore épargné par les critiques à l'égard de l'intervention américaine en Afghanistan ou en Irak et une certaine prudence est également observée dans les diatribes à l'égard de la Banque mondiale et du Fmi.

En revanche, avec les accords de libre-échange Ue-Acp2 ou encore la directive européenne pour le retour des migrants illégaux, l'Europe a été identifiée comme adversaire susceptible de faire l'unanimité contre elle.

La composante libertaire du mouvement a dû affronter le consensus majoritaire qui se forme progressivement autour de l'importance du rôle de l'État et des politiques publiques, pour endiguer les effets de la crise pour les populations les plus vulnérables. De même, les rhétoriques les plus radicales du discours antilibéral ont perdu de leur mordant, dès lors que leurs principaux arguments sont repris dans les discours des économistes et des chefs d'État, y compris des plus libéraux.

La triple crise : climatique, énergétique, alimentaire

Le nouveau rendez-vous de Belém, situé à la lisière de la forêt amazonienne, emblème de la menace de déforestation, a offert un lieu unique de débat autour de la triple crise mondiale – climatique, énergétique et alimentaire. De nombreux ateliers et tables rondes ont débattu d'un autre contenu de la croissance, fondé sur le respect du développement durable et de la biodiversité. En mettant le sort des peuples indigènes d'Amazonie au centre des débats, le forum a été avant tout conçu et vécu comme un lieu de rencontres et de consolidation de réseaux locaux, un espace d'échanges d'expériences autour de l'économie solidaire, du mouvement coopératif, de l'agriculture familiale...

Le forum a donné lieu à 22 assemblées réunissant Ong et mouvements sociaux dans « le respect de la diversité et la totale liberté de chaque composante », autour de thématiques communes : justice climatique, droits de l'homme et des peuples indigènes, sciences et démocratie, femmes, Noirs, culture et éducation, crise financière, monde du travail et crise globale, pour un monde sans dette et sans corruption, contre l'approche sécuritaire des migrations...

Les objectifs très larges du forum, propres à accueillir toutes les sensibilités, et le très grand nombre d'ateliers (2 400), n'ont pas toujours facilité la confrontation entre les différents mouvements en présence. Dans une ambiance très



studieuse, chacun a donc plus débattu avec ses pairs qu'avec des organisations issues d'autres courants.

À Belém, les principaux organisateurs ont définitivement renoncé à formuler un seul et unique cahier de propositions globales comme en 2005. Lors de la séance de clôture du forum, chaque assemblée a pu donner lecture de sa propre déclaration et proposer un agenda de mobilisation. S'en dégage toutefois un diagnostic commun sur la banqueroute des politiques néolibérales et un large consensus sur la nécessité d'un nouveau modèle de production et de consommation. Il y a accord sur l'urgence à freiner le changement climatique, sur la promotion d'un développement durable à visage humain, sur la garantie d'une sécurité alimentaire et énergétique pour les populations les plus fragiles, sur le droit à la terre et le droit à un travail décent, sur l'éducation et la santé pour tous... Par ailleurs, des exigences en matière de politique internationale ont porté sur le retrait des troupes étrangères d'Irak et d'Afghanistan et la solidarité avec le peuple palestinien...

### L'impossible synthèse

Les organisateurs auraient pu profiter de la présence plus visible des organisations syndicales du Nord et du Sud, pour aborder les conflits d'intérêt au sein même des différentes composantes des mouvements sociaux. À cet égard, trois questions auraient mérité d'être débattues de manière contradictoire. Tout d'abord, dans les réponses à la crise économique, la question du libre-échange, par opposition aux solutions protectionnistes envisagées par certains États avec l'appui des syndicats nationaux, n'a pas trouvé à Belém un espace d'échanges à la hauteur de l'enjeu.

Ensuite, des projets de développement comme le grand chantier de barrage hydroélectrique sur le fleuve Madeira, affluent de l'Amazone, aurait pu donner lieu à une confrontation passionnante entre les tenants de la souveraineté énergétique du pays (la Cut par exemple) et les écologistes conduits par Marina Silva, ancienne ministre de l'Environnement, préoccupée par ses effets « prédateurs » sur les populations locales et la reproduction des poissons.

Enfin, dans les réponses à la crise financière, la légitimité des « plates-formes d'exclusion » tels le G8 ou le G20, pour opérer une transformation fondamentale de l'architecture financière mondiale a été remise en question. Une Onu réformée et le G192, son assemblée, ont été présentées comme le seul forum réellement multilatéral à même de donner la parole à tous les citoyens du monde affectés par la crise financière. On aurait pu, dès lors, poser la question de l'efficacité d'une telle institution pour produire des mesures rapides et opérationnelles, imposables à tous.

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Si, à l'origine, les forums sociaux mondiaux étaient conçus comme des lieux de construction de stratégies de « résistance » au modèle de mondialisation proposé à Davos, la juxtaposition des revendications, sans confrontation ni synthèse finale, ancre les Fsm dans la dispersion empirique des démarches locales. La plupart des organisateurs y voient sa seule voie de survie.

Tous n'ont pas, cependant, totalement renoncé à engager un rapport de force, en cherchant cette fois des alliés du côté des leaders politiques latino-américains se réclamant du « socialisme bolivarien ». Malgré des divergences politiques de fond, les cinq chefs d'État du continent, Lula (Brésil), Chavez (Venezuela), Morales (Bolivie), Correa (Équateur) et Lugo (Paraguay), qui ont tenu un meeting populaire très médiatisé en marge du Fsm, ne semblent pas insensibles à la démarche. Ils ont tous appelé à l'unité avec les mouvements sociaux pour lutter contre les effets de la crise dont les grandes puissances occidentales leur font porter la charge.



Le Fsm de Belém a fait preuve d'une dynamique certaine, revitalisée par le contexte mondial de la crise et la vigueur des organisations de la société civile, notamment en Amérique latine. Il illustre, à bien des égards, le regain d'intérêt des jeunes générations pour l'engagement dans des initiatives locales diverses, autogérées, autour des grands principes de justice, de paix, des droits de l'homme et du respect de l'environnement. Ils développent, avec l'internet, des réseaux de vigilance et de surveillance, tout en mettant à distance les tentatives des plus anciens de trouver des prolongements politiques possibles aux rassemblements. La candeur de leurs démarches est souvent couplée à une méfiance viscérale envers les États soupçonnés de corruption et d'autoritarisme.

Pour ce qui est de la capacité de mobilisation de la mouvance altermondialiste, la semaine d'action, prévue fin mars en marge du sommet du G20 à Londres, aura sans doute valeur de test.

Anousheh Karvar

1. Voir Christophe Courtin, « Le Forum social mondial, objet politique non identifié », Esprit, novembre 2006.

2. Amérique, Caraïbes, Pacifique.

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Tremonti Giulio

**La crisi è globale perché ha origine nella globalizzazione**

in *ItalianiEuropei*, n. 1

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Dore Ronald

**La finanziarizzazione dell'economia globale**

in *Stato e mercato*, 3 , 373-394

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 5. The Globalization process*

Beck Ulrich

**La società (mondiale) del rischio e le insicurezze fabbricate**



in *Iride*, numero 3, dicembre 2008 , 511-520

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 5. The Globalization process*

Prince Agbodjan Hervé

**Le droit international économique face aux défis des subventions à l'exportation: évolution et traitement d'une pratique déloyale (Note)**

in *Etudes Internationales*, 4, Decembre 2008

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 5. The Globalization process*

Dimitrova Anna, Fougier Eddy

**Les illusions perdues de la « mondialisation heureuse »**

in *Europe en formation (L')*, n. 351, printemps , 119-147

Full text available on-line: <http://www.cife.eu/UserFiles/File/EEF/351/DIMICTROVAEEF351.pdf>

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Holmes Kim R.

**Liderazgo de EE. UU.: la esperanza para la libertad**

in *Cuadernos de pensamiento político*, Nr 20, octubre-diciembre 2008 , 109-134

No abstract available

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Yakemtchouk Romain

**L'Islam face à l'Occident: un heurt des civilisations**

in *Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali*, Volume 76, n. 1, gennaio-marzo , 24-58

Since the Iranian Revolution and the tragic events on September 2001, the world is shattered by the radical Bin Laden movement who recommends the establishment of a global Islamic order based on the strict interpretation of Quran, and motivates the terrorist activities against the Western countries. Some thinks that the next world war, if there is one, will be a war between civilizations. Is the Islamic threat myth or reality? Naturally, most of the terrorists are Muslims, but all Muslims are not terrorists. The radical fundamentalism is considered by a wide range of Islamic countries as an impending danger, and at the same time, the Islamic world is politically profoundly divided: there are powerful forces



toward integration of both civilizations who share common cultural values.

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Padoa-Schioppa Tommaso

**Market Fundamentalism and the Abdication of Politics**

**in Federalist Debate (The)**, Year XXII, n. 1, March , 9-11

We know that the market system's strength is not to avoid mistakes, but to sanction and correct mistakes. Its philosophical foundation is not the Utopia of a flawless economy, but the acceptance of human fallibility. And we know that prices are the essential vehicle of adjustments.

Volatility, the name we give to the restless movement of prices, manifests itself in hourly, daily, quarterly, up to multiyear movements. They are all 'corrections', triggered by new information or revisions of judgements over previously available information. Most corrections are totally harmless; some may be painful or even fatal for individual firms or households, but harmless for the system; yet others hurt entire branches or even the whole of the economy, although they do not permanently impair the system. The word 'crisis' is appropriate when the correction is particularly sharp and the return to track particularly laborious. Accepting the market economy implies coming to terms with the inevitability not only of corrections, but also of crises.

Where should the present crisis be placed in this scale? Of which system is this the crisis? Not – as some pretend – of capitalism or of the market economy, in the same way as the fall of the Berlin Wall marks the final crumbling of central planning. The system of which this is the crisis, is the particular variety of the market economy that we have seen at work in the last three or four decades.

How will the crisis be surmounted? There are here, to be sure, two issues in this single interrogation: first, how to steer the economy out of the mess and, second, how to reshape the economic and financial system in order to avoid repeating it. This is the common distinction between management and prevention.

Before concentrating on the foundations of prevention, its interaction with management should be clarified. First, the crisis itself, including the public action undertaken to manage it, shapes a new reality, and it is with this reality, not with the pre-crisis configuration, that politics will be confronted. Indeed, the crisis is a 'reformer'. One example is the come back of universal banking, with the transformation of Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and American Express into Bank Holding Companies; another is the consolidation of financial institutions produced by the fall of Lehman and the takeovers of Bear Sterns and Merrill Lynch.

Second, prevention starts before crisis management ends: the conferences of Havana, Bretton Woods, San Francisco, were held while World War Two was still raging. Many of the actions undertaken by public authorities to manage the crisis are chosen with the 'after crisis' in mind, just as the strategy of the allied powers combating in Europe aimed not only at winning the war, but also at influencing the post-war borders.

Third, the legacy of the crisis should not be untouchable for the architects of the reconstruction. Certain public interventions required and justified in the emergency, should not create a precedent for ordinary times and should be quickly reversed after the storm. Injections of public capital into private institutions or the acceptance of dubious



collateral by the central bank are examples in point; a main aim of reforms is precisely to avoid the repetition of unorthodox measures that proved indispensable in the emergency. This holds also for structural changes produced by the storm: if, for instance, part of the problem was that too many financial institutions were deemed too big to fail and the crisis has produced further consolidation, there could be good reason to pursue deconsolidation as part of the recovery programme.

The reform agenda is long. It comprises the role and structure of regulators and a redrawing of the list of regulated institutions, access to central bank facilities and accounting standards, compensation policies for directors and managers and pro-cyclicality of regulatory requirements, rating agencies and the financial infrastructure. Rather than reviewing the technical issues involved in this agenda, I will try to identify a few aims which should guide the entire reform. Such aims are formulated in a conceptualized form, which may appear removed from the frontline of the present debate. Conceptualizing, however, is not escaping from reality but, on the contrary, going to the heart of it.

Reform, however, should stem from an in-depth understanding of the fundamental flaws, which have developed in the last three decades, and from recognition that it is the task of public policies, not of the market itself, to remove, as much as possible, these flaws. There is of course no certainty that the correction will come, but there can be little doubt that to make it come is a task of politics, not a spontaneously generated order à la Hayek.

One of the flaws that are at the origin of this crisis is market fundamentalism. This amounts to saying that what should be blamed is politics, not the market. Indeed, it was known that the proper functioning of the market economy rests on an appropriate mix of private and public actions and that the animal spirits produce collective prosperity only if they operate within the framework of legislation, regulation and supervision. It was also known how, by and large, this framework should be constructed and operated. The fact that in the last three decades the public side of the economic system omitted to make this framework evolve at the same pace at which the private side was moving and even dismantled relevant parts of it can only be called a politics failure. Politics failures are usually seen as due to an excess of government intervention; here they were due to a lack of government.

Market fundamentalism is the appropriate label for the radical wing of a vast movement of ideas, which has dominated economic thinking and policymaking in the last thirty years. Such movement entered the scene as a reaction to excessive political activism and mistrust of markets of a previous period. In the course of five decades – through the mistaken response to 1929 and the experience of the New Deal – the notion that government intervention is a necessary component of the market economy had turned from provocation to orthodoxy to overzealous implementation. In the 1950s its acceptance was still cautious, but by the mid 1960s it had become prevalent and often simplistically overstretched. By the end of the 1970s, against a background of high inflation and government deficits, the time came for the pendulum to reverse its movement: the swing began in Chile with the Chicago economists hired by Pinochet, and continued with the accession to power of Margaret Thatcher (1979) and Ronald Reagan (1980).

Jeremy Bentham's presumption that government 'interference is, at the same time, generally needless and generally pernicious', against which J.M. Keynes, as far back as in 1926, had invoked The End of Laissez-Faire, was restored. 'Be quiet!' had been Bentham's admonishment to governments. 'The market knows best' was the battle-cry of the growing phalanx of new volunteers fighting – in universities, trading rooms, newspapers columns, think tanks, central bank and Treasury departments, parliamentary committees – for less government, less rules, more Darwinian selection (in science, though, some of these volunteers were creationists).

Market fundamentalism took a number of forms. One was the abdication of policy makers (politicians and officials alike)



from their institutional role. Deregulation became the top, sometimes almost exclusive, item of the economic policy agenda. 'Less is more' was stated by an eminent member of the EU Commission. Policy makers became not only non-interventionist and active deregulators; they even professed agnosticism on key economic concepts as equilibrium exchange rate, neutral level of the interest rate, core inflation, full employment, etc. The difficulty of measuring such concepts was taken as an argument to exclude them from the kit of analytical policy tools. The only 'real thing' was the view of the market; any attempt to form the view of policy was an illegitimate interference and circumstantial evidence of heresy.

The three decades in which market fundamentalism replaced excessive activism as radical version of the dominant policy paradigm are those in which public agencies (central banks, financial regulators, etc.) fought and won their battle to become independent of political bodies. They fought it not only in the name of the technical nature of their task, but also as part of the revival of market principles. What has perhaps not been sufficiently perceived was that emancipation from politics risked to give way to the blandishment of business interests, particularly in a time in which the intellectual and social prestige of the private sector obscured the pride to serve the public interest. And not many officials were familiar with the economic literature dealing with the risk of capture of the regulator.

The idea that markets, in general, and financial markets in particular, are capable of regulating themselves and therefore do not need public regulation is the most patent policy failure and is a direct manifestation of the fundamentalist attitude. In the last two decades the agenda of public policy concerning the financial sector has mainly consisted in removing regulatory barriers, resisting proposals to regulate new players, blurring the frontier between licensed and non licensed institutions, getting close to a return to free banking.

Unfortunately, one excess paves the way to its opposite. The exaggerated retreat of public policy from the task of prevention has contributed to produce such a systemic collapse that, when the time of management came, all the taboos of market fundamentalism crumbled and public measures out-passed even the inclinations of more balanced policy makers.

Now that it has swung, those who – like the author of this article – like the pendulum in a median position between economic anarchy and government intrusiveness, should get ready to fight again in defence of market principles.

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## **Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

### *Subsection 5. The Globalization process*

**Cerny Philip G.**

#### **Multi-nodal politics: globalisation is what actors make of it**

**in Review of International Studies (The)**, Vol. 35, Issue 2, April , 421-449

What has been traditionally conceptualised as 'the international' has been undergoing a fundamental transformation in recent decades, usually called 'globalisation'. Globalisation is a highly contested concept, and even among those who accept that some sort of globalisation process is occurring, attempts to analyse it have focused on a range of structural explanations: the expansion of economic transactions; the development of transnational or global social bonds; and the emergence and consolidation of a range of semi-international, semi-global political institutions. In all of these explanations, the role of actors as agents strategically shaping change has been neglected. In this article I argue that structural variables alone do not determine specific outcomes. Indeed, structural changes are permissive and can be the source of a range of potential multiple equilibria. The interaction of structural constraints and actors' strategic and



tactical choices involves a process of 'structuration', leading to wider systemic outcomes. In understanding this process, the concepts of 'pluralism' and 'neopluralism' as used in traditional 'domestic'-level Political Science can provide an insightful framework for analysis. This process, I argue, has developed in five interrelated, overlapping stages that involve the interaction of a diverse range of economic, social and political actors. Globalisation is still in the early stages of development, and depending on actors' choices in a dynamic process of structuration, a range of alternative potential outcomes can be suggested.

There is a tide in the affairs of men  
Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune;  
Omitted, all the voyage of their life  
Is bound in shallows and in miseries.  
On such a full sea are we now afloat,  
And we must take the current when it serves,  
Or lose our ventures.  
(William Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, IV.ii.269–276)

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 5. The Globalization process*

**Goldschmidt Paul N.**

**Ne tirez pas sur les ambulances ! Diagnostic d'une crise fi nancière sous forme de parabole  
in Europe en formation (L'), n. 351, printemps , 151-155**

Full text available on-line: <http://www.cife.eu/UserFiles/File/EEF/351/GOLDSCHMIDTEEF351.pdf>

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 5. The Globalization process*

**Patman Robert G.**

**Out of sync: Bush's expanded national security state and the war on terror  
in International Politics , Volume 46, Issue 2-3, March , 210-233**

The US national security state was fashioned at the beginning of the Cold War to contain the global threat of the rival superpower, the Soviet Union. However, this security framework did not wither away with the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the USSR. The events of September 11 starkly exposed the limitations of a state-centric approach to international security in a globalizing world. But the Bush administration falsely assumed that the traumatic events of 9/11 came out of a clear blue sky, and that a rejuvenated national security state would eventually overwhelm the 'new' threat of terrorism. The dangers of persisting in this direction were shown by the US-led invasion of Iraq. Far from closing the gap between the US approach to security and the operation environment of a post-Cold War world, Bush's war on terror undermined the international reputation of the US and presented the American taxpayer with a huge and probably unsustainable burden. All this highlighted the need for a more multilateral direction in US security policy in the post-Bush era. Such an approach would not only correspond better to the realities of today's interconnected world, but also serve as a buffer against the extension of the power of government that had been witnessed in America during the Bush years.



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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 5. The Globalization process*

Paterson Matthew

**Post-Hegemonic Climate Politics?**

in **British Journal of Politics & International Relations** , Vol. 11, Issue 1, February , 140-158

The article argues that the effects of a new US president on global climate politics will be rather less than might be expected. This is partly because the rhetorical differences between Bush, his predecessor Clinton and President Obama mask great continuities in US climate change politics since the early 1990s. It is also because, unlike in other issue areas, the EU has moved into a position of clear international leadership, which is likely to provoke diplomatic conflict, both for standard reasons of realpolitik but more precisely because of the different growth strategies pursued by each side and the different implications of those strategies for climate policy. Finally, the emergence of a dense pattern of transnational climate governance will increasingly constrain the options for either side in pursuing new climate change agreements after 2012.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 5. The Globalization process*

Hyde-Price Adrian

**Realist Ethics and the 'War on Terror'**

in **Globalizations** , Volume 6, Issue 1, March 2009 , 23-40

This article makes the case that realist international theory provides firm theoretical and conceptual foundations for thinking ethically about the 'war on terror'. It begins by outlining the fundamental political and theoretical assumptions underpinning the realist approach to ethics, arguing that realist theory is based on three core principles: prudence, scepticism, and reciprocity. Drawing on the political philosophy of Michael Oakeshott, Reinhold Niebuhr, E. H. Carr, and Hans Morgenthau, the article argues that the belief in universally valid ethical and political principles found in liberal and cosmopolitan approaches to international politics risks conflating particularist interests with universalist claims, and generating foreign and security policies based on a moral crusades rather than a hard-headed calculation of national interests. For realists, the multiplicity of political communities and rival conceptions of the 'good life' inherent in the anarchic structure of international politics necessitates an ethical approach rooted in communitarian political theory. The article concludes by outlining a realist response to some of the major ethical questions raised by the 'war on terror'.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 5. The Globalization process*

Dondi Angelo

**Realtà evolutiva della professione legale. Sfide della globalizzazione, "glocalizzazione" e adeguatezza degli standard professionali**

in **Politica del diritto**, n.4 , 623-634



No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 5. The Globalization process*

**Brooks Stephen G., Wohlforth William C.**

**Reshaping the World Order**

**in Foreign Affairs**, March/April 2009 Volume 88, Number 2

The current architecture of international institutions must be updated, but skeptics question whether the United States is up to the task. They need not worry: the United States still possesses enough power and legitimacy to spearhead reform.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 5. The Globalization process*

**Economy Elizabeth C., Segal Adam**

**The G-2 Mirage**

**in Foreign Affairs**, May/June 2009 Volume 88, Number 3

A heightened bilateral relationship may not be possible for China and the United States, as the two countries have mismatched interests and values. Washington should embrace a more flexible and multilateral approach.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 5. The Globalization process*

**Lee Robert , Marsden Terry**

**The Globalization and Re-localization of Material Flows: Four Phases of Food Regulation**

**in Journal of Law and Society**, Volume 36 Issue 1 - March , 129-144

Over three phases of regulation, the paper traces a narrow range of regulatory interest in food, focusing largely on food safety and the handling of periodic food crises. We suggest that these crises were early indications of the problems in sustaining increasingly unsustainable modes of food production through global supply chains and that United Kingdom/EU regulation acted in part as a palliative, cloaking the wider systemic disorders. We go on to suggest that, as resource pressures become increasingly apparent in world food systems, a further fourth phase of food regulation will need to pay much greater attention to the resilience, sustainability, and security of food supply

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 5. The Globalization process*

**Viellechner Lars**

**The Network of Networks: Karl-Heinz Ladeur's Theory of Law and Globalization**

**in German Law Journal**, Vol.10, n.4 , 515-536

No abstract available



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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 5. The Globalization process*

**Gunningham Neil**

**The New Collaborative Environmental Governance: The Localization of Regulation**

in **Journal of Law and Society**, Volume 36 Issue 1 - March , 145-166

This article examines the new collaborative environmental governance, an enterprise that involves collaboration between a diversity of private, public, and non-government stakeholders who, acting together towards commonly agreed goals, hope to achieve far more collectively, than individually. Such an approach appears to blur the familiar sharp boundaries that separate 'the state' from civil society, yet we still know very little about exactly what this blurring of public and private adds up to, and what its implications are. This new form of governance is examined through the lens of three Australian case studies. Each of these studies involves participatory dialogue, flexibility, inclusiveness, transparency, institutionalized consensus-building practices, and, at least to some extent, a shift from hierarchy to heterarchy. The paper examines the relationships between new and old governance, the architecture of these new initiatives, the role of the state, and the importance of negotiating in 'the shadow of hierarchy'.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 5. The Globalization process*

**Baeka Junggho, Cho Yongsung, Koo Won W.**

**The environmental consequences of globalization: A country-specific time-series analysis**

in **Ecological Economics**, Volume 68, Issues 8-9, 15 June , 2255-2264

The dynamic relationships among trade, income and the environment for developed and developing countries are examined using a cointegration analysis. Results suggest that trade and income growth tend to increase environmental quality in developed countries, whereas they have detrimental effects on environmental quality in most developing countries. It is also found that for developed countries, the causal relationship appears to run from trade and income to the environment — a change in trade and income growth causes a consequent change in environmental quality. For most developing countries, on the other hand, the causality is found to run from the environment to trade and income; however, the opposite causal relationship holds for China.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 5. The Globalization process*

**Hahn Henning**

**The global consequence of participatory responsibility**

in **Journal of Global Ethics**, Volume 5, Issue 1, April 2009 , 43-56

The aim of this article is to introduce and defend a revised conception of responsibility - namely, participatory responsibility. It starts from the insight that some pressing problems of global injustice render our common conception of responsibility useless. As an alternative the author mainly discusses Iris Marion Young's social connection model of



responsibility. However, Young's approach becomes unconvincing in addressing and weighing specific duties. The author therefore adds a basic rights approach to her conception and argues that mere participation in a basic-rights-violating structure creates superordinated responsibilities for justice. Thus institutions and individual persons hold responsibility not because they have intentionally caused a foreseeable wrong, but because they have participated in, and thereby maintained, a social structure which has morally unacceptable effects.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 5. The Globalization process*

Short Clare

**The grave challenge facing the international humanitarian system - a personal view**

in **Journal of Global Ethics**, Volume 5, Issue 1, April 2009 , 7-15

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 5. The Globalization process*

T. Jandl

**The withering state debate: evidence from Malaysia's and Vietnam's globalising economies**

in **International Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies (The)**, Volume 5: No 1, January , 55–80

It has been frequently argued that under globalisation, the state's ability to make autonomous decisions declines and the state withers away as it adapts to the lowest common denominator of taxation and social services in order to attract global investment flows. This paper challenges the withering-state theory. States are not hapless victims of globalisation, but active facilitators. Through the case studies of Vietnam and Malaysia, it is demonstrated that the state makes decisions about globalisation—either to engage in it or to retreat from it—based on the state's perceived interest. Moreover, the state is perfectly capable of reversing these decisions as state interests change over time.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 5. The Globalization process*

Kessler Oliver

**Toward a Logic of Social Systems?**

in **International Political Sociology** , Volume 3, Issue 1, March 2009 , 132-136

No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 5. The Globalization process*

Kessler Oliver

**Toward a Sociology of the International? International Relations between Anarchy and World Society**

in **International Political Sociology** , Volume 3, Issue 1, March 2009 , 87-108



To develop a sociology of the international, it is common in international relations (IR) to use a notion of inter-subjectivity defined as the space "in-between" individual actors. This approach is based on a parts/whole systems theory where common norms and values inscribed in international law not only create a "world society" but also provide for its social cohesion. Rooted in a parts/whole distinction, the very term of inter-subjectivity takes on a rather positivist meaning as the social quality of the international is then "measurable" and possibly even falsifiable by observing states' behavior. In the end, the inter-subjective quality of rules and norms is then ultimately reduced to the individual level. This article proposes a different avenue that breaks with the parts/whole distinction to emphasize the connectivity of communications. From this perspective, the notion of inter-subjectivity appears to be part of the problem rather than part of the solution and is thus replaced by the distinction between system and environment. The changing contours of international law are then decoupled from states' interests to emphasize the "relative autonomy" of the legal discourse as represented in its shifting paradox and programs.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 5. The Globalization process*

Smith Michael

**Transatlantic Economic Relations in a Changing Global Political Economy: Achieving Togetherness but Missing the Bus?**

in **British Journal of Politics & International Relations** , Vol. 11, Issue 1, February , 94-107

This article focuses on the changing context for transatlantic relations within the global political economy. The first part of the article identifies key areas of structural change in the GPE and in particular the potentially revolutionary shifts caused by global instability and the emergence of new economic powers. The argument then explores changing patterns of economic relations between the EU and the US, within a general framework of continuity created by the coexistence of competition and convergence. These contextual factors are then related to patterns of Atlanticism and transatlanticism, to questions of values and identities in the GPE and to the possibility of an EU-US 'grand strategy' for the changing GPE. The conclusion argues that although there is perhaps more secure ground for a sustainable EU-US 'compact' than previously, the EU and the US may have 'missed the bus' in terms of jointly shaping the future of the global economy.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 5. The Globalization process*

Berry Craig, Gabay Clive

**Transnational political action and 'global civil society' in practice: the case of Oxfam**

in **Global Networks**, vol. 9, n. 3, july , 339-358

ABSTRACT: The term 'global civil society' has taken on increasing significance within scholarly debate over the past decade. In this article we seek to understand transnational political agency via the study of a particular transnational actor, Oxfam. We argue that various schools of thought surrounding the global civil society concept, in particular the prevailing liberal-cosmopolitan approach, are unable to conceptualize transnational political action in practice – due largely, in the case of liberal-cosmopolitanism, to a shared normative agenda. We also assess what contribution literature on development and civil society has made to the analysis of groups such as Oxfam. In investigating Oxfam's



own perceptions of its context and the meanings of its agency, we discover an anti-political perspective derived from an encounter between Oxfam's longstanding commitment to liberal internationalism and globalization discourse. Existing scholarship has insufficiently identified the local or parochial nature of the identities of global civil society actors.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 5. The Globalization process*

Winter Gerd

**Transnationale Regulierung: Gestalt, Effekte und Rechtsstaatlichkeit**  
in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, Band 8, 2009

Die Befreiung von Investitionen, Warenproduktion, Handel und Kapitaltransfers aus den Fesseln des nationalen Rechts hat vielen Menschen und Unternehmen zusätzlichen Wohlstand gebracht. Sie hat aber auch gewaltige Probleme geschaffen.[1] Die Standortkonkurrenz hat in den entwickelteren Volkswirtschaften das Lohnniveau gesenkt und die Arbeit prekariert, die Produktkonkurrenz gefährdet die Qualität der Produkte, die Besteuerungskonkurrenz vermindert die Mittel für Bildung und sozialen Ausgleich, der Ausbau der Infrastruktur und Siedlungsräume verarmt die Biodiversität, das Wachstum der Produktion, des Warentransports und des Konsums verschmutzt die Umwelt und gefährdet das Weltklima, die wachsende Ungleichheit der Lebenschancen treibt entwurzelte Menschen in die Migration, die Entgrenzung der Kapitalrenditen verführt zu Steuerflucht und Spekulation, usw.

<http://www.bpb.de/publikationen/6MAPW0.html>

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 5. The Globalization process*

Yi-chong Xu

**Who's afraid of sovereign wealth funds?**  
in *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 63, n. 1 / March , 1-21

A spectre is stalking the world: the spectre of a rich Chinese state buying strategic resources, hollowing out companies, gobbling up financial institutions and threatening the sovereignty of the countries in whose resources and companies it invests. The China Investment Corporation (CIC) - a sovereign wealth fund company (SWF) - is the stalking horse of the Chinese state. Using the CIC as an example, this article argues that the warning about SWFs has little to do with their size, the speed of their growth or what SWFs have or have not done. It is about a shifting power relationship in the global economy. This broader realignment may have been occurring slowly, but it is happening. Neither side - those who have been writing the rules of the game for international political economy and those who are historically rule-takers - is fully willing to acknowledge the shift and take responsibility to build a new architecture of an international financial system that can accommodate interests of old and new players.

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 5. The Globalization process*

Pomian, Krzysztof

**World History : histoire mondiale, histoire universelle**  
in *Debat (Le)*, N° 154, mars-avril



No abstract available

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**Section B) Global governance and international organizations**

*Subsection 5. The Globalization process*

Thomas George M.

**World Polity, World Culture, World Society**

*in International Political Sociology*, Volume 3, Issue 1, March 2009, 115-119

No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 1. Theory of regional integration processes*

Andreas P. Kyriacou

**Decision rules, membership and political centralization in the European Union**

*in European Journal of Law and Economics*, Volume 27, Number 2, 143-158

The decision to enter the European Union is based on a comparison of the costs of staying out and going it alone, and the costs membership. The latter depend on the degree of preference heterogeneity between prospective members and the Union as well as the decision rules employed for "constitutional" decisions. The same calculus guides the decision, by member states, to shift policies up to the Union level, only now the decision rules refer to centrally assigned policies. Preference heterogeneity makes more inclusive rules optimal in either case while at the same time reducing the attractiveness of membership or the centralization of policies to the EU level, respectively. The analysis complements and extends both traditional fiscal federalism literature as well as the more recent political economics literature on federalism.

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 1. Theory of regional integration processes*

Slapin Jonathan B.

**Exit, Voice, and Cooperation: Bargaining Power in International Organizations and Federal Systems**

*in Journal of Theoretical Politics*, Volume 21, n. 2, April, 187-211

Literature on international organizations points to several potential sources of bargaining power: voice, exit, and exclusion. In some circumstances, a member state may be able to effectively voice objections to a change to an organization's institutions. In others, it may threaten to leave the organization if its demands are not met. Finally, member states may be able to force a laggard member state to accept unwanted change by threatening to exclude the laggard from the organization. Under what circumstances do these strategies provide bargaining leverage? Are these options available simultaneously or if one is available does that mean that the others are not? What implications does this have for international cooperation, and more broadly, the possible creation of a federal state? This article seeks to answer these questions using a formal model to examine the interaction between voice, specifically veto rights, exit, and exclusion in international organizations and federal states. The model has implications for European integration and can also help explain the conditions under which independent states give up sovereignty to form a stable federal union. Implications of the model are tested through a case study of EU integration in the 1970s and 1980s.



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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 1. Theory of regional integration processes*

Patience Akpan-Obong, Mary Jane C. Parmentier

**Linkages and Connections: A Framework for Research in Information and Communication Technologies, Regional Integration, and Development**

*in Regional and Federal Studies*, Volume 19 Issue 2 , 289 - 309

This article examines the relationship between information and communication technologies (ICTs) and regional integration as a pathway to socioeconomic development in Africa and South America. Both regions share a colonial legacy often characterized by stronger economic ties to the developed world than within the regions. In recent decades, regional organizations have been involved in efforts to strengthen the infrastructure for ICTs, as well as the enhancement of economic and political integration as strategies to achieve development. However, the literature continues to show distinct research agendas that unwittingly overlook the connections between these areas. This article proposes a theoretical framework combining research on integration, ICTs, and development. It provides a brief analysis of each region and its ICT initiatives, the potential impact on regional integration, and how this relates to development. We suggest possible applications of the framework to identify and research the processes of integration and expected outcomes of development.

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 1. Theory of regional integration processes*

Marie M. Stack

**Regional Integration and Trade: Controlling for Varying Degrees of Heterogeneity in the Gravity Model**

*in World Economy*, Volume 32 Issue 5 , 772 - 789

The proliferation of regional trade agreements (RTAs) in the 1990s prompted a renewal of interest in studying the effect of regional integration on trade. Using a panel dataset of bilateral export flows from 12 EU countries to 20 OECD trading partners over the period 1992–2003, the trade effect of European regional integration, denoted by an EU dummy, is examined across a number of fixed effects (FE) specifications, each of which has been claimed as the correct econometric specification of the gravity model. Typically parsimonious in (time-varying) economic variables and abundant in fixed effects, the FE specifications allow for varying degrees of heterogeneity in the gravity model. Two gravity models are estimated: a gravity model of traditional trade determinants and a gravity model of new trade theory (NTT) determinants. Both gravity models provide reasonable coefficient estimates, although they vary somewhat across the FE specifications for the traditional gravity model. Both gravity models are congruent in suggesting that the coefficient of the EU dummy declines in magnitude and becomes insignificant as an increasing degree of heterogeneity is admitted into the model. This suggests the fundamental importance of the econometric specification when evaluating trade policy effects within a gravity framework.

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 1. Theory of regional integration processes*

Lake Dadid A.

**Regional hierarchy: authority and local international order**



in **Review of International Studies (The)**, Vol. 35, S1, February , 35-58

A regional security complex (RSC) is a set of states continuously affected by one or more security externalities that emanate from a distinct geographic area. In such a complex, the members are so interrelated in terms of their security that actions by any one member, and significant security-related developments inside any member, have a major impact on others. Regional orders describe how states within an RSC manage their security relations and range from balances of power, to regional power concerts, collective security organisations, pluralistic security communities, and integration. As regional states move 'up' this continuum of regional orders, relations generally become more peaceful and interactions less coloured by actual or threatened violence.

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 1. Theory of regional integration processes*

Pompeo Della Posta, Valeria De Bonis

**Strategic Interactions Among Central Bank and National Fiscal Authorities in a Monetary Union Subject to Asymmetric Country Shocks**

in **Open Economies Review**, Volume 20, Number 2 , 241-263

In this paper we extend Nordhaus' (Brookings Pap Econ Act (2):139–199, 1994) results to an environment which may represent the current European situation, characterised by a single monetary authority and several fiscal bodies. We show that, even assuming that the monetary and the fiscal authorities share the same ideal targets, in the presence of asymmetric shocks the "symbiosis" result found by Dixit and Lambertini (J Int Econ 60:235–247, 2003) no longer obtains. Thus, fiscal rules as those envisaged in the Maastricht Treaty and in the Stability and Growth Pact may work as monetary/fiscal coordination devices that improve welfare. The imposition of common targets, however, may work as a substitute for policy coordination only if these are made state contingent, an aspect that the recent version of the Stability and Growth Pact takes into account in a more appropriate way than its original version.

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 1. Theory of regional integration processes*

Kubicek Paul

**The Commonwealth of Independent States: an example of failed regionalism?**

in **Review of International Studies (The)**, Vol. 35, S1, February , 237-256

The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was designed to manage the collapse of the Soviet Union and foster post-Soviet cooperation in political, economic, and security spheres. Over a decade into its existence, most analysts would rate it a failure: many post-Soviet states do not participate in CIS ventures, the institutional machinery of the CIS is weak, and Russia, the most dominant post-Soviet state, has tended to favour bi-lateral relationships over multi-lateral institutions. Why is this the case? This article looks at the CIS through the prism of theories of regionalism, demonstrating that the CIS was handicapped on many fronts, including emergent multi-polarity in the post-Soviet space and domestic-level political considerations in many post-Soviet states.

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 1. Theory of regional integration processes*



Fawn Rick

**'Regions' and their study: wherefrom, what for and whereto?**

in *Review of International Studies (The)*, Vol. 35, S1, February , 5-34

Long a focal point in the study of Geography, regions have become a major concern of International Relations, and for some even its essence. Principle definitions and approaches, however, remain contested, as do the contexts in which and how they matter, from economic to security. This article examines contested views on what constitutes a region and on the nature and functioning of regional architecture, drawing from thematic and case-specific literature to indicate the expanse of analytical enquiry. These include the roles and interpretations of geography, identity, culture, institutionalisation, and the role of actors, including a hegemon, major regional powers and others actors from within a region, both state and societal. A final section indicates additional areas for future research.

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 2. Cooperations and integration in Africa and in the Middle East*

Kistin E. J., Ashton P. J., Earle A., Malzbender D., Patrick M. J., Turton A. R.

**An overview of the content and historical context of the international freshwater agreements that South Africa has entered into with neighbouring countries**

in *International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics*, Volume 9, Number 1, February , 1-21

Southern Africa is at a pivotal point in time for transboundary water cooperation. The number and extent of coverage of existing international water agreements and joint management institutions merits cautious optimism about future water management in the region. Yet, taken alone, a numerical account of water treaties reveals little about the context in which the agreements were negotiated, the nature of the rules and regulations adopted, or the influence of the agreements in addressing problems or enhancing joint governance. Drawing on a database containing all the international freshwater agreements entered into between South Africa and its neighbours since 1910, this article examines trends in the articulation of these treaties and discusses the implications of the rules and regulations they embody. Specific consideration is given to issues of information sharing, water allocation and organizations. This analysis is a first step towards understanding the impact of existing agreements, identifying opportunities for the negotiation of new treaties and enhancing existing systems.

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 2. Cooperations and integration in Africa and in the Middle East*

Carlucci Francesco

**Hamdi Dahir. Cooperazione sociale ed economica in Africa orientale**

in *Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali*, Volume 75, n. 4, ottobre-dicembre , 515-533

Several Countries forming that part of the world we call Eastern Africa: Somalia, Kenya, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, are often taken into consideration by mass-media because of bloody and devastating wars, but these subjects are dealt with at length by magazines, books and other means of communication. Public opinion is appropriately informed. On the contrary, we believe that the following topic, directly originating from this situation, is quite interesting: the attempt of overcoming this state by means of the social and economic co-operation, realized through the institution of a supranational intergovernmental authority, the Igd (Intergovernmental Authority on Development), with the charge of fostering the human development of seven Countries in Eastern Africa, Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya, Uganda, Somalia,



Eritrea and

Djibuti (a group of Countries called «Greater Horn of Africa») in a co-ordinated way. The paper illustrates this topic. Its first part shows the current conditions of the seven countries. The existing war situation is summarized, which is originated by the past European colonization, the current geopolitical aims of at least three great powers (the United States of America, Russia and China) and some specific characters of the States in that Region after their independence. Afterwards, the problems caused by the utilization of the Nile waters are exposed and three sections define the main aspect of human development in the seven Countries: one on demography, health and nutrition; one further on education, environment and infrastructures; a third on economy.

The second part of the paper analyzes the structure of economic, social and political co-operation in the Region; Igad's objectives together with the first results as well as the efforts made to solve the conflicts by means of an early warning system, addressed to prevent them, are described. Afterwards, the main problems that the co-operation initiatives should solve are shown, stressing the importance of Nile waters as the chief water resource, and of the infrastructural, trade, health, energy, agricultural and zootechnical policies. The process of co-operation in Eastern Africa is difficult and long, but only that can give the hope of solving the problems that face the countries in the Region.

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### **Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 2. Cooperations and integration in Africa and in the Middle East*

**Yohannes Okbazghi**

#### **Hydro-politics in the Nile basin: in search of theory beyond realism and neo-liberalism**

**in *Journal of Eastern African Studies*** , Volume 3, Issue 1, March , 74-93

In response to runaway population growth in the Nile basin, the reality and perils of desertification and the frequent cycles of drought, human demand on Nile water resources has intensified in recent years. Nothing captures the enormity of the challenge more than the fact that the present combined 360 million population of the 10 Nile states is projected to reach 850 million in a generation or so. Because of this, the riparian states have formed the Nile Basin Initiative as an inter-state water regime, entrusted to fashion a framework for the allocation of Nile water resources among the co-basin states. The initiative has yet to take root however, precisely because the approach to the hydrographic problem is informed by conventional regional geopolitics and international development assistance.

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### **Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 2. Cooperations and integration in Africa and in the Middle East*

**Richard Gibb**

#### **Regional Integration and Africa's Development Trajectory: meta-theories, expectations and reality**

**in *Third World Quarterly***, Volume 30 Issue 4 , 701 - 721

Regional integration remains an integral part of Africa's development strategy and has underpinned most pan-African development policies for the past 50 years. This paper explores the issue of regional integration in the context of 'development' theory and the neo-patrimonial state system in Africa. A central contention of the paper is that Western, Euro-centric conceptions of regionalism, particularly those centred on the market integration approach, have promoted a very biased understanding of regional integration in many parts of the developing world. Using southern Africa as an exemplar case study, the paper argues that the various meta-theories focused on explaining the political economy of regionalism, often closely allied to a development theory paradigm, fail to account for the nature, character and evolution of regional integration. Regional integration in sub-Saharan Africa has been conceived and analysed in the light of the



market-led approach, modernity and development. Thus far, it has failed. This paper therefore explores why market-led regional integration has failed and why, for the foreseeable future, it will continue to do so.

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### **Section C) Regional integration processes**

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Hanafi Hazem

#### **The Limits of Integration Processes in the Arab World in Federalist Debate (The), Year XXII, n. 1, March , 22-26**

The Arab World, with 22 countries and 320 million people, larger in size than the US, Canada, Europe or China, with GDP of about 1.3 trillion US dollars in 2007, and with such strong common ties as language, history, culture, ethnicity and religion has not only failed to achieve a modest level of cooperation, integration and development, but has also become a battleground for widespread inter-state and intra-state conflicts, has been subjected to occupation or foreign domination and has fallen behind in major human development indexes.

I will review the failures of the current two models of Arab co-operation and integration.

#### 1. Arab Nationalism

The birth of the Arab nationalism project lies within the framework of Islamic reformism in the 19th century. The Ottoman Empire, a mighty force between the 13th and 17th centuries, began to show signs of stagnation and chronic weakness in the 18th-19th centuries in the face of rising European powers. Military defeats, European encroachments, internal mismanagement and secessionist movements have all turned the empire into "the Sick Man of Europe". Reforms Tanzimat in the mid-19th century were the answer, but for whose benefit was the question. The Ottomans implemented several measures of political, religious and communal reforms but with administrative centralization and an emphasis on creating an Ottoman nationality Ottomanism to keep the empire intact and strong<sup>1</sup>, while many local communities and nationalities used these reforms to gain greater autonomy, redefine their own identities and territorial borders. For the Ottomans, the struggle was against European expansionism and internal disintegration, but for the communities and nationalities, the struggle was against European imperialism and Ottoman authoritarianism.

The ideas of reforms in Islamic societies preceded the Tanzimat, and Egypt had an early start, both through conflict with, and educational missions to the West. The shock of Napoleon's short-lived French Expedition to Egypt from 1798 to 1801 and the new encounters with European rising imperialism in Egypt, Syria and North Africa have aroused questions over the backwardness of Moslem societies, but without challenging the overall legitimacy of the Ottoman rule and its religious bond. Rafa'a Al Tahtawy (1801-1873) and Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-1897), both modern Islamic scholars, emphasized the ideas of liberalism, rationalism, law and public good to reform the ailing Islamic societies. Al-Afghani in particular, with his critical view of traditionalism, had an indirect role in the early development of Arab nationalism by "reinterpreting the Islamic past in modern and nationalist terms"<sup>2</sup>. This emphasis on history took him to champion Pan-Islamism, uniting all Moslems under one reformed modern Ottoman Empire as the seat of the Caliphate<sup>3</sup>.

This historical emphasis, however, took Al-Kawakibi<sup>4</sup> (1854-1902) to a different direction, although he shared Al-Afghani's conviction that political reforms are the key to religious reforms<sup>5</sup>. By emphasizing ties of history, ethnicity, language, land and common rights, as opposed to religious ties championed by the Ottomans, Al-Kawakibi was able to redraw the boundaries of an "Arab" community thus redefining the struggle against fellow Moslem Turks on "nationalist" not religious grounds. The Arabs are the basis of Islam, the carrier of its message and have always constituted a distinct nation "Umma". He used Ibn Khaldoun's notion of the rise and fall of civilizations to argue that Arabism is being



rediscovered not recreated.<sup>6</sup>

Al-Husari (1879-1967) also emphasized language and history as factors that determine Arab identity and nationalism. According to him, "people who spoke a unitary language have one heart and a common soul. As such, they constitute one nation, and so they have to have a unified state."<sup>7</sup> Arab states are artificial creations, and the division of the Arab nation into these separate states was the reason behind the Arab defeat in the Palestine War of 1948-49. People who are not aware of their Arabism have false consciousness and need to be enlightened. For him, nationalism is a living spirit that has an existence of its own regardless of the collective will or pure national origin. His ideas were much influenced by German Romantic nationalism of the 19th century. The political expression of these ideas was that Arabs should have one democratic and secular state that unites them all. Both Zureiq (1909-2000) and Aflaq (1910-1989) followed the same path.

It is clear from this brief overview that Arab nationalism is constructed as a living idea based on language and history. It breeds on culture not race, economic factors or temporal collective will. It has a mission and a national philosophy that need to be consciously embraced and transferred to future generations, and it is secular and democratic with a strong bend towards socialism. The aim is political unity in a single unitary state because the existing "individual Arab states are deviant and transient entities, their frontiers illusory and permeable, their rulers interim caretakers, or obstacles to be removed."<sup>9</sup>

The political (mis)-use of this ideology was detrimental to the Arabs. The British used it in the context of World War I to encourage the Arabs to revolt against the Turks in exchange for an independent Arab state extending from Syria to Yemen after the war<sup>10</sup>. This was the Great Arab Revolt of 1916-1918 that helped the UK and France defeat the Ottomans. However, a secret agreement between these two countries divided the newly-freed land between themselves in betrayal to the Arabs<sup>11</sup>. Syria, Lebanon and Northern Iraq fell to the French, while Palestine, Jordan, Southern Iraq and the Gulf to the British.

Since their independence from the UK and France, all other attempts at unity by the Arabs have failed<sup>12</sup>. The United Arab Republic formed by Egypt and Syria in 1958 ended in 1961 with a coup in Syria. The Arab Federation between Iraq and Jordan in 1958 lasted six months and ended with a coup in Iraq, and the Tripartite Unity talks between Egypt, Syria and Iraq in 1963 also did not succeed.

The rise of Arab nationalism in the 1950s and 1960s caused much rivalry in the region between the progressive socialist republican states of Egypt, Iraq and Syria, and the reactionary monarchic traditionalist Gulf states and Jordan who gave it rhetoric support but opposed it in practice for fear of losing their power. This was the Arab Cold War<sup>13</sup>, which was exacerbated by foreign intervention, oil and the Arab Israeli conflict.

Arab nationalism also came into conflict with pan-Islamism. From an Islamic perspective, the bond should be religion without discrimination based on race, language, culture, colour or wealth. Pan-Islamism viewed Arab nationalism with suspicion as a foreign idea designed to divide the Moslem society. This was aided by the fact that most Arab nationalist thinkers were Christians who emphasized the personal nature of religion, and the universal nature of culture.

## 2. The Arab League

Having been successful in using Arab nationalism to break up the Ottoman Empire during the First World War, the British resorted to a similar strategy during World War II to regain Arab public sympathy that was tilting towards the advancing Germans in North Africa. Eden declared in 1941 that the British government was sympathetic to the ideas of



strengthening the cultural, economic and political ties among Arab states<sup>14</sup>.<sup>14</sup> Consultations took place in 1943-1944 between the then seven independent Arab states<sup>15</sup>. The Alexandria Protocol was signed in October 1944, and the Charter of the League in March 1945.

The purpose of the League is to bring Arab states closer, achieve political coordination and cooperation in six general fields:<sup>16</sup> 1- Economic and financial affairs: including commercial relations, customs, currency, and questions of agriculture and industry, 2- Communications; this includes railroads, roads, aviation, navigation, telegraphs and posts, 3- Cultural affairs, 4- Nationality, passports, visas, execution of judgments and extradition of criminals, 5- Social welfare and 6- Health affairs. The Charter also prohibits intervention in the internal affairs of other member states<sup>17</sup> and the use of force to settle disputes<sup>18</sup>. In foreign policy, Article 9 states that “treaties and agreements already concluded or to be concluded in the future between a member-state and another state shall not be binding or restrictive upon other members”<sup>19</sup>. The highest decision making body is the Arab League Council which oversees the work and approves the recommendations of the specialized committees for each of the policy areas outlined above. It is composed of one representative for each member state.

From its inception, the Arab League was designed to be state-centered with very limited powers, and it stayed true to its character despite its remarkable growth in terms of institutions and policy agreements over the last 60 years. Article 7 not only removes any enforcement mechanisms<sup>20</sup>, but it also obstructs unified agreement on important policies causing repeated postponements and delays.

In terms of institutions, several new councils were created including the Joint Defense Council<sup>21</sup>, the Economic and Social Council<sup>22</sup>, the Council for Arab Economic Unity<sup>23</sup>, in addition to 12 ministerial councils for information, interior, justice, housing, transport, environment, communication, electricity, tourism, youth and sports, social affairs and health. Moreover, two important regional development funds were created: the Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development (1967) and the Arab Monetary Fund (1976). Despite the positive contributions these funds have provided in terms of economic aid, their effect was within the state, not across, and it was project-based not target-oriented. It was more of a bilateral funding than multilateral cooperation.

Perhaps the most important institutional development has been the adoption of Arab Summits in 1964 as the highest decision making body in place of the Arab League Council, although this mechanism is not mentioned in the Charter nor in the Protocol. This shift highlighted the fact that Council was powerless in the face of continued bilateral disputes among Arab states, and that political agreement by the heads of states was the only way for agreements to move forward. However, this turned more into a curse rather than blessing as political disputes prevented the regular meetings of the Summits, and subsequently, important decisions were repeatedly deferred to next rounds for further consultations<sup>24</sup>. Even agreement on where the Summit would be held became a subject for dispute<sup>25</sup>.

In terms of policy agreements, there are several, such as the Cultural Treaty (1946), the Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (1950), the Economic Unity Agreement (1957), the Arab Common Market (1965), the Strategy for Joint Arab Economic Action (1980), the Joint National Economic Action (1980), the Convention to Facilitate and Develop Trade Exchange among Arab States (1981), the Standard Convention for the Investment of Capital in the Arab States (1981), the Arab Charter on Human Rights (1994), the Arab Free Trade Area (1997) and the Arab Convention for the Combat of Terrorism (1998).

With this rich array of institutions and policy agreements, it is hard to imagine that inter-Arab trade has not surpassed 10% of total Arab foreign trade, except in 2002 and 2005, since the League’s establishment in 1945<sup>26</sup>, that restrictions



on the movement of people, goods and capital are still in place region-wide, that several violent conflicts have broken out between member states, and that threat perception in some Arab countries focus on other neighboring Arab states rather than on non-Arab states<sup>27</sup>.

Following the crushing Arab defeat in 1967 and the oil boom in the Gulf states in the 1970s, Arab nationalism lost ground and the Arab system moved into further chaos during the 1980s. With Egypt's suspension from the Arab League in March 1979 because of its peace treaty with Israel<sup>28</sup>, the threat posed by the Iranian revolution of 1979 with its declared aim of exporting Islamic revolution to neighboring Arab countries, the break up of the Iraq-Iran war in 1980, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and the subsequent intensification of Arab rivalries, a new trend emerged for cooperation - the establishment of regional groupings. Whether such groupings signaled the break-up of the Arab League system or a move towards greater cooperation between countries closely connected in accordance with the objectives of the League became a matter of dispute<sup>29</sup>.

Three groupings were established in the 1980s: the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981<sup>30</sup>, the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)<sup>31</sup> and the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC) in 1989<sup>32</sup>. Of the three, the GCC has been the most successful. Building on a strong and similar oil economy, close social and cultural makeup, Islamic legal code and common security threats, the GCC established a small joint military force, a Free Trade Zone in 1983. It has plans to establish a common market and a custom union by the end of 2007 and a single currency by 2010. It has unified many of its legal codes including Personal Law, Civil Law and Penal Code<sup>33</sup>. However, the GCC is not without disputes. Both Bahrain and Oman have unilaterally signed a free trade agreement with the US, causing further disputes within the GCC on the pace and depth of economic integration plans, possibly forcing a delay in implementation of those decisions.

The other two groupings have been less successful. The Arab Maghreb Union is stalled by the Moroccan Algerian dispute over Western Sahara's independence, which Morocco accuses Algeria of supporting. Members have complied with the UN-imposed sanctions on Libya for its role in Lockerbie which pushed Libya to effectively end its participation in the AMU and turn towards Africa. Algeria went into a violent civil war for 10 years when the parliamentary elections of 1991 brought Islamists to power, but the results were annulled by the army. Mauritania experienced several coups. None of the objectives of the AMU were achieved. The Arab Cooperation Council barely completed a year before Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990 and brought the organization to a halt. Jordan sided with Iraq while Egypt supported Kuwait, effectively ending the Council which was dissolved in 1994. Unlike the GCC, membership in the AMU and the ACC was open to other Arab states.

The drama of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 and its aftermath opened a new chapter in Arab vulnerabilities, and further manifested the inadequacy of the Arab League system. Not only has a member state of the League occupied another, but the League has also failed to mediate and avert the conflict, or compel Iraq to withdraw except through the help of an international force. The Arab League decision was even labeled illegal by some<sup>34</sup>.

The Arab League was not designed or equipped to handle such complex political and economic issues, and has not developed the appropriate institutions and processes to respond effectively to such challenges. It fits perfectly the Federalist criticism of the Articles of Confederation as weak and ineffective.

Arab nationalism, as a centralist ideology aiming at creating one single unitary state, and the Arab League, as a very loose inter-governmental organization aiming at enhancing cooperation and coordination among Arab states have both failed to achieve the aims they have set for themselves. The Arab world, despite huge potential, continues to be weak, divided and underdeveloped. This failure has to do more with the unsuitability of these two models to the task at hand



than the way they were implemented. This brings us to consider whether federalism could be a more suitable and successful alternative.

- 1 Hasan Kayali, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1997).
- 2 Nikki Keddie, *Sayyid Jamal ad-Dan al-Afghan: A Political Biography* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1972), p. 2.
- 3 Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*, pp. 103-160.
- 4 Born in Aleppo, Syria, studied in Syria and Turkey, started his active public life writing in different newspapers, held many governmental posts and served several prison sentences for anti-Turkish writings. Fearing for his life, he fled to Cairo in 1899 where he published his two books in Arabic *Characteristics of Tyranny* and *Umm al-Qura* (Mother of the Cities) referring to an imaginary meeting in Mecca by representatives from all Islamic cities to discuss political reforms. He died in 1902 presumably from poison on the order of the Ottoman ruler.
- 5 Al-Kawakibi, "Umm al-Qura", in Mohamed Jamal Tahan, *The Complete Works of Al-Kawakibi* (Beirut, Center for Arab Unity Studies, 1995), pp.265-411.
- 6 Ibn Khaldoun 1332 – 1406, a pioneer Arab historian, philosopher and sociologist.
- 7 Abu Khaldun Sati Al-Husari, *What is Nationalism?* (Beirut, Dar al-Ilm lil Malayeen, 1963), p. 57 (in Arabic).
- 8 Al-Husari, *Arabism First* (Beirut, Dar al-Ilm lil Malayeen, 1965), p. 149 (in Arabic).
- 9 Walid Khalidi, "Thinking the Unthinkable: A Sovereign Palestinian State", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 56, No, 4 (July 1978), p. 695.
- 10 Letters exchanged between Hussein, ruler of Mecca and McMahon, British High Commissioner in Cairo, known as Hussein-McMahon Correspondence.
- 11 Sykes Picot Agreement
- 12 Youssef Khoury, *Arab Unity Projects 1913-1987* (Beirut, Center for Arab Unity Studies, 1988) (in Arabic).
- 13 Malcolm Kerr, *The Arab Cold War 1958-1964: A Study of Ideology in Politics* (London, Oxford University Press, 1965).
- 14 Ahmed Gomaa, *The Foundation of the League of Arab States: Wartime Diplomacy and Inter-Arab Politics, 1941-1945* (London, Longman, 1977), p. 103.
- 15 Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan (Jordan), Saudi Arabia, and Yemen.
- 16 Article 2: The purpose of the League is to draw closer the relations between member States and co-ordinate their political activities with the aim of realizing a close collaboration between them, to safeguard their independence and sovereignty, and to consider in a general way the affairs and interests of the Arab countries.
- 17 Article 8: Each member-state shall respect the systems of government established in the other member-states and regard them as exclusive concerns of those states. Each shall pledge to abstain from any action calculated to change established systems of government.
- 18 Article 5: Any resort to force in order to resolve disputes between two or more member-states of the League is prohibited.
- 19 This is much toned down from the original Article 1 of the Alexandria Protocol stating that "In no case will the adoption of a foreign policy which may be prejudicial to the policy of the League or an individual member state be allowed" and prohibiting the conclusion of agreements which "contradict the text or spirit of the present dispositions".
- 20 Article 7: The decisions of the Council taken by a unanimous vote shall be binding on all the member States of the League; those that are reached by a majority vote shall bind only those that accept them.
- 21 It was established in 1950 under the Arab League Council.
- 22 It was first established under the name of the Economic Council according to Article 8 of the Joint Defense and



Economic Cooperation Agreement of 1950, later renamed to Economic and Social Council by the Arab League in 1977. It was entrusted with the supervision of the specialized ministerial committees.

23 It was created in 1964 to implement the Economic Unity Agreement of 1957, and it has helped establish 30 unions and federations for Arab industries, business, labour and services.

24 The latest example was the Tunisia Summit in 2004 in which important decisions on Arab League reforms were expected, but the Summit never took place because of political disputes. The Arab Court of Justice (Article 19 of the Charter) had been on the Council's agenda for several decades, but no consensus was reached to create it.

25 Libya objected holding the Summit in Riyadh in 2007 because it was accused by the Royal Saudi family to have supported an earlier assassination attempt on its Crown Prince.

26 Arab Monetary Fund, Annual Economic Report 2006, p. 147.

27 James Leonard (et al.), National threat perceptions in the Middle East (New York, United Nations, 1995).

28 Egypt resumed its membership in 1987 and the headquarters moved back to Cairo from Tunisia in September 1990.

29 Article 9 of the Charter states that "the States of the Arab League that are desirous of establishing among themselves closer collaboration and stronger bonds than those provided for in the present Pact, may conclude among themselves whatever agreements they wish for this purpose". See for example Khalid Sekkat, Regional integration among the Maghreb countries and free trade with the European Union (Cairo, Economic Research Forum for the Arab Countries, Iran, and Turkey, 1995).

30 It is composed of the six Gulf states: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar and Bahrain.

31 It is composed of five states in North Africa: Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania.

32 It is composed of four states in the center of the Arab World: Egypt, Jordan, Iraq and Yemen.

33 The Muscat Instrument for a Unified Personal Law was ratified in 1996, while the Kuwait Instrument for the Unified Civil Law and the Doha Instrument of the Unified Penal Code were ratified in 1997.

34 Article 6 states that in case of aggression "the Council shall determine the necessary measures to repel this aggression. Its decision shall be taken unanimously". Libya argued that it had objected to the council decision to join in the liberation of Kuwait but its objection was ignored, and thus the council decision is illegal because it was not unanimous.

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### **Section C) Regional integration processes**

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Hanafi Hazem

#### **The Limits of Integration Processes in the Arab World**

**in Federalist Debate (The)**, Year XXII, n. 1, March , 22-26

The Arab World, with 22 countries and 320 million people, larger in size than the US, Canada, Europe or China, with GDP of about 1.3 trillion US dollars in 2007, and with such strong common ties as language, history, culture, ethnicity and religion has not only failed to achieve a modest level of cooperation, integration and development, but has also become a battleground for widespread inter-state and intra-state conflicts, has been subjected to occupation or foreign domination and has fallen behind in major human development indexes.

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#### 1. Arab Nationalism

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mismanagement and secessionist movements have all turned the empire into “the Sick Man of Europe”. Reforms Tanzimat in the mid-19th century were the answer, but for whose benefit was the question. The Ottomans implemented several measures of political, religious and communal reforms but with administrative centralization and an emphasis on creating an Ottoman nationality Ottomanism to keep the empire intact and strong<sup>1</sup>, while many local communities and nationalities used these reforms to gain greater autonomy, redefine their own identities and territorial borders. For the Ottomans, the struggle was against European expansionism and internal disintegration, but for the communities and nationalities, the struggle was against European imperialism and Ottoman authoritarianism.

The ideas of reforms in Islamic societies preceded the Tanzimat, and Egypt had an early start, both through conflict with, and educational missions to the West. The shock of Napoleon’s short-lived French Expedition to Egypt from 1798 to 1801 and the new encounters with European rising imperialism in Egypt, Syria and North Africa have aroused questions over the backwardness of Moslem societies, but without challenging the overall legitimacy of the Ottoman rule and its religious bond. Rafa'a Al Tahtawy (1801-1873) and Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-1897), both modern Islamic scholars, emphasized the ideas of liberalism, rationalism, law and public good to reform the ailing Islamic societies. Al-Afghani in particular, with his critical view of traditionalism, had an indirect role in the early development of Arab nationalism by “reinterpreting the Islamic past in modern and nationalist terms”<sup>2</sup>. This emphasis on history took him to champion Pan-Islamism, uniting all Moslems under one reformed modern Ottoman Empire as the seat of the Caliphate<sup>3</sup>.

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From its inception, the Arab League was designed to be state-centered with very limited powers, and it stayed true to its character despite its remarkable growth in terms of institutions and policy agreements over the last 60 years. Article 7 not only removes any enforcement mechanisms<sup>20</sup>, but it also obstructs unified agreement on important policies causing repeated postponements and delays.

In terms of institutions, several new councils were created including the Joint Defense Council<sup>21</sup>, the Economic and



Social Council<sup>22</sup>, the Council for Arab Economic Unity<sup>23</sup>, in addition to 12 ministerial councils for information, interior, justice, housing, transport, environment, communication, electricity, tourism, youth and sports, social affairs and health. Moreover, two important regional development funds were created: the Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development (1967) and the Arab Monetary Fund (1976). Despite the positive contributions these funds have provided in terms of economic aid, their effect was within the state, not across, and it was project-based not target-oriented. It was more of a bilateral funding than multilateral cooperation.

Perhaps the most important institutional development has been the adoption of Arab Summits in 1964 as the highest decision making body in place of the Arab League Council, although this mechanism is not mentioned in the Charter nor in the Protocol. This shift highlighted the fact that Council was powerless in the face of continued bilateral disputes among Arab states, and that political agreement by the heads of states was the only way for agreements to move forward. However, this turned more into a curse rather than blessing as political disputes prevented the regular meetings of the Summits, and subsequently, important decisions were repeatedly deferred to next rounds for further consultations<sup>24</sup>. Even agreement on where the Summit would be held became a subject for dispute<sup>25</sup>.

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With this rich array of institutions and policy agreements, it is hard to imagine that inter-Arab trade has not surpassed 10% of total Arab foreign trade, except in 2002 and 2005, since the League's establishment in 1945<sup>26</sup>, that restrictions on the movement of people, goods and capital are still in place region-wide, that several violent conflicts have broken out between member states, and that threat perception in some Arab countries focus on other neighboring Arab states rather than on non-Arab states<sup>27</sup>.

Following the crushing Arab defeat in 1967 and the oil boom in the Gulf states in the 1970s, Arab nationalism lost ground and the Arab system moved into further chaos during the 1980s. With Egypt's suspension from the Arab League in March 1979 because of its peace treaty with Israel<sup>28</sup>, the threat posed by the Iranian revolution of 1979 with its declared aim of exporting Islamic revolution to neighboring Arab countries, the break up of the Iraq-Iran war in 1980, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and the subsequent intensification of Arab rivalries, a new trend emerged for cooperation - the establishment of regional groupings. Whether such groupings signaled the break-up of the Arab League system or a move towards greater cooperation between countries closely connected in accordance with the objectives of the League became a matter of dispute<sup>29</sup>.

Three groupings were established in the 1980s: the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981<sup>30</sup>, the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)<sup>31</sup> and the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC) in 1989<sup>32</sup>. Of the three, the GCC has been the most successful. Building on a strong and similar oil economy, close social and cultural makeup, Islamic legal code and common security threats, the GCC established a small joint military force, a Free Trade Zone in 1983. It has plans to establish a common market and a custom union by the end of 2007 and a single currency by 2010. It has unified many of its legal codes including Personal Law, Civil Law and Penal Code<sup>33</sup>. However, the GCC is not without disputes. Both Bahrain and Oman have unilaterally signed a free trade agreement with the US, causing further disputes within the GCC on the pace and depth of economic integration plans, possibly forcing a delay in implementation of those decisions.



The other two groupings have been less successful. The Arab Maghreb Union is stalled by the Moroccan Algerian dispute over Western Sahara's independence, which Morocco accuses Algeria of supporting. Members have complied with the UN-imposed sanctions on Libya for its role in Lockerbie which pushed Libya to effectively end its participation in the AMU and turn towards Africa. Algeria went into a violent civil war for 10 years when the parliamentary elections of 1991 brought Islamists to power, but the results were annulled by the army. Mauritania experienced several coups. None of the objectives of the AMU were achieved. The Arab Cooperation Council barely completed a year before Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990 and brought the organization to a halt. Jordan sided with Iraq while Egypt supported Kuwait, effectively ending the Council which was dissolved in 1994. Unlike the GCC, membership in the AMU and the ACC was open to other Arab states.

The drama of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 and its aftermath opened a new chapter in Arab vulnerabilities, and further manifested the inadequacy of the Arab League system. Not only has a member state of the League occupied another, but the League has also failed to mediate and avert the conflict, or compel Iraq to withdraw except through the help of an international force. The Arab League decision was even labeled illegal by some<sup>34</sup>.

The Arab League was not designed or equipped to handle such complex political and economic issues, and has not developed the appropriate institutions and processes to respond effectively to such challenges. It fits perfectly the Federalist criticism of the Articles of Confederation as weak and ineffective.

Arab nationalism, as a centralist ideology aiming at creating one single unitary state, and the Arab League, as a very loose inter-governmental organization aiming at enhancing cooperation and coordination among Arab states have both failed to achieve the aims they have set for themselves. The Arab world, despite huge potential, continues to be weak, divided and underdeveloped. This failure has to do more with the unsuitability of these two models to the task at hand than the way they were implemented. This brings us to consider whether federalism could be a more suitable and successful alternative.

1 Hasan Kayali, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1997).

2 Nikki Keddie, *Sayyid Jamal ad-Dan al-Afghan: A Political Biography* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1972), p. 2.

3 Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*, pp. 103-160.

4 Born in Aleppo, Syria, studied in Syria and Turkey, started his active public life writing in different newspapers, held many governmental posts and served several prison sentences for anti-Turkish writings. Fearing for his life, he fled to Cairo in 1899 where he published his two books in Arabic *Characteristics of Tyranny* and *Umm al-Qura* (Mother of the Cities) referring to an imaginary meeting in Mecca by representatives from all Islamic cities to discuss political reforms. He died in 1902 presumably from poison on the order of the Ottoman ruler.

5 Al-Kawakibi, "Umm al-Qura", in Mohamed Jamal Tahan, *The Complete Works of Al-Kawakibi* (Beirut, Center for Arab Unity Studies, 1995), pp.265-411.

6 Ibn Khaldoun 1332 – 1406, a pioneer Arab historian, philosopher and sociologist.

7 Abu Khaldun Sati Al-Husari, *What is Nationalism?* (Beirut, Dar al-Ilm lil Malayeen, 1963), p. 57 (in Arabic).

8 Al-Husari, *Arabism First* (Beirut, Dar al-Ilm lil Malayeen, 1965), p. 149 (in Arabic).

9 Walid Khalidi, "Thinking the Unthinkable: A Sovereign Palestinian State", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 56, No. 4 (July 1978), p. 695.



- 10 Letters exchanged between Hussein, ruler of Mecca and McMahon, British High Commissioner in Cairo, known as Hussein-McMahon Correspondence.
- 11 Sykes Picot Agreement
- 12 Youssef Khoury, Arab Unity Projects 1913-1987 (Beirut, Center for Arab Unity Studies, 1988) (in Arabic).
- 13 Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War 1958-1964: A Study of Ideology in Politics (London, Oxford University Press, 1965).
- 14 Ahmed Gomaa, The Foundation of the League of Arab States: Wartime Diplomacy and Inter-Arab Politics, 1941-1945 (London, Longman, 1977), p. 103.
- 15 Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan (Jordan), Saudi Arabia, and Yemen.
- 16 Article 2: The purpose of the League is to draw closer the relations between member States and co-ordinate their political activities with the aim of realizing a close collaboration between them, to safeguard their independence and sovereignty, and to consider in a general way the affairs and interests of the Arab countries.
- 17 Article 8: Each member-state shall respect the systems of government established in the other member-states and regard them as exclusive concerns of those states. Each shall pledge to abstain from any action calculated to change established systems of government.
- 18 Article 5: Any resort to force in order to resolve disputes between two or more member-states of the League is prohibited.
- 19 This is much toned down from the original Article 1 of the Alexandria Protocol stating that "In no case will the adoption of a foreign policy which may be prejudicial to the policy of the League or an individual member state be allowed" and prohibiting the conclusion of agreements which "contradict the text or spirit of the present dispositions".
- 20 Article 7: The decisions of the Council taken by a unanimous vote shall be binding on all the member States of the League; those that are reached by a majority vote shall bind only those that accept them.
- 21 It was established in 1950 under the Arab League Council.
- 22 It was first established under the name of the Economic Council according to Article 8 of the Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement of 1950, later renamed to Economic and Social Council by the Arab League in 1977. It was entrusted with the supervision of the specialized ministerial committees.
- 23 It was created in 1964 to implement the Economic Unity Agreement of 1957, and it has helped establish 30 unions and federations for Arab industries, business, labour and services.
- 24 The latest example was the Tunisia Summit in 2004 in which important decisions on Arab League reforms were expected, but the Summit never took place because of political disputes. The Arab Court of Justice (Article 19 of the Charter) had been on the Council's agenda for several decades, but no consensus was reached to create it.
- 25 Libya objected holding the Summit in Riyadh in 2007 because it was accused by the Royal Saudi family to have supported an earlier assassination attempt on its Crown Prince.
- 26 Arab Monetary Fund, Annual Economic Report 2006, p. 147.
- 27 James Leonard (et al.), National threat perceptions in the Middle East (New York, United Nations, 1995).
- 28 Egypt resumed its membership in 1987 and the headquarters moved back to Cairo from Tunisia in September 1990.
- 29 Article 9 of the Charter states that "the States of the Arab League that are desirous of establishing among themselves closer collaboration and stronger bonds than those provided for in the present Pact, may conclude among themselves whatever agreements they wish for this purpose". See for example Khalid Sekkat, Regional integration among the Maghreb countries and free trade with the European Union (Cairo, Economic Research Forum for the Arab Countries, Iran, and Turkey, 1995).
- 30 It is composed of the six Gulf states: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar and Bahrain.
- 31 It is composed of five states in North Africa: Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania.
- 32 It is composed of four states in the center of the Arab World: Egypt, Jordan, Iraq and Yemen.
- 33 The Muscat Instrument for a Unified Personal Law was ratified in 1996, while the Kuwait Instrument for the Unified



Civil Law and the Doha Instrument of the Unified Penal Code were ratified in 1997.

34 Article 6 states that in case of aggression “the Council shall determine the necessary measures to repel this aggression. Its decision shall be taken unanimously”. Libya argued that it had objected to the council decision to join in the liberation of Kuwait but its objection was ignored, and thus the council decision is illegal because it was not unanimous.

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 2. Cooperations and integration in Africa and in the Middle East*

Hentz James

**The Southern African security order: regional economic integration and security among developing states in Review of International Studies (The)**, Vol. 35, S1, February , 189-213

Theories in international relations, predicated on particular assumptions, for explaining the relationship between regional economic integration and regional security miss the challenges to security in the developing world. Unlike the developed world, regional interdependence in much of the developing world engenders negative externalities. The relationship between regional economic integration and regional security depends on the nature of the security threats that define the region – traditional state vs state threats on one hand versus new security threats on the other hand. The nature of the security threat, or security dilemma, will determine how different forms of regional economic integration, laissez faire, functional, and developmental, define or re-define a particular regional security order. Building a ‘security community’ in the developing world, therefore, calls for new architectural principles. In the case of southern Africa, both, laissez faire (free trade area) and functional cooperation (spatial development initiatives) will foster insecurity rather than security.

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 3. Cooperations and integration in Central and North America*

Anusua Datta and Mikhail Kouliavtsev

**NAFTA and the Realignment of Textile and Apparel Trade: Trade Creation or Trade Diversion?**  
in *Review of International Economics*, Volume 17, Issue 1, February 2009

No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 3. Cooperations and integration in Central and North America*

Irish Maureen

**Regulatory Convergence, Security and Global Administrative Law in Canada–United States Trade**  
in *Journal of International Economic Law*, Volume 12, Number 2 , 333-355

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) contains provisions that encourage regulatory convergence among member countries. Convergence within regional trade agreements raises several issues, including questions of political accountability and the potential application of most favoured nation (MFN) rights to any mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) that are negotiated. The author suggests an interpretation of MFN obligations that is compatible with closed MRAs. As well, she addresses the contribution of global administrative law to procedures for accountability. This article argues that border security concerns should not over-ride other public policies on levels of convergence and



economic integration. Even between contiguous countries, there is no reason to presume that regional trade agreements ought to adopt common security perimeters.

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 3. Cooperations and integration in Central and North America*

Capling Ann, Nossal Kim Richard

**The contradictions of regionalism in North America**

*in Review of International Studies (The)*, Vol. 35, S1, February , 147-167

Students of regionalism almost reflexively include North America in their lists of regions in contemporary global politics. Inevitably students of regionalism point to the integrative agreements between the countries of North America: the two free trade agreements that transformed the continental economy beginning in the late 1980s – the Canada–US Free Trade Agreement that came into force on 1 January 1989, and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the United States, Mexico, and Canada, that came into force on 1 January 1994 – and the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP), launched in March 2005. These agreements, it is implied, are just like the integrative agreements that forge the bonds of regionalism elsewhere in the world. We argue that this is a profound misreading, not only of the two free trade agreements of the late 1980s and early 1990s and the SPP mechanism of 2005, but also of the political and economic implications of those agreements. While these integrative agreements have created considerable regionalisation in North America, there has been little of the regionalism evident in other parts of the world. We examine the contradictions of North America integration in order to explain why North Americans have been so open to regionalisation but so resistant to regionalism.

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 3. Cooperations and integration in Central and North America*

Capling Ann, Nossal Kim Richard

**The contradictions of regionalism in North America**

*in Review of International Studies (The)*, Vol. 35, S1, February , 147-167

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**



*Subsection 4. Cooperation and integration in Central and Latin America*

Hoffmann Andrea Ribeiro, Coutinho Marcelo, Kfuri Regina

**A multidimensional analysis of the process of regional integration in the Southern Cone**

in *Revista Brasileira de Política internacional* , vol.51 – No 2/2008 , pp. 98-116

The present work develops indicators of regional integration in order to conduct a multidimensional analysis of Mercosur in the period of 1991 to 2006. One premise is that Mercosur cannot be considered a sui generis case but an example of regional integration organization such as the European Union or the Andean Community of Nations. In that sense, although the indicators are developed to be applied in Mercosur, they could be applied in other organizations of regional integration.

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 4. Cooperation and integration in Central and Latin America*

Bernal-Meza Raul

**Argentina and Brazil in the International Politics: regionalism and Mercosur (strategy, cooperation and factors of tension)**

in *Revista Brasileira de Política internacional* , vol.51 – No 2/2008 , pp. 154-178

This article analyzes the politics of Brazil and Argentina in the relation of the regional integration and cooperation process, stressing the Mercosur. Firstly a theoretical reflection about the regionalism, Secondly a concise explanation about the Mercosur, then discuss the respective external politics. In South America the Mercosur coexist along other initiative. As new regionalism scenarios appears since December 2004, the Unasur (Union of South American nations) such a cooperation and agreement plan leadership by Brazil and, from the same time, ALBA (Bolivarian alternative of integration) promoted by the president Chávez by a project against the Mercosur, which he considered "neoliberal".

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 4. Cooperation and integration in Central and Latin America*

Oelsner Andrea

**Consensus and Governance in Mercosur: The Evolution of the South American Security Agenda**

in *Security Dialogue*, vol. 40, n. 2, april , 191-212

**ABSTRACT:** This article constitutes a first exploration of the security governance of Mercosur, the common market of Latin America's Southern Cone. Drawing on securitization theory, the article argues that three major clusters of security issues have consecutively become the focus of the region's security agenda. First, prior to Mercosur's foundation and during the various processes of democratization in the region, the success of democratic transitions, the stabilization of civil—military relations and the region's insertion into the world economy were successfully securitized. At a second stage, more traditional issues associated with the use of military force gained centrality in the security agenda. Finally, and particularly since 11 September 2001, the region's security architecture was redesigned to accommodate 'new' security threats. Around the consensuses on these three issue-clusters, formal and informal structures of policy coordination have emerged, constituting a limited system of governance. Yet, though regional governance is admittedly weak, this article contends that the security consensuses and the emerging institutional structures that have ensued are contributing to forging a shared normativity in the Mercosur area.



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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 4. Cooperation and integration in Central and Latin America*

**Caba Pérez Carmen, López-Hernández Antonio Manuel**

**Governmental financial transparency in MERCOSUR member countries**

**in *International Review of Administrative Sciences*** , March 2009, Volume 75, No. 1 , 169-181

in the last century, the MERCOSUR member countries have carried out reforms aimed at achieving better public financial information for governmental decision-taking. Important changes are currently taking place on the international public accounting scene, and the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) has published International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS), by which it seeks to ensure that governmental financial reports include financial information of sufficient quality to support decision-making by different users, and at the same time to improve the comparability of the financial information presented by public sector bodies throughout the world. In this article, we examine the consistency of the information included by MERCOSUR member countries in their current year-end governmental public financial reports with the public financial reporting practices recommended by IFAC, in order to determine whether further efforts are needed to improve transparency and comparability.

Points for practitioners The article may help government practitioners in MERCOSUR countries to become aware of the divergences which exist regarding the governmental financial information offered by each of the countries in MERCOSUR. Moreover, it could help to set up a common project of account reform which would take IPSAS as its model. This unified framework for accounting policies would increase the coherence of financial information and would establish a common measurement basis to assess the financial results of all of the MERCOSUR countries.

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 4. Cooperation and integration in Central and Latin America*

**Oddone Carlos Nahuel, Granato Leonardo**

**La teoria dell'autonomia applicata ai nuovi processi di integrazione regionale latinoamericani**

**in *Politico (II)***, n. 220, anno LXXIV, gennaio-aprile , 183-200

ABSTRACT: The present work is focused on approaching the origin, the principles and the course of action of two new proposals of regional integration in Latin America : the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (BAA) and the Southern Community of Nations (SCN), known nowadays like South American Nations Union (UNASUR). The named new proposals of the regional integration in the Latin American subsystem are studied from the perspective of the Autonomy Theory. We identify a kind of specific autonomy in each process of integration. We aim at proving that the BAA would suit the "secessionist autonomy" whereas the latter project, the SCN, could suit the "relational autonomy".

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 4. Cooperation and integration in Central and Latin America*

**Tussie Diana**

**Latin America: contrasting motivations for regional projects**



in *Review of International Studies (The)*, Vol. 35, S1, February , 169-188

The breakdown of the North-South, East-West governing principles, and the removal of superpower overlay have led to an increasingly decentralised system setting the stage for the so called new geography of trade and the reconfiguration of political – diplomatic strategies. Such strategies now include contestation, articulation, competitive liberalisation, ample inter-state coalition building such as the G-20, G-33, G-90 in the Doha Round and the proliferation of regional and wider ranging preferential arrangements. Regionalism is both policy and project. Agreements vary widely in motivation, form, coverage and content. It is very often the case that, as in multilateral institutions, one major actor sets the agenda at the regional level with the view not only of constructing and retaining power at that level but also of setting global precedents. New balancing or bandwagoning efforts vis-à-vis the local strong power are set in motion with fresh implications for the emerging global architecture. Regional alignments are thus constantly shaping and reshaping market relations. Intra-Latin American agreements (those not including the majors, the US and the EU) were motivated by the search for wider markets building up economies of scale amongst similar countries. Such agreements mostly focused on market liberalisation through diverse schedules of tariff reduction. The result has been the emergence of shallow regional agreements. Nonetheless, most have not been fully implemented, but they show a long term trend towards potential convergence, especially if the Community of South American Nations moves on. External pressures have also spurred agreements as defensive mechanisms. So we witness impulses to regionalism complementing and at times competing with older patterns and trends. This contribution focuses on the different avenues that Latin America is undertaking in terms of regional projects. It will assess the dynamics of intra- regional integration and the inter-action effects with varieties of North-South integration.

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 4. Cooperation and integration in Central and Latin America*

**Foxley Alejandro**

**Los tiempos de la integración real y no solo verbal**

in *Estudios internacionales : revista del Instituto de Estudios Internacionales de la Universidad de Chile*, Vol. 41 / 2008 / Nr 161 , 201

No hace un mes que Chile es el país pasó a ocupar la Presidencia Pro Témpore del primer año de vida de la Unión de Naciones Sudamericana. Esto se firmó recién en Brasilia, hace unas tres o cuatro semanas. Se le pidió a la Presidenta Bachelet que encabece este proceso el primer año y, por lo tanto, todas las reflexiones al estilo de las que hay en este libro, nos van a ser extremadamente útiles para tratar de impregnarle a esta UNASUR, un espíritu que nos permita reconocer los avances, pero también superar las deficiencias de procesos de integración anteriores.

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 4. Cooperation and integration in Central and Latin America*

**Hummer Waldemar**

**Von der 'Gemeinschaft' zur 'Union' Südamerikanischer Nationen**

in *Verfassung und Recht in Übersee*, vol. 42, issue 1 , 7-21

No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area*

Hao Duy Phan

**A Blueprint For a Southeast Asian Court Of Human Rights**

*in Asia-Pacific Law and Policy Journal* , Volume 10, Issue 2 , 385-432

No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area*

Dilip K. Das

**A Chinese Renaissance in an Unremittingly Integrating Asian Economy**

*in Journal of Contemporary China*, Volume 18 Issue 59 , 321 - 338

This paper attempts to address an imperative topic in Asian economic development: the relationship between China's economic expansion and Asian economic growth. It tries to answer the all important query, whether China's economic ascent is a threat or an opportunity for the Asian economies. Due to the size of its economy, its openness and the rapidity of its GDP growth, China is swaying the individual Asian economies as well as the regional economy. When a significant-size economy is growing almost three times as rapidly as the global economy, the neighboring economies cannot possibly expect to remain impervious. Various issues are analyzed in the paper, including foreign direct investment inflows and impacts, regional production networks, plausible scenarios for China and the remaining Asian economies, and strategy for coping with China's rapid development. Although some Asian economies and some sectors will face adverse effects—short- or long-term—of China's rapid growth, the apocalyptic predictions are grossly overdone. For the most part, the impact of China's rapid growth can be mutually beneficial. This is the conclusive idea of this paper.

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area*

Wu Richard W. X.

**APEC and Future Asia-Pacific Regional Architecture**

*in American Foreign Policy Interests*, Vol. 31, Issue 1 , 12-22

There is no doubt that Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is a useful platform for bilateral and multilateral meetings among regional leaders, and as the only forum for trans-Pacific dialogues, it is important for stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. Besides that, how can APEC contribute to regional institutional building in the future? How will it be related to the emerging regional architecture in the Asia-Pacific region? This article addresses those issues by analyzing APEC's role and weakness in regional community building, the forces shaping future regional architecture, the challenges that APEC is facing in the competitive environment of region building, and the possible roles that APEC can play in the construction of architecture in the Asia-Pacific region.

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area*



J. Haacke

**ASEAN and Political Change in Myanmar: Towards a Regional Initiative?**

in *Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs*, Volume 30, Number 3, December , 351-378

ASEAN states have favoured diplomacy and peer pressure in order to sway Myanmar's military regime to release Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and other political detainees and to promote national reconciliation. So far, ASEAN's combined efforts have not been very successful, although the generals are moving Myanmar beyond extra-constitutional rule. This paper asks whether, in the aftermath of the September 2007 protests, the constitutional referendum and Cyclone Nargis, there is much scope for a new regional effort to promote reconciliation and democratization in Myanmar that is additional to the support ASEAN offers for the good offices of the United Nations Secretary General. The paper sets out different positions held within ASEAN on promoting political change in Myanmar. It also examines the prospects for putting into practice recent ideas to address Myanmar's political situation in new regional settings. The paper concludes that: (1) significant differences characterize the Myanmar policy of individual ASEAN countries in line with varying interests and pressures, and dissimilar views on what—if anything—should be done to help Myanmar democratize; (2) Indonesia is the only ASEAN country to have conceptualized a possible regional diplomatic initiative, but its full implementation and success are far from certain.

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area*

H.E.S. Nesadurai

**ASEAN and regional governance after the Cold War: from regional order to regional community?**

in *Pacific Review (The)* , Volume 22 Issue 1

This paper first reviews and critiques the dominant realist and constructivist accounts of ASEAN, which have enjoyed much prominence in *The Pacific Review* since the journal's founding in 1988. ASEAN behaviour and outcomes cannot be fitted into neat theoretical categories that emphasize either material or ideational variables in explanation. Instead, ASEAN displays complexities in behaviour that are the product of the contingent interaction between the material (power, territory, wealth) and the ideational (norms, ideas, identity) as member states actively seek to manage domestic order as well as regional order within and beyond ASEAN. In all of this, state interests and identities remain paramount, which means that the long-standing ASEAN norms of sovereignty/non-interference remain central to regional governance. Under these conditions, and despite the Charter's newly articulated political norms of democratization, human rights, and the rule of law, the prospects seem doubtful for building a people-centred ASEAN Community in which regional governance displays inclusiveness, seeking to address the interests and needs of the region's ordinary people as opposed to what its elites deem appropriate. The final portion of the paper explores what a critical approach to studying ASEAN might reveal. In particular, the paper attempts to identify whether there may be any political spaces opening up within existing structures and practices from which progressive change could emerge, even if slowly, particularly in the area of human rights and social justice, key elements in building an inclusive, ASEAN Community.

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area*



Ren Xiao

**Between Adapting and Shaping: China's role in Asian regional cooperation**  
in *Journal of Contemporary China*, Volume 18 Issue 59 , 303 - 320

This paper attempts to examine the process of China's participation in regional cooperation in Asia and the factors that affect its participation. It focuses on a changing China-ASEAN relationship that is reshaping Asia. To build a peaceful and stable external environment, China has been making various efforts, political, economic and in the security field, to maintain and upgrade a harmonious and constructive relationship with its neighboring East Asian countries. Politically, China acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), essentially accepting the code of conduct stipulated by ASEAN and prompting other regional countries to observe this code. China has been supportive of ASEAN, playing a leadership role in East Asian regional cooperation. China and Asian regional cooperation is an evolving concept and a couple of theoretical points may be taken into account, such as how regional cooperation influences major powers' international behavior and vice versa.

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area*

H. Dieter

**Changing patterns of regional governance: from security to political economy?**  
in *Pacific Review (The)* , Volume 22 Issue 1 , 73 - 90

For decades, international relations in the Asia-Pacific were characterized by an emphasis on security affairs. Following the Asian financial crisis of 1997/98, this pattern has changed. In the early 21st century, policy makers in the region put emphasis on the deepening of economic relations. Both in trade and finance, new patterns of governance have emerged. The reasons are manifold. First, traditional security threats are not as important as they used to be. Second, the experience of 1997/98 as well as the current crisis have demonstrated that economic instability is of greater concern than security threats. Third, the economies of the Asia-Pacific are deepening their ties both at the level of production and with regard to investment flows. Despite these structural changes, the level of cooperation continues to be relatively low.

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area*

Zi LIU; Jinxia CHEN

**China and Monetary Integration in East Asia**

in *China: an International Journal*, Volume: 7 No. 1 March , 124 - 143

No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area*

Jian Yang

**China in the South Pacific: hegemon on the horizon?**

in *Pacific Review (The)* , Volume 22 Issue 2 , 139 - 158



Abstract

China's influence in the South Pacific appears to be growing rapidly. Some analysts are concerned that China is on its way to replacing the West as the dominant power and China's rise in the region poses a major threat to the West. However, there is no clear evidence to suggest that China's deepening involvement in the South Pacific is a calculated strategic move for its military security. The move can be strategic mainly in the sense that it has strong implications for China's reunification strategy and it serves China's long-term development strategy. The strategic value of the South Pacific to China's national security is limited at present and will remain so in the foreseeable future. China also lacks the military capability to challenge the US-led West in the region in the years to come. Chinese influence in the region is not deep-rooted and is largely based on its 'no-strings-attached' aid and its increasing economic interactions with the region. China has serious image problems in the region and these problems are unlikely to be resolved in the near future. China thus has neither the hard power nor the soft power to become a genuine hegemon in the region.

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area*

**China-ASEAN Relations, April 2008 to September 2008: Chronology of Events  
in China: an International Journal**, Volume: 7 No. 1 March , Page 177 - 185

No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area*

Siow Song TENG; Chee Kia LIM

**China-ASEAN Relations, April 2008 to September 2008: Important Documents  
in China: an International Journal**, Volume: 7 No. 1 March , 186

No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area*

R. Emmers

**Comprehensive security and resilience in Southeast Asia: ASEAN's approach to terrorism  
in Pacific Review (The)** , Volume 22 Issue 2 , 159 - 177

This paper explores how the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has tackled the threat of terrorism since 9/11 and the Bali bombings. It claims that ASEAN has applied its traditional approach to security, based on comprehensive security and the principle of resilience, when addressing this challenge. The resilience concept underpins the nexus between national and regional security and emphasizes domestic regime consolidation re-enforced by regional consultations. In their pursuit of resilience, member states have sought in various degrees to address terrorism domestically through a mixture of security, law enforcement, socio-economic, ideological, and educational policies. It is noted that Indonesia, the Philippines, and Singapore have tackled terrorism more comprehensively than



Thailand and Malaysia. Reflecting the synergy between national and regional resilience, ASEAN has operated as an umbrella organization meant to complement domestic and sub-regional efforts. It has been committed rhetorically, has produced frameworks of action, as well as reached agreements with the great powers. The paper is not overly optimistic, however, about ASEAN's role in promoting regional resilience against the threat of terrorism in Southeast Asia.

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area*

R. Emmers

**Comprehensive security and resilience in Southeast Asia: ASEAN's approach to terrorism in Pacific Review (The)** , Volume 22 Issue 2 , 159 - 177

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area*

A. Jetschke; J. Rland

**Decoupling rhetoric and practice: the cultural limits of ASEAN cooperation in Pacific Review (The)** , Volume 22 Issue 2 , 179 - 203

Why have ASEAN member states declared and why do they continue to declare their intention to enhance cooperation and devise projects when implementation lags behind their rhetoric? Why do they rhetorically commit themselves to cooperation, when they continue to stick to self-interested policies to the detriment of ASEAN's collective interest? And given these diverging practices, how likely is it that the objective of a more legalized and binding cooperation associated with the recently ratified ASEAN Charter is being implemented? This article draws attention to ASEAN's hybrid or dual character of international cooperation, consisting of the emulation of the European integration project and the persistence of deeper cultural strata of Southeast Asia's cooperation project that determine the limits of cooperation: Southeast Asia's social structure and political culture that have not produced those mechanisms that might facilitate international cooperation. If our explanation is correct that cooperation within ASEAN comes about as a simultaneous process of emulation and established cultural practices, we expect change only under specified conditions. Based on our argument and the theoretical literature on normative change, we identify and discuss in greater detail three potential outcomes of change: inertia, localization and transformation. The three modes make different predictions concerning



change within ASEAN. Based on an analysis of the two major shocks with which ASEAN has had to contend in the last two decades, namely the Cold War in Asia and the Asian financial crisis, we argue that ASEAN's dominant response to major ideational challenges has been combinations of localization and inertia and has not been followed by a fundamental change of practice

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area*

Lehmann Julia

**Die Asiatische Entwicklungsbank im Gefüge der 'regional governance' in Asien  
in *Verfassung und Recht in Übersee*, vol. 41, issue 4 , 560-567**

No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area*

Ravenhill John

**East Asian regionalism: Much Ado about Nothing?  
in *Review of International Studies (The)*, Vol. 35, S1, February , 215-235**

East Asia has emerged over the last decade as the most active site for the negotiation of regional inter-governmental collaboration. The primary focus has been on trade but, in the wake of the financial crises, governments have also engaged in historically unprecedented collaboration in several areas of finance. Multiple factors have driven this new regional engagement. Although the agreements have been primarily economic in their focus, the primary motivation for many of them has been to secure diplomatic or strategic gains. The aggregate benefits from the agreements are likely to be limited given the low levels of tariffs and the availability of provisions that facilitate the intra-regional exchange of components. They may, however, be of significant interest to producers of specific products either because they provide advantage over competitors (or remove the advantage that competitors through agreements that their governments have signed). The trade agreements thus often reflect particularistic interests that governments have been enlisted to champion.

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area*

P. Chambers

**Edgy Amity along the Mekong: Thai-Lao Relations in a Transforming Regional Equilibrium  
in *Asian Journal of Political Science*, Volume 17 Issue 1 , 89 - 118**

In 1994, the opening of the Friendship Bridge commenced an apparent thawing of ties between Thailand and Lao People's Democratic Republic (PDR). Out of deep socio-historical antagonisms and Cold War acrimony, the two countries seemed suited now for amity. But amity has continued to be edgy. Meanwhile, other countries in the region—China and Vietnam—vie for influence with Thailand over Lao. Amidst a rapidly integrating Mekong market and changing regional equilibrium, this study seeks answers to the following questions: What are the most significant Thai-Lao state security interests and how do they mesh with human security—especially in relation to economic



interests? Why do Thailand and Lao currently appear to be highlighting economic ties to the detriment of military preparedness and human security? How is the shifting equilibrium in the Mekong Region shaping the future of Thai-Lao relations? The study hypothesizes that despite tensions, in an age of enhanced state-market linkages, Thailand and Lao prioritize economic collaboration over military and human security considerations.

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area*

Xinyi Li

**Free trade agreements and vertical-specialisation in East Asia**

*in Asia Europe Journal*, Volume 7, Number 1 / February , 145-160

Regional integration in East Asia has been described as 'market-led' integration driven by the activities of multinational corporations creating vertical specialisation. This paper investigates the effect of free trade agreements (FTAs) on vertical specialisation-based trade by employing a gravity estimation for a sample of nine East Asian countries plus the US. We find that FTAs promote international trade based on vertical specialisation and enhances deep integration between countries. The FTA effect on vertical specialisation-based trade increases with pre-agreement vertical linkage level, that is, the deeper the real integration between countries the larger the FTA impact. The results of this paper also suggest that deeper economic integrations, such as currency unions, will enhance trade based on vertical production by reducing the risk of exchange rate volatility.

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area*

E. Yamashita

**Future targets for Asian regional integration**

*in Asia Europe Journal*, Volume 7, Number 1 / February , 109-125

The central framework of Asian integration is ASEAN+3 and, since its first Summit meeting in 1997, it has advanced regional integration in East Asia. Based on the direct experience of the author, this article presents a critical assessment of the progress made over the past ten years and argues that the 'Singapore Declaration' of 2007 is not ambitious enough for the future. An East Asian customs union (EACU) and common regional market should be the next targets for trade integration. In terms of monetary integration, Asia should aim for de-dollarisation and to achieve this it is crucially important to create a regional Asian monetary system (AMS).

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area*

Manela Maria-Gabriela

**How and Why Interaction Matters. ASEAN's Regional Identity and Human Rights**

*in Cooperation and Conflict*, vol. 44, n. 1, march , 27-49

ABSTRACT: human rights standards in developing countries. In this context, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member countries challenge the West's position based on two contradictory principles — comprehensibility



and cultural embedment of human rights. In this article, I argue that interactions with regard to human rights involving state and non-state actors in ASEAN have become part of the process of regional identity formation. How ASEAN has responded to external pressures in terms of compliance with international human rights norms, and how it has developed its own normative and procedural approach to human rights at the regional level, are inherent in the dynamics of 'Self' definition. A mixed pattern of 'rhetorical' and 'communicative action' explains how interaction has led to different phases — differentiation, affirmation, contestation and re-orientation — in the dynamics of 'Self' definition of ASEAN with regard to human rights.

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### **Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area*

Nishikawa Yukiko

#### **Human Security in Southeast Asia: Viable Solution or Empty Slogan?**

in *Security Dialogue*, vol. 40, n. 2, april , 213-236

ABSTRACT: This article explores the concept of human security and its relevance to the discourse and management of security in Southeast Asia. It examines whether the human security concept is applicable in the management of internal conflicts in that region, such as the conflict currently taking place in southern Thailand. The article argues that human security will have limited applicability in dealing with internal conflicts in Southeast Asia because of the huge gaps between what governments and other groups within Southeast Asian societies regard as threats. Nevertheless, the concept contributes to our understanding of the complex root causes of violence and illustrates links between human insecurity and conflict. The article concludes that the future usefulness of human security in efforts to manage internal conflict in Southeast Asia will depend on whether the analysis of specific situations incorporates a thorough understanding of the unique relationships between government and other groups, as manifested in the 'ASEAN Way', within the localities in question.

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### **Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area*

C. M. Dent

#### **Japan, China and East Asian regionalism: implications for the European Union**

in *Asia Europe Journal*, Volume 7, Number 1 / February , 161-178

East Asia is becoming an increasingly coherent regional entity in political economic terms, and remains a region of enormous geo-strategic significance for the European Union. Europe's links with China and Japan are especially important, and moreover these two countries are looking in various ways to exercise various forms of regional leadership in East Asia. This has critical implications for the EU's relations with the East Asia region generally, and also for the wider international system. Similar and related impacts maybe construed from deepening East Asian regionalism, involving processes where both Japan and China play vitally important roles. The analysis presented here examines the both micro and macro level developments in East Asian regionalism, and issues relating to Japan, China and regional leadership. It concludes by discusses the implications of these matters for the European Union, and recommends that the EU should pay particularly close attention to emergent exercises of regional leadership in East Asia, most likely to be performed by Japan and/or China.



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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area*

Chacón Morales Alejandra, Pérez Le-Fort Martín

**Políticas de unificación de Corea y alianzas regionales. Korean unification policies and regional alliances in Estudios internacionales : revista del Instituto de Estudios Internacionales de la Universidad de Chile**, Vol. 41 / 2008 / Nr 161 , 53-82

This first document resulting from the project on “Korean Unification: Historical Outline of Presumptions, Perceptions and Policies” is a synthesis of the international academic debate on national unification policies in South Korea and their relationship with the role played in the process by North Korea and regional (Russia, China and Japan) and extrarregional actors (United States) in 1988-2002. It includes a very partial processing of qualitative information gathered by means of semi-formal interviews to Korean experts , which will be developed in a second document. As an overall hypothesis, it contends that strategic interests of Russia, China, Japan and the United States regarding the Korean peninsula point to the need of its stabilization, according to their own perceptions of security that do not imply supporting a Korean process of national unification but rather maintaining the status quo, which conflicts with South Korea’s interests.

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area*

Sutherland Claire

**Reconciling Nation and Region: Vietnamese Nation Building and ASEAN Regionalism in Political Studies**, Volume 57, Issue 2, June , 316-336

The article sets out to gauge the usefulness of the concepts of legitimacy, sovereignty and nation in theorising a specific, South-East Asian case of nation building. It looks at the interplay between nation building and regionalist ideology in Vietnam, within the context of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). As one of the world's last communist states, the way in which Vietnam has reconciled hard-won sovereignty with regionalisation is all the more intriguing. The article distinguishes the state-led ideology of regionalism from the macro-level process of regionalisation in charting how sovereignty, legitimacy and nation are constructed in the Vietnamese case, with a view to drawing parallels with experiences in other regions. The first section looks at the concepts of legitimacy, sovereignty and nation and how they underpin the state construct, before relating these to Vietnam's ongoing nation-building project in the second section. The final section evaluates the evolution of these concepts within a regional framework, with specific reference to Vietnam's experience as a member of ASEAN. It concludes that official nation building in Vietnam continues to be based on the premises of state sovereignty and legitimacy, an approach eminently compatible with 'the ASEAN way'. The Vietnamese Communist party seeks to reconcile regionalism with its ongoing nation-building project in a bid to bolster both domestic legitimacy and external sovereignty.

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area*

John Asafu-Adjaye, Renuka Mahadevan

**Regional Trade Agreements versus Global Trade Liberalisation: Implications for a Small Island Developing**



## **State**

in *World Economy*, Volume 32 Issue 3 , 509 - 529

This study undertakes an empirical investigation of the macroeconomic and sectoral impacts of two forms of regional trade agreements vis-à-vis global trade liberalisation on a small island country, using Fiji as a case study. In order to capture the feedback effects of such a complex set of policies, we employ a dynamic computable general equilibrium model of the Fijian economy to investigate (i) the impact of the Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA), (ii) the impact of PICTA, the Pacific Agreement for Closer Economic Relations (PACER), and the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), (iii) the impact of full tariff liberalisation (i.e. tariff removal only), and (iv) the impact of full trade liberalisation, with removal of both tariff and non-tariff barriers. While PICTA consistently provides the least benefits across a range of macroeconomic indicators including real output, welfare, trade volumes and employment, full trade liberalisation involving the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers provides the greatest benefits compared to the other scenarios in terms of real output. However, the latter scenario is outperformed by PICTA, PACER, the EPAs and full tariff liberalisation in terms of welfare effects, trade volumes and employment. The policy implications hold important lessons for developing countries considering trade liberalisation.

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### **Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area*

J. C. Hsiung

#### **The Age of Geoeconomics, China's Global Role, and Prospects of Cross-Strait Integration**

in *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, Volume 14, Number 2, June , 113-133

After noting the rise of geoeconomics in the post-Cold War era, the paper ascertains how the age of geoeconomics re-defines power and the rules of the balance of power game. Of particular significance is that a nation's economic security eclipses its military security (or traditional national defense). In this context, I examine the meanings of the rise of a re-ascendant China for world politics in general and for Taiwan's future in particular. Considering Taiwan's heavy dependence on imported natural resources and its isolation and exclusion from vital international economic groupings, such as FTA's, ASEAN, ASEM, and the 16-nation Asian super economic bloc in the making. Finally, I take a prospective look at the prospect of a future cross-Strait integration between Taiwan and mainland China under the impact of the dictate of geoeconomics.

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McGoldrick Dominic , Seah Daniel

#### **The Asean Charter**

in *Harvard International Law Journal*, Volume 50, Issue 1 (Winter 2009) , 197-212

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### **Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area*



Duy Phan, Hao

**The Evolution Towards an Asean Human Rights Body**

in *Asia Pacific Journal on Human Rights and the Law*, Volume 9, Number 1 , 1-12

No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area*

Yong Tan Tai, Mun See Chak

**The Evolution of India-ASEAN Relations**

in *India Review*, Volume 8, Issue 1, January , 20-42

This paper traces the evolution of India's relations with Southeast Asia from 1947 to the present. It looks at three distinct phases of this relationship, and explains the motivations behind and manifestations of India's relations with the Southeast Asian region in each of these phases.

In the 1950s and early 1960s, many Southeast Asian states, spurred by anti-imperialist sentiments and harboring national aspirations, looked to India as a natural leader in post-colonial Asia, and later as a model of independence from superpower politics through its commitment to a strategy of nonalignment. This relationship cooled in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s, during which India's policy towards Southeast Asia, derived from the dictates of regional geopolitics in South Asia and the Cold War regime, came to be described as one of "benign neglect."

The third phase began in the 1990s, following the end of the Cold War and the onset of India's liberalization effort, and saw India's renewed engagement with Southeast Asia through its new Look East Policy. An increasing convergence of interests, both on economic and security issues, now forms the basis of a stable relationship between India and Southeast Asia.

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*Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area*

Matthias Helble, Ben Shepherd, John S. Wilson

**Transparency and Regional Integration in the Asia Pacific**

in *World Economy*, Volume 32 Issue 3 , 479 - 508

We show in this paper that increasing the transparency of the trading environment can be an important complement to traditional liberalisation of tariff and non-tariff barriers. Our definition of transparency is grounded in a transaction cost analysis. We focus on two dimensions of transparency: predictability (reducing the cost of uncertainty) and simplification (reducing information costs). Using the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) member economies as a case study, we construct indices of importer and exporter transparency for the region from a wide range of sources. Our results from a gravity model suggest that improving trade-related transparency in APEC could hold significant benefits by raising intra-APEC trade by approximately US\$148 billion or 7.5 per cent of baseline trade in the region. Action to improve transparency measures examined could be undertaken in many forms, including within the current APEC framework or future talks on a Free Trade Area in the Asia Pacific.

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**



*Subsection 6. The European unification process*

Lefebvre Maxime

**A l'Est de l'Union européenne : bilan d'une présidence française mouvementée**

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, n. 524, janvier , 11-16

No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 6. The European unification process*

Buzelay Alain

**A propos de la crise américaine et de son impact sur la zone euro**

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, n. 524, janvier , 17-21

The credits which have been too generously granted to the United States for the purpose of revitalising growth via the support of a consumption held back by a high disparity and a near stability of wages have engendered a solvency crisis with financial and economic consequences. Europe, in spite of the "protective" effect of the single currency, has not been able to shun the spread of the American crisis, bearing in mind the current dichotomy between a monetary policy which has become a single policy and prudential strategies which have remained at too national a level.

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 6. The European unification process*

Billet Carole

**Cohérence et différenciations dans le cadre de l'Espace de Liberté, de Sécurité et de Justice**

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, n. 523, décembre , 680-684

No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 6. The European unification process*

Tournemire Georges

**L'Union économique et monétaire entre succès et défis**

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, n. 524, janvier , 22-29

The economic and monetary Union is not suffering from the lack of visibility which is generally attributed to European policies. No advance can be felt as much by the citizen as the Euro, which is indissolubly linked to the European Union, as much inside as outside of its borders. It remains to be discovered whether the introduction of the Euro is the culmination of a monetary integration process or rather the start of a new era of economic integration. We shall plead here for the second hypothesis of the two, since challenges faced by the countries of the Eurozone will only be overcome by more ambitious, more voluntarist and better coordinated economic policies.

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*Subsection 6. The European unification process*

Farantouris Nikolaos E.

**La "fin" de la concurrence non faussée après le traité réformateur**

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, n. 524, janvier , 41-47

The obligation to maintain a workable competition system in the internal market (in accordance with the provision of article 3, paragraph 1, under g) EC) does not just constitute a mere formal objective, but an effective interpretation instrument in terms of market liberalisation, the eradication of protectionist practices and the promotion of the competition policy. The Court of Justice of the European Communities has always referred to the preamble and to the first articles of the Treaty, with a view to clarifying the justification or real meaning of the various provisions, including the rules of competition. However, the maintaining of a workable competition system will now no longer feature among the obligations and actions of the Union and of the member States, such as defined in the first articles of the 2007 reforming treaty (Treaty of Lisbon). The placing of the objective in question extra muros, finally stated in an attached protocol relating to the internal market and competition, is far from meaning that the aforesaid objective will be invoked in the same way and as frequently. The questioning continues, in view of the importance attached by jurisprudence to the withdrawn provision of article 3, paragraph 1, under g)

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*Subsection 6. The European unification process*

Thouvenin Jean-Marc

**Le droit communautaire, le droit international, et l'arrêt Kadi du 3 septembre 2008**

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, n. 523, décembre , 653-656

No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 6. The European unification process*

Flauss Jean-François

**Les élections de juges à la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme (2005-2008)**

in *Revue trimestrielle des droits de l'homme*, n° 75 - Juillet

No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 6. The European unification process*

**Memorandum per le elezioni del Parlamento europeo del 2009**

in *Queste istituzioni*, n. 150-151

No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 6. The European unification process*

Chaltiel Florence

**Regards sur la présidence française**

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, n. 524, janvier , 5-10

No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 6. The European unification process*

Flåm Karoline Hægstad

**Restricting the import of 'emission credits' in the EU: a power struggle between states and institutions**

in *International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics*, Volume 9, Number 1, February , 23-38

This article examines the development of a cap on the use of so-called 'project credits' in the EU emissions trading scheme. It investigates how the issue of such a limit was addressed in the negotiations of the Linking Directive, and how it has been dealt with in the later implementation of this directive. The article applies two explanatory approaches: one based on intergovernmentalist theory, assuming that the cap reflected the preferences of the EU Member States; and one based on the multi-level governance model, assuming that the cap expressed the preferences of EU institutions rather than Member States. What is found is a two-stage development: during the negotiations of the Linking Directive, Member States managed to secure a no-cap solution allowing extensive use of the project credits. In the later implementation phase, however, when the emissions trading scheme was up and running and a certain legitimacy for the system had been established, the Commission managed to 'regain control' by bringing back a cap. Thus, the project credit cap—and by that, the very nature of the EU emissions trading scheme—has been the subject of a continuing power struggle within the EU—and different theoretical perspectives explain different stages of this process.

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 6. The European unification process*

Huber Peter M.

**"Unitarizzazione" attraverso i diritti fondamentali comunitari**

in *Rivista italiana di diritto pubblico comunitario*, n. 1 , 1-16

No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 6. The European unification process*

Youngs Richard

**'A door neither closed nor open': EU policy towards Ukraine during and since the Orange Revolution**

in *International Politics* , Volume 46, Issue 4, July , 358-375

Ukraine provides evidence of very different Common Foreign and Security Policy negotiating dynamics. In the run up to the country's Orange Revolution, significant differences persisted between member states over how the European Union



(EU) should support Ukraine's democratic transition. A combination of normative entrapment and co-operative bargaining ensured that 'maximalist' and 'minimalist' member states united around a common position in support of the Orange Revolution. In subsequent debates over whether the EU should offer Ukraine a membership prospect, however, lowest common denominator dynamics prevailed. This case additionally demonstrates that both before and after Ukraine's democratic transition very specific external geostrategic factors played an important role in conditioning EU policy outcomes.

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*Subsection 6. The European unification process*

Siehr Angelika

**'Entdeckung' der Raumdimension in der Europapolitik: Neue Formen territorialer Governance in der Europäischen Union**

in *Staat*, vol. 48, issue 1 , 75-106

No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 6. The European unification process*

Wüst Andreas M., Tausendpfund Markus

**30 Jahre Europawahlen**

in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, Band 23-24, 2009

Seit 1979 werden die Abgeordneten des Europäischen Parlaments direkt gewählt. Waren bei der ersten Direktwahl noch 184 Millionen Bürgerinnen und Bürger in neun Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Gemeinschaft (EG) wahlberechtigt, werden es nun bei der siebten Wahl rund 378 Millionen Bürger in mittlerweile 27 Ländern der Europäischen Union (EU) sein. Erhöht hat sich auch die Zahl der Parlamentarier, wenn auch nicht proportional zur Bevölkerung: Vor 30 Jahren zählte das bis 1986 offiziell "Gemeinsame Versammlung" genannte Parlament noch 410 Abgeordnete,[1] nach dem derzeit gültigen EU-Vertrag von Nizza werden 2009 insgesamt 736 Abgeordnete gewählt. Damit repräsentiert das europäische Parlament (EP) als direkt gewählte Institution weltweit die zweitgrößte Anzahl an Bürgern. Nur in Indien können mehr Menschen in allgemeinen, freien, direkten und geheimen Wahlen über ihre parlamentarische Vertretung entscheiden.

<http://www.bpb.de/publikationen/8WIAES.html>

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 6. The European unification process*

Niess Frank

**60 Jahre Europarat: Das große Vergessen**

in *Blätter für deutsche & internationale Politik*, Mai, 2009 , 25-28

Wenn vom 4. bis 6. Juni die europäische Bevölkerung zu den Wahlen gerufen sein wird, dürfte fast vollkommen in



Vergessenheit geraten sein, dass vor 60 Jahren, am 5. Mai 1949, der Europarat ins Leben gerufen wurde. Damals Mittelpunkt heftiger europapolitischer Kontroversen, steht diese Institution heute völlig zu Unrecht im Schatten der Europäischen Union und ihrer Institutionen. Gewiss, die Bilanz zum 60. Geburtstag des Europarates fällt zwiespältig aus – wie bereits die Bewertung ...

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 6. The European unification process*

JWS and WTE

**A Glimpse of EU Government**

in **European Constitutional Law Review**, Volume 5 - Issue 01 , 1-4

When president Sarkozy said, before the European Parliament on 16 December 2008, that the French presidency had allowed the European institutions to function at full capacity and successfully, he corrected a widely held image. The image, proffered in the media and in even better informed circles, was that he, Nicolas Sarkozy, happening into a repetition of crises which plunged him into his element, had personally gone around to solve one crisis after the other. According to Sarkozy himself, that was not the case. It was the European states, the Brussels institutions and the Parliament that had for once taken their responsibility and had acted.

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 6. The European unification process*

Gros Daniel, Micossi Stefano

**A bond-issuing EU stability fund could rescue Europe**

in **Europe's World**, Issue 11, Spring

EU governments' responses to last autumn's financial sector meltdown were too little and too late, warn Daniel Gros and Stefano Micossi, to avert more trouble ahead both in the eurozone and around its periphery. They urge the creation of a common European re-capitalisation fund to be financed by a new breed of EU bonds.

<http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/21306/Default.aspx>

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 6. The European unification process*

Milani Fabio

**Adaptive Learning and Macroeconomic Inertia in the Euro Area**

in **Journal of Common Market Studies**, Volume 47, Issue 3, June 2009 , 579-599

This article aims to study the determinants of macroeconomic inertia in the euro area. To this end, it estimates a simple monetary DSGE model with private-sector learning, but which also includes more structural sources of inertia, such as habit formation in consumption and inflation indexation. Economic agents are assumed to form near-rational expectations and to learn the model parameters over time. Likelihood-based Bayesian methods are used to estimate the



agents' beliefs jointly within the system and to provide evidence on the fit of alternative learning rules. The results show that European macroeconomic inertia has only moderately changed over the sample. The evidence is consistent with a small gain coefficient and low degrees of habits and indexation, although some uncertainty remains after the estimation.

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 6. The European unification process*

Trondal Jarle

**Administrative Fusion: Less Than a European 'Mega-administration'**

in *Journal of European Integration*, Volume 31, Number 2 / March , 237-260

This study explores administrative fusion. It is argued that the differentiated organizational constellation of the European Union contributes to a differentiated fusion of domestic core executive institutions. The European Commission mainly activates the lower echelons of domestic government hierarchies and contributes to a relative weakening of domestic politico-administrative leadership. On the contrary, the Council of Ministers accompanies primarily a strengthening of domestic government hierarchies — notably the Foreign Office. Based on a rich body of survey data, this article reveals that multi-level interaction of administrative systems between the European Commission and the central administrations of Sweden and Norway occur largely outside the control of the domestic politico-administrative leadership, Prime Minister's Office and Foreign Office. This tendency, however, is counterbalanced by the Council of Ministers, which accompanies inter-sectoral coordination and vertical mandating within the Swedish central administration.

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Comte Françoise

**Agences européennes :relance d'une réflexion interinstitutionnelle européenne?**

in *Revue du droit de l'Union Européenne*, n. 3 , 461 - 506

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Jakobsson Ulf

**An International Actor Under Pressure: The Impact of the War on Terror and the Fifth Enlargement on EU Voting Cohesion at the UN General Assembly 2000–05**

in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Volume 47, Issue 3, June 2009 , 531-554

This article examines empirically whether Iraq and the fifth enlargement affected EU voting cohesion at the UN General Assembly 2000–05. It poses the question of whether the entrants' willingness to co-operate might have ameliorated the expected adverse effects of Iraq and an increase in the number of new members.

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Cagiati Andrea

**Antichi errori e nuove opportunità in Occidente**

in *Affari Esteri*, Anno XLI, n. 162 , 303-311

No abstract available

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Busek Erhard

**Assessing the western Balkans' EU membership hopes**

in *Europe's World*, Issue 11, Spring

The countries of the western Balkans have made giant strides since the dark days when NATO forces intervened against Serbia. Erhard Busek considers their achievements and their shortcomings as they pursue their hopes of EU membership.

<http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/21337/Default.aspx>

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Raimondi L.

**Atti nazionali inoppugnabili e diritto comunitario tra principio di effettività e competenze di attribuzione**

in *Diritto dell'Unione europea*, Anno: 2008 - Fascicolo: 4 , pag. 773

No abstract available

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Maurel Marie-Claude, Perottino Michel

**Avant-propos La République tchèque à la veille de la présidence de l'Union européenne**

in *Revue d'études comparatives Est-Ouest*, vol. 40, n. 1, Mars , 5-17

Au 1er janvier 2009, la République tchèque (RT) prend la présidence de l'Union européenne pour une période de six mois. C'est un événement en soi. Il y a deux décennies, l'annonce d'une telle perspective aurait laissé les Européens incrédules tant la fin des régimes communistes en Europe et la réunification du continent paraissaient inimaginables. En novembre prochain, les Tchèques commémoreront le vingtième anniversaire de leur « révolution de velours », quelques mois seulement après la fin de leur présidence de l'UE. D'ici là, ils accueilleront à Prague la « Conférence sur le grand élargissement – Cinq ans après » et, en juin, comme l'ensemble des Européens, ils éliront leurs représentants au Parlement européen pour un nouveau mandat de cinq ans.

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Schwartz Antoine

**Bonne Europe et mauvaise France. Les éditorialistes français interprètent la victoire du « non » au traité constitutionnel européen**

in *Politique et sociétés, revue de la Société québécoise de science politique*, Volume 27, numéro 2,

Le 29 mai 2005, la majorité des électeurs français ont rejeté le projet de « traité constitutionnel européen » qui leur était soumis par référendum. Que signifie ce vote ? Comment l'expliquer ? Comme après chaque scrutin, s'est engagée une lutte symbolique pour l'interprétation des résultats faisant intervenir hommes et femmes politiques, journalistes et experts. La présente contribution se propose de réfléchir à la construction médiatique de ce vote en étudiant les réactions des commentateurs au lendemain du scrutin. Ce faisant, seront exposées leurs stratégies idéologiques, ainsi que les logiques sociales qui en sont au fondement. Cette recherche interroge ainsi le rôle des médias dans la structuration du débat public.

Abstract

On May 29, 2005, the European Constitution Treaty submitted by referendum had been rejected by a majority of French voters. What does this opposition to the project of a European Constitution mean ? How can it be explained ? As after each vote, the interpretation of the results raises symbolic struggles amongst politicians, journalists, and experts. This research paper aims at analysing the media coverage of this "no" vote, especially through the study of leading columns. It deals with ideological strategies as well as structural logics. It reflects on the impact of mass media on the public sphere.

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Katainen Jyrki

**Bringing economic growth back to the European Union**

in *European View* , vol. 8, n. 1, June , 47-52

Festering for a long time now, the financial collapse being witnessed has proven more problematic than any crisis in the past. The global financial meltdown has affected and continues to affect the livelihood of almost everyone in an increasingly interconnected world. Institutions have collapsed, stock markets have plummeted and governments in even the wealthiest nations have been forced to bail out their financial systems. The author compares Finland's economic crisis of the 1990s with that which is sending countries into disarray on a worldwide level today and establishes the reasons and possible solutions for this recession. He notes how fiscal and monetary policy measures alone cannot build a bridge over this severe recession. Moreover, he concludes by stressing that this crisis must be addressed alongside and not to the exclusion of other problems, underlining the importance of strengthening supervisory frameworks at a global and, more precisely, at EU level.

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Vergara Meleto José Antonio

**Capacidades militares al servicio de la Estrategia Europea de Seguridad**

in *Relaciones internacionales : revista publ. por el Instituto de Relaciones Internacionales* , N°9, Octubre de 2008



The passing of the first European Security Strategy (ESS) at the end of 2003 was followed by the “Headline Goal 2010”, an important programme concerning the development of the military capacities of the ESDP. This document has since worked as a headlight, orienting the efforts of the EU to accomplish before that deadline several substantial targets, some of which have already been fulfilled. Among the proposed tasks, two stand in the forefront: the creation of the European Defence Agency (EDA), operational since 2004, and the generation of an armed forces system capable of rapid response, the battlegroups, operational since 2007.

This article aims to address the triangle based on the ESS and completed by the battlegroups and the EDA as dynamizing elements of the whole development of the military capacities of the European Union, and as means to boost a growing convergence in its security and defence dimensions.

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Salerno Marcello

**Carrott and stick: sostegno finanziario e condizionalità nelle costituzioni economiche balcano-occidentali**  
in *Diritto pubblico comparato ed europeo*, n.4 , 1747 ss.

No abstract available

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Daniele L.

**Carta dei diritti fondamentali dell'Unione Europea e Trattato di Lisbona**  
in *Diritto dell'Unione europea*, Anno: 2008 - Fascicolo: 4 , p. 655

No abstract available

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Finke Daniel

**Challenges to Intergovernmentalism: An Empirical Analysis of EU Treaty Negotiations since Maastricht**  
in *West European Politics*, vol. 32, n. 3, may , 466-495

ABSTRACT: During the last 15 years the nature and process of European treaty reforms changed significantly. The underlying reasons comprise enlargement, a shift of the reform agenda beyond economic coordination and procedural innovations, in particular the invocation of the Convention on the Future of Europe. Against this background, the present article revisits two classic propositions of liberal intergovernmentalism: (1) the power of the largest member states; and (2) the irrelevance of procedural constraints. This analysis compares the positions of national governments at Amsterdam, Nice, and the Constitutional IGC along the two most prevalent dimensions of intergovernmental conflict. Locating the EU treaties in this intergovernmental conflict space, it finds that the reforms of Amsterdam and Nice reflect a sequence of equilibrium and disequilibrium. Both treaty reforms are best understood as minimum compromise between all member states, instead of a deal struck between the most powerful members. However, the Constitutional



IGC reveals a slightly different picture as the unanimity win-set for reform has been almost empty. The fact that member states nevertheless signed the Constitutional Treaty hints towards the importance of procedural innovations, in particular the Convention method.

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European Economy News

**Changeovers made easy**

in **European Economy News**, April 2009 - Issue 13

Introducing euro cash is a logistical challenge of the first order – and the EU has risen to it on every occasion. The collective experience gathered during the euro ‘big bang’ of 2002 and subsequent changeovers has set a ‘gold standard’ for the switch which maps out the smoothest route for new entrants into the euro area.

Cast your mind back to 1 January 2002, ‘E-Day’ as it became popularly known. As fireworks went off at midnight, euro notes and coins officially became legal tender in 12 European countries with a population of over 300 million, with curious citizens queuing at cashpoints to withdraw their first euros.

But this massive currency switchover, the largest in human history, was a complex logistical operation which involved the printing and minting of an astonishing 7.4 billion notes and 38.2 billion coins. This money then needed to be distributed by citizens through banks and businesses, such as retailers, while the old ‘legacy’ currencies had to be eased out of circulation.

Despite a certain amount of apprehension that chaos might ensue, the smoothness of the whole changeover surprised everyone. By 3 January 2002, an astonishing 96% of all cash dispensers in the euro area were issuing euro banknotes, and only a week after the introduction more than half of all cash transactions were in euros.

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Rehn Olli

**Charting Europe's changing shape**

in **Europe's World**, Issue 11, Spring

The deepening credit crunch is changing the context of the EU's ongoing enlargement strategy, says Ollie Rehn, the EU Commissioner responsible for implementing it. But he emphasises that enlargement is part of the solution to Europe's problems, not part of the problems themselves.

<http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/21315/Default.aspx>

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Vogler John

**Climate change and EU foreign policy: The negotiation of burden sharing**

in **International Politics**, Volume 46, Issue 4, July, 469-490



The European Union has established itself as the leader of attempts to construct a global climate change regime. This has become an important normative stance, part of its self-image and international identity. Yet it has also come to depend on the Union's ability to negotiate internally on the distribution of the burdens necessitated by its external pledges to cut emissions. The paper considers institutionalist hypotheses on cooperative bargaining and normative entrapment in EU internal negotiations before the 1997 Kyoto Protocol negotiations and the more recent approach to negotiations on a post-2012 regime. It finds that there is evidence to support the normative entrapment hypothesis in both cases, but that agreement in 1997 was facilitated by a very favourable context associated with a 1990 baseline.

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Hamonc Anne

**Cohérence et action extérieure de l'Union européenne**

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, n. 523, décembre , 675-679

No abstract available

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Auber Emmanuel Desmason Xavier

**Comment s'élabore la politique européenne de la France ?**

in *Politique Etrangère*, n. 2, été

"L'opinion se répand que la France ne parvient plus à contrôler les processus de décision communautaire, générant le sentiment que ce qui constituait autrefois le levier de la puissance française est en passe de devenir un fardeau." L'élaboration de la politique européenne de la France souffre d'un montage institutionnel peu lisible, et d'une répartition des rôles souvent approximative entre les services. S'y ajoutent une présence assez limitée à Bruxelles, un défaut de communication, et une faiblesse plus générale en matière de politique d'influence. La France doit se manifester plus en amont auprès des institutions européennes, et rendre plus cohérent l'appareil national de préparation des décisions européennes.

"It is more and more widely held that France is no longer able to control European decision processes, which spawns scares that what used to be a lever for French power is now becoming a burden".

French European policy suffers from a set of inadequacies: it is not clearly designed from an institutional point of view, and the division of labour between the different governmental services is not clear-cut. France should intervene earlier within the European institutions and improve the way its national institutions prepare European decisions by making their actions more consistent.

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Hillion Christophe, Wessel Ramses

**Competence distribution in EU external relations after Ecowas: Clarification or continued fuzziness?**



in **Common Market Law Review**, vol. 46, issue 2 , 551-586

ABSTRACT: The ECOWAS case – Case C–91/05, Commission v. Council (“ECOWAS” or “Small Arms and Light Weapons”), Grand Chamber Judgment of 20 May 2008 – provided the first opportunity for the Court of Justice to speak out on a legal base conflict between the first (EC) and second (CFSP) pillars, and to shed some light on the distribution of competence between the EC and the EU. Although the Court at first sight opted for a clear preservation of the *acquis communautaire*, the judgment has implications for the distribution of external competences, both between the pillars and in relation to the Member States. In that, the ECOWAS pronouncement is a milestone in the Court of Justice’s jurisprudence on the EU external competence and legal basis, on the functioning of the EU system of external relations and, more generally, on the present and future constitutional architecture of the Union.

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Draetta Ugo

**Composizione e funzionamento di Consiglio e Consiglio europeo nel Trattato di Lisbona**

in *Studi sull'integrazione europea*, Anno IV, n. 1 , 7-22

No abstract available

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Krossa Anne Sophie

**Conceptualizing European Society on Non-Normative Grounds**

in *European Journal of Social Theory*, Volume 12, No. 2, May 2009 , 249-264

For the most part, current reflections on the social seem to overemphasize either homogeneity (society/nation-state, modernization/globalization) or heterogeneity (sociality, cosmopolitanism). Against this, here the argument is put forward that it is appropriate to think of the social as consisting of aspects of homogeneity or shared frames of reference and aspects of heterogeneity at the same time. This thought is developed particularly in contrast to normative concepts such as Bauman's sociality—republicanism nexus or Beck and Grande's ideas on European cosmopolitanism. With the help of concepts such as sociation, glocalization and conflict, a basis will be developed for the elaboration of particular socials (e.g. Europe) as a general social theory. This avoids falling into normative traps, which are usually risky when starting out from a historical particularity to explain current and future structures and features of notions such as European society.

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Duke Simon

**Consensus building in ESDP: The lessons of Operation Artemis**

in *International Politics* , Volume 46, Issue 4, July , 395-412



This paper examines how EU Member States reach agreement in the area of European Security and Defence Policy, including how differences are resolved and priorities aligned. The case study, Operation Artemis conducted in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2003, is used to test the key explanatory hypotheses of normative institutionalism. It is argued that normative entrapment played a significant role, although the cooperative bargaining aspects were significantly modified in this case by the awareness that one larger EU Member State was willing to assume the bulk of the burdens.

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Piqani Darinka

**Constitutional issues of pre-accession: from CEE to SEE**

in *Diritto pubblico comparato ed europeo*, n.4 , 1677 ss.

No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

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Dani Marco

**Constitutionalism and Dissonances: Has Europe Paid Off Its Debt to Functionalism?**

in *European law journal*, May 2009 - Vol. 15 Issue 3 , 324-350

The negative outcomes of the French and Dutch referenda on the Constitutional Treaty have opened a period of profound constitutional disenchantment in relation to the EU. This impression seems confirmed by the recent Presidency Conclusions of the European Council which, although salvaging many important solutions contained in the Constitutional Treaty, explicitly sanction that 'the constitutional concept . . . is abandoned'. In the light of this context, what role could the constitutional scholarship play? How to make sense of a polity in which the claims of constitutionalism as a form of power are politically unappealing though legally plausible? This article tries to respond to these questions by reaffirming functionalism as a valid analytical and normative perspective in facing the current constitutional reality of European integration. The analytical value associated with functionalism is evidenced by testing against the current context of the EU legal framework the accounts for EU constitutionalism which postulate functional equivalence between the EU and the Member States. The normative potential of functionalism, then, is discussed by arguing that there may be a value worth preserving in a degree of functional discrepancy between the EU and state constitutionalism and, notably, that the transformative and civilising dividend inherent in functionalism could still be exploited, at least in certain areas of EU policy making. Finally, the article suggests that the difficulties in accounting for EU constitutionalism in the light of state-centred constitutional theory could be regarded as symptoms of European integration marking a moment in the theoretical evolution of constitutionalism.

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Daillier Patrick

**Contribution au débat entre monisme et dualisme de l'ordre juridique de l'Union européenne**

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, n. 529, juin , 394-396

The European Union's contribution to the debate on the relationships between legal systems is not well stabilised and is somewhat paradoxical, in terms of the relationship of Union law with international public law, as opposed to its firm position on its relationship with the domestic laws of member countries. Its increasing contribution to international relationships enriches and makes more complex the hierarchy of standards; but the concern for self-sufficiency, conversely, results in the same institutional liability law the final say in major conflicts between conflicting values. The gradual integration of the Union and European Community does not make it easy to go beyond those ambiguities.

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Desli Evangelia

**Convergence and efficiency: evidence from the EU-15**

in *Journal of Macroeconomics*, Volume 31, Issue 2 , 403 - 430

This paper considers per capita income and productive efficiency beta-convergence for 15 EU countries (EU-15) during the European Economic and Monetary Union and the period preceding it. A production frontier approach is used to obtain efficiency measures. Even though we uncover evidence of convergence in both per capita income and efficiency, the results differ across various subperiods. Convergence per capita income occurs during 1986-90 and 1991-95. Productive efficiency convergence occurs during 1986-90, 1996-2000, and 2000-4. When we control for different efficiency levels, it emerges that less efficient countries display per capita income convergence more often. We also consider the implications of income inequality on per capita income growth and productive efficiency change and find that it mainly affects the latter.

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Delreux Tom

**Cooperation and Control in the European Union. The Case of the European Union as International Environmental Negotiator**

in *Cooperation and Conflict*, vol. 44, n. 2, june , 189-208

ABSTRACT: This article examines the internal decision-making process in the European Union when the EU participates in international environmental negotiations. More particularly, the practical functioning of the relation between the member states and the EU negotiator (i.e. the Commission, the Presidency or a lead country), representing the member states externally, is examined. Starting from principal—agent theory and based on empirical research on eight EU decision-making processes with regard to international environmental negotiations, the article argues, first, that control by the member states on the EU negotiator takes place most manifestly during the course of the international negotiations, and, second, that these ad locum control mechanisms perform not only a control function, but also a cooperation function.

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Johnson Corey M.

**Cross-Border Regions and Territorial Restructuring in Central Europe**

in *European Urban and Regional Studies*, Volume 16, No. 3 , 177-191

As the world's 'first postmodern political form', Europe provides an excellent laboratory for exploring how border regions offer new spaces of/for governance, cultural interaction, and economic development. With the backdrop of dynamic transboundary regionalization in Europe, this article has two goals: the first is to provide a critical review of some recent literature on territorial restructuring whose spatial ambit curiously omits transboundary space. Second, the article follows in the tradition of recent literature on regionalism in geography by exploring competing visions of the scales which are appropriate for organizing particular political and economic activities, in order to call for more engagement with transboundary regionalism. A case-study from Saxony (Germany) shows that the functional utilitarianism — and resulting short half life — of some European transboundary regions is a factor inhibiting the emergence of coherent regions. This notwithstanding, evidence also suggests that cross-border cooperation is becoming a key tool as localities and other territories strive to become 'global'. The tangled map of current regional initiatives within the European Union (EU) reflects the temporal emergence and disappearance of cross-border regions in response to changing political priorities and shifting macro-institutional funding sources. The article shows that transboundary regions play an important role in territorial restructuring in Central Europe, but not necessarily in the way EU regional policy intends.

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Louis Jean-Victor

**D'une présidence à l'autre**

in *Les Cahiers de droit européen*, Vol.44, issue 5-6 , 583-590

No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

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Louis Jean-Victor

**D'une présidence à l'autre**

in *Cahiers de Droit Européen*, n. 5-6 , 583-590

No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

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Chaltiel Florence

**D'une présidence à une autre... La présidence tchèque et ses enjeux à mi-parcours**

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, n. 528, mai , 284-287



No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

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**Bainczyk Magdalena**

**Das Ratifizierungsverfahren des Vertrages von Lissabon in Polen**

in *Europarecht*, Volume 44, Issue 1, 2009 , 145-161

No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 6. The European unification process*

**Wittinger Michaela**

**Das Rechtsstaatsprinzip - vom nationalen Verfassungsprinzip zum Rechtsprinzip der europäischen und der internationalen Gemeinschaft?**

in *Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart*, Band 57, 2009

No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 6. The European unification process*

**Kämmerer Jörn Axel**

**Das Urteil des Europäischen Gerichtshofs im Fall „Kadi“: Ein Triumph der Rechtsstaatlichkeit?**

in *Europarecht*, Volume 44, Issue 1, 2009 , 114-131

No abstract available

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**Lucarelli Sonia, Fioramonti Lorenzo**

**Das globale Image der Europäischen Union**

in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, Band 23-24, 2009

In institutionellen Foren und akademischen Kreisen gleichermaßen spricht man von der Europäischen Union (EU) zunehmend auf eine Art und Weise, die nahe legt, dass sie endgültig zu einer globalen Macht geworden ist. Dies belegen Bücher, Konferenzen und journalistische Dossiers über die EU-Außenpolitik, die seit dem Jahr 2000 fast alltäglich geworden sind.

<http://www.bpb.de/publikationen/HNG0GW.html>



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Lenaerts Koen

**De Rome à Lisbonne, la constitution européenne en marche?**

in *Les Cahiers de droit europeen*, Vol.44, issue 3-4 , 229-254

No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

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Lenaerts Koen

**De Rome à Lisbonne, la constitution européenne en marche?**

in *Cahiers de Droit Européen*, n. 3-4 , 229-254

No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

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Beckmann Volker, Eggers Jörg, Mettepenningen Evy

**Deciding how to decide on agri-environmental schemes: the political economy of subsidiarity, decentralisation and participation in the European Union**

in *Journal of Environmental Planning and Management*, Volume 52, Issue 5, July , 689-716

Since 1992 the provision of agri-environmental schemes (AESs) has been obligatory for member states of the European Union. However, decisions concerning the actual design of schemes and measures are left to member states who have to integrate this policy within their administrative structures and to comply with the general rules laid down in the EU rural development regulations. Over time, the respective council regulations have increasingly encouraged member states to design agri-environmental policy in a sub-national, decentralised and participatory way. However, the response to these opportunities has been quite diverse amongst the member states. This paper presents the results of a unique expert survey in nine different member states, focusing on decentralisation and participation. The results show that the way in which decisions are made affects the environmental effectiveness of AES. In particular, the involvement of actors at a local level and the participation of environmental NGOs have a positive effect on the environmental effectiveness of AES. Therefore, it is not surprising that most actors involved in decision making surrounding AESs are in favour of further decentralisation and participation in order to tackle agri-environmental problems. However, actors from the agricultural administration and agricultural associations, which are the most influential groups in terms of the design of AESs, oppose extending participation to the local level and to environmental associations.

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Eisenhut Dominik



**Delimitation of EU-Competences under the First and Second Pillar: A View Between ECOWAS and the Treaty of Lisbon**

in *German Law Journal*, Vol.10, n.5 , 585-604

No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

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Bicchi Federica

**Democracy Assistance in the Mediterranean: An Overview**

in *Mediterranean Politics*, Volume 14, Issue 1, March , 61-78

Democracy assistance has increasingly featured in the foreign policy discourse of the European Union toward the Mediterranean. This article overviews three of its key aspects. First, it shows how the Mediterranean has become an area for democracy assistance. Second, it focuses on the implementation of the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), with a special emphasis on microprojects funded in the Mediterranean, showing the gaps between discourse and practice. Finally, the article briefly sketches the current format of the EIDHR, which covers 2007-13, questioning whether it represents an improvement. The overall goal is to offer a starting point to readers interested in the topic, by summarizing historical developments of democracy assistance in the EU, its legal framework and issues arising from its implementation in the Mediterranean.

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Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa

**Demos e Kratos in Europa**

in *Mulino (il)*, n. 3, maggio-giugno, 2009 , 365-378

No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

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Ehs Tamara, Valchars Gerd

**Demos statt Ethnos. Plädoyer für ein EU-Volk jenseits des Homo Europaeus**

in *Blätter für deutsche & internationale Politik*, April, 2009 , 85-91

Im 15. Jahrhundert landeten die Spanier auf den Kanarischen Inseln und entdeckten die Guanchen. Papst Eugen IV. erklärte sie 1434 per Erlass zu „Menschen“ und gar zu „freien Leuten“ – immerhin waren die Guanchen nach spanischen Berichten „groß, blond und blauäugig, wenn auch dunkelhäutig“ und damit ganz nah am „europäischen Menschen“, dem homo europaeus. Heute stranden auf den Kanaren täglich dutzende Bootsflüchtlinge. Sofern sie es dauerhaft ins EU-Hoheitsgebiet schaffen, ...



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**Deploying the Classic 'Community Method' in the Social Policy Field: The Example of the Acquired Rights Directive**

in *European law journal*, March 2009 - Vol. 15 Issue 2 , Barrett Gavin

The use of the Community method of legislation, in particular the deployment of directives, has for a long time been at the core of EC labour market policy. This article seeks to reflect on the lessons to be learned from the experience of the adoption and operation of one particularly significant directive, namely the Acquired Rights Directive, and on the experience of its transposition in one Member State, Ireland. Among features noted at the EU level are the watering down of the Commission's initial legislative ambitions; the substantial lacunae, failures to address issues and ambiguities incorporated in the text of the directive, the consequent enlarged role for the Court of Justice and the apparent difficulty in changing policy direction in the event of errors being made. As regards the Irish experience of transposing the directive, lessons learnt have included the importance of the means of implementation chosen by the Member State; the obstructive effect which national industrial relations systems may have on the evolution of a common European approach; the significance which attaches to national sanctions and enforcement mechanisms; the importance attaching to the degree of collective organisation in workplaces where the implementing legislation is sought to be relied upon; and the potential which the implementation of a directive has for disruption of the harmony of a national policy approach. Finally, the use of a form of social dialogue in the implementation of employment-related directives in Ireland is also commented upon.

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Lockwood Ben, Migali Giuseppe

**Did The Single Market Cause Competition in Excise Taxes? Evidence From EU Countries**

in *Economic Journal*, Volume 119 Issue 536, March 2009 , 406-429

Tax competition theory predicts that the introduction of the EU Single Market in 1993 should have caused excise tax competition and thus increased strategic interaction in the setting of excise taxes among EU countries. We test this prediction using a panel data set of 12 EU countries over the period 1987–2004. We find that for excise duties on still and sparkling wine, beer and ethyl alcohol, strategic interaction significantly increased after 1993. There is weaker evidence of increased interaction in cigarette taxes, possibly because cigarettes are widely smuggled, giving rise to tax competition even before the Single Market.

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Hegewald Ulrike, Schmitt Lars

**Die Deutschen vor der Europawahl 2009**

in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, Band 23-24, 2009



Anfang Juni 2009 kann das Europäische Parlament (EP) mit der siebten Europawahl den 30. Jahrestag seiner ersten Direktwahl feiern. Es hat in dieser Zeit seine Rechte und Kompetenzen stetig erweitern können. Heutzutage teilt sich das EP als Bürgerkammer der Europäischen Union (EU) das Gesetzgebungsrecht mit dem Ministerrat als Staatenkammer, muss dem Haushalt der EU zustimmen und kontrolliert ihre Organe. Zudem spielt es bei der Wahl und Auswahl der Kommissare eine wichtige Rolle. Ob allerdings anlässlich des Jubiläums Feierlaune aufkommen wird, hängt insbesondere von der Wahlbeteiligung ab.

The full text is free:

<http://www.bpb.de/publikationen/WZRA7J.html>

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

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Häberle Peter

**Die Werte der Selbstregierung als Elemente gemeineuropäischer Verfassungskultur**

in *Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart*, Band 57, 2009

No abstract available

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Haller Max

**Die europäische Integration als Elitenprojekt**

in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, Band 23-24, 2009

Schon seit längerer Zeit lässt sich feststellen, dass sich eine erhebliche Kluft aufgetan hat zwischen Eliten und Bürgerinnen und Bürgern, wenn es um den europäischen Einigungsprozess geht. Während ihn Erstere enthusiastisch verteidigen, zeigt sich unter Letzteren allenfalls lauwarmer Zustimmung, vielfach auch Skepsis. Im Jahr 2005 lehnten 55 Prozent der Franzosen und 62 Prozent der Niederländer die "Verfassung für Europa" ab. Der damalige französische Staatspräsident Jacques Chirac hatte diese Abstimmung aus freien Stücken angesetzt.

Die Ablehnung traf ihn und ganz Europa wie ein Donnerschlag, konnte man doch sagen, dass diese Verfassung einen klaren Fortschritt der Europäischen Union (EU) im Hinblick auf Demokratisierung, Transparenz und Effizienz der Entscheidungsstrukturen mit sich gebracht hätte. EU-freundliche Kommentatoren suchten - und fanden auch - die Gründe für dieses Resultat, die, wie sich herausstellte, mit der Verfassung selbst wenig zu tun hatten - sondern vor allem mit der Unbeliebtheit von Präsident Chirac. Es scheint in der Tat, als verstünde das Volk ein so komplexes Thema wie die europäische Integration nicht wirklich, weshalb es besser wäre, die Entscheidung darüber seinen gewählten und fachkundigen Repräsentanten zu überlassen.

The full text is free:

<http://www.bpb.de/publikationen/QJQ4DX.html>



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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

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Göler Daniel

**Die europäische Legitimationsfalle. Das Problem von Effizienz und Partizipation im europäischen Mehrebenensystem**

in *Zeitschrift für Politik*, Jahrgang 56, Heft 1, 2009 , 3-18

Summary

Against the backdrop of the current EU crisis after the referenda in France, the Netherlands and Ireland this article reflects on the legitimacy problem of the European Union. It is argued that input- and output – legitimacy are provided in a particular way by the supranational and national level, which creates a specific legitimacy problem for the EU. The present pattern of input- and output legitimation, so the hypothesis, does not correspond adequately to the current challenges. Instead, the governance structures of the European multi-level system result from path dependent developments, rooted in the beginning of integration process. In the light of the changing context and conditions for creating legitimacy these path-dependencies lead the EU into a kind of »legitimacy-trap«, from which it is hard to escape.

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Andrew Watt

**Distributional issues in the context of the economic crisis in Europe**

in *Intereconomics*, Volume 44, Number 2 / March, 2009 , 82-89

This article takes a step back from the debate on the precise causes of the crisis and the detailed steps needed to resolve it. It focuses on distributional issues and discusses the ways in which widening income inequality in most European countries has been linked to factors that lie behind the crisis. It then considers distributional effects of current efforts to resolve the crisis and explains why crisis-resolution policies need to address distributional concerns. Finally it proposes measures, many of which require coordination at least at the European level, to address the distributional crisis that otherwise awaits us in coming years and that will ultimately help to establish a new, more economically and socially balanced growth model.

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Solanke Iyiola

**Diversity And Independence In The European Court Of Justice**

in *Columbia Journal of European Law*, Vol.15, issue 1

The European Court of Justice (ECJ) currently comprises twenty seven judges and eight Advocates General who together make law affecting citizens of the European Union over a wide range of social and economic issues, including racial and ethnic equality. However, the ECJ's composition remains unreflective of the millions of black and migrant



European Union citizens whom it serves. As the rulings of the Court reach into the everyday lives of an increasing number of people, the need for it to be legitimate in the eyes of all those it serves also rises. Courts derive their legitimacy from both inputs and outputs. A traditional input is independence; a more recent concern is diversity. This Article argues that the current procedure for appointments to the ECJ undermines both of these. The lack of transparency, coupled with the proximity to the national governments, undermines the independence of the members and precludes racial and ethnic minority representation at the Court. To address this problem, I suggest the development of objective eligibility criteria, the use of which, I argue, can promote both diversity and independence in the ECJ.

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**Juncker Jean-Claude**

**Dixième anniversaire de l'euro**

**in Europe en formation (L')**, n. 351, printemps , 5-7

Full text available on-line: <http://www.cife.eu/UserFiles/File/EEF/351/JUNCKEREEF351.pdf>

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**Kovats Laszlo**

**Do elections set the pace? A quantitative assessment of the timing of European legislation**

**in Journal of European Public Policy** , Volume 16 Issue 2 2009 , 239 – 255

Many parliamentary systems are marked by regular periods of higher and lower legislative activity. This legislation cycle is characterized by an increase in the legislative output shortly ahead of elections and a decrease in legislative initiatives in the second half of the legislative term. This article shows that legislative cycles at the European level are different. First, it shows that the initiation of legislation peaks at the end of parliamentary terms rather than at the beginning. Second, the article shows that the adoption of legislation is only partially connected to the electoral cycle. Instead, the reallocation of agenda powers within the European Parliament twice during a legislature better explains the timing of the adoption of bills than the end of Parliament's term. This finding is especially relevant for legislation adopted under the co-decision procedure. The 'procedural cartel theory' of Cox and McCubbins (2005) combined with the 'economic theory of legislation' provide the theoretical basis that may explain this finding.

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**Vollmer Uwe**

**Do we need a European lender of last resort?**

**in Intereconomics**, Volume 44, Number 1 / January, 2009 , 59-68

During a financial crisis, pressure on Central banks to act as a lender of last resort (LLR) and to offer emergency liquidity assistance to troubled banks increases. The European Central Bank, however, has announced that it does not regard it as its principal task to provide emergency liquidity to troubled banks and that it does not wish to disclose the conditions



and practicalities of emergency liquidity assistance arrangements. In this paper, we investigate the benefits and the costs of centralising the LLR function in a monetary union and ask whether establishing an LLR in Europe could be useful.

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Lacroix Justine

**Does Europe Need Common Values? Habermas vs Habermas**

in *European Journal of Political Theory*, Vol. 8, n. 2, April, 141-156

This article argues that there is a discrepancy between Jürgen Habermas's initial plea for critical and rational identities and his more recent glorification of the European model. Initially, Constitutional Patriotism could be apprehended as a critical standard for existing political practices. However, Habermas's recent political texts tend to lose all kind of reflexive distance in their apprehension of the European identity — which is presented as distinct and even superior to its counter-model, the US. Such a 'Europatriotic' temptation should be resisted. The 'thick' European identity advocated by Habermas has no truly federative dimension and could undermine the unique normative potential of a political entity composed of distinct identities. Consequently, the article suggests an elucidation of liberal postnationalism with a view to explaining its refusal to tie Europe's legitimacy to an identification logic.

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Preto Claudia

**Doppi standard di tutela: reciproca 'influenza' fra 'nuova' e 'vecchia' Europa?**

in *Diritto pubblico comparato ed europeo*, n.4, 1736 ss.

No abstract available

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Dumoulin André, Bonneau Mathias, Manigart Philippe

**Du poids des opinions publiques européennes**

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, n. 526, mars, 174-178

Public opinion in Europe should be taken into account by governments even and above all on issues dealing with safety and defence. With more weight after the cold war, they generally support the PESD but can switch rather fast on the issue of the EU's missions, risks, solidarity and priorities. With regard to that, there lacks a new euro barometer indicator specific to the PESD to fine tune the knowledge and determine the good communication and political parameters.

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O'Brennan John



## **Dublin: Recession will be the wild card in second Irish treaty referendum**

in *Europe's World*, Issue 11, Spring

After December's European Council, there is renewed optimism that the second referendum promised by the Irish government for this autumn will see the Lisbon treaty carried. But in reality, it's far from being in the bag. The economic crisis is already making the ruling Fianna Fáil party deeply unpopular and there is no guarantee that the electorate won't punish Taoiseach (prime minister) Brian Cowen with a second No vote.

One of the reasons that Irish voters rejected the Lisbon treaty in mid-2008 was concern that Ireland's voice in the European Union would be diminished, particularly through the loss of an Irish member of the European Commission. As a first step towards a second referendum, Cowen sought EU-wide agreement that the "one member state, one commissioner" rule would be resuscitated. His success gives Dublin the breathing space it needs to run a more effective referendum campaign.

Part II of the plan agreed by the European Council will see the EU making several binding declarations on some of the other subjects that worry Irish voters. These include Ireland's right to decide on issues such as abortion, corporation tax and participation in European security operations. The legal substance of these statements will be worked out under the Czech presidency, but it is already clear that they will be designed to prevent any repeat of the sort of distorted arguments typical of the last No campaign. The text of the Lisbon document will remain unchanged but the concessions for Ireland will get treaty status, probably by being attached to the accession agreement for Croatia, which is expected in late 2009 or early 2010.

Is all this likely to be enough to persuade Ireland to vote Yes? The answer may depend on the state of the economy. Ireland has benefited hugely from European largesse; in 2007, for instance, it still received €500m net from the EU budget. So the government will remind voters of the potentially catastrophic cost of being excluded, not just from the Single Market but also from the Council and the European Central Bank. The recent turmoil in global financial markets has reinforced the point: Ireland's cannot seriously contemplate an economic future outside the Union. Irish ministers have, indeed, consistently argued that Ireland would have gone the way of Iceland in recent months were it not for the country's membership of the EU. The economic trauma suffered by other small states, such as Hungary and Serbia, underlines how vulnerable Ireland would become without the protection of the eurozone.

the economic crisis also contains a potential sting in the tail, however, for the second Lisbon referendum. Economists expect output to contract by up to 5% this year and the budget deficit to balloon to more than 10% of gross domestic product. The Irish property bubble has burst and small businesses are hurting from the worldwide squeeze on credit; unemployment is soaring and emigration has resumed. The Celtic Tiger is dead.

Cowen's government already faces a popular backlash against the recent budget and the situation is likely to get worse as the recession deepens. Opinion polls showed support for his Fianna Fáil party collapsed last year. If the trend continues in 2009, it might well result in voters castigating the government by rejecting the Lisbon treaty for the second time around.

<http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/21320/Default.aspx>

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**European Economy News**

**ECFIN documentary: 10th anniversary of the euro**  
in *European Economy News*, January 2009 - Issue 12

1 January 2009 marked 10 years since the euro was launched. The single currency has confounded critics and doomsayers to become one of the greatest success stories of European integration. To celebrate this achievement DG ECFIN has produced a 26-minute video documentary on the story of the euro, from its beginnings as a vision in the minds of a few committed Europeans to its existence as an everyday reality for millions of people.

The film draws extensively on archive footage as well as specially conducted interviews with key players in the euro's launch and management including Jacques Delors, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, Theodor Waigel, Philippe Maystadt and Jean-Claude Trichet, to name but a few.

The first of the documentary's four sections – which can be viewed all together or as stand-alone modules – looks back at the stages which led to the launch of EMU, starting with the devaluation of the dollar in 1971 and the ensuing period of instability which led to the launch of the EMS in the late 1970s. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, Jacques Delors, former Belgian Finance Minister Philippe Maystadt and others describe how they conceived and implemented first a new common monetary system to help protect Europe from destabilising currency fluctuations, and then – at Maastricht in 1992 – a step-by-step plan to create a single currency.

The second module describes how the physical introduction of the euro in 2002 was planned and executed. From the choice of the name and design of the symbol – now as well known as the \$, £ or ¥ – to the massive logistical operation involved in printing notes and minting coins, putting the new money into circulation and withdrawing the old, and ensuring that all members of society, including the most vulnerable, were properly prepared for the change.

The third module examines the euro's benefits for EU citizens and impact on companies. Ordinary people interviewed on the street for the documentary refer to the most obvious benefit, namely the way the euro has made it easier and cheaper to travel or do business across borders. Other benefits are greater price transparency, lower inflation, reduced interest rates, the creation of new markets, facilitation of intra-European investment, confidence in a stable currency, stimulation of growth, job creation, and so on. But in addition, as Commissioner Joaquín Almunia points out in an interview in the film, the euro acts as a shield and shock absorber in a crisis – a major advantage in today's difficult economic circumstances.

Finally, the fourth module looks at the prospects for the euro as a reference currency in the world. The euro area has already expanded from 11 to 16 members, with Slovakia the most recent addition. The sheer size of the euro area gives its members a weight on the international stage they would not otherwise have.

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Kurowska Xymena, Tallis Benjamin

**EU Border Assistance Mission: Beyond Border Monitoring?**  
in *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Volume 14, Issue 1, 47-64

On 1 December 2005, the EU deployed its Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM), an innovative concept merging border monitoring and capacity-building. The improvised launch of the mission reflected the urge to put it in place against all odds and despite the presence of many practical obstacles. The hectic beginnings of the mission similarly reflected the impromptu character of the enterprise. Yet at present EUBAM has come to be seen as a



fully fledged success story and a showcase for the EU's constructive engagement with its Eastern neighbours. The mission exceeded the expectations placed upon it at the time of the inception. To such an extent are the mission's achievements taken for granted that it is no longer an eligible case for routine inventories of successful project implementation used as public relations material by the EU and EC: it is simply too obvious. This contribution seeks to trace and unpack this 'path to glory'. It enquires into the pre-history of the mission and follows its ambiguous institutional background. Through analysis of the mission's development so far it tries to map EUBAM's role in, and impact on, the regional situation. Grasping the mission's position and positioning, it also aims to put the project in context and pinpoint lessons, if not necessarily learned, then at least identified at this point. Some of them may question the received wisdom of EUBAM as immaculate in conception and implementation.

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**Mols Frank, Jetten Jolanda, Haslam S. Alexander**

**EU Identification and Endorsement in Context: The Importance of Regional Identity Salience**  
in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Volume 47, Issue 3, June 2009 , 601-623

Public opinion research has increased our understanding of the variables affecting endorsement of EU integration. What is less well understood is how comparative identity processes shape EU identification. Drawing on social identity principles, we argue that EU identification is in part affected by tensions between relevant subgroup identities. To illustrate this point, two studies were conducted in UK regions (Wales and Cornwall). Findings confirm our prediction that a comparative context affects EU identity and indicate (a) that levels of EU identity were higher in contexts where regional identity was salient, and (b) that regional identity affected the bases and meaning of EU identification and EU endorsement. Discussion highlights the importance of taking context and intergroup relations into account when examining EU attitudes.

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**Lewis Jeffrey**

**EU Policy on Iraq: The collapse and reconstruction of consensus-based foreign policy**  
in *International Politics* , Volume 46, Issue 4, July , 432-450

At first glance, Europe's discord over the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a foreign policy debacle. And when a majority of Member States publicly broke ranks with a tenuously reached common position, skeptics argued that the EU's consultative and consensus-based process of foreign policy making was either fictitious or irrevocably broken. But in fact, the Iraq crisis triggered a normative reframing of security and defense policy and renewed a commitment to consensus decision making. Rather than a lowest common denominator outcome, a compromise position was reached in the form of EU-coordinated economic and humanitarian assistance to rebuilding Iraq that has exceeded 200 million euros per year since 2004. This was possible because normative commitments to develop the EU as a global actor and to promote democracy and the rule of law worldwide legitimated EU action and constrained Member States with 'do nothing' and/or 'let the UN do it' preferences. The foreign ministers' ability to reach agreement on coordinated recon aid to Iraq also displays the Union's principled commitment to make decisions in a norm-governed and consensus-based institutional environment of cooperative bargaining.



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Tekin Ali, Williams Paul A.

**EU-Russian Relations and Turkey's Role as an Energy Corridor**

in *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 61, n. 2, March , 337-356

This article analyses the impact of EU-Russian relations on Turkey's role as a corridor for the transit of energy supplies to Europe. While the European Union (EU) has inherent leverage in its collective purchase of most Russian gas exports, market power has shifted in Russia's favour. Russian efforts to build new pipelines and widen downstream access have stimulated EU interest in diversifying energy imports and transit routes. In this sense, the EU has recognised Turkey's potential value as a secure and independent route for importing non-Russian energy supplies, which may in turn have an impact on Turkey's EU accession process.

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Van Vooren Bart

**EU-EC External Competences after the Small Arms Judgment**

in *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Volume 14, Issue 1 , 7-24

On 20 May 2008, the Court of Justice handed down its long-awaited judgment in the Small Arms case (C-91/05). Two issues are addressed in this initial essay. First, three different approaches to the relationship between the Community and the Union as captured in Article 47 TEU are proposed, and it is argued that an overly strict interpretation of the 'non-affectation clause' could render the CFSP nugatory, whereas an exceedingly unrestricted interpretation could open up an escape route from the legal principles applicable to the Member States in their relationship with the Community. Second, the court's judgment is assessed in the light of the various options and their underlying rationales. In the final paragraphs, the article concludes that the ECJ's approach to the two CFSP instruments before it is incongruent, and therefore does not settle the dust that had been stirred up by this cross-pillar conflict. Noting the importance of this case, this contribution is the opening part of a diptych. Whereas this article discusses the case in the context of the post-Nice Treaty framework, a follow-up contribution will assess the case's importance should the Lisbon Treaty be ratified.

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Keating Avril

**Educating Europe's citizens: moving from national to post-national models of educating for European citizenship**

in *Citizenship Studies*, vol. 13, n. 2, april , 135-151

ABSTRACT: The relationship between the EU institutions and its citizens is once again foremost in the minds of European policymakers and commentators. Recent referenda on European institutional reform have been rejected by the citizens of France, the Netherlands and, most recently, Ireland, thus re-igniting debates across Europe about the



quality of European democracy and the limits and possibilities of European integration. Educational reforms and initiatives are often suggested as means of fostering stronger ties between political institutions and their citizens. This article therefore considers how European policies for fostering citizenship through education have fared thus far, focusing in particular on two questions: what sort of citizenship has been offered by European education policies; and how have these policies sought to construct a sense of community amid the diverse peoples of Europe? These questions are examined from a socio-historical perspective, which illustrates that European institutions have long sought to harness education as a means of fostering European citizenship. However, this process also illustrates that European education policies have evolved over time from an ethnocentric 'national' model of citizenship education towards a post-national model in which the citizens of Europe are united not (only) by a common culture or history, but also civic values, educational skills, and a shared future. This post-national model, the author suggests, avoids many of the pitfalls of the national model of educating citizens, but nonetheless creates a new set of challenges for the citizens and institutions of Europe.

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Van Ooyen Robert

**Eine »europafeindliche« Kontinuität? Zum Politikverständnis der Lissabon-Entscheidung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts**

in *Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft*, Heft 4, 2009 , 26-45

ABSTRACT: Die Lissabon-Entscheidung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts wird oft als europafreundlich missverstanden. Tatsächlich bleibt sie dessen etatistischem Politikverständnis liberal-konservativer Provenienz verpflichtet. Nationalstaat, Souveränität und Demokratie werden als sich gegenseitig bedingend begriffen und mit Hilfe der Unterscheidung von völkerrechtlichem Staatenbund und staatsrechtlichem Bundesstaat auf den Integrationsprozess projiziert.

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Duch i Guillot Jaume

**El Tratado de Lisboa y los cambios en la organización institucional de la Unión Europea**

in *Cuadernos europeos de Deusto*, n.40 , 51-62

No abstract available

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Lasheras Borja

**El futuro de la Política Europea de Seguridad y Defensa**

in *Cuadernos europeos de Deusto*, n.40 , 85-107

No abstract available



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Ponzano Paolo

**Elezioni europee o "nazionali"?**

in *ItalianiEuropei*, n. 2

No abstract available

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Del Gaizo Danilo

**Elezioni europee o nazionali? Riflessioni sul voto e sulla cittadinanza europea**

in *Federalismi*, Anno VII - Nr. 9

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

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Solioz Christophe, Stubbs Paul

**Emergent regional co-operation in South East Europe: towards 'open regionalism'?**

in *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, vol. 9, n. 1-2, March , 1-16

Regional cooperation in South East Europe is at a crossroads. Until now, it has been largely ascribed by outside forces, perceived as a condition related to the EU integration process, and approached from a state-based viewpoint as an interstate construct. However, there are emergent trends which reframe regional cooperation as 'open regionalism', more achieved from within, and consisting of multi-actor, multilevel and multi-scalar processes forming a complex geometry of interlocking networks, with variable reach and multiple nodal points. This text critically explores these trends, addressing some of their cross-border, transnational and interregional dimensions, in the context of wider processes of regional integration.

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European Economy News

**Enlargement: good for all**

in *European Economy News*, April 2009 - Issue 13

The fifth wave of EU enlargement marked a milestone in reunifying Europe a decade and a half after the end of the Cold War. Twelve countries from Central and Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean have joined the EU over the past five years, ten of them in 2004 and two more in 2007.



In addition to making the EU politically and economically stronger, enlargement has led to higher growth and increased living standards, both for the newest Member States and the 15 they joined. These benefits are documented in 'Five years of an enlarged EU', a DG ECFIN report released on 20 February 2009.

The biggest beneficiaries of the enlargement were the 12 new Member States. The accession process boosted economic growth in the new Member States by an average of 1.75% per year from 2000 to 2008. As a result, living standards in the new Member States have risen, with average income per capita reaching 52% of that of the old Member States in 2008, compared to 40% in 1999. The growth was mostly attributable to capital accumulation and productivity increases. Workers also benefited. Since 2004, job growth has risen by about 1.5% annually on average. About 3 million new jobs were created between 2003 and 2007, with unemployment declining to around 7% by 2007, about the same as the rest of the Union.

The rapid trade integration with the rest of the EU also boosted exports and imports, which now make up a 56% share of the new Members' average GDP, compared to 47% before enlargement. While the level of exports from new Member States to the rest of the EU has been broadly stable at 80%, important shifts have occurred. Trading among new Member States has increased to make up about 19.5% of their exports in 2007 compared to 13.2% in 1999. Meanwhile, old Member States have increased exports to new Member States to 7.5% of total exports from 4.7% over the same period.

Increased trade integration in the EU exploits comparative advantages, and thus strengthens the growth potential and enhances the competitiveness of the EU as a whole, the report states.

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Schimmelfennig Frank

#### **Entrapped again: The way to EU membership negotiations with Turkey**

*in International Politics* , Volume 46, Issue 4, July , 413-431

The membership of Turkey is one of the most controversial external relations issues of the European Union (EU). In a comparison of four instances of decision-making on accession negotiations with Turkey between 1997 and 2006, this paper explains why and under which conditions Turkey has progressed on the way to EU membership in spite of persistent and increasing divergence of membership preferences. In line with the entrapment hypothesis of normative institutionalism, the analysis shows that Turkey and its supporters within the EU have been able to overcome the opposition to its membership bid to the extent that Turkey followed the fundamental norms of the EU.

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Grard Loïc

#### **Etude d'impact du droit communautaire sur les réglementations étatiques des transports**

*in Les Cahiers de droit europeen*, Vol.44, issue 3-4 , 255-278

No abstract available

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**Bénassy-Quéré Agnès, Berthou Antoine, Fontagné Lionel**

**Euro: comme prévu, des gains et des coûts**

in *Lettre du CEPII*, N° 284 Décembre

Il y a dix ans, onze pays européens, rejoints depuis par cinq autres, abandonnaient leurs monnaies nationales pour créer l'euro. Cet anniversaire est l'occasion d'évaluer si les promesses de l'euro ont été tenues. Différentes études menées sur les exportations françaises indiquent que la monnaie unique a bien produit les gains microéconomiques attendus d'une baisse des coûts de transaction et d'une plus grande transparence des prix. Mais la politique monétaire unique a entraîné des divergences fortes des taux d'intérêt réels entre pays, dont les effets n'ont pas été corrigés faute de coopération macroéconomique adaptée. Dix ans après la création de l'euro, l'éclatement de la bulle immobilière dans certains pays de la zone et les conséquences de la crise financière pointent la nécessité de politiques macroéconomiques fortement contra-cycliques en union monétaire.

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 6. The European unification process*

**Eilenberger Wolfram**

**Europa 2030: der Garten des Candide**

in *Internationale Politik*, 64. Jahrgang, n. 5, Mai, 10-15

ABSTRACT: Das Zeitalter der Globalisierung ist zu Ende. Die Verknappung zentraler Ressourcen wird eine Abkehr vom Welthandel und die Entstehung kontinentaler Autarkiezonen zur Folge haben. Doch Europa ist für diese Herausforderungen gerüstet. Es hat die beste sozio-politische Ordnung der Weltgeschichte hervorgebracht und wird diese – hinter Mauern – aufrechterhalten.

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*Subsection 6. The European unification process*

**Khanna Parag**

**Europa 2030: vorwärts ins neue Mittelalter**

in *Internationale Politik*, 64. Jahrgang, n. 5, Mai, 16-20

ABSTRACT: Die Globalisierung wird fortschreiten – und ein weiteres Aufweichen nationaler Ordnungsstrukturen bewirken. Der langwierige Transitionsprozess hin zu einem globalen Regierungssystem wird, ähnlich dem Mittelalter, von Unsicherheit geprägt sein. Doch Europa hat ein regionales Governance-System entwickelt, das den Weg durch diese Epoche weisen kann.

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*Subsection 6. The European unification process*

**Kostoris Fiorella**

**Europa coordinata, non unita**



in *Queste istituzioni*, n. 150-151 , 1-3

No abstract available

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*Subsection 6. The European unification process*

Lucke Albrecht von

**Europa und die Krise der Linken**

in *Blätter für deutsche & internationale Politik*, Juli, 2009 , 5-8

Auch wenn Wahlen zum Europäischen Parlament traditionell ein Schattendasein fristen und in der Regel schnell vergessen sind: Der jüngste Urnengang war eine Zäsur. Und zwar ironischerweise zunächst in nationaler Hinsicht. Noch 1979, bei den ersten Europawahlen, erreichte die SPD über 40 Prozent; seither hat sich ihr Stimmenanteil halbiert. Doch viel zu sehr war der Wahlkampf auf den eigenen Kanzlerkandidaten zugeschnitten, als dass man ernsthaft von „bloß“ europapolitischer Bedeutung sprechen könnte. Im Gegenteil: Das Desaster für die Sozialdemokratie – „SPD in Insolvenz“ titelte treffend die „tageszeitung“ – verschafft in erschreckender Weise Klarheit hinsichtlich der kommenden Bundestagswahlen.

Während sich die Union, nicht zuletzt dank der Stabilisierung der CSU, mit 37,8 Prozent als Volkspartei behauptete, kann die SPD mit ihren 20,8 Prozent kaum mehr ernsthaft den Anspruch auf die Kanzlerschaft vertreten. Selbst eigentlich katastrophale 30 Prozent bei den Wahlen am 27. September müssten nach heutigem Stand bereits als gewaltiger Erfolg gewertet werden. Während damit Schwarz-Gelb rechnerisch und – aufgrund des enormen Rückenwindes für das „kleine, aber feine bürgerliche Bündnis“ 1 – auch politisch-strategisch immer wahrscheinlicher wird, ist sogar die von der SPD als Ersatzziel ausgegebene Ampel ziemlich ausgeschlossen. Ganz zu schweigen von der strategischen Unmöglichkeit, einerseits gegen die FDP einen harten Richtungswahlkampf betreiben zu müssen, um anschließend nichtsdestotrotz mit ihr koalieren zu wollen.

Kurzum: Angesichts der Konsolidierung des sogenannten bürgerlichen Lagers wird die Wahl für die SPD zu einer bloßen Verhinderungskampagne gegen Schwarz-Gelb. In der fehlenden Machtoption liegt das eigentliche Problem der Sozialdemokratie. Aus einer sichtbar verbrauchten großen Koalition lässt sich kaum für eine erneute große Koalition mobilisieren, zumal angesichts der eigenen Chancenlosigkeit in Sachen Kanzlerschaft. 2 Daran werden auch die Durchhalteparolen des Parteivorsitzenden – „Das Spiel ist noch nicht verloren“ – und ein durchaus kämpferischer Auftritt des Spitzenkandidaten auf dem jüngsten Wahlparteitag wenig ändern können.

Europa wird schwarz

Doch in der nationalen Perspektive geht das Problem nicht auf, sondern es reicht weit über Deutschland hinaus und betrifft die Sozialdemokratie in ganz Europa. In den meisten EU-Staaten erlitt diese dramatische Einbußen: In Frankreich stürzte die Parti Socialiste unter Martine Aubry auf 16,5 Prozent ab (während die Grünen mit Daniel Cohn-Bendit an der Spitze 16,3 Prozent erreichten); in Österreich verlor die SPÖ mehr als neun Prozent und kam mit 23,8 Prozent auf ihr historisch schlechtestes Ergebnis; in Großbritannien rangiert Gordon Browns Labour Party nach desaströsen 15,7 Prozent zwölf Prozentpunkte hinter den Konservativen und sogar hinter der antieuropäischen Unabhängigkeitspartei – das schlechteste Labour-Ergebnis bei einer landesweiten Wahl seit Beginn des 20.



Jahrhunderts; und auch in Schweden, den Niederlanden und zahlreichen weiteren Staaten erlitten sozialdemokratische Parteien verheerende Verluste. Selbst der skandalgeplagte Berlusconi konnte, obwohl er mit 35 Prozent weit hinter den erhofften 45 Prozent zurückblieb, den Partito Democratico unter Dario Franceschini mit 27 Prozent (und sechs Prozent Verlusten) deutlich deklassieren. Insgesamt werden die Konservativen mit 265 Sitzen im neuen, verkleinerten EU-Parlament eindeutig die stärkste Kraft sein. Der Abstand zu den zweitplatzierten Sozialisten ist damit auf mehr als 100 Sitze angewachsen.

Offensichtlich geht jetzt ein sozialdemokratischer Regierungszyklus endgültig zu Ende, der im englischen Sprachraum unter „New Labour“ und im deutschen unter „Neuer Mitte“ firmierte. An seinem Ausgangspunkt stand die weitreichende Anpassung der englischen Labour Party an das herrschende neoliberale Marktmodell, das alle sozialdemokratischen Parteien infizierte. Am wohl ausgeprägtesten war diese Entwicklung in Großbritannien und Deutschland, wo vor zehn Jahren, am 13. Juni 1999, mit dem Schröder-Blair-Papier die Blaupause für alle späteren Agenda-Reformen geschaffen wurde. Heute, das belegen die miserablen Ergebnisse der Europawahlen, erweist sich der Zug der Sozialdemokratie in die Neue Mitte endgültig als Zug ins politische Abseits – und das ironischerweise just in dem Augenblick ihrer Rückkehr zu Staatshilfe und Sozialpaternalismus. Offenbar zeigt sich dem Wähler gerade in dieser Widersprüchlichkeit die politische Entkernung der Sozialdemokratie besonders deutlich.

Die gegenwärtige Krise geht jedoch weit über die der Sozialdemokratie hinaus. In ganz Europa haben konservative bis rechte Parteien zugelegt, die Linke dagegen hat in Gänze verloren. Hinter dem Desaster der SPD verbirgt sich somit eine Krise linker Politik, ja linken Denkens insgesamt. Exemplarisch dafür ist auch das Abschneiden der deutschen Linkspartei. Sie avisierte 10 Prozent plus x und erzielte am Ende lediglich 7,5 Prozent.

#### Die Linke – ohne europäische Alternative

Trotz der größten Krise des Kapitalismus seit 1929 kommt man zu dem paradoxen Befund: Die Linke als politische Richtung verkörpert heute in Europa, aber auch in den meisten nationalen Parlamenten, keine politische Alternative. Dies nur mit dem zweifellos vorhandenen und in Krisenzeiten weiter zunehmenden Bedürfnis nach konservativer Besitzstandswahrung zu erklären, greift aus zwei Gründen zu kurz.

Erstens verweist gerade das Beispiel Deutschland in zahllosen Fällen auf internes Versagen. Zunächst auf den besagten grundlegenden Wechsel der Sozialdemokratie zu New Labour. Aber auch auf Fehler im Kleineren, im Vorfeld der Wahlen, etwa Münteferings bedingungslose Rettungsvorschläge gegenüber Arcandor, die den Konservativen die Chance boten, die SPD gleichsam von links zu überholen – mit dem keineswegs ganz falschen Argument, damit würden die milliardenschweren Eigentümer zu Lasten des Steuerzahlers saniert. Auf Seiten der Linkspartei wurde Mobilisierung dadurch verhindert, dass keine engagierte und kontroverse Debatte über die zukünftige Europa-Politik geführt, sondern ausschließlich EU-kritische bis -ablehnende Kandidaten nominiert wurden.

Zweitens allerdings, und dieses Problem wiegt schwerer, bedeutet das vermeintlich exkulpierende Argument, wonach Krisenzeiten keine Wechselzeiten sind, dass eine Linke faktisch auf jede gestalterische Politik in den kommenden Krisenzeiten vorab verzichtet. Denn dass die nächsten Krisen, sozialer und ökologischer Art, in Bälde folgen werden, steht heute bereits fest. Das Argument tatsächlich ernst genommen, taugte die Linke damit endgültig, einem alten Vorurteil ihrer Gegner Vorschub leistend, allenfalls als Reparaturbetrieb für Schönwetterzeiten – von denen in der Zukunft jedoch keineswegs auszugehen ist.

#### Europa als linkes Projekt

Das verweist auf das Hauptproblem der gesamten Linken seit 1989 und dem Ende des realexistierenden Sozialismus.



New Labour war bereits die Kompensation der Tatsache, dass es seither kein neues linkes Projekt gegeben hat – jenseits eines nationalstaatlichen Keynesianismus, der bereits unter François Mitterrand Schiffbruch erlitten hatte. Der Konjunktur der „Reagonomics“ begegnete die Sozialdemokratie deshalb in den 90er Jahren mit einem rosa gefärbten Neoliberalismus, was die damalige PDS zu Recht mit dem Festhalten an neokeynesianischen Konzepten und der Forderung nach einer Regulierung des neuen globalen Finanzkapitalismus quittierte. Die Ironie der Geschichte: Jetzt, da sich in der Krise alle nationalstaatlichen Regierungen wieder zu keynesianischen Rezepten flüchten, steht die Linke nackt da. Ihres Copyrights an der Domestizierung des Kapitalismus beraubt, fällt ihr darüber hinaus scheinbar nichts mehr ein. 3

Damit aber werden die tiefer liegenden Krisengründe sichtbar. Diese haben viel mit der Krise der Linken im europäischen Rahmen zu tun. Offenbar fehlt es der gesamten Linken seit 1989 an positiv konnotierten Politik-Diskursen oder gar Projekten. Exemplarisch dafür ist die höchst ambivalente Haltung gegenüber Europa und der EU: Europa wurde über Jahrzehnte primär als Projektionsfläche goutiert, als Kontinent, der mit der Beseitigung von Krieg und Gewalt die Lehren aus der Geschichte gezogen habe. Mit der konkreten Ausgestaltung tat sich die Linke dagegen von jeher schwer und überließ sie lieber der Rechten, von Adenauer bis Kohl – umso mehr als sich das „gemeinsame europäische Haus“ (Gorbatschow) seit 1989 von einem utopischen, durch den Eisernen Vorhang getrennten, zu einem höchst realen, aber auch politisch umkämpften Ort entwickelte, der seine idyllischen Züge sehr schnell verlor.

Ein einziges Mal schien es in den letzten Jahren tatsächlich zu gelingen, das Projekt Europa von links zu besetzen – und zwar anlässlich der Konfrontation mit den USA im Vorfeld des Irakkriegs. Damals, am 15. Februar 2003, brachten die Anti-Irakkriegsdemonstrationen Hunderttausende auf die Straße, worin Intellektuelle wie Jacques Derrida und Jürgen Habermas bereits die politische Wiedergeburt Europas erkennen wollten. 4

Allerdings blieb dies, wie wir heute erkennen müssen, primär ein Anti-Projekt der neuen globalisierungskritischen Bewegung, gegen die neoimperiale Politik der Regierung Bush. Um langfristig ernsthafte Politik auf europäischer Ebene zu betreiben, reicht dies jedoch ebenso wenig wie eine Anti-Hartz-IV-Politik auf nationaler Ebene. Gelingt es der Linken, ob Sozialdemokratie oder Linkspartei, nicht, politische Gestaltungsangebote zu machen, wird die Tendenz zur Selbstmarginalisierung weiter zunehmen.

Die Grünen auf Abwegen?

Denn eines steht fest: Ohne gestalterische Perspektive – was in letzter Konsequenz auch Regierungsorientierung bedeutet – verfängt bei eigentlich sympathisierenden Wählern und potentiellen Koalitionspartnern sehr schnell die „Verlockung der Macht“. Selbiges erlebt man gerade bei den Grünen. Im Südwesten Deutschlands beginnt bei ihnen (als den Wahlgewinnern der parallel zu den Europawahlen abgehaltenen Kommunalwahlen) die Versuchung bereits zu wirken, sind bereits eindeutige Anzeichen für eine Orientierung hin zur Union als vermeintlicher Gestaltungspartei der Zukunft zu erkennen. Waren die Grünen bislang in ihrer bundesweiten Basis im linken Lager verortet, wie es der letzte Bundesparteitag mit seiner klaren Absage an Jamaika und die Wünsche der Parteiführung zum Ausdruck brachte, beginnen im reicheren Süden bereits die Rechenübungen für eine mögliche schwarz-grüne Koalition nach Hamburger Vorbild. „Das Bürgertum wählt grün“, lautete dort der Wahlkampflogan, womit sich die Partei eindeutig nicht links, sondern, ihrer Herkunft nach in durchaus zutreffender Weise, in der liberalen Mitte positionierte.

Und die Überlegungen gehen bereits weiter: Ganz im Sinne der bürgerlichen Lagertheorie wird jetzt bereits in einigen Medien über das Projekt einer Vereinigung der beiden „eigentlichen“ bürgerlichen Parteien, Grüne und FDP, nachgedacht. Noch erscheint dieses Unterfangen ziemlich absurd und der Weg dahin weit.<sup>5</sup> Doch politische Perspektivlosigkeit auf der Linken wird derartige Annäherungsbestrebungen weiter forcieren. Ohne eine linke



Machtperspektive werden sich die durchaus machtbewussten bürgerlichen Grünen weiter von Rot-Rot-Grün abwenden. Die Folge wäre das endgültige Nischendasein der beiden roten bzw. rosa-roten Parteien.

Ohne die Verbindung von politischer Idee und konkreter Machtoption droht der linken Strömung die politische Bedeutungslosigkeit in Folge struktureller Regierungsunfähigkeit. Damit fände das sozialdemokratische Jahrhundert endgültig sein Ende. Lange, nämlich genau 20 Jahre, hat die Linke in der Bundesrepublik benötigt, bis sie 1969 erstmalig eigenständige Regierungsverantwortung übernehmen konnte. Gegenwärtig scheinen sich SPD und Linkspartei rapide von einer möglichen linken Regierung zu entfernen. Dabei bietet gerade das Projekt Europa ungenutzte Möglichkeiten einer Annäherung an ein gemeinsames linkes Projekt. Für die Grünen war die positive Mobilisierung zu Europa das Erfolgsrezept, wie für die Linkspartei die primär desinteressierte bis eindeutig ablehnende Haltung der Grund ihres Scheiterns. Jenseits der berechtigten Kritik an der Entdemokratisierung durch die Europäische Kommission in Brüssel fehlt es an einer konstruktiven Europa-Perspektive. Doch mit der absehbar kritischen Kommentierung des Lissabon-Vertrages und der Einforderung demokratischer Reformen durch das Bundesverfassungsgericht bietet sich auch für die Linkspartei die Möglichkeit, über die primär ablehnende Haltung gegenüber der Europäischen Union als einem neoliberalen Elitenprojekt hinauszugehen und einen kritisch-konstruktiven Umgang zu entwickeln.

Seit 1989, das zeigt nicht nur die gegenwärtige Krise, handelt es sich um eine Notwendigkeit für die gesamte Linke, aus den engen nationalstaatlichen Grenzen auszubrechen und gegen die neoliberale Globalisierung in europäischen Dimensionen zu denken und zu handeln – ob als sozial-ökologische Bewegung, Gewerkschaft oder auch als Partei. Denn eines hat diese Europawahl ebenfalls gezeigt: Letztlich landen die Stimmen der wirklichen Europagegner auf dem Konto rechtspopulistischer oder rechtsextremer Parteien. Ein Grund mehr, die Gefilde bloßer Gegnerschaft schleunigst zu verlassen und an konkreten politischen Projekten und koalitionären Alternativen zu arbeiten – sowohl auf internationaler als auch auf nationaler Ebene.

1 Berthold Kohler, Glück und Not, in: „Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung“ (FAZ), 9.6.2009.

2 Vgl. auch Albrecht von Lucke, Wahl ohne Wahl: Das Dilemma der SPD, in: „Blätter“, 3/2009, S. 5-8.

3 Vgl. Albert Scharenberg, Die Lähmung der Linken, in: „Blätter“, 4/2009, S. 5-9.

4 Jürgen Habermas und Jacques Derrida, Unsere Erneuerung. Die Wiedergeburt Europas, in: FAZ, 31.5.2003, dok. in: „Blätter“, 7/2003, S. 877- 881.

5 Vgl. etwa Peter Fahrenholz, Schwarz-Rot? Schwarz-Gelb? Grün-Gelb! In: „Süddeutsche Zeitung“, 9.6.2009.

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### **Section C) Regional integration processes**

#### *Subsection 6. The European unification process*

**Guérot Ulrike**

#### **Europa wie es sinkt und lacht**

**in Internationale Politik** , 64. Jahrgang, n. 3, März , 52-59

ABSTRACT: Soll die Europäische Union eigentlich erst untergehen, bevor wir erkennen, was sie uns wirklich bedeutet? Natürlich nicht, und deshalb ist es höchste Zeit für eine neue Debatte über die Zukunft der EU. Groß muss sie sein, die Union, und politisch, will sie ihre Interessen und Ambitionen durchsetzen. Deutschland spielt dabei eine zentrale Rolle.



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**Chrysochoou Dimitris N.**

**Europe as a synarchy: a study in organized co-sovereignty**

in *Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart*, Band 57, 2009

No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

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**Pagrotsky Leif**

**Europe must swallow its bitter economic medicine**

in *Europe's World*, Issue 11, Spring

The European Union has missed its chance to grab global leadership, says Sweden's former Industry and Trade Minister Leif Pagrotsky. To earn another opportunity to exert influence, it must stop squabbling over internal reforms and start focusing on concrete measures to revive its flagging economies.

<http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/21308/Default.aspx>

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**Jørgen Wettestad**

**European Climate Policy: Toward Centralized Governance?**

in *Review of Policy Research*, Volume 26 Issue 3, 311 - 328

The EU emissions trading system (ETS) is the first large-scale international emissions trading system and a "cornerstone" in EU climate policy. A key element in the ETS implementation process is deciding upon the ceiling ("cap") for the emissions included in the ETS. Over time, a significant change and centralization of this model has taken place. In order to understand this development, we need to acknowledge the increasing acceptance of stronger centralized governance among the member states due to ETS pilot phase problems; take into consideration frustration in the European Commission over complex and differing National Allocation Plans; and add the fact that the Kyoto Protocol target was getting nearer and a good performance of the "flagship" ETS was becoming increasingly important. Hence, although the case supports the importance of acknowledging the multilevel character of the EU, it still emphasizes the key role of changes in member states' interests and positions for understanding outcomes.

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**Thurner Paul, Binder Martin**

**European Union transgovernmental networks: The emergence of a new political space beyond the nation-state?**



in *European Journal of Political Research*, vol. 48, issue 1, January, 80-106

ABSTRACT: Does the European Union (EU) represent a new political order replacing the old nation-states? The assessment of the real character of political orders requires the identification of political key actors and of the specific structure of their interactions. Transgovernmental networks have been considered to be one of the most important features of EU integration. Unfortunately, the network structures, processes and the impact of these informal horizontal inter-organisational relations between nation-states are mostly unknown. The main objective of this article is to measure and explain the selective pattern of informal bilateral relations of high officials of the EU Member States' ministerial bureaucracies on the occasion of an EU Intergovernmental Conference. The quantitative data used rely on standardised interviews with 140 top-level bureaucrats. The statistical estimation of network choices is based on recent developments of exponential random graph models.

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Rauschmayer Felix, Paavola Jouni, Wittmer Heidi

**European governance of natural resources and participation in a multi-level context: An editorial**

in *European Environment/Environmental Policy and Governance*, Volume 19, Issue 3, May-June, 141-147

Policy makers are looking at two different directions for guidance when addressing the challenges of multi-level environmental governance in the face of global environmental change. First, they are seeking scientific advice to find solutions to policy problems. Second, they are emphasizing participation of the public and/or stakeholders to enhance the legitimacy of governance. In this editorial we explore the challenges of participation in a multi-level governance context, outline a practically relevant strategy for research on multi-level governance of natural resources and briefly outline the key contributions of the five articles that comprise this special issue. The special issue maps issues of key importance for research on multi-level governance of natural resources rather than offering conclusions from systematic comparative studies - the latter is the ultimate goal of the GovernNat project from which the contributions stem.

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Çelenk Ayşe Aslihan

**Europeanization and Administrative Reform: The Case of Turkey**

in *Mediterranean Politics*, Volume 14, Issue 1, March, 41-60

This article aims to analyse the relationship between Europeanization and administrative reform within the context of recent developments in Turkey. While doing this, the analytical tools of sociological institutionalism and the misfit model of Europeanization are utilized together with the analysis of related legal documents and in-depth interviews conducted with the actors in various tiers of administration. The article argues that institutional change entails a change in values and discourses of the political actors and in the Turkish case, despite the EU's pressures for administrative reform and the resulting legal changes of the 2000s, because of the institutionalized powers and resistance of the actors at the central level no institutional change has occurred in Turkey regarding the administrative system.

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Unalan Dilek, Cowell Richard J.

**Europeanization, strategic environmental assessment and the impacts on environmental governance**

**in European Environment/Environmental Policy and Governance**, Volume 19, Issue 1, January-February , 32-43

Recent European Union (EU) directives in the environmental field have promoted sustainable development alongside new modes of environmental governance for achieving this elusive goal. These modes are characterised by integrated, participatory and transparent decision-making processes. This paper provides a conceptual clarification of this new environmental governance and then examines the extent to which it is being promoted, through Europeanization, in one of the impending south-eastern enlargement countries, Turkey. Empirical data is taken from an analysis of Turkey's progress in adopting the Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive which - potentially at least - embodies features of the new environmental governance. A key finding is that there are close links between the adoption of the new modes of environmental governance and the power of Europeanization discourses in national policy making processes, but these are insufficient to forge significant changes in inter-sectoral working around environmental issues, or markedly expand opportunities for public participation.

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Mittag Jürgen

**Europäische Parteien im Wandel**

**in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte**, Band 23-24, 2009

Immer dann, wenn Wahlen zum Europäischen Parlament (EP) anstehen, rücken auch die europäischen Parteien - oder wie sie offiziell heißen: die "politischen Parteien auf europäischer Ebene" - stärker ins Blickfeld der Öffentlichkeit. Mit einem gewissen Erstaunen werden seitens der Bevölkerung dann Kürzel wie SPE oder EVP registriert und mehr oder weniger eindeutige Verbindungslinien zu den nationalen Parteien gezogen. Jenseits der Europawahlen aber verharren die europäischen Parteien, die sich als grenzüberschreitend kooperierende Bündnisse von nationalen Parteien formiert haben, zumeist im Schatten der öffentlichen Wahrnehmung.

Wenn EU-bezogene Themen oder Konflikte vermittelt werden, geschieht dies nur selten über europäische Parteien, die in erster Linie als Kommunikationsforen ihrer nationalen Mitgliedsparteien fungieren. Damit aber unterscheidet sich ihre Funktion deutlich von der nationaler Parteien, denen als Transmissionsriemen in den einzelnen parlamentarischen Systemen Europas entscheidende Bedeutung für die kollektive Interessensrepräsentation, aber auch für die Legitimation der politischen Willensbildungs- und Entscheidungsprozesse zukommt. Dass die europäischen Parteien dennoch mehr sind als "Phantomorganisationen"[1], ist nicht zuletzt auf strukturelle Reformen der jüngsten Zeit zurückzuführen. Mit der Verankerung ihrer rechtlichen Grundlagen, der Ausweitung ihrer finanziellen Möglichkeiten und der Etablierung europäischer politischer Stiftungen ist das Handlungspotenzial der europäischen Parteien in den vergangenen fünf Jahren erheblich gewachsen. Infolgedessen hat ihre Zahl zugenommen und haben sich ihre Aktivitäten ausgeweitet.

The full text is free:

<http://www.bpb.de/publikationen/V2T086.html>



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**Battis Ulrich, Kersten Jens**

**Europäische Raumentwicklung**

in *Europarecht*, Volume 44, Issue 1, 2009 , 3-24

No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 6. The European unification process*

**Pfetsch Barbara, Heft Annett**

**Europäische Öffentlichkeit - Entwicklung transnationaler Medienkommunikation**

in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, Band 23-24, 2009

In einer Zeit, in der die Europäische Integration durch ablehnende Verfassungsreferenden, Akzeptanzprobleme auf Seiten der Bevölkerung und eine turbulente wirtschaftliche Entwicklung auf eine harte Probe gestellt wird, ist politische Unterstützung eine wichtige Ressource für die Europäische Union (EU). Die politische Gemeinschaft der Europäer ist auf die sozialen Funktionen der gesellschaftlichen Integration und Identitätsbildung angewiesen.

Öffentlichkeit ist hier eine wichtige Bedingung, denn in öffentlicher Kommunikation werden die Wirklichkeitskonstruktionen, Regeln und Normen ausgehandelt, auf denen der Verständigungsprozess einer Gesellschaft beruht. Europäische Öffentlichkeit ist daher eng mit dem Prozess der Herausbildung einer kollektiven Identität der EU-Bürger verbunden.[1] Sie ist aber auch für den Politikprozess der EU eine kritische Bedingung.

The full text is free:

<http://www.bpb.de/publikationen/44064E.html>

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**Rauschmayer Felix, Berghöfer Augustin, Omann Ines, Zikos Dimitrios**

**Examining processes or/and outcomes? Evaluation concepts in European governance of natural resources**

in *European Environment/Environmental Policy and Governance*, Volume 19, Issue 3, May-June , 159-173

Effectively evaluating the governance of natural resources is a precondition for its improvement in contexts of change. In order to do so, one can use methods for evaluating (1) the outcome of a governance process or (2) the governance process itself. Outcome-oriented and process-oriented approaches have different strengths and weaknesses. This paper explores the challenges associated with both options when applied to European biodiversity and water governance - namely the implementation of the Habitats Directive (Natura 2000 network) and the Water Framework Directive.



Current evaluation practice, concerned with governance processes for EU policy implementation, focuses mainly on outcomes. In this paper, we examine the methodology involved and argue that, for three reasons, it makes sense to combine the two approaches: a normative reason, relating to standards of good governance; a substantive reason, relating to the complexity of the system to be governed; and a third, instrumental, reason relating to the task of policy evaluation and implementation itself. Combining outcome- and process-oriented evaluation of governance processes is not without caveats, but it appears a promising approach in the light of current problems in European governance of natural resources.

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Sadeh Tal, Verdun Amy

**Explaining Europe's Monetary Union: A Survey of the Literature**  
in *International Studies Review*, vol. 11, issue 2, June, 277-301

ABSTRACT: This article offers a survey of the literature on European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), in particular works that deal with the question why EMU happened and, based on this literature, what one might be able to conclude about its sustainability. It reviews the literature by dividing up the analyses into four categories: those that explain EMU at the global and at the European Union (EU) levels of analysis, explanations at the national level, and explanations at the domestic level of analysis. The review suggests that EMU was a particular European response to global developments, which was possible because of existing EU institutions. EMU was causally motivated by a Franco-German deal, balancing national interests. Domestic motives reflect essentially opportunistic motives, and thus, cannot explain EMU. In our judgment the review suggests that Europe's single currency will remain sustainable as long as the Franco-German political deal sticks, the belief in the "sound money" idea remains hegemonic in Europe, and the losers from EMU are underrepresented in national and EU institutions. While opportunistic domestic motives cannot explain embarking on a long-term project, they can definitely be sufficient to derail such a project.

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Thomas Daniel C.

**Explaining the negotiation of EU foreign policy: Normative institutionalism and alternative approaches**  
in *International Politics*, Volume 46, Issue 4, July, 339-357

Despite the vast literature on the development of EU foreign policy institutions and the EU's growing experience as an international actor, relatively little effort has been made to explain the often-contentious negotiations among Member States that determine whether or not a common policy is adopted, and if so, what it will be. This paper proposes a Normative Institutional theory of intra-EU negotiations on foreign policy and external relations, including hypotheses that explain policy outcomes in terms of entrapment and cooperative bargaining dynamics. It compares these hypotheses' causal mechanisms and observable implications to those of hypotheses derived from Intergovernmentalism as well as theories of Social Learning and Normative Suasion.

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Padoa-Schioppa Tommaso

**Face à la crise, quelle pertinence pour l'Union européenne?**

in *Esprit*, n. 355, juin 2009 , 130-139

Has Europe any relevance in the current crisis?

For all the talk over minimal coordination between national economic stimulus schemes, hardly anyone has stopped to wonder where European countries would stand if EU economic arrangements had not been there, and the euro first and foremost. The current global crisis comes as a test for the relevance of the EU and is a good opportunity to assess its weaknesses as well as its benefits.

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Lordon Frédéric

**Fin de la mondialisation, commencement de l'Europe ?**

in *Monde Diplomatique (Le)*, Juin

L'élection du Parlement européen se déroule alors que, un à un, les piliers juridiques de l'Union chancellent sous l'impact de la crise économique. En avril, la Banque centrale européenne a même concédé l'hérésie suprême : adopter une politique revenant à faire tourner la planche à billets. Ces dérèglements seraient-ils l'occasion de repenser radicalement le projet européen ? Un détour par l'histoire y incite.

<http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2009/06/LORDON/17217>

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Swieboda Pawel

**Five good reasons for rewriting Europe's security strategy**

in *Europe's World*, Issue 11, Spring

There are important new security issues that the recent update of the 2003 European Security Strategy has not fully addressed, says Pawe&#322; &#346;wieboda, who puts forward five reasons for the EU to give it a more thorough overhaul.

<http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/21338/Default.aspx>

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Verney Susannah

**Flaky Fringe? Southern Europe Facing the Financial Crisis**

in *South European Society & Politics*, Volume 14, Issue 1, March , 1-6



The introduction to this special issue notes how the financial crisis has revived long-held concerns about the potential impact of Southern Europe on the economic cohesion of the European Union and the eurozone. The article outlines the brief of the special issue (geographical scope, time period covered) and suggests that expectations of a South European eurozone withdrawal are unrealistic.

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Allina-Pisano Jessica

**From Iron Curtain to Golden Curtain: Remaking Identity in the European Union Borderlands in East European Politics and Societies**, vol. 23, n. 2, May , 266-290

The village of Kisszelmenc, a historically Magyar settlement at the edge of southwestern Ukraine, has been separated by an international border from its sister village of Nagyszelmenc, now in Slovakia, since just after World War II. A recent project to reconnect the two villages sought to support Magyar identity in the region through the reunification of village families. The opening of a border crossing project instead drove economic changes that resulted in the Ukrainianization and the Slovakization of Kisszelmenc. This article shows how the reconfiguration of economic relations stemming from changes in political institutions can generate unexpected shifts in the enactment of ethno-cultural identity on a given territory.

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European Economy News

**From crisis to recovery: the tools for the job in European Economy News**, January 2009 - Issue 12

As the financial crisis infects the economy at large, the EU has unveiled its economic action plan to give the European economy a much-needed boost. This is the latest in a series of robust coordinated measures to stave off a deepening recession and to turn crisis into opportunity with key reforms of the European and global financial sectors.

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Kluvánková-Oravská Tatiana , Chobotová Veronika, Banaszak Ilona , Slavikova Lenka, Trifunovova Sonja

**From government to governance for biodiversity: the perspective of central and Eastern European transition countries in European Environment/Environmental Policy and Governance**, Volume 19, Issue 3, May-June , 186-196

This paper addresses the problems of institutional changes in governance and the framing of biodiversity conservation policy at the level of the enlarged European Union. The current development of European Union governance has become more complex and multilevel, partially usurping competences from the central state and relying on networks of interconnected actors rather than on a hierarchy dominated and defined by the state. This shift is particularly challenging for biodiversity governance in new member states, where current decision making is still affected by post-socialist relations and massive ongoing institutional changes, often resulting in inefficient institutional designs and



over-exploitation of natural resources. The paper offers a cross-country analysis of five Central and Eastern European countries, characterized by different socialist regimes and different transition processes from hierarchical to democratic and market governance. The theoretical basis of the paper is institutional rebuilding in Central and Eastern Europe in the context of the emerging multilevel environmental governance of the EU. The data were collected from desk study research and interviews. The results show that some elements of multilevel governance existed in these countries prior to the transition, but that EU integration empowered lower levels of self-government. The mismatch between the old hierarchical institutions developed under socialism and the new decentralized institutions introduced during the transformation process still persists and is visible. The emergence of multilevel governance with multiple actors' participation is prone to create tensions, but evidence from the countries studied indicates that this is not necessarily a disadvantage.

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Tews Kerstin

**From law-taking to policy-making. The environmental dimension of the EU accession process - challenges, risks and chances for the SEE countries**

in *European Environment/Environmental Policy and Governance*, Volume 19, Issue 2, March-April , 130-139

This paper addresses the challenges and risks of an environmental enlargement strategy that has to rely on conditionality as a modus of operation. Such policy transfers generate shortcomings, which, in the case of the EU, might affect their future capacity to develop innovative environmental policy, if it enlarges. The paper begins with a short description of the challenges both from the EU's and the SEE countries' perspective. It highlights some of the newer, even stricter elements of the conditionality mode applied by the EU. It proceeds with an analysis of the risks of conditionality. In doing so, it outlines some of the lessons gleaned from the former enlargement process to Central and Eastern Europe, within which comparable experiences were made in unilaterally adjusting national law according to an agenda set by external actors. In the third section, the paper develops arguments with respect to handling these risks.

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Baker Estella, Harding Cristopher

**From past imperfect to future perfect? A longitudinal study of the Third Pillar**

in *European Law Review*, vol.34, issue 1 , 25-54

No abstract available

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Danwitz Thomas von

**Funktionsbedingungen der Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofes**

in *Europarecht*, Volume 43, Issue 6, 2008 , 769-786

No abstract available



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Vranes Erich

**Gemischte Abkommen und die Zuständigkeit des EuGH – Grundfragen und neuere Entwicklungen in den Außenbeziehungen**

in *Europarecht*, Volume 44, Issue 1, 2009 , 44-80

No abstract available

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Amato Giuliano, Galli della Loggia Ernesto

**Giuliano Amato e Ernesto Galli della Loggia discutono di Europa**

in *Mulino (il)*, n. 1, gennaio-febbraio, 2009 , 107-117

No abstract available

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Hannay of Chiswick David Hugh Alexander Hannay

**Global Challenges: How Should the European Union Best Respond?**

in *Global Society*, Volume 23, Issue 1, January

No abstract available

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Pekka Kettunen, Michael Kull

**Governing Europe: the Status and Networking Strategies of Finnish, Estonian and German Subnational Offices in Brussels**

in *Regional and Federal Studies*, Volume 19 Issue 2 , 117 - 142

his article examines and compares the status of Estonian, Finnish and German regional and local EU offices. The research data stem from structured interviews. We are interested in the status of different actors and their strategies for positioning their ideas in the policy-making and law-making procedures. While local and regional actors established new forms of representation and co-operation with EU institutions, these new channels and institutions are not equally open and accessible to all. Whilst the number of actors in Brussels has increased, this does not necessarily mean that they are all included in the decision-making process itself. Furthermore, it is not only institutions that matter but the actors themselves, the people involved in the day-to-day construction of Europe and the personal networks they create.



In contrast to German regional offices, the regions' power houses in Brussels, the institutional position of Finnish and Estonian offices is rather weak. However, to the extent that interaction takes place between the EU institutions and the regions, without the involvement of state actors, it is easy to see how certain decisions are pulled towards a regionally acceptable content. While size and institutional status matters, this is a world where a skilful actor can build his or her own networks, if he or she is in the right place at the right time and knows the right people.

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Scott Colin

**Governing Without Law or Governing Without Government? New-ish Governance and the Legitimacy of the EU**  
in *European law journal*, March 2009 - Vol. 15 Issue 2 , 160-173

The way the EU is governed and the way such governance is perceived contributes centrally to the legitimacy of the European enterprise. This legitimacy underpins both the acceptance and the effects of EU activity. Legitimacy is a product of the way in which decisions are taken, and the nature and quality of such decisions. Pressures created by concerns about both forms of legitimacy affecting EU decision making partially explain the turn in legal scholarship away from the more traditional preoccupation with the analysis of legislative instruments and case-law, towards a more broadly based conception of governance which involves the examination of a more diverse range of processes and instruments. This article offers an analysis of the parameters of newness in governance. The overall argument is that some of the more innovative governance modes are not so new, whilst more recent and celebrated modes, although displaying elements of newness, are, perhaps, not that innovative. The focus of the new governance in the EU is largely on governing without law, rather than the more radical governing without government; hence the suggestion that we are experiencing only 'new-ish governance'. The article asks whether a limited conception of new governance is inevitable given the legitimacy constraints within which the EU operates, or whether the potential for developing a broader conception of governance, through wider participation and involvement of non-governmental governing capacities, might bolster legitimacy through both better processes and better outcomes.

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Lazdinis Marius, Angelstam Per, Lazdinis Imantas

**Governing forests of the European Union: institutional framework for interest representation at the European Community level**

in *European Environment/Environmental Policy and Governance*, Volume 19, Issue 1, January-February , 44-56

We analyse whether the European Community provides for articulating a common set of priorities for society and supports openness and participation in the area of forest policy at the Community level. In doing so, we review the institutional framework and, using the results of the internet-based stakeholder consultation, assess the presence of interested parties at the level of the European Community. In addition, from the same consultation we learn about the opinions of the interest groups concerning possible areas for enhancing coherence in forest governance in the European Union.

The results of the study demonstrate that there is a range of possibilities for participation of different interest groups and flow of information between the European Commission and the stakeholders. However, the number of interest groups prepared to actively participate in Community-level forest and forestry-related policy- and decision-making is relatively



low.

We conclude that the present institutional arrangements should be sufficient for open and participatory priority setting in forest governance at the European Community level. However, based on the stakeholder consultation we also conclude that co-ordination and co-operation, and hence coherence, in forest and forestry-related policy- and decision-making at the Community level should be improved.

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**Nettesheim Martin**

**Grundrechtskonzeptionen des EuGH im Raum der Freiheit, der Sicherheit und des Rechts**

in *Europarecht*, Volume 44, Issue 1, 2009 , 24-44

No abstract available

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**Theisen Heinz**

**Hic Rhodus, hic salta! Die EU in der multipolaren Welt**

in *Osteuropa*, 58. Jahrgang, Heft 12, Dezember , 93-102

ABSTRACT: Die EU könnte in der multipolaren Weltordnung eine herausragende Rolle spielen. Ihre Mehrebenenstruktur ist ein Vorbild für andere Weltregionen. Doch ihr Demokratie- und Menschenrechtsuniversalismus verleitet die EU dazu, ihre Möglichkeiten zu überdehnen.

Sie versucht Staaten zu integrieren, die nicht zum westlichen Kulturkreis gehören. Gleichzeitig intervenieren Mitgliedstaaten militärisch in anderen Kulturkreisen. Beides schwächt die Handlungsfähigkeit der EU und erschwert die Machtbildung, die für die Regierbarkeit

der neuen Weltordnung unverzichtbar ist. Mehr Selbstbegrenzung würde die Handlungsfähigkeit der EU stärken.

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**Dullien Sebastian, Fritsche Ulrich**

**How bad is divergence in the euro zone? Lessons from the United States and Germany**

in *Journal of Post Keynesian Economics*, Volume 31, Number 3 , 431 - 457

This paper compares relative unit labor cost developments in the countries of the euro area since the beginning of the European Monetary Union (EMU) both with historical developments and with intraregional developments in the United States and Germany. Unit labor cost indices for the U.S. states and census regions from 1977 to 1997 as well as for the German Länder from 1970 to 2004 have been constructed. It is found that unit labor cost increases since 1999 in Portugal, and to a lesser extent, in Spain and Greece can be judged as excessive, which might impair a smooth working of the EMU in the future.

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Goetz Klaus H.

**How does the EU tick? Five propositions on political time**

in **Journal of European Public Policy** , Volume 16 Issue 2 2009 , 202 – 220

In what manner is political time institutionalized in the political system of the EU? This article advances five propositions on political time in the EU and highlights their implications for the workings of the EU. The propositions stress: (i) the absence of a dominant EU political cycle, which creates problems of mobilization and synchronization, but also allows for temporal plurality; (ii) an emphasis on linear political time, associated with ongoingness and open-endedness, as opposed to cyclical political time, which favours discontinuity in institutional practices and policies; (iii) intensive bargaining over time-setting, which encourages governing by timetable; (iv) the sensitivity of EU political time to member state influence, on the one hand, and (v) the Europeanization of political time in the member states, on the other. The balances struck in the temporal constitution of the EU are critical to its future.

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Moscovici Pierre

**How hubris is leading the EU to its nemesis**

in **Europe's World**, Issue 11, Spring

Initial over-enthusiasm for the Lisbon treaty, much of it based on misunderstandings, may have contributed to its downfall, suggests Pierre Moscovici. He believes the treaty has its virtues, but even if saved is unlikely to give answer to the question: What kind of Europe do we want?

<http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/21310/Default.aspx>

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Biondi Andrea

**How to Go Ahead as an EU Law National Judge**

in **European public Law**, Volume 15 (2009) Issue 2 , 225-238

The effective protection of those rights that the EU legal order confers on individuals has traditionally been ensured by a continuous dialogue between the supranational judiciary and all national courts. Such a constitutional settlement, which worked reasonably well for several years, is now considered by some commentators under threat. The obligations imposed on national courts are perceived as too burdensome, and several recent judgments have been regarded as intruding excessively into national procedural autonomy. This article analyzes recent decisions such as *Kempter*, *Impact*, and *Lucchini*, *SPA*, and argues instead that these fears are unjustified mainly because both the ECJ and national courts are striving to achieve the same aims, namely, the effective application of a given legal system, the fair composition of litigation, the protection of the parties involved, and the promotion of the efficiency of the legal process

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**Baldwin-Edwards Martin**

**How to cut the Gordian knot of Europe's muddled immigration policies**

in *Europe's World*, Issue 11, Spring

The EU's vaunted "Blue Card" for managing immigrant job-seekers is doomed to fail and should be scrapped at once, says Martin Baldwin-Edwards, who warns that Europe's uncoordinated national approaches to immigration will create major problems during the global recession.

<http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/21317/Default.aspx>

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**Vedovato Giuseppe**

**I due polmoni dell'Europa**

in *Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali*, Volume 75, n. 4, ottobre-dicembre , 491-497

The Council of Europe and the European Union represent the two principal organs of power in Europe. The two European organizations not only differ constitutionally and structurally, they also possess widely differing financial powers. The inter-constitutional dialogue between them occurs both through liaison and the complementary nature of a common goal to reinforce the unity of a Europe that is both multi-faceted and credible. Whatever happens to the Treaty of Lisbon, one can be sure that the Union will now have to debate how to go about ratifying the institutional reforms necessary for its continuing operation. With respect to previous negotiations, several positive elements can be perceived. Nevertheless, despite undeniable progress, certain limits and indeed some deficiencies have emerged. On the common ground created

between the inter-governmental method and the community method the so called «democratic deficit» subsists: participant democracy no longer sits at the same level as representative democracy. The French have suggested the creation of a European Senate, the nucleus of which would be formed out of the parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Although the Treaty of Lisbon embraces the Charter of fundamental rights with all its constraints for the member States, its precise role is uncertain. Doubts emerge for the jurisdictional guarantees of these fundamental rights on a European scale because of the coexistence of European judicial organs with competences that are conflicting and sometimes difficult to justify. Besides, the scant approach to culture is debatable.

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**Ciancio Adriana**

**I partiti politici europei e il processo di democratizzazione dell'Unione**

in *Federalismi*, Anno VII - Nr. 9



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**Draetta Ugo**

**I principi democratici dell'Unione europea nel Trattato di Lisbona**

in **Studi sull'integrazione europea**, Anno III, n. 3 , 513-525

No abstract available

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**Il Trattato di Lisbona e l'avvenire dell'Europa**

in **Affari Esteri**, Anno XLI, n. 162 , 408-434

Report of the International Seminar "The Treaty of Lisbon and the future of Europe" (Rome, 24 November 2008) organised by Fondazione Alcide De Gasperi at the Italian Chamber of Deputies (Palazzo Marini - Sala delle Colonne).

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**Cannizzaro E.**

**Il diritto internazionale nell'ordinamento giuridico comunitario: il contributo della sentenza Intertanko**

in **Diritto dell'Unione europea**, Anno: 2008 - Fascicolo: 4 , pag. 645

No abstract available

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**Morrone Federica**

**Il processo di integrazione europea e il ruolo delle istituzioni nell'ambito della politica migratoria dell'Unione alla luce dei Trattati di riforma**

in **Studi sull'integrazione europea**, Anno III, n. 3 , 611-638

No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

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**Saltari Lorenzo**

**Il trattato di Lisbona, le promesse del governo inglese ed il legittimo affidamento**

in **Rivista trimestrale di diritto pubblico**, n.1 , 239 ss.



No abstract available

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**Wolczuk Katarzyna**

**Implementation without Coordination: The Impact of EU Conditionality on Ukraine under the European Neighbourhood Policy**

*in Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 61, n. 2, March , 187-211

The article examines the impact of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) on domestic change in Ukraine during the period 2005-2007. Due to the interplay of external and domestic factors, no political leadership on European matters emerged in Ukraine under the ENP. The implementation of the Action Plan (AP)—the key instrument of the policy—has been left to the discretion of middle-level state officials, resulting in selective empowerment of sections of the state apparatus. However, without strong political engagement or an effective coordinating mechanism, this delivered slow, uneven and localised results. Nevertheless, despite the limited impact of the ENP, it is through the AP that the European Union has for the very first time started to affect domestic developments in Ukraine.

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**Brummer Klaus**

**Imposing Sanctions: The Not So 'Normative Power Europe'**

*in European Foreign Affairs Review*, Volume 14, Issue 2 , 191-207

This paper shows that the sanctions policy of the EU is characterized by three inconsistencies. They relate to the selection of countries against which sanctions are imposed, the triggers for autonomous European sanctions and the use of exemptions. Whereas no pattern can be discerned concerning the first two aspects, the misuse of exemptions for political reasons also adds to inconsistent European policies. This paper argues that although norms and values play a role in the EU's sanctions policy, more often than not they are upstaged by security and economic interests. As none of the underlying reasons for the inconsistencies (e.g. predominance of national interests, diverging views on the viability of sanctions) will disappear anytime soon, the sanctions policy of the EU will continue to oscillate between interests, norms and values.

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**Doleys Thomas**

**Incomplete Contracting, Commission Discretion and the Origins of EU Merger Control**

*in Journal of Common Market Studies*, Volume 47, Issue 3, June 2009 , 483-506

Council Regulation 4064/89 on the Control of Concentration between Undertakings— more commonly known as the Merger Regulation – was a watershed development in the evolution of the EU's competition policy regime. In this article we seek to cast new analytical light on what, in many respects, is an established narrative. To do this we draw on



insights from the new institutional economics (NIE). Specifically, we draw on the complementary concepts of incomplete contracting and delegation. We demonstrate how the Commission utilized the discretion attendant to its delegated authority to interpret and apply the indeterminate language of treaty competition articles so as to alter the economic, political and legal environment as it pertained to merger activity. It did so to such an extent that Member States, long resistant to Commission proposals for a merger control regulation, came to regard legislative action as preferable to the uncertainty represented by the evolving status quo.

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**Luiza Bialasiewicz, Carl Dahlman, Gian Matteo Apuzzo, Felix Ciut&#259;, Alun Jones, Chris Rumford, Ruth Wodak, James Anderson, Alan Ingram**

**Interventions in the new political geographies of the European 'neighborhood'**  
**in Political Geography**, Volume 28, Issue 2 , 79-89

The past year has seen media attention on both sides of the Atlantic focussed on the question of the EU's status as an international actor and, especially, its increasingly important role in governing its immediate 'Neighbourhood'. Indeed, European media and politicians have become visibly less reticent to speak openly of a 'European geopolitics' – or certainly of the need for a geopolitical vision for (EU)rope. This semantic shift has occurred even in the most traditionally Eurosceptic national contexts such as the UK where it is becoming commonplace to speak of 'European power' – and even 'European Empire' (see, for e.g. the comments of Foreign Secretary David Miliband in Bruges in November 2007). Certainly, European foreign policy and the EU's external role have always been conceived in very different ways by the various member states, strongly conditioned by national political (and geopolitical) cultures; these different national preoccupations and geopolitical visions (for Europe) are still present, evident for instance in the privileged place afforded to certain 'Neighbourhoods' rather than others – France and Italy see the Mediterranean as Europe's key space of intervention, while Germany has traditionally looked East and South East (Rupnik, 2007).

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**Bideleux Robert**

**Introduction: Reconstituting Political Order in Europe, West and East**

**in Perspectives on European Politics and Society**, vol. 10, n. 1, April, Special Issue "Reconstituting Political Order in Europe, West and East" , 3-16

This article offers a reappraisal of some of the distinctive features and implications of the supranational civil legal order which now encompasses over 500 million Europeans, or about two-thirds of Europe's inhabitants, depending on how Europe is delimited. This order offers unprecedented degrees of security, stability, certainty and calculability and maximum scope and incentives for the peaceful and profitable coexistence of a great multiplicity of peoples with widely differing cultures, values and belief-systems, while minimizing the scope for mutual impairment, friction and violent conflict. The European Union's unprecedented and unique supranational legal order is the bedrock of this rule-governed order. Even though it is not in itself democratic, it nevertheless enhances the resilience and efficacy of liberal democracy at the state and sub-state levels and provides strong support for relatively liberal forms of capitalism and civil society. This continually evolving order is unique and without precedent, and yet it does not involve the acting out or unfolding of a preordained plan, teleology or script. It is having a transformative impact on East Central European, Baltic and Balkan



post-Communist states and their positions within the wider European order. This is still dominated by the strongest West European states, but the position of smaller and poorer states is nevertheless much stronger and more secure than in any previous European order. This Introduction also contextualizes the wide-ranging contributions to this special issue. The contributors are united by shared perceptions of the fluidity, indeterminacy, ambiguities and open-endedness of the emerging civil order in Europe and its impact on the reconfiguration of East-West relationships within Europe. The resultant metamorphoses in the European states system, democracy, governance and East-West relations are also central concerns.

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**Maher Imelda**

**Introduction: Regulating Markets and Social Europe: New Governance in the EU**

*in European law journal*, March 2009 - Vol. 15 Issue 2 , 155-159

No abstract available

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**O'Brennan John**

**Ireland says No (again): the 12 June 2008 Referendum on the Lisbon Treaty**

*in Parliamentary Affairs* , Volume 62, Number 2, April , 258-277

This article analyses the significance of the 12 June 2008 Lisbon Treaty referendum in the Republic of Ireland. This was the third such referendum on Europe held in Ireland since the millennium, and the second referendum in three to result in a rejection of an EU Treaty following the failed Nice poll in 2001. Assessing both the campaign itself and the reasons for the No vote, the article argues that while variables such as age, educational attainment, geography, gender and social class all have a part to play in explaining the outcome of the referendum, post-referendum analysis suggests that two key phenomena proved decisive. First, an enduring Irish attachment to an overwhelmingly exclusivist national identity rather than more open and fluid identity conceptions means that a space exists where issues such as neutrality, sovereignty and Ireland's relative influence in the EU institutional matrix can be readily exploited by opponents of the European integration process, and where any changes in the EU constitutional order can be emotively presented as an existential threat to Ireland's values and interests. Second, post-referendum analysis also suggests that lack of knowledge constituted a key reason for voting No. The absence of any effort by government to provide and promote sufficient information channels which explain how and why Ireland's EU membership matters means that EU 'debates' within Irish political culture are frequently characterised by apathy, confusion, and ignorance, in a context where the chasm in elite-popular opinion has grown wider. The referendum result also points to a growing Eurosceptic tendency in Ireland which has seen the size of the No vote increase from 17% in 1972 to a decisive majority of 53.4% in 2008, on a significantly higher turnout than either 2001 or 2002.

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Costa Oriol

**Is climate change changing the EU? The second image reversed in climate politics**

in *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* , Vol. 21, n. 4, December , 527-544

The participation of the European Union (EU) in the international negotiations on climate change has attracted a significant share of scholarly attention. Climate change has certainly become a new dimension of European foreign policy and has enabled the EU to play a leadership role in the international arena. However, the relationship between the EU and the international climate regime is not a one-way street—while the EU has been active and decisive in shaping international negotiations, the latter have also had an impact on the EU. The international negotiations have influenced the EU's decision-making processes and internal negotiations—which has in turn influenced European integration itself. This article builds on the arguments of second image reversed analyses and proposes that there is a reciprocal relation between certain conditions of the EU-domestic setting and the international climate regime. The internal arrangements of the EU regarding climate change have maximized the influence of the regime and the very existence of the international negotiations has moulded these arrangements, making them more prone to external influence.

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Jesus Ferreiro, M. Teresa Garcia-Del-Valle, Carmen Gomez

**Is the composition of public expenditures converging in EMU countries?**

in *Journal of Post Keynesian Economics*, Volume 31, Number 3 , 459 - 484

The literature on fiscal policy is paying increasing attention to the impact of the composition of public expenditures on long-term economic growth. Public policy endogenous growth models recommend to change the composition of public expenditures to items considered as productive expenditures. Based on these models, European institutions are encouraging to increase the share of outlays, such as public investments, research and development, active labor market policies, and so on. This paper analyzes whether a convergence to a new pattern of public finances with a higher share of productive expenditures is arising in the euro zone.

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Tiido Harri

**It's time Europe faced up to its changed security needs**

in *Europe's World*, Issue 11, Spring

Europe's capitals seem agreed on the need for the EU's to be a global security player, but reluctant to commit the necessary resources. Harri Tiido, formerly Estonia's ambassador to NATO, assesses the areas where strong doses of political will are now needed.

<http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/21344/Default.aspx>



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Kochenov Dimitry

**Ius tractum of many faces: european citizenship and the difficult relationship between status and rights**  
in *Columbia Journal of European Law*, Vol.15, issue 2

The citizenship of the European Union is a rare example of a “fundamental status” which is entirely dependent on the specific features of the bearer, instead of vice versa, making any appeal to equality between European citizens impossible. Based on an overview of the legal essence and functioning of European citizenship both as a legal status and a bundle of rights, this paper provides a critical analysis of the current development of the European citizenship concept vis-à-vis both citizens and third-country nationals in the EU and addresses key issues which will have to be resolved to create a truly meaningful citizenship in Europe. The deficiencies of European citizenship are too important to resolve them rhetorically by appeals to the interplay between different legal orders in Europe. Sooner or later the outstanding problems will have to be addressed in a constructive way. The EU does not need a citizenship of unequals by law.

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Harpaz Guy

**Judicial Review by the European Court of Justice of UN ‘Smart Sanctions’ Against Terror in the Kadi Dispute**  
in *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Volume 14, Issue 1 , 65-88

In September 2008, the European Court of Justice found EU measures implementing UN Security Council resolutions which had called for the imposition of financial sanctions against certain persons and entities associated with Usama bin Laden, the Taliban and the Al-Qaeda network to be illegal. In a robust, inward-looking, human rights oriented, constitutionbased judgment, the ECJ provided a venue for indirect judicial review of Security Council resolutions and restored the EU legal order to its constitutional foundations. The ECJ furthermore buttressed the bridges between the EU legal order and the ECHR legal order, while erecting high walls between the former and the international law-UN legal order. The dispute before the EU judiciary highlights the multifaceted nature of modern, multilevel governance (multilateral: UN; regional: European; and national). It juxtaposes multilateralism with regionalism; the need to effectively combat international terrorism with the need to protect human rights; and the predominance in international relations of politics and diplomacy with the predominance of international and EU law. This article tackles all these themes, highlights the importance and complexities of the issues involved and analyses the commendable manner in which the ECJ addressed them.

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Sanchez Barrueco M.L

**L'Agence européenne de défense, un organe intergouvernemental au service d'une institution communautaire?**  
in *Revue du droit de l'Union Européenne*, n. 3 , 507 - 542



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**Camporini Vincenzo**

**L'Agenzia europea di difesa**

in *Affari Esteri*, Anno XLI, n. 161 , 123-131

No abstract available

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**Marchat Philippe**

**L'Albanie, pays des aigles..., candidat à l'adhésion ?**

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, n. 527, avril , 236-245

Albania, a Balkan country on the coasts of the Adriatic sea, with a surface area under that of the Great Albania of yesteryear, has a long history, which, from the Illyrians of the IIIrd millennium BC, is a sequence of invasions and unions to Greece, Rome, the Byzantine, Serbian and Ottoman empires, the latter empire having lasted five centuries. It gained, not without difficulty, and not for long, in 1272, independence materialised, more recently, in a republic and two kingdoms, in 1914 of William the 1st and between 1928 and 1939, of Zog the 1st, freed in 1946 from Italian and German occupation, Albania was thrown by Enver Hodja in a half a century of withdrawal and hard-line communism. As multiparty system settles in, a serious financial crash led to disorders in 1992, resulting in yet further foreign interference, shorter than the one caused by the self-proclaimed independence prompted in 1989. With a heavy inheritance and a great deal of tourism resources, Albania has gone through a half century of political swings from socialists to democrats, currently in power. The successive governments try, in order to make up for lost time in the country, to implement a political democratisation and economic liberalisation programme and outside the country, to conduct an openness policy, towards the West, by continuing the process initiated several years ago, of double integration in NATO and in the European Union. Yet for various reasons, this should take time.

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**Napolitano Giorgio**

**L'Europa deve riprendere il suo cammino**

in *Affari Esteri*, Anno XLI, n. 162 , 243-249

No abstract available

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Salvemini Maria Teresa

**L'Europa e la crisi**

in *Queste istituzioni*, n. 152 , 1-5

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Napolitano Giorgio

**L'Europa sarà all'altezza delle sue responsabilità?**

in *Affari Esteri*, Anno XLI, n. 163 , 470-482

No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

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Sarcinelli Mario

**L'Europa tra realtà effettuale, volontà popolare e opzioni politiche**

in *Studi sull'integrazione europea*, Anno III, n. 3 , 495-512

No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

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Gnesotto Nicole

**L'Europe : anomalie ou nécessité?**

in *Esprit*, n. 355, juin 2009 , 120-130

Is Europe a freak or a necessity?

Against an historical background calling for more political coordination and economic regulation, Europe is in a good position to make herself heard. And yet it is struggling to stand forth at a crucial moment, in the process losing any credit we thought she might have. How are we to understand this fresh European paradox?

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Ferrand Olivier

**L'Europe contre l'Europe**

in *Esprit*, n. 355, juin 2009 , 139-149



Europe against Europe.

What is currently standing in the way of European integration is little else than... Europe herself! Though the methods that presided over the foundation period have been well tested, they have also favoured a de-politicisation of the European project which today's citizenry are finding unacceptable. This is why a political dimension must be restored to EU decision-making, which calls for enhanced powers for the European Parliament.

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**Mezzalama Francesco**

**L'Ucraina, avamposto dell'Europa**

in *Affari Esteri*, Anno XLI, n. 163 , 599-606

No abstract available

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**Solana Javier**

**L'Union européenne : dix ans de politique européenne de sécurité et de défense**

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, n. 528, mai , 281-283

No abstract available

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**Bardi Luciano, Iacopetti Simona**

**L'Unione europea e la crisi di democrazia. Un aiuto dai partiti**

in *ItalianiEuropei*, n. 2

No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

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**Maarten Keune**

**L'allargamento dell'Unione Europea e gli standard sociali: l'Europa sociale come modello da esportare?**

in *Rivista Italiana di Politiche Pubbliche*, 3, Dicembre 2008 , 153-175

In this paper the extent to which the EU is actively disseminating a social model is considered through the lens of EU enlargement and accession. The paper examines the social effects of the transposition and implementation of the *acquis communautaire*, taking account of the weight given to social considerations in the accession procedure; the impact of the (hard and soft) elements of the social *acquis* on labour markets and welfare state regulations and policies



in the EU-10; as well as the social implications of some of the economic elements of the acquis. It is concluded that the social acquis has had a limited weight in the accession process; that its impact in the NMS has been further limited by the fact that social dialogue has been comparatively weak and the informal sector comparatively large; and that it has been subject to a series of implementation problems

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Louckx Freek

**L'influence du droit européen de la concurrence sur l'organisation des systèmes de soins de santé nationaux**  
in *Les Cahiers de droit européen*, Vol.44, issue 3-4 , 339-406

No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

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Chaltiel Florence

**L'occasion manquée des élections européennes**  
in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, n. 529, juin , 349-351

No abstract available

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Mojon Benoît, Bonzom Philippe

**La BCE et l'eurosystème : 10 ans de fonctionnement**  
in *Europe en formation (L')*, n. 351, printemps , 47-64

Full text available on-line: <http://www.cife.eu/UserFiles/File/EEF/351/MOJONEEF351.pdf>

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Charrin Ève

**La Belgique, vertige de l'Europe**  
in *Esprit*, n. 353, mars/avril 2009 , 31-43

Belgium as Europe's vertigo.

The Belgian government has fallen victim to the economic crisis. The problem is that its fragility is here to stay and is not just yhre by-product of local antics. More than the nation's mood, this fragility comes as a reflection of a country wondering about a collective future where Europe has a role. This is why Belgium may be seen as a harbinger of Europe's own future, caught between a skeptical sense of nationhood and a crisis in political decision-making.



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**Forteau Mathias**

**La CJCE et la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme face à la question de l'articulation du droit européen et du droit des Nations Unies. Quelques remarques iconoclastes**

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, n. 529, juin , 397-402

The community judge is not the only European judge to be facing the issue of the relationship of European law and United Nations law (and particularly the decisions of the Security Council passed in the area of peacekeeping). The issue is also debated before the European Court of Human Rights as shown by the ruling entered on May 2, 2007 in the *Behrami and Saramati* cases. The comparison of the solutions reached by those two European courts is interesting in that it helps better identify the gaps in the standard system relationship reasoning. It has two limits, in particular. By enclosing constitutional claims of European organisations in regional legal systems deemed to be fully sealed, that reasoning first challenges the very value of those claims and their aim to be universal. By choosing to place the debate on the formal field of legal system self sufficiency, it conceals the true stakes: the regional judge's ability to exercise his power in the area of exterior relationship and the effect that can only be produced on the extent of such power by the importance taken in these past years by the right to a judge.

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**Benlolo-Carabot Myriam**

**La CJCE et la protection des valeurs fondamentales de l'ordre juridique communautaire**

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, n. 529, juin , 380-386

The *Kadi* ruling is indisputably a significant step in the CJEC's case law relating to the protection of basic rights in the community's legal system. Never before did the Court so emphasise the values that the European Community is based on and that give it its *raison d'être* and legitimacy. As bases of the European Union, human rights have become constitutional principles of the community's legal system. The prevalence of the constitutional area used by the CJEC allows to reverse the prospect in the taking into account of the international legal system. A Supreme Court, the CJEC protects its legal system against what it sees as an inadmissible breach of its values. Recommending an exacerbated and debated autonomy, it yet helps clarify the community's constitutional identity, and more broadly, the very nature of the community phenomenon.

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**Jimena Quesada Luis**

**La Carta de los Derechos Fundamentales de la UE: rango legal y contenidos sustantivos**

in *Cuadernos europeos de Deusto*, n.40 , 63-83



No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

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**Puoti Paola**

**La PESC nella prospettiva del Trattato di revisione**

in *Studi sull'integrazione europea*, Anno III, n. 3 , 539-574

No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

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**Ortega Carcelén Martín**

**La Política Exterior y de Seguridad Común en el Tratado de Lisboa: un cauce adecuado a la espera de contenidos**

in *Cuadernos europeos de Deusto*, n.40 , 149-159

No abstract available

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**Messina M.**

**La Rete europea delle autorità garanti della concorrenza tra Convenzione europea dei diritti dell'uomo e Carta dei diritti fondamentali**

in *Diritto dell'Unione europea*, Anno: 2008 - Fascicolo: 4 , p. 731

No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

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**Palmas Francesco**

**La Turchia e l'Europa**

in *Affari Esteri*, Anno XLI, n. 161 , 164-180

No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

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**Macchia Gianmarco**

**La Turchia e la sicurezza energetica europea**



in *Affari Esteri*, Anno XLI, n. 163 , 583-598

No abstract available

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**Godano G.**

**La cooperazione in materia di vigilanza bancaria: le regole europee**

in *Diritto dell'Unione europea*, Anno: 2008 - Fascicolo: 4 , p. 701

No abstract available

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**de Schoutheete Philippe**

**La crise et la gouvernance européenne**

in *Politique Etrangère*, n. 1, printemps

"La réussite de la présidence française ne doit pas occulter la faiblesse réelle et inquiétante du pouvoir exécutif de l'Union européenne. Et on ne voit pas ce que le traité de Lisbonne pourrait y changer."

La crise financière frappe une Europe institutionnellement mal en point. La présidence française a donné à l'UE l'illusion d'être gouvernée, sans instituer de gouvernance nouvelle. La Commission s'est marginalisée, et le Conseil n'a démontré aucune autonomie par rapport à sa présidence semestrielle. La Banque centrale est sans doute l'institution qui a le mieux réagi. Quant au traité de Lisbonne, il n'est pas bien sûr qu'il puisse remédier à une faiblesse persistante de l'exécutif européen.

"The success of the French presidency should not hide a very real and preoccupating weakness of the executive in the European Union, that certainly will not be improved by the Lisbon Treaty."

The financial crisis hit European institutions that are already shaky. The French presidency gave the illusion that the European Union was well governed, even if the rules remained unchanged. The European Central Bank is presumably the institution which held best, while the European Commission became marginalized. Furthermore, the European Council has not proven autonomous enough in respect to the bi-annual presidency. As for the Lisbon Treaty, it is unsure whether it will be able to cure the European Executive's persistent weaknesses.

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**Draetta Ugo**

**La funzione legislativa ed esecutiva dell'Unione europea nel Trattato di Lisbona**

in *Diritto comunitario e degli scambi internazionali*, n. 4 , 677-695

No abstract available



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Cangelosi Rocco, Peronaci Marco

**La geografia istituzionale post-Lisbona e la posizione dell'Italia**

in *Studi sull'integrazione europea*, Anno IV, n. 1 , 55-72

No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

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Yakemtchouk Romain

**La navigation par satellite – Les systèmes européens GALILEO et EGNOS**

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, n. 526, mars , 154-162

The world market of satellite navigation (GNSS) is becoming a significant driver of the world economy: it is one of the fastest growing high technology markets. It is also the largest industrial project ever to be set up on a European scale. The assignment of the joint company incorporated on May 21, 2002, GALILEO, is to handle the management of that programme during the 2002-2005 period. The Council suggested on April 21, 2005, that the EGNOS programme, which uses the emissions from the American system GPS and from the Russian system Glonass, be included in that project. The GALILEO development and programme approval phase should end in 2010, its deployment phase would end in 2013, and it is during that year that its operating phase should start. GALILEO will offer five services: an open service, free to the user, supplying positioning data; the back up service for the air, maritime and railroad sectors; a commercial service; a governmental service with a high protection level; an aid and rescue service. The major problem of GALILEO is its competitive viability and its profit capacity versus the American GPS, or even the Chinese and Russian systems, which are improving their business.

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Seatzu Francesco

**La nuova disciplina giuridica sul finanziamento dei partiti politici a livello europeo**

in *Studi sull'integrazione europea*, Anno III, n. 3 , 575-595

No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

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Jean Carlo

**La nuova geopolitica europea**

in *Affari Esteri*, Anno XLI, n. 163 , 567-574



No abstract available

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**Barroso José Manuel, Bollaert Baudouin**

**La passion de l'Europe**

in *Politique internationale*, n°122 - Hiver

José Manuel Durao Barroso, à bientôt 53 ans, brigue ouvertement un deuxième mandat à la tête de la Commission européenne. Ministre portugais des Affaires étrangères de 1991 à 1995, premier ministre de son pays de 2002 à 2004, ce libéral de centre droit qui se dit « modéré, réformateur et anti-étatiste » occupe le poste de président de l'exécutif bruxellois depuis la fin 2004. Ses ennemis parlent de lui comme d'un caméléon sans ligne politique claire. Ses partisans vantent, au contraire, son esprit de consensus et sa vision stratégique. Affable, polyglotte et travailleur, il réussit le tour de force de bien s'entendre avec des personnalités aussi contrastées que Nicolas Sarkozy, Angela Merkel ou Gordon Brown. La crise économique et financière menace-t-elle les fondements de l'Union européenne ? À quelles conditions la voix de l'Europe se ferait-elle mieux entendre dans le monde ? Quelles surprises Barack Obama réserve-t-il à ses alliés du Vieux Continent ? À ces questions, et à bien d'autres encore, M. Barroso répond sans détour. En exclusivité pour *Politique Internationale*.

A former prime minister of Portugal (2002-2004), this center-right liberal who calls himself a "moderate, anti-statist reformer" has been president of the European Commission since late 2004 and is openly canvassing for a second term. What to make of Barack Obama's first days in the White House? Does the economic and financial crisis threaten the foundations of the European Union? Should the Maastricht criteria be abandoned? Should a grand transatlantic market be created? Are we witnessing the states' return to power, to the detriment of EU institutions? Will the Mediterranean Union flourish? How can Europe best ensure its voice is heard in the world? José Manuel Barroso provides frank answers to these and many other questions in this exclusive interview with *Politique Internationale*.

[http://www.politiqueinternationale.com/revue/article.php?id\\_revue=122&id=773&content=synopsis#show1](http://www.politiqueinternationale.com/revue/article.php?id_revue=122&id=773&content=synopsis#show1)

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**Palacios González José**

**La protección de los Derechos Fundamentales por el Tribunal de Justicia de la UE: alcance y consecuencias de la futura adhesión de la UE al Convenio Europeo**

in *Cuadernos europeos de Deusto*, n.40 , 161-179

No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

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**Kinsky Ferdinand**

**La présidence tchèque de l'Union européenne**



in *Europe en formation (L')*, n. 351, printemps , 157-162

Full text available on-line: <http://www.cife.eu/UserFiles/File/EEF/351/KINSKYEEF351.pdf>

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Napolitano Giorgio

**La sfida politica per l'Europa. La lezione di Jacques Delors**

in *Affari Esteri*, Anno XLI, n. 161 , 24-26

No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

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Roland Genson, Buyskens Erwin

**La transformation d'Europol en agence de l'Union – Regards sur un nouveau cadre juridique**

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, n. 525, février , 83-87

The year 2008 can be remembered as a remarkable year for Europol. The Council will soon adopt a Decision "establishing the European Police Office (Europol)". This Decision replaces the current Europol legal framework - a Convention with three protocols - and will turn Europol into an Agency of the Union, funded from the general budget of the European Union as of 1 January 2010. This is a milestone in Europol's history. The still ongoing process requires the Council and the Europol Management Board to prepare and adopt in the coming weeks and months a whole series of implementing measures, covering legislative, budgetary and administrative issues. This is an unprecedented operation representing a massive workload. No other JHA organisation has gone through such a transformation in the past. Furthermore the start of this new and challenging episode in Europol's history should also coincide with Europol's move into its new headquarters in The Hague.

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Kaddouri Hamid

**La valeur ajoutée de la politique européenne de voisinage en matière de conditionnalité politique**

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, n. 525, février , 107-117

The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) anticipates a significant integration between the EU and its neighbours. The ENP allows all neighbour states to be invested in EU policy and programmes. It consists of an interim stage between partnership and membership. This transition is however reliant upon radical policy reforms and structural adjustment, improving economic relations. The ENP instigates a programme of dual-edged conditional membership, where neighbour states would be subject to the dictates of the EU whilst also benefiting from the incentives of the ENP. The conditionality of the ENP is managed according to the principles of differentiation and progressiveness, taking into account all the particular features unique to each neighbour state.



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Chemain Régis

**Le "suites" dell'arrêt Kadi**

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, n. 529, juin , 387-393

The Kadi ruling is a major ruling by the CJEC, due to the answers that it provides and the relationship between community law and international law, as well as in terms of the place of basic rights among the rules of a constitutionalised European order. Considering the acknowledgement in Europe and internationally, of that ruling and the measures taken in response thereto, it is now possible and useful to think about the consequences of that case in a manner tangible on the short term, and according to a more prospective process on the long term. Will the consequences given or likely to be given to this case confirm the self-sufficiency stated here, of community law in relationship to international law and the prevailing place of basic rights on the war on terrorism. On those two points, the progress seems limited in relationship to what could be expected.

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Lefebvre Maxime

**Le Partenariat oriental : à l'Est rien de nouveau ?**

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, n. 528, mai , 288-293

No abstract available

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Cerretelli Adriana

**Le cattive abitudini dell'Italia in Europa**

in *ItalianiEuropei*, n. 2

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Thouvenin Jean-Marc

**Le choc du droit communautaire et du droit international, encore l'arrêt Kadi**

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, n. 524, janvier , 30-31

No abstract available



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Calamia Pietro

**Le elezioni europee del giugno 2009**

in *Affari Esteri*, Anno XLI, n. 162 , 341-345

No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

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Daniele Luigi

**Le istituzioni politiche dell'Unione europea dopo il Trattato di Lisbona: verso un nuovo equilibrio?**

in *Studi sull'integrazione europea*, Anno IV, n. 1 , 43-54

No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

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Le Goff Jacques

**Le origini dell'Europa**

in *ItalianiEuropei*, n. 2

No abstract available

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Micossi Stefano

**Le politiche economiche dell'Unione europea dopo la crisi finanziaria: è tempo di cambiare**

in *ItalianiEuropei*, n. 2

No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

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Racah Aurélien

**Le principe de subsidiarité, vers une codification de la procédure pré-législative de l'union ?**

in *Revue française d'administration publique*, n. 127



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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

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Tsalpatouros Eva

**Le précédent de la résistance des juges internes au droit communautaire**

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, n. 529, juin , 403-407

Domestic judges' resistance to community law, which is an ordinary, much analysed topic, has gained renewed interest in the framework of the Kadi ruling analysis grid. The community judge intends to protect the constitutional legal system of the Community while overcoming the lack of any control over the compliance with basic rights by the Security Council's decisions. The Court of Justice offers a standard interpretation of the relationships of the systems such as analysed by constitutional law. It resists and raises the same questions as the Italian and German constitutional courts. The judges' dialogue generated by community experience helped to achieve an unprecedented balance in the framework of twin-sided monism.

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Beqiraj Julinda

**Le sfide del processo di pre-adesione fra modifiche costituzionali, consolidamento del potere giudiziario e volontà politiche: brevi commenti e riflessioni sull'articolo di D.Piqani**

in *Diritto pubblico comparato ed europeo*, n.4 , 1697 ss.

No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

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Chaltiel Florence

**Le traité de Lisbonne peut-il entrer en vigueur ?**

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, n. 525, février , 77-82

No abstract available

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McLure Jr. Charles

**Legislative, judicial, soft law, and cooperative approaches to harmonizing corporate income taxes in the us and the EU**

in *Columbia Journal of European Law*, Vol.14, issue 3

The Member States of the European Community have systems of taxing corporate income that are more appropriate for nations than for members of an economic union. This paper describes the problems of the present system, which is



based on separate accounting and arm's length pricing, the advantages of one based on consolidation and formula apportionment, such as those employed by the US states and Canadian provinces, and the desirable characteristics of such a system.

The European Court of Justice outlaws practices inconsistent with a single market. But judicial harmonization cannot achieve a fully harmonized system. Since the required legislative harmonization is stymied by the requirement in the EC Treaty that tax provisions be adopted unanimously, the European Commission has proposed that "enhanced cooperation" between as few as eight Member States be employed to initiate harmonization. The paper examines judicial, legislative, and cooperative approaches to corporate tax harmonization in the EC and the US.

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**Drulák Petr**

**Les Tchèques à la tête de l'Europe La présidence tchèque de l'Union européenne en 2009**

*in Revue d'études comparatives Est-Ouest*, vol. 40, n. 1, Mars , 19-43

Czech political thinking about the EU is still under the sway of the idea of "returning to Europe", which has guided the country's foreign policy. Given the Czech government's composition, the Czech presidency of the EU can be expected to evidence a slightly pro-American tendency. However priorities will reflect the country's long-term interests given the still prevailing conceptual framework of a "return to Europe". These priorities but partly overlap with those of the French EU presidency, since the French and Czech governments hold different views about Europe.

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**Beauvallet Willy, Michon Sébastien**

**Les femmes au Parlement européen : Effets du mode de scrutin, des stratégies et des ressources politiques.**

**L'exemple de la délégation française**

*in Swiss Political Science Review - Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft - Revue suisse de science politique*, Volume 14, Number 4, Winter 2008-09 , 663-690

Cet article vise à apporter des éléments d'explication quant à la féminisation des élus français au Parlement européen. S'il semble nécessaire de prendre en compte le mode de scrutin, ses effets ne peuvent véritablement se comprendre qu'en relation, d'une part avec la position du Parlement européen dans le champ politique français et d'autre part avec la configuration propre des luttes sociales et politiques qui traversent l'espace public français au cours des années 1990. C'est dans ce cadre que le genre constitue une ressource politique plus rentable au Parlement européen qu'au parlement français, avec pour conséquence la promotion de femmes moins familiarisées avec l'exercice du métier politique ; des femmes qui de ce fait s'orientent davantage vers des formes de « bonne volonté » parlementaire et des stratégies de surinvestissement des rôles politiques européens. La spécificité relative des postures qu'elles adoptent au sein de l'institution renvoie donc moins à une hypothétique « nature féminine », qu'à un ensemble de processus sociopolitiques.

The full text is free: <http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/spsa/spsr/2008/00000014/00000004/art00003>



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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

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**Met-Domestici Alexandre**

**Les parlements nationaux et le contrôle du respect du principe de subsidiarité**

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, n. 525, février , 88-96

The new role entrusted to National Parliaments in the control of compliance with the subsidiary principle is a major contribution of the Treaty of Lisbon. Taking back up the mechanism contained in the Constitutional Treaty and going into it in depth, the new Treaty provides both for a deductive political control exercised directly by the Parliaments, and an inductive jurisdictional control exercised on the appeal of the latter at the Court of Justice of the European Communities. If this mechanism reinforces the involvement of National Parliaments in the Community legal process, thanks to the innovative procedure of reinforced political control in particular, which can lead to blocking the adoption of an act, questions remain concerning the effectiveness of jurisdictional control, due to the intermediation of the national governments and the uncertainties regarding its impact.

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**Castorina Emilio**

**Linguaggio costituzionale e integrazione europea**

in *Federalismi*, Anno VII - N. 8

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**Ordóñez Solís David**

**Lo que se salvó en Lisboa y su significado en la pequeña historia constitucional de la Unión Europea**

in *Cuadernos europeos de Deusto*, n.40 , 109-148

No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

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**Boixareu Carrera Angel**

**Los derechos de los ciudadanos de la Unión Europea y otros aspectos de democracia directa**

in *Cuadernos europeos de Deusto*, n.40 , 43-50

No abstract available



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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

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Beulay Marjorie

**L'arrêt Kadi et Al Barakaat International Foundation : Réaffirmation par la Cour de Justice de l'autonomie du droit communautaire vis-à-vis du droit international**

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, n. 524, janvier , 32-40

The issue of system relations is at the centre of the recent Kali ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Communities. In the context of the application of anti-terrorist combating measures against private individuals, initially imposed by the United Nations Security Council, the Court determines the place of international law in the Community legal order. It takes the opportunity to remind people of the famous autonomy principle of the Community legal order in the course of a highly awaited ruling within the international Community. Indeed, beyond the simple definition of the relations between international law and Community law, the Court, by the yardstick of Community law, also enables a split to be brought about in a controversial penalty system. This stance does not just have its consequences within international law but also within the Community legal order itself. Indeed, by opting for a monistic vision with pre-eminence of Community law, the Court of Justice of the European Communities is remaining true to its traditional position but is leaving room for uncertainties concerning the practical repercussions of its reasoning.

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Shuibhne Niamh Nic

**Margins of appreciation: National values, fundamental rights and EC free movement law**

in *European Law Review*, Vol.34, issue 2 , 230-256

No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

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Adamowicz Jakub

**Maturity at ten: a new scope of challenges for the euro**

in *Europe en formation (L')*, n. 351, printemps , 111-116

Full text available on-line: <http://www.cife.eu/UserFiles/File/EEF/351/ADAMOWICZEEF351.pdf>

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Bénassy-Quéré Agnès, Poplawski Ribeiro Marcos

**Mauvais temps pour le Pacte**

in *Lettre du CEPII*, N° 286 Avril



Partout dans le monde, le besoin de relance fait dérapier les finances publiques et pose l'inévitable question de la soutenabilité de la dette. En zone euro, le récent lancement par la Commission européenne de procédures pour déficits excessifs fait débat. Pourtant, la zone a cruellement besoin d'un dispositif crédible de discipline budgétaire qui permettrait de rassurer les marchés de dettes souveraines et de dissiper la réticence de la BCE à adopter une politique quantitative. La relance publique en serait facilitée, ce qui pourrait ouvrir la voie à un processus de sortie de crise. Reste à définir les contours d'une discipline plus stricte, mais aussi plus favorable aux politiques contra-cycliques.

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309-323

**Moment of Stasis: The Successful Failure of a Constitution for Europe**

in *European law journal*, May 2009 - Vol. 15 Issue 3, Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos Andreas

The 2005 French and Dutch negative votes on the Constitution open up a space of conceptualisation, not only of Europe's relation to its demos, but significantly to its failures. Through a critical analysis of mainly Niklas Luhmann's systems theory, the article proposes taking a distance from traditional constitutional dogmatics that are no longer capable of dealing with the paradox of contemporary society, and more specifically with the eventual resurgence of the European project as one of absence and stasis: the two terms are used to explain the need, on the one hand, to maintain the 'absent community' of Europe, and, on the other, to start realising that any conceptualisation of the European project will now have to take place in that space of instability and contingency revealed by the constitutional failure. The relation between law and politics, the location of a constitution, the distinction between social and normative legitimacy, the connection between European identity and demos, and the concept of continuity between constitutional text and context are revisited in an attempt to trace the constitutional failure as the constitutional moment par excellence.

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Krotz Ulrich

**Momentum and Impediments: Why Europe Won't Emerge as a Full Political Actor on the World Stage Soon**

in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Volume 47, Issue 3, June 2009, 555-578

Is Europe about to rise as a full political actor on the world stage? Conventional wisdom had it that European integration in foreign policy, security and defence was unlikely to amount to much very quickly. More recently, however, a diverse group of scholars has argued that pan-European political actorhood had gained considerable substance. Surveying the recent literature, pertinent related writings and relevant primary materials on the matter, this article identifies and systematizes the many different factors affecting European high-politics actorhood in the early 21st century. A fully grown international actor Europe, it finds, remains a longer-term project rather than an imminent prospect.

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Mark M. Spiegel

**Monetary and financial integration: Evidence from the EMU**

in *Journal of the Japanese and International Economies*, Volume 23, Issue 2, 114-130



This paper examines the impact of European Monetary Union (EMU) accession on bilateral international commercial bank lending patterns. Using a difference-in-differences methodology, I demonstrate that accession to the EMU was accompanied by a change in Portuguese and Greek borrowing in favor of borrowing from their EMU partner nations. This extends the evidence in the literature that overall international borrowing is facilitated by the creation of a monetary union, and raises the possibility of financial diversion

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Plassnik Ursula

**Mut Zu Europa. Für eine europäische Zukunftsoffensive**

in *Europäische Rundschau*, Heft 1, 2009 , 25-33

No abstract available

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Pliakos Asteris

**National Parliament and the European Union: Necessity of Assigning a Supranational Role**

in *Revue européenne de droit public*, Vol. 19 - No. 2 , 157-785

No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

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Semin Suvarierol

**Networking in Brussels: Nationality over a Glass of Wine**

in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Volume 47, Issue 2, March 2009 , 411-435

This article provides an insight into the Brussels informal networking scene by providing empirical evidence on the networks of European Commission officials. It is argued that Commission officials tend to separate work and private contacts and that nationality rather forms a bonding factor for leisure purposes.

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De Vreese Claes H., Kandyla Anna

**News Framing and Public Support for a Common Foreign and Security Policy**

in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Volume 47, Issue 3, June 2009 , 453-481

A common EU foreign and security policy (CFSP) can be framed by elites and media as a risk or as an opportunity. This article examines the effects of framing in terms of 'risk' and 'opportunity' on public support. Moreover, we examine first whether the effect of framing CFSP as a 'risk for the nation-state' has more impact than 'risk for the EU' framing, and



second whether fear of globalization moderates the effect of news framing at the individual level. Drawing on a survey-embedded experiment (n = 2,081) we found that participants in the 'risk' frame condition showed significantly lower levels of support compared to participants in the 'opportunity' condition. Those in the 'risk for the nation-state' condition were significantly less supportive of CFSP than those in the 'risk for the EU' condition. The framing effect was moderated by fear of globalization so that individuals more afraid of globalization exposed to the 'risk' frame condition were significantly more susceptible to 'risk' framing than individuals with low fear of globalization. The results provide insights into the effects of valenced news frames and support for specific EU policies.

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Schimmelfennig Frank, Thomas Daniel C.

**Normative institutionalism and EU foreign policy in comparative perspective  
in International Politics** , Volume 46, Issue 4, July , 491-504

Normative Institutionalism has proven to be a robust theory of EU decision-making on foreign policy and external relations whose entrapment and cooperative bargaining explanations for the policy-making process and outcome are generally (though not universally) superior to those of competing theories. This conclusion emerges from 14 case studies across a broad range of policy areas and institutional settings, all of which exhibited clear differences in the initial policy preferences of member states. Only two of the cases offered clear support for Intergovernmentalism's competitive bargaining hypothesis, while none of the case studies conforms to either the normative suasion or policy learning hypotheses, which posit distinctive mechanisms of policy agreement based on preference convergence. Cross-case analysis identifies the relative importance of five conditions hypothesized to affect the likelihood of entrapment and cooperative bargaining: determinacy, relevance, publicity, precedent and forum. Finally, we discuss the implications of this special issue for future research and for EU policy-making.

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Brüner Franz Hermann, Spitzer Harald

**OLAF-REFORM II – Kosmetischer Eingriff oder Großer Wurf?  
in Europarecht**, Volume 43, Issue 6, 2008 , 859-873

No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

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Convery Frank J.

**Origins and Development of the EU ETS  
in Environmental & Resource Economics**, Volume 43, Number 3, July , 391-412

The successful creation of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) was not inevitable. Countries such as Canada and Japan which might be thought to have a less complex and more cohesive cultural and institutional context failed to do so. Europe succeeded for a number of reasons: with a Single Market for the economy, the logic of a



single market for environment is inexorable; the European Commission—which had failed in its earlier efforts to introduce a carbon energy tax—made the case for trading with great skill and persistence, on the basis of qualified majority voting, which meant no country had a veto; the UK and Denmark initiated their own national schemes, and there was a serious risk of balkanising the market with up to 27 different schemes, with the losses of scale and scope this would entail; meeting the Union's Kyoto commitments required a substantive pan European response, and EU ETS was the most credible and effective way of doing so. The European Parliament and Environmental Non Governmental Organisations played a constructive role, pushing for more auctioning of allowances and less of them, allocated centrally. Free allocation managed by Member States (MS) was a necessary condition to achieve the support needed, so they failed to achieve these objectives in the initial phase, but they characterize the Commission's proposals post 2012.

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Pace Michelle

**Paradoxes and contradictions in EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean: the limits of EU normative power**

in *Democratization*, vol. 16, n. 1, February - Special Issue: THE EUROPEAN UNION'S DEMOCRATIZATION AGENDA IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: A CRITICAL INSIDE-OUT APPROACH , 39-58

Abstract

Disciplinary debates about the challenge of liberal democracy in the Mediterranean suggest that the underlying constraints in the region, such as the nature of authoritarian regimes, economic underdevelopment, and the nature of rentier states, pose severe tests for external actors like the European Union (EU) seeking to encourage political reform. These debates have, however, failed to address the question of how and why liberal democracy per se achieved normative status. This article seeks to take this debate forward by examining the substance of the EU's efforts at democracy promotion in the Mediterranean. It does this first by explaining the EU's diagnosis of the Mediterranean 'condition', which highlights the logic behind the EU's prescription for democratization specifically in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. This sheds light, second, on the inherent paradoxes and contradictions in the EU's push for democracy in the MENA. The article concludes by arguing that EU actions limit any potential for normative impact in the MENA because of the lack of coherence in EU policy.

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Giandomenico Jessica

**Path Dependency in EU Enlargement: Macedonia's Candidate Status from a Historical Institutional Perspective**

in *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Volume 14, Issue 1 , 89-112

This article argues that EU enlargement policy and actions within that field are guided by the logic of path dependency. By studying the decision to confer candidate status on Macedonia in 2005, which was granted despite important shortcomings regarding democracy and rule of law, we can reveal key aspects of the decision-making process regarding the enlargement policy. The Macedonian crisis in 2001 was instrumental in shaping EU enlargement policy as a foreign policy tool to promote peace and stability in the Western Balkans. The peace agreement that ended the



conflict, in turn, became an important reference for measuring reform progress in Macedonia. The enlargement policy thus became locked in a path-dependent pattern, where the implementation of the peace agreement from 2001 has become very important. The strong commitments by the EU towards Macedonia are identified as a particularly strong mechanism influencing the path dependent pattern. Where other influential theories cannot explain contradictions between EU Member State voting and preferences, or ignorance of democratic shortcomings, historical institutionalism offers tools to make such theoretical inconsistencies intelligible.

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Saam Nicole J., Sumpter David

**Peer selection in EU intergovernmental negotiations**

in *Journal of European Public Policy* , Volume 16 Issue 3 2009 , 356 – 377

In this paper we present the peer co-ordination approach which we apply to EU intergovernmental negotiations. This approach seeks to contribute to liberal intergovernmentalist' bargaining theory (Moravcsik 1993, 1998). It assumes that EU intergovernmental negotiations should be conceptualized as a rational learning process under uncertainty in which governments co-ordinate with peers in intergovernmental policy networks. In particular, we investigate the reasons why an EU government should select another government as a peer. Relying on a dataset on the EU Intergovernmental Conference of 1996 which led to the Amsterdam Treaty, we test five alternative hypotheses on peer selection (ex ante transnational co-ordination, preference, salience, power, and neighbourhood; H1-H5). A random model provides us with a null model (H0) against which to test alternative models. We find that peer selection during these EU intergovernmental negotiations can best be explained by ex ante transnational co-ordination networks.

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Goetz Klaus H., Meyer-Sahling Jan-Hinrik

**Political time in the EU: dimensions, perspectives, theories**

in *Journal of European Public Policy* , Volume 16 Issue 2 2009 , 180 – 201

The manner in which time is institutionalized is critical to how a political system works. Terms, time budgets and time horizons of collective and individual political actors; rights over timing, sequencing and speed in decision-making; and the temporal properties of policy matter to the distribution of power; efficiency and effectiveness of policy-making; and democratic legitimacy. This article makes a case for the systematic study of political time in the European Union (EU) - both as an independent and a dependent variable - and highlights the analytical value-added of a time-centred analysis. The article discusses previous scholarship on the institutionalization of political time and its consequences along the dimensions of polity, politics and policy; and then reviews dominant perspectives on political time, which centre on power, system performance and legitimacy. These perspectives tie in with diverse theoretical traditions in the study of the EU. Taken together, dimensions, perspectives and theories help to guide time-centred analyses of the EU political system.

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Bulmer Simon

**Politics in Time meets the politics of time: historical institutionalism and the EU timescape**  
in *Journal of European Public Policy* , Volume 16 Issue 2 2009 , 307 – 324

This article considers what light historical institutionalism (HI) may be able to shed on the European Union's (EU's) timescape. Drawing on Paul Pierson's work *Politics in Time* it reviews what HI has to say about the dual dynamics of path dependent incremental development and radical change (termed punctuated equilibrium or critical junctures) as well as relating to timing, sequencing and long-term processes. It then suggests three areas of EU studies for exploring these contrasting dynamics, namely the integration process as a whole, EU policy dynamics and Europeanization. Applications of HI in EU studies have tended to be empirical and have often neglected to engage with the temporal theorizing embraced by Pierson. The special issue's appeal for a new research agenda on the EU timescape offers the opportunity, it is argued, to rectify the insufficiency of theoretical reflection.

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Wind Marlene

**Post-national citizenship in Europe: the EU as a “welfare rights generator”?**  
in *Columbia Journal of European Law*, Vol.15, issue 2

As a result of recent developments in the European Union, governments no longer have the exclusive authority to decide who can reside and work in their territories or who is eligible for the social provisions that have traditionally been reserved for their own nationals. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has recently interpreted Union citizenship to confer the benefits associated with EU free movement rights on all citizens of EU Member States. According to the ECJ, there is now so much “financial solidarity” between the EU Member States that citizens of other Member States have become eligible for non-contributory social assistance in the host state. The much criticized citizenship concept adopted in the Maastricht Treaty is thus gradually gaining some of the substance that was originally accredited to it. The link between territoriality, membership, and national solidarity characterizing classical concepts of citizenship is thus undergoing transformation and turning citizenship in Europe into a truly post-national phenomenon. By combining insights drawn from law and political science, the article analyzes how this transformation of citizenship in Europe has come about. The study demonstrates that the concept of Union citizenship has evolved from political rhetoric to become one of the Community's most important principles.

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Antón Zarragoitia Mikel

**Previsiones sobre el principio de subsidiariedad y su impacto en el ámbito regional**  
in *Cuadernos europeos de Deusto*, n.40 , 19-41

No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

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Rozenberg Olivier

**Présider par plaisir. L'examen des affaires européennes à l'Assemblée nationale et à la Chambre des Communes depuis Maastricht**

in *Revue française de science politique*, Volume 59, Numéro 3, Juin

Les parlements français et britannique ont progressivement obtenu d'importantes prérogatives en matière européenne. Les activités européennes de leur chambre basse demeurent pourtant sous-développées et peinent à intéresser les députés. Ce paradoxe résulte d'une divergence entre les intérêts des chefs de partis de gouvernement et les députés de base. Il contribue à ce que les activités européennes des deux assemblées soient menées non pas par des experts de la chose communautaire mais par une diversité d'élus endossant différents rôles en fonction de leurs aspirations psychologiques personnelles. L'étude des motivations des présidents de la Délégation pour l'Union européenne de l'Assemblée nationale et du European Scrutiny Committee de la Chambre des Communes conduit ainsi à distinguer quatre rôles européanisés : le Président de Commission, le membre d'un club, l'inquisiteur et celui qui côtoie les grands.

The fun of chairing a select committee : The scrutiny of European affairs at the French National Assembly and at the House of Commons since Maastricht

Over time, the French and British parliaments have progressively obtained significant prerogatives in the control of European affairs. However, the European activities of their lower houses are under-developed and attract a limited number of MPs. This paradox results from a divergence of interest between governing-party leaders and backbenchers. In consequence, the European activities of both assemblies are handled not by experts on Community affairs, but by a variety of MPs, who play various roles according to their personal psychological expectations. Based on an analysis of what motivates those presiding over the National Assembly's Delegation for the European Union and the House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee, we can distinguish four basic Europeanized roles, which we call the Chair, the Club Member, the Inquisitor and the One who rubs shoulders with the Great and Powerful.

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Berend Ivan

**Quo Vadis Europa**

in *Europäische Rundschau*, Heft 4, 2008

No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

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Qvortrup Matt

**Rebels without a Cause? The Irish Referendum on the Lisbon Treaty**

in *Political Quarterly*, Volume 80, Issue 1, January/March 2009, 59-66



The Irish referendum on the Lisbon Treaty follows a pattern of class-voting also seen in the 2005 referendums on the European Constitution. However, the poll differed in other respects. Polling in the wake of the vote suggested that the main reason given for voting no was a lack of knowledge about the treaty (22 per cent of no voters holding that view). A further 40 per cent of the voters voted no because they claimed not to understand the Treaty. This is in contrast to referendums in 2005 in Spain and the Netherlands where, respectively 70 and 51 per cent, of those with a self confessed 'very limited' knowledge of the Constitution voted yes.

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

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Deakin Simon

**Reflexive Governance and European Company Law**

in *European law journal*, March 2009 - Vol. 15 Issue 2 , 224-245

The use of reflexive forms of governance is growing within the EU, in particular as the open method of coordination (OMC) is applied to a wider range of contexts. Reflexive approaches view diversity of laws and practices across the Member States as the basis for experimentation and mutual learning within the overall process of European integration. Company law, however, seems to be an exception to this trend: recent activity in this area has mostly taken the form of 'hard law' harmonisation through directives, coupled with the stimulation of regulatory competition through judgments of the European Court of Justice concerning freedom of movement, most notably the Centros case. The deliberations of the European Corporate Governance Forum barely qualify as a 'company law OMC' because of the limited space allowed for 'learning from diversity'; instead, differences in the laws of the Member States are seen, in the discourse of the Forum, as 'distortions of competition'. In the area of labour law, by contrast, a degree of functional convergence and a coordinated raising of standards have recently been achieved by the dovetailing of the OMC with social policy directives. The contrasting experiences of labour law and company law suggest that reflexive or experimentalist approaches to European governance can be effective when they operate so as to complement mechanisms of harmonisation and regulatory competition, rather than being presented as alternatives to them.

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Kämpfer Sylvia

**Regionale Ungleichheiten in der Tschechischen und Slowakischen Republik im Zuge des Erweiterungsprozesses der Europäischen Union**

in *Soziale Welt*, Jahrgang 59, Heft 4, 2008 , 351-372

No abstract available

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Thomas Daniel C.

**Rejecting the US challenge to the International Criminal Court: Normative entrapment and compromise in EU policy-making**

in *International Politics*, Volume 46, Issue 4, July, 376-394

Achieving European Union (EU) unity in world affairs is particularly difficult when divergent Member State preferences are reinforced by US pressure. This paper explains how the EU maintained unity on the International Criminal Court (ICC) despite a concerted American effort in 2002 to exploit intra-EU discord on the issue of agreements to shield citizens from certain states from ICC scrutiny. Some Member States were sympathetic to American efforts to shield US personnel from the ICC, while others considered them incompatible with the EU's prior commitment to support the new Court. By comparing the process and outcome of two sets of negotiations on this issue, one within the UN Security Council and one within EU forums, the paper suggests that the likelihood of EU policy outcomes being shaped by prior normative commitments and cooperative bargaining (as expected by Normative Institutionalism) rather than competitive bargaining (Intergovernmentalism) depends significantly upon the institutional context in which the Member States negotiate.

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Milman-Sivan Faina

**Representativity, Civil Society, and the EU Social Dialogue: Lessons from the International Labor Organization in *Indiana Journal for Global Legal Studies*, Volume 16, issue 1, winter, 311-337**

ABSTRACT: This article addresses representativity questions that arise from the formal insertion of private, functional groups within the European Union (EU) governance via the EU social dialogue. It depicts the representativity debate at the EU social dialogue and suggests that important lessons can be learned through the examination of another institutional context in which similar questions have been raised and addressed: the International Labor Organization (ILO) tripartite structure. In addition, it ascertains that the issue of representativity of the EU social partners would further benefit from viewing it in the broader context of the EU "democratic deficit." The article concludes that such an analysis underscores the need to rethink the current understanding of representativity in the EU social dialogue. In particular, it considers the benefits and disadvantages of expanding the notion of representativity to encompass the internal structural mechanisms of the EU social partners.

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Rosenzweig Luc

**Republique Tchèque: Une Présidence à reculons**

in *Politique internationale*, n°122 - Hiver

The Czech presidency of the European Union has kicked off in an atmosphere of mutual mistrust between Brussels and Prague. It is true that the outsized personality and thunderous declarations of President Vaclav Klaus, known for his hostility to European institutions and his abhorrence of ecologists, do not really help matters. Although the Czech Constitution accords him few powers, he is nonetheless the master of the situation. He has reigned over the Czech political scene for nearly twenty years and, despite the economic crisis, does not disown his ultra-free-market beliefs.



His prime minister Mirek Topolánek, with whom he has had stormy relations although they belong to the same party, has a hard time making his voice heard. Paradoxically, the Czech Republic is, along with Ireland who voted against it, the last of the twenty-seven members who haven't ratified the Lisbon treaty. A sign of reluctance that doesn't put the country in a solid position to take the reins of the EU.

[http://www.politiqueinternationale.com/revue/article.php?id\\_revue=122&id=775&content=synopsis](http://www.politiqueinternationale.com/revue/article.php?id_revue=122&id=775&content=synopsis)

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**Keating Michael**

**Rescaling Europe**

**in Perspectives on European Politics and Society**, vol. 10, n. 1, April, Special Issue "Reconstituting Political Order in Europe, West and East" , 34-50

The European nation-state as an ideal-type was a polity bounded by fixed borders, which enclosed an economy, a society, a system of representation and a demos. Normatively, it was supported as essential to democracy and social solidarity. In practice, states had to engage in strategies of territorial management in order to maintain their spatial integrity. From the late twentieth century, spatial rescaling at supranational and substate levels has produced a disjuncture of systems that previously coincided in the nation-state. This poses a series of questions about democracy, efficacy in government and social solidarity.

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**Exadaktylos Theofanis, Radaelli Claudio M.**

**Research Design in European Studies: The Case of Europeanization**

**in Journal of Common Market Studies**, Volume 47, Issue 3, June 2009 , 507-530

In this article, we contribute to the debate on research design and causal analysis in European integration studies by considering the sub-field of Europeanization. First, we examine the awareness of research design issues in the literature on Europeanization through a review of the debate on causality, concept formation and methods. Second, we analyse how much of the discussion of the trade-offs in causal analysis in mainstream political science has percolated into Europeanization studies. We therefore construct a sample of the Europeanization literature, comparing it to a control group of highly cited articles on European integration. This enables us to control if some patterns are specific to the Europeanization literature or reflect a more general trend in European integration. We then look at trade-offs in the Europeanization sample and in the control group. Our findings indicate that awareness of research design is still low. Europeanization articles differ from the control group in the focus on mechanisms (rather than variables) and the qualitative aspects of time in politics. Complex notions of causality prevail in Europeanization but not in the control group and the cause-of-effects approach is preferred to effects-of-causes in the control group but not in Europeanization – in both cases, however, the difference is slight. We conclude by explaining differences and similarities and make proposals for future research.

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Radosevic Slavo

**Research and Development, Competitiveness and European Integration of South Eastern Europe**  
in *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 61, n. 4, June , 621-650

This article explores the relationship between research and development (R&D) and competitiveness of South East European (SEE) economies from the perspective of European Union (EU) integration. Specifically, the article addresses the question of whether South East Europe is a potential asset or liability to the enlarged EU. SEE countries are quite diverse in terms of levels of competitiveness, with visible effects on the role of R&D, which is confirmed by analysis of R&D demand and supply factors. Improvements in the national innovation systems of SEE countries have largely taken place through vertical linkages on the supply and demand sides. However, a wider role for R&D will depend increasingly on the strength of horizontal linkages within national systems of innovation and their key agent—the local innovative business enterprise sector. This calls for a rethinking of science and technology policy, traditionally defined as a sectoral activity.

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Bideleux Robert

**Rethinking the Eastward Extension of the EU Civil Order and the Nature of Europe's New East-West Divide**  
in *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, vol. 10, n. 1, April, Special Issue "Reconstituting Political Order in Europe, West and East" , 118-136

The first half of this article argues that the EU can be most aptly characterized as a law-governed and highly consensual civil association and that the chief benefits of the ongoing eastward enlargement of the EU derive from the impact of the rule of law and increased rule-certainty on economic, social and political activity and conduct in the new and prospective member countries. The second half of the article argues that the unreadiness of Russia and most other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to become part of Europe's civil order derives, not from 'essentialist' cultural/civilizational differences between the CIS and the rest of Europe, but from the profoundly entrenched (albeit not wholly unassailable) 'verticality' of power structures and power relations in most of the CIS polities, economies and societies. Thus Europe's new East-West divide need not be explained by ethnocentric cultural essentialism and fatalism concerning Europe's 'East' (a latter day version of 'Orientalism'). This divide can instead be challenged and eventually surmounted by persistent and concerted efforts to change the structures, opportunities, incentives and penalties in Europe's East-West relations.

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Biebuyck William

**Review Essay: The New European Imaginary (Jeremy Rifkin, *The European Dream: How Europe's Vision of the Future Is Quietly Eclipsing the American Dream*. New York: Jeremy P. Tarcher/Penguin, 2004, 448pp.; John McCormick, *The European Superpower*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, 256pp.; T.R. Reid, *The United States of Europe*. New York: Penguin, 2004, 320pp.)**

in *European Journal of Social Theory*, Volume 12, No. 2, May 2009 , 291-302



No abstract available

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Mill Colorni Felice

**Ricostruire il progetto europeo**

in *Critica liberale*, Volume XV, n. 151-152, maggio-giugno

No abstract available

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Verola Nicola

**Ripartire da Lisbona. Le sfide per l'Unione nell'età della crisi**

in *ItalianiEuropei*, n. 2

No abstract available

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Leggewie Claus

**Schlachtfeld Europa. Transnationale Erinnerung und europäische Identität**

in *Blätter für deutsche & internationale Politik*, Februar, 2009 , 81-93

Dass Europa sich in einer Krise befindet, ist längst ein Gemeinplatz. Erst war es eine Krise der Erweiterung, dann eine Vertiefungs- und schließlich auch eine Verfassungskrise. Daran konnte die vergangene französische Ratspräsidentschaft unter einem hyperaktiven Präsidenten Nicolas Sarkozy wenig ändern; und auch der gegenwärtige Vorsitz Tschechiens mit dem ausgewiesenen EU-Skeptiker Václav Klaus gibt kaum zu größerer Hoffnung Anlass. Insofern wäre es bereits eine positive Überraschung, wenn ...

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Pridham Geoffrey

**Securing the Only Game in Town: The EU's Political Conditionality and Democratic Consolidation in Post-Soviet Latvia**

in *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 61, n. 1, January , 51-84

Abstract

The state of democracy in post-communist Europe has been subject to some debate in recent years; but it needs to take account of longer-term trends. The focus here is on how far the EU's political conditionality has contributed to



democratic consolidation using an in-depth case study of post-Soviet Latvia. The record of the impacts of conditionality up to EU entry is examined and then attention turns to whether post-accession tendencies have demonstrated any significant changes after the end of Brussels' monitoring. Using a comparative framework, this article shows that the outcome after four years of EU membership is mixed with both positive and negative results. It is concluded that there is no automatic locking-in effect of European integration; and that conditionality assists democratic consolidation more in structural than in attitudinal or behavioural terms.

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Neal Andrew W.

**Securitization and Risk at the EU Border: The Origins of FRONTEX**

in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Volume 47, Issue 2, March 2009 , 333-356

Documenting the origins, remit and practices of the European external borders agency FRONTEX, this article argues that FRONTEX is not the product of 'securitizing' links between terrorism, security, migration and borders made by EU institutions in response to 9/11, but rather of their failure. In so doing, the article critiques securitization theory in comparison to the alternative modality of risk.

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Daugbjerg Carsten

**Sequencing in public policy: the evolution of the CAP over a decade**

in *Journal of European Public Policy* , Volume 16 Issue 3 2009 , 395 – 411

This article sets out to bring the concept of reactive sequencing into policy studies and demonstrate its value in the analysis of policy reform. Reactive sequencing is based on the notion that early events in a sequence set in motion a chain of causally linked reactions and counter-reactions which trigger subsequent development. Since responses to earlier events may come in the form of counter-reactions, reactive sequences do not necessarily induce further movements in the same direction but remain open to a change of direction. Therefore, the approach is well suited to analyse substantial policy change over time. The analysis of agricultural reform in the European Union from 1992 to 2003 demonstrates that this approach to sequencing is useful. The MacSharry reform of 1992 set in motion a sequence of reactive reform events which resulted in the Fischler reform of 2003. Each reform event opened new opportunities for further reform.

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Calamia Pietro

**Silvio Fagiolo e l'Europa**

in *Affari Esteri*, Anno XLI, n. 163 , 668-671

Review article (Silvio Fagiolo, *L'idea dell'Europa nelle relazioni internazionali*, Milano, FrancoAngeli, 2009)



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Halimi Serge

**Simulacre européen**

in **Monde Diplomatique (Le)**, Juin

« Imaginez, écrit M. Vaclav Havel, une élection dont les résultats sont largement connus à l'avance et à laquelle se présentent toute une série de candidats à l'incompétence notoire. Tout scrutin prétendument démocratique organisé de la sorte ne manquerait pas d'être qualifié de farce (1). » L'ancien président tchèque ne pensait pas au Parlement européen, mais au Conseil des droits de l'homme des Nations unies. Et pourtant...

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Röper Erich

**Sinnhaftigkeit von Plebisziten in europäischen Fragen**

in **Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte**, Band 23-24, 2009

"Wer gegen Europas Einheit ist, soll auf einen Soldatenfriedhof gehen." Jean-Claude Juncker (Premierminister Luxemburgs)

Referenden über komplexe Verfassungsfragen sind national und in Europa nur dann sinnvoll, wenn a)es das Volk als ethnische, historisch gewachsene "Schicksalsgemeinschaft" gibt, b)der Sachverhalt vorurteilsfrei, ohne Besitzstandsdenken zu beurteilen ist, oder c) ein Ja-Nein-Votum ohne die Kompromisse im parlamentarischen Prozess möglich ist.

Diese Voraussetzungen fehlen aber in der Europäischen Union (EU). Ethnische, historisch gewachsene Völker sind ein Mythos des 19. Jahrhunderts und bis heute Ausgangspunkt vieler Kriege. Staaten sind Rechts- und Zweckgemeinschaften der Bewohner, kein Kollektivsubjekt und mangels sozialer Solidarität auch keine "Schicksalsgemeinschaft".

Der Nationalstaat, das Volk der Staatsrechtslehre und Politik ist eine Leerformel mit allenfalls emotionalen Bezügen zu einer ausgehöhlten Staatlichkeit. Sie überdeckt unüberbrückbare gesellschaftliche, soziale und wirtschaftliche Konflikte. Doch fordert die Staatsrechtslehre die vorstaatliche Entstehung eines europäischen Volkes, bevor von Staatswerdung zu sprechen sei. Tatsächlich geht es um "das tägliche Plebiszit" (Ernest Renan).

Kein Nationalstaat hat derzeit noch ökonomischen Handlungsspielraum. Die Folgen der Globalisierung führen zu Renationalisierung und "Sandburgenmentalität", Besitzstandsdenken und sacro egoismo, Quellen immer neuer Vorurteile auch gegen die EU. Die Komplexität der EU-Verträge überfordert die Menschen und entzieht sie somit dem Ja-Nein-Votum von Referenden. Abgestimmt wird über die Regierung, oft mit sachfremden Motiven. Mit der Forderung, über EU-Beitritte abstimmen zu lassen (z.B. über den der Türkei), wird das Einfallstor für Rassismus und Fremdenfeindlichkeit geöffnet.

The full text is free:

<http://www.bpb.de/publikationen/BI75XM.html>



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Daul Joseph

**Solving the economic crisis: the role of the EU  
in European View** , vol. 8, n. 1, June , 21-27

The author argues that over the past few months, the political centre-right has become the most credible option in regards to future economic reforms. The proposed framework which balances competitiveness with rules to protect European citizens, while at the same time maintaining the core values of freedom and responsibility, is the best recipe for an effective economic recovery. The author underlines the importance of facing this first global economic crisis by adapting our values to the new era, suggesting that although faced by difficult times, the world has been offered powerful incentives to change. He argues that the single market is part of the solution and not the problem in this financial crisis. Only by working together, yet respecting the rules of subsidiarity at all times and avoiding protectionism at all costs, will the EU both overcome the recession and ensure that a similar situation will never happen again.

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Amalfitano Chiara

**Spazio giudiziario europeo e libera circolazione delle decisioni penali  
in Studi sull'integrazione europea**, Anno IV, n. 1 , 73-120

No abstract available

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Malueg David A., Yates Andrew J.

**Strategic Behavior, Private Information, and Decentralization in the European Union Emissions Trading System  
in Environmental & Resource Economics**, Volume 43, Number 3, July , 413-432

In the European Union Emissions Trading System, the supply of carbon permits is determined in a decentralized manner by Member States. Alternatively, the supply could be determined by an EU central authority. We analyze whether decentralization leads to lower total abatement costs under various assumptions about the behavior of Member States and the privacy of information about their abatement costs. If Member States do not behave strategically, then decentralization is preferred, regardless of whether abatement costs are private information. If the Member States behave strategically, then decentralization may or may not be preferred, depending on the degree of uncertainty about abatement cost parameters, the variation in emission endowments, and the number of Member States.

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Herlin-Karnell Ester



### **Subsidiarity in the Area of EU Justice and Home Affairs Law—A Lost Cause?**

in *European law journal*, May 2009 - Vol. 15 Issue 3 , 351-361

This article intends to highlight the concept of subsidiarity in the area of the third pillar and EU criminal law more generally. In doing so, the article tries to show that criminal law could and should be seen as imbued with 'subsidiarity' and, more specifically, that it could be viewed as an expression of the principle of ultima ratio—a minimalism approach—in criminal law. Accordingly, the article asks why subsidiarity appears to be forgotten in third pillar matters despite its important function in this area. Moreover, the article confronts such a desired application of subsidiarity in the context of established EC law doctrine, by questioning whether it is possible simply to transplant the supranational discussion into the terrain of criminal law. Further, the article explores the function of Article 47 EU as the watchdog of the supranational sphere and discusses also briefly the phenomenon of enhanced cooperation in relation to the principle of subsidiarity in the domain of EU Justice and Home Affairs.

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Lee-Ohlsson Fredrik

### **Sweden and Development of the European Security and Defence Policy: A Bi-Directional Process of Europeanization**

in *Cooperation and Conflict*, vol. 44, n. 2, June , 123-142

ABSTRACT: Since its creation in 1999, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has evolved rapidly. This new policy area presented Sweden, once a neutral state, with a challenge to its security policy tradition. In responding to the challenge, the Swedish government was initially reluctant about the ESDP, but today has become one of its staunchest supporters and active members. In this article, I examine Swedish participation in the ESDP since its inception, i.e. the impact Sweden has had on the ESDP, but also the extent to which the ESDP has influenced Swedish security policy. Furthermore, I seek to shed light on why the Swedish government has become so active and supportive of the ESDP despite initial reluctance. Drawing on Reuben Wong's multidimensional model of Europeanization and new research undertaken primarily through interviews with key officials, I argue that Sweden has embarked on a journey from sceptical and hesitant participant to one of its main driving forces. Although the ESDP has had a major influence on Swedish security policy, I argue that the Swedish government has had a major impact on shaping the current character of the ESDP. I point to an interwoven relation between European and domestic levels, thus confirming the bi-directional character of the process of Europeanization.

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Jürgen Matthes

### **Ten years EMU — Reality test for the OCA endogeneity hypothesis, economic divergences and future challenges**

in *Intereconomics*, Volume 44, Number 2 / March, 2009 , 114-128

At the start of European Monetary Union in 1999 the pessimists argued that it was too early for such a step and that EMU would aggravate economic divergences between the members, while the optimists believed that EMU itself would generate the integrative forces necessary to move towards the achievement of an optimum currency area. Ten years on,



which of them prove to be right?

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Alemanno Alberto

**The Better Regulation Initiative at the Judicial Gate: A Trojan Horse within the Commission's Walls or the Way Forward?**

in *European law journal*, May 2009 - Vol. 15 Issue 3 , 382-400

While most academic attention is currently being paid to the goals and to the merits of the Better Regulation initiative (BR), this article examines the most immediate legal implications stemming from reliance on the main tools of BR (such as systematic impact analysis and consultation procedures on proposed legislation) within the European legal order. Since the BR package boils down into a set of regulatory requirements, enforcement issues are likely to arise. For instance, what if the Commission omits to undertake (or badly performs) an impact assessment of a legislative proposal? Who is currently in charge of ensuring the Commission's compliance with these requirements? After illustrating the existing administrative oversight mechanisms designed to ensure effective compliance with BR requirements, by focusing notably on the recently established Impact Assessment Board, the article examines to what extent the European courts may be called upon to review the respect paid to the requirements of BR by the Commission services. To prevent the BR initiative from turning into a Trojan Horse within its own walls, the Commission is likely to comply with these regulatory requirements, thereby paving the way for the initiative's success

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Rabbinge Rudy

**The CAP needs radical reform, not tinkering**

in *Europe's World*, Issue 11, Spring

The EU's overhaul of the Common Agricultural Policy is only superficial, says Rudy Rabbinge. He argues that the EU needs a new policy that reflects modern practices and needs, along the lines of production ecological approaches in the Netherlands.

<http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/21314/Default.aspx>

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Hugh Edward

**The Center Cannot Hold**

in *Foreign Policy*, Issue 171, March / April

The EU's newest states want its core members to bail them out. But it's the union itself that's broken.

[http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story\\_id=4772](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4772)



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Copsey Nathaniel, Haughton Tim

**The Choices for Europe: National Preferences in New and Old Member States**

in **Journal of Common Market Studies**, Volume 47, Issue 2, March 2009 , 263-286

Drawing on the existing body of literature that deals with national preference formation and building on the role played by vulnerability and deficits in shaping policy choices at the European level, this article provides a synthetic framework to explain the stances of the Older Member States (OMS) and New Member States (NMS). We subsequently apply the model to NMS, focusing largely, although not exclusively, on Poland. We argue that although many of the policy preferences can be explained by the framework, the size of states, especially with regard to ambition and capacity, and the nature of the country's post-communist transition appear significant for the NMS and need to be incorporated into future theory-building. We conclude by highlighting areas in need of further empirical research.

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Golinelli Roberto , Momigliano Sandro

**The Cyclical Reaction of Fiscal Policies in the Euro Area: The Role of Modelling Choices and Data Vintages**

in **Fiscal Studies**, Volume 30 Issue 1 , 39 - 72

We survey the recent empirical literature concerning the cyclical response of fiscal policies in the euro area, finding large differences in results. We show that these differences are heavily influenced by the choices made in modelling fiscal behaviour. We make a case for the use, in assessing policies and in the EMU context, of the standard modelling choice where the discretionary reaction of fiscal policy is directly estimated. Models where the overall reaction to the cycle – which includes the effects of both discretionary actions and automatic stabilisers – is directly estimated tend to suggest either strong pro-cyclical or strong counter-cyclical discretionary reactions, depending on how this component is identified. Within the standard model and for the years 1994 to 2008, we show that results are significantly affected by the data vintage (ex post or real-time). With ex post data, we find an unambiguous indication of a-cyclicity. Using real-time data, we find that the output gap matters. However, depending on whether we assess policy intentions or actual policies, euro-area governments' behaviour radically changes. A plausible interpretation is that in the implementation phase, governments loosen their fiscal stance, giving in to political pressures that are proportional to the scale of the economic difficulties in bad times and the size of the 'growth dividend' in good times.

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Stavridis Stelios, Tsardanidis Charalambos

**The Cyprus Problem in the European Parliament: A Case of Successful or Superficial Europeanization?'**

in **European Foreign Affairs Review**, Volume 14, Issue 1 , 129-156

There is a vast literature on Europeanization but to date it has not concentrated on its impact on EU institutions. There is an emerging literature on the external relations of transnational parliaments (including the European Parliament's



external policies), some of it labelled 'parliamentary diplomacy', but it remains an under-studied area all the same. The original contribution of this article is to bring those trends together in a specific attempt to identify if there is a Europeanization of the European Parliament (EP) on a specific international issue: the Cyprus problem. That particular question is extremely important because the EU's enlargement policy is considered to be its most effective Europeanization process. As the Republic of Cyprus has now joined the EU and Turkey has begun accession negotiations, the role of the EP is extremely relevant. After reviewing briefly the existing literature on Europeanization, and on the external relations of the EP, the article considers in more detail the EP's empirical record on the Cyprus problem. It identifies three distinct stances and phases. It concludes by arguing that a shifting EP stance on the Cyprus problem shows signs not of a successful Europeanization, but rather of a superficial one, which depends largely on changing circumstances and national preferences.

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Wessel Ramses A.

#### **The Dynamics of the European Union Legal Order: An Increasingly Coherent Framework of Action and Interpretation**

in *European Constitutional Law Review*, Volume 5 - Issue 01 , 117-142

Institutional and normative convergence – Common Foreign and Security Policy – Pillar Structure – External Relations – Role of the Court – Normative Consistency – EU Legal Order – Legal Nature CFSP – Treaty of Lisbon – Legal Instruments – Decision-Making

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Seeberg Peter

#### **The EU as a realist actor in normative clothes: EU democracy promotion in Lebanon and the European Neighbourhood Policy**

in *Democratization*, vol. 16, n. 1, February - Special Issue: THE EUROPEAN UNION'S DEMOCRATIZATION AGENDA IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: A CRITICAL INSIDE-OUT APPROACH , 81-99

The article takes recent research on the difficulties for the EU in successfully promoting democracy in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region as its point of departure, with a specific focus on the European Neighbourhood Policy EU-Lebanon Action Plan. It is shown that, in spite of the fact that Lebanon does not present the same authoritarian institutions and character as most of the other countries in the region, the EU seems to have difficulties dealing with the political realities of Lebanon. This has to do with its consociational system and the existence of political elites in Lebanon, who see avoiding another breakdown of the political system as the decisive political issue. In addition, the existence of a 'dual power' situation, where two sources of authority are competing for power and legitimacy, constructs a Lebanese reality which the EU chooses to address by neglecting its own normative, democracy promotion ambitions. The article concludes that the vagueness and inconsistency of EU policies in Lebanon cannot only be explained by tactical considerations, but also imply that the EU pursues a realist agenda: in other words it is a realist actor dressed in normative clothes.



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**Meyer-Sahling Jan-Hinrik, Goetz Klaus H.**

**The EU timescape: from notion to research agenda**

in *Journal of European Public Policy* , Volume 16 Issue 2 2009 , 325 – 336

This article outlines how the notion of an EU timescape may be developed into a fruitful research agenda. It sets out central tasks involved, including clarification of the concept of an EU timescape; of the key empirical questions to be asked; and of the status of political time in variable-oriented research. The article illustrates the potential value-added of a time-centred approach to the study of the EU by highlighting temporal issues in EU enlargement, differentiated integration and democratization. It concludes with thoughts on the comparison of democratic timescapes.

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**Pace Michelle, Seeberg Peter, Cavatorta Francesco**

**The EU's democratization agenda in the Mediterranean: a critical inside-out approach**

in *Democratization*, vol. 16, n. 1, February - Special Issue: THE EUROPEAN UNION'S DEMOCRATIZATION AGENDA IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: A CRITICAL INSIDE-OUT APPROACH , 3-19

No abstract available

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**Albi Anneli**

**The EU's 'External Governance' and Legislative Approximation by Neighbours: Challenges for the Classic Constitutional Templates**

in *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Volume 14, Issue 2 , 209-230

In the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy, the EU's enlargement conditionality and pre-accession methodology have largely been extended to the new neighbours, with the rule transfer having been characterized as part of the EU's 'external governance'. The absence of accession prospects for these countries at the present stage makes this an intriguing case; the paper consequently seeks to explore the extent to which the EU rules are transferred, with a special focus on Ukraine. The analysis leads to an inquiry into an issue that has been largely missing in the voluminous literature on EU conditionality: the legitimacy of the approximation process from the national constitutional perspective. The paper contends that voluntary approximation of national legislation to external rules presents a novel challenge to the classic constitutional models that have emerged to accommodate international and EU rules within sovereign legal orders, and hence a search for new solutions is warranted.

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**Buti Marco**

**The Euro Area's Global Role: Economic Opportunities and Political Challenges**  
in *Economia Politica*, Fascicolo 3 , 381-394

No abstract available

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**Jones Arik**

**The Euro and the Financial Crisis**  
in *Survival*, vol. 51, n. 2, april , 41-54

ABSTRACT: The global financial crisis has put the euro under stress. Interest-rate differentials across sovereign borrowers have risen to unprecedented levels and competitiveness is diverging across national economies, prompting speculation that countries might leave the euro or that highly indebted governments may be pushed into default. Speculation has added fuel to the fire, driving up interest-rate differentials by pulling money into safe bonds and away from those most at risk. But the euro is much better than any plausible alternative involving a return to national currencies. The European currency is not so much under stress as it is absorbing stress from its members. By looking at the experience of countries and their currencies outside the euro we get a better sense of what non-membership entails. Speculation that participants might leave the euro is hard to justify; rumours that countries outside the euro are now more eager to join are closer to the mark. The euro cannot solve the global financial crisis, but it is unlikely to be destroyed by it either; Europe's economic situation without the euro would not be better, but worse.

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**Toscano Roberto**

**The European Archipelago. Europe between Unity and Difference**  
in *Pace Diritti Umani*, anno 4, n. 3, settembre-dicembre 2007

No abstract available

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**Toscano Roberto**

**The European Archipelago. Europe between Unity and Difference**  
in *Pace Diritti Umani*, anno 4, n. 3, settembre-dicembre 2007

No abstract available

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Harpaz Guy

**The European Court of Justice and its relations with the European Court of Human Rights: The quest for enhanced reliance, coherence and legitimacy**

in **Common Market Law Review**, vol. 46, issue 1 , 105-141

ABSTRACT: Adopting legal–normative and political–governance perspectives, this article reviews the growing formal and informal relations that are developing between the EU and the ECHR human rights regimes, with a view to analysing the various reasons why the Luxembourg Court should rely on the Strasbourg Regime and on its jurisprudence in a more explicit, coherent, systematic and comprehensive manner. The article contends that such greater reliance may bring the EU abundant benefits in terms of enhanced and more coherent European human rights protection, reduced normative and jurisdictional tensions and resultant enhanced legitimacy, fairness, predictability, social and judicial acceptance and *effet utile* of the ECJ’s judgments. The article concludes that further desirable results of such a course of action would be improved and more harmonious relations with the EU Member States, the ECHR Members and the ECHR itself, and enhanced cohesive identity, internal and external legitimacy and global leadership.

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José Menéndez Agustin

**The European Democratic Challenge: The Forging of a Supranational *Volonté Générale***

in **European law journal**, May 2009 - Vol. 15 Issue 3 , 277-308

This article explores in a systematic manner the different components of the democratic legitimacy of the Union from the standpoint of deliberative democratic theory. Contrary to standard accounts, it is claimed that the democratic deficit must be disaggregated, given that the Union has not only several shortcomings, but also some democratic surpluses. On the one hand, the Union was created to tackle the democratic deficit of nation states, and has been partially successful in mending the mismatch between the scope of application of their legal systems and the geographical reach of the consequences of legal decisions. Moreover, the European legal order is based on a synthetic constitutional law, which reflects the common constitutional traditions of the Member States, which lend democratic legitimacy to the whole European legal order. On the other hand, the lack of a democratically written and ratified constitution is a central part of the democratic challenge of the Union. But equally important is the structural bias in favour of certain material legal results, which stems from the interplay of the division of competences and the plurality of law-making procedures.

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Harbo Tor-Inge

**The European Economic Area Agreement: A Case of Legal Pluralism**

in **Nordic Journal of International Law**, vol. 78, issue 2 , 201-223

ABSTRACT: In the article the author discusses the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement in light of theories of constitutional and legal pluralism. The author begins with a presentation of the EEA Agreement and compares it with the



European Union (EU) legal order. It is pointed out that one of the differences between the two legal regimes is the fact that the EU law principle of direct effect is not applicable in EEA law. Since there is no provision in the EEA Agreement which hinders the establishment of direct effect in EEA law, the author seeks to find the deeper explanation for the rejection of the principle. This leads into an elaboration of the pragmatic concept of law. An important feature of this concept of law is the dominant role of the will of the legislator. This constitutional set-up is also reflected in the concept of sovereignty, which is one leading rationale of the EEA Agreement. Being in the squeeze between the two rationalities of the EEA Agreement: sovereignty and homogeneity, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) Court has been willing to take into consideration contextual particularities. This contextual or legal pluralistic approach is a result of an implicit and explicit judicial dialogue, which secures the legitimacy of the EFTA Court and the EEA Agreement.

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Robinson Nick

**The European Investment Bank: The EU's Neglected Institution**

in **Journal of Common Market Studies**, Volume 47, Issue 3, June 2009 , 651-673

The European Investment Bank is the largest multilateral lender in the world, facilitating total spending which is equivalent to the total of the EU budget. Its activity thus has a potentially huge effect on EU policy-making, yet research to date has failed to recognize this. This article addresses this, offering detailed empirical analysis and re-evaluating debates on multi-level governance.

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Sari Aurel

**The European Union Status of Forces Agreement (EU SOFA)**

in **Journal of Conflict and Security Law**, Volume 13, Number 3, Winter , 353-391

This article offers an overview of the main jurisdictional provisions of the EU Status of Forces Agreement (EU SOFA) of 2003. The EU SOFA was signed by the representatives of the governments of the member states of the EU on 17 November 2003 and its purpose is to define the legal position of the military and civilian personnel, as well as the forces and headquarters, deployed by one EU member state in the territory of another member state in the context of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The EU SOFA makes an important contribution to the development of the EU's crisis management capabilities. By addressing some of the key legal and practical questions raised by the presence of European military and civilian personnel in the territory of other EU member states, the Agreement facilitates their transit and temporary deployment throughout the territory of the EU for the purposes of the ESDP. The EU SOFA is based on the NATO Status of Forces Agreement (NATO) of 1951. As such, it confirms the pre-eminent position of the NATO SOFA as a model for multilateral status of forces agreements governing the legal position of visiting forces deployed among politically equal partners.

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Bradbury Jonathan

**The European Union and the Contested Politics of 'Ever Closer Union': Approaches to Integration, State Interests and Treaty Reform since Maastricht**

in *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, vol. 10, n. 1, April, Special Issue "Reconstituting Political Order in Europe, West and East", 17-33

The 1992 Maastricht Treaty on European Union made major commitments to economic and monetary union as well as to political reform culminating in the objective of an 'ever closer union'. Since Maastricht there have been a series of intergovernmental councils focused on building on these objectives. Discussions have led to the Amsterdam Treaty (1997), the Nice Treaty (2001), the failed constitutional treaty (2004), and the Lisbon Treaty (2007). The paper first clarifies the achievements that resulted in the 1992 Treaty on European Union; secondly, it explores the 'community method' approach, intrinsic to the reforms at Amsterdam and Nice; and, thirdly, it examines the attempt at a more 'constitutional' approach to completing European Union during the 2000s, and the problems that this has faced. The paper argues that whilst integration strategies to achieve 'ever closer union' have been shaped by the need to respond to perceived collective 'European' challenges, developments in practice have been influenced by the assertion of different 'nation' state interests and contested visions of what 'ever closer union' should comprise. This respect for the diversity of state interests may be seen as a strength as European integration both deepens and widens, particularly in taking in Central East European states. On the other hand, the inability of the EU to offer a clear model of political development may yet squander the opportunity not only for the EU to achieve a coherent and consensual 'ever closer union' but also to show leadership and play a unifying role across the continent.

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Delreux Tom

**The European Union in international environmental negotiations: an analysis of the Stockholm Convention negotiations**

in *European Environment/Environmental Policy and Governance*, Volume 19, Issue 1, January-February, 21-31

This article focuses on the way the European Union acted as a negotiating party during the international negotiations leading to the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (1998-2000). Starting from a principal-agent model, the article discusses how the EU participated in these negotiations and how the internal decision-making process developed. It argues that the EU was able to negotiate in a unified and influential way by defending a common position, which was expressed by a flexible negotiation arrangement, at the international level. Three features of the EU decision-making process engendered such a strong EU negotiation arrangement: homogeneous preferences among the actors in the EU, symmetrically distributed information among them and a cooperative and institutionally dense decision-making context.

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Wood Steve

**The European Union: A Normative or Normal Power?**

in *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Volume 14, Issue 1, 113-128



A feature of the European Union's self-definition is its adherence to and promotion of particular norms and values. These are integral to academic literature that has examined the EU as a 'normative power' in global affairs. Much of the relevant scholarship, along with EU statements and documentation, underestimates or overlooks that what the EU does not do, or does not succeed in, may be as significant as what it does do and does succeed in. A policy area where evidence to support that the EU's motivations and influence are not primarily normative continues to accumulate is that of energy security. Energy represents a more serious test of the EU's capacity and commitment as a normative power than asymmetric relationships in which it is by far the stronger party or when the issue does not threaten its vital interests. Energy needs expose the limited character of the EU's exertion of normative power (capacity) and its political will to do so (commitment).

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**Warkotsch Alexander**

**The European Union's Democracy Promotion Approach in Central Asia: On the Right Track?**

*in European Foreign Affairs Review*, Volume 14, Issue 2, 249-269

This article examines the adequacy of the EU's tool kit and overall strategy for the promotion of democracy in Central Asia by drawing on two generic social mechanisms: strategic calculation and normative suasion. First, the analysis will show that several interrelated conditions, above all cultural idiosyncrasies, properties of interaction between socializees and socializing agents, as well as the nature of the political system, are not sufficiently allowed for by the EU's policy approach, rendering bleak the prospects for moving the region towards a democratic trajectory. Second, building on identified problems in the EU's socialization efforts, the paper presents policy recommendations on how to improve the EU's democratizing impact.

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**Lauk Kurt Joachim**

**The European social model: in urgent need of redefinition**

*in European View*, vol. 8, n. 1, June, 53-63

Europe has good reason to be proud of its achievements in the area of social policy, and indeed, Europeans are happy to hold up their social model as a reference point. In reality, though, there is no such thing as the European social model. The various national systems for social security are the products of historical change, and resemblances among them tend to be patchy. There is of course a common denominator: virtually all citizens of the European Union benefit from a safety net that protects them against undue hardship in the event of illness, age or unemployment, and shields them from abusive employment practice with collective wage agreements, social security law and labour law. This is what is generally understood to constitute the European social model (ESM). These accomplishments deserve to be protected. However, that does not mean that we can dispense with the need for change. The ESM was developed in recent decades by each country following its own approach to providing its citizens with social security, which took different forms. Until now, economic growth, while uneven, has been sustained sufficiently to finance the rising costs. When growth alone has proved inadequate, countries have run up debts to pay for social security, ultimately as an expression of their confidence in economic growth and the associated increase in purchasing power of future



generations. Can this system, cobbled together over decades, continue to work in the future?

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MacMaoláin Caoimhín

**The General Principles of EU Law**

in *European public Law*, Volume 15 (2009) Issue 2 , 280-282

No abstract available

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Coninx Michèle, Mota José Luís Lopes da

**The International Role of Eurojust in Fighting Organized Crime and Terrorism**

in *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Volume 14, Issue 2 , 165-169

No abstract available

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Itzcovich Giulio

**The Interpretation of Community Law by the European Court of Justice**

in *German Law Journal*, Vol.10, n.5 , 537-560

No abstract available

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Ferrera Maurizio

**The JCMS Annual Lecture: National Welfare States and European Integration: In Search of a 'Virtuous Nesting'**

in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Volume 47, Issue 2, March 2009 , 219-233

In recent years the EU has been witnessing a growing tension between the logic of 'closure', which underpins national welfare systems, and the logic of 'opening', which guides the integration process, especially in the economic sphere. Are there ways of mitigating such tension, in order to avoid negative consequences in terms of performance and legitimacy? The article outlines a strategy of institutional reconciliation between the two logics, based on a more explicit and effective 'nesting' of the nation-based welfare state within the overall spatial architecture of the Union. While recognizing the important role played by free movement and competition rules, this nesting strategy entails the strengthening of an EU 'social space', capable of safeguarding the closure preconditions for multi-level social sharing arrangements.

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P&#345;ibá&#328; Ji&#345;í

**The Juridification of European Identity, its Limitations and the Search of EU Democratic Politics in Constellations**, Vol. 16, Issue 1, March , 44-58

No abstract available

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Alicia Hinarejos

**The Lisbon Treaty Versus Standing Still: A View from the Third Pillar in European Constitutional Law Review**, Volume 5 - Issue 01 , 99-116

Third pillar – European Arrest Warrant – Nature of third pillar – Litigation before national constitutional courts – Primacy of EU law over national law – Differing national attitudes with regard to the status of third pillar law – Process of approximation: first pillar and third pillar – Achieving consistency through primacy of third pillar – Judicial protection of position of individual – Lisbon Treaty and the unification of EU law

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Juncos Ana, Whitman Richard

**The Lisbon Treaty and the Foreign, Security and Defence Policy: Reforms, Implementation and the Consequences of (non-)Ratification in European Foreign Affairs Review**, Volume 14, Issue 1 , 25-46

The article examines the Lisbon Treaty and asserts that the treaty's effects would be to revamp rather than revolutionize the existing arrangements for the CFSP/ESDP. With the future of the Lisbon Treaty in doubt since the Irish referendum on 12 June 2008, the article considers what the future scenarios might be for the CFSP/ESDP provisions of the treaty. The article does not adjudicate on the credibility of these future scenarios but proceeds by first outlining the changes introduced to the CFSP/ESDP by the treaty; the issues raised by the amendments introduced; and then considers the consequent effects on the functioning of the CFSP/ESDP, either by the approval of the reform by ratification of the treaty or, if it is considered a credible proposition, by piecemeal implementation. As the article illustrates, in most instances the reforms introduced by the Lisbon Treaty (or through part of a 'cherry picking' process) will still require further substantive decisions to determine the form of their implementation.

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Hogan G .

**The Lisbon Treaty and the Irish Referendum**



in *European public Law*, Volume 15 (2009) Issue 2 , 163-170

The defeat of the Lisbon Treaty in the Irish referendum on 12 June 2008 has sent shock waves throughout the European Union (EU). It is still premature to attempt to evaluate the full consequences of this referendum defeat. Whatever the legal and political merits of the Treaty itself, it is clear that Ireland's standing within the EU has been diminished. Nor, as a matter of political reality, is Ireland in the position of either France or the Netherlands following the defeat of the European Constitution in those jurisdictions in the summer of 2005. For a start, the Lisbon Treaty was a further compromise – even if it did contain much of what had hitherto been in the ill-fated European Constitution – and the appetite for a wearisome further round of institutional reflection on the part of the Member States had diminished further. Just as critically, even if many voters in Ireland were in denial on this point, there is a difference in terms of *realpolitik* between a negative decision on the part of two key founder Member States on the one hand and a rejection in a small, peripheral country such as Ireland on the other. Again, irrespective of what one thinks of the merits of the Lisbon Treaty, in practical terms, it is hard to see how one small Member State can refuse to ratify a Treaty deemed essential by the other twenty-six Member States, at least without jeopardizing huge reserves of goodwill.

Ireland has, of course, been in this situation before following the first (negative) referendum vote on the Nice Treaty in June 2001. That defeat was highly embarrassing for both the Government and the country. We were the only country to hold a referendum on an innocuous treaty designed to facilitate the accession of new entrants, most of whom had suffered the yoke of communism and Soviet domination. The referendum did not engage the public; the quality of debate was poor and the turnout – 34% – unimpressive. A combination of domestic and EU pressures saw a successful second referendum in the Autumn of 2002. On that occasion, the Government campaign was much better, as was the quality of the political debate. The second referendum passed comfortably with a significantly higher turnout.

So far as the Lisbon referendum was concerned, many were of the view that that turnout would prove to be the key. On this occasion, the turnout at 54% was sufficiently high so as to remove the question of turnout as a factor in the defeat of the referendum. And yet despite an active – if at times uninspiring – campaign on the part of the Government and the main opposition parties, the referendum was defeated by 53% to 47%.

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Reh Christine

#### **The Lisbon Treaty: De-Constitutionalizing the European Union?**

in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Volume 47, Issue 3, June 2009 , 625-650

Calls to ratify the Lisbon Treaty by referendum have been countered with arguments about the Treaty's 'non-constitutional' nature. Against this backdrop, this article asks how much 'constitution' is left in the new document. To answer this question, I assert that little is gained by classifying the Treaty in toto as a 'European constitution' or as the epitome of its failure. Instead, I develop an analytical framework that disaggregates the concept of constitution into its formal, material and symbolic functions, and systematically assess how far Lisbon would strengthen (or weaken) Europe's constitutional quality. The article suggests that, rather than transferring new competences to Brussels or



making a constitutional *saut qualitatif*, Lisbon moderately bolsters the Treaties' formal functions; yet, in contrast to the Constitutional Treaty it adds little in material terms and is a decisive setback symbolically. Calls for ratification by referendum justified by the reform's extent are therefore ill-founded.

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**Pahre Robert, Ucaray-Mangitli Burcu**

**The Myths of Turkish Influence in the European Union**

in **Journal of Common Market Studies**, Volume 47, Issue 2, March 2009 , 357-384

Among the many objections to Turkish membership of the European Union lie claims that Turkey will be a powerful actor in the future EU, with a population as large as or larger than Germany. Many also claim that this power will have negative effects on the EU. We examine such claims analytically, influenced strongly by spatial models of EU policy-making. We find that Turkey's preferences lie sufficiently outside the EU mainstream that it will have little influence in day-to-day policy-making under the assent, co-decision, consultation and co-operation procedures (or the common procedure in the Constitutional Treaty). Its influence may be more evident in areas such as the CFSP or JHA, where unanimity remains the normal procedure. Still, Turkey's veto power here is no different from that of other, much smaller countries. Furthermore, veto power can only block changes and cannot be used to pull the EU in undesirable new directions. Even this veto power can be avoided if the EU-27 establish whatever policies they desire prior to Turkish membership, forcing Turkey to accept a *fait accompli*. Despite these limitations to its power, Turkey may have some influence in purely intergovernmental settings such as negotiations over new treaties that might occur some decades hence.

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**Burgess J. Peter**

**The New Nomos of Europe**

in **Geopolitics**, Vol. 14, n. 1, February , 135-160

According to Carl Schmitt, in his late work *The Nomos of the Earth*, published in 1950, the long evolution in the relation between humans and the earth has been decisive for the nature of traditional legal order. The historical links to European international jurisprudence (*ius publicum Europaeum*) have decayed with the old world order that supported them. Territoriality, once the foundation of the nation-state has evolved, causing a parallel change in the nation-state paradigm of sovereignty and the fabric of international law which has its basis in that paradigm. If Schmitt is correct in his prognoses about the end of a global era and the rise of a new yet uncharted world order in the mid-1940s, then the architects of the nascent European Coal and Steel Community face the same conditions, and must carry out their work with the same cultural, social and juridical raw materials, against the backdrop of the same concrete historical experience. This article will attempt to continue the trajectory of Schmitt's historical analysis of the *ius publicum Europeum*, suggesting how its central concepts and theses map onto the grand geopolitical and civilisational project of European construction from 1950 to 2004 and beyond. It will explore the applicability of the concept of *nomos* for the nature of EU evolution, and interpret general elements of the European legal system in terms of the concept of *nomos*.

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Kardasheva Raya

**The Power to Delay: The European Parliament's Influence in the Consultation Procedure**

in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Volume 47, Issue 2, March 2009 , 385-409

This article analyses the European Parliament's legislative influence in the consultation procedure. It examines all (925) consultation proposals completed in the period 1 May 1999 to 30 April 2007. The article finds that through its 'power of delay' the European Parliament can substantially influence EU legislative outcomes alongside the Council and the Commission. In addition, the results demonstrate that EP influence in the consultation procedure is conditional on the support of the Commission, the type of issues contested and the ability of the European Parliament to link its opinions to co-decision proposals.

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de Sadeleer Nicolas

**The Precautionary Principle as a Device for Greater Environmental Protection: Lessons from EC Courts**

in *Review of European Community & International Environmental Law*, Volume 18, Issue 1, April , 3-10

Given that the precautionary principle has never been defined in the EC Treaty, the EC jurisdictions have been playing a key role in determining the status as well as the scope of that principle. Although scholars have hitherto been paying heed to the case law on food safety, the literature has become a little thinner when one considers environmental case law. This article attempts to set the scene to explain how the precautionary principle can be invoked in different judiciary procedures at the EU level.

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Bilancia Paola

**The Role and Power of European and National Parliaments in the Dynamics of Integration**

in *Rivista italiana di diritto pubblico comunitario*, n. 2 , 273-284

No abstract available

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Van Vooren Bart

**The Small Arms Judgment in an Age of Constitutional Turmoil**

in *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Volume 14, Issue 2 , 231-248

On 20 May 2008, the Court of Justice handed down its long-awaited judgment in the Small Arms case (C-91/05). In a previous contribution in this review I have argued that from the perspective of the current post-Nice Treaty framework, the ECJ has rendered a judgment that is neither legally coherent nor conducive to dynamism in foreign policy conduct. It



was concluded that the ECJ's bifurcated treatment of the two CFSP instruments at issue has failed to settle the dust that had been stirred up by this cross-pillar conflict. In this article it is argued that the Lisbon Treaty would rectify this situation by obsoleting the Court's interpretation of Article 47 TEU, and putting in place the legal equality of the Union's CFSP and its other external policies. This would erase the Court's hierarchical approach to the 'non-affectation clause', but maintain the Grand Chamber's construction that was arguably more conducive to finding the legal equilibrium between the CFSP and other EU external action such as development, while maintaining sufficient flexibility in formulating external policy.

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Schain Martin A.

**The State Strikes Back: Immigration Policy in the European Union**  
in *European Journal of International Law*, Vol.20, n.1 , 93-109

Scholars have argued that the dynamics of immigration control have changed. Unlike previous waves of immigration which were controlled by national law and administration, this wave would be more difficult to control. Because of the constraints imposed by international agreements, international institutions, and national judicial authorities, controls would be embedded in international institutions and law that were assumed to be inclined to be less restrictive than national institutions and law. Looking at these patterns over the past 20 years, it now appears that international constraints on immigration control have been highly exaggerated. Indeed, international relations have become an important context for understanding the enhanced ability of states to control immigration, and to develop more muscular policies for integration. For this reason, international constraints may be less important for understanding the development of immigration policy than neo-nationalism, enhanced through intergovernmental relations in the international system. Therefore, what began as a scholarly discussion of the limits on restrictionist policies because of international constraints has developed into a discussion of the use of international relations to strengthen the effectiveness of restrictionist policies.

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Dawson Mark

**The ambiguity of social Europe in the open method of co-ordination**  
in *European Law Review*, vol.34, issue 1 , 55-79

No abstract available

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Schmieding Holger

**The case against a common fiscal boost in Europe**  
in *Intereconomics*, Volume 44, Number 1 / January, 2009 , 4-22

Policymakers in the EU member states are currently shaping rescue packages to prevent the financial crisis hitting their



economies with unmitigated force. Each government is responding to the emerging problems with a country-specific set of measures. Given the global nature of the crisis, would coordinated action at the European level not be a better approach? Was the German government — much-criticised for its initial reluctance to adopt massive fiscal stimulation measures — right after all to exploit the option value of waiting in a situation of high uncertainty?

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Thomas Daniel C.

**The challenge of EU policy-making: Moving from divergent preferences to common policies**  
in *International Politics* , Volume 46, Issue 4, July , 335-338

This paper presents the special issue as a systematic attempt to understand why and when Member States succeed or fail in negotiating common policies for the world stage. It highlights the European Union's (EU's) lack of automatic unity in world affairs, and focuses on the process by which Member States negotiate their differences in the quest for common policies. The subject and conclusions of the various case studies are presented.

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Le Cacheux Jacques

**The challenges and trappings of convergence**  
in *Europe en formation (L')*, n. 351, printemps , 35-46

Full text available on-line: <http://www.cife.eu/UserFiles/File/EEF/351/LECACHEUXEEF351.pdf>

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Bailes Alyson

**The conscription debate that Europe shies away from**  
in *Europe's World*, Issue 11, Spring

Europe's security and defence ambitions are held back by many member states' reluctance to send troops abroad, says Alyson Bailes. With so much fresh thinking needed to find a way forward, she asks whether the EU should consider conscripting a new European army.

<http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/21343/Default.aspx>

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Kamps Christophe , Leiner-Killinger Nadine, Martin Reiner

**The cyclical impact of EU cohesion policy in fast growing EU countries**  
in *Intereconomics*, Volume 44, Number 1 / January, 2009 , 23-29



Most of the newly acceded central and east European EU countries are among the main beneficiaries of EU Cohesion Policy. The main objective of this policy is to improve the long-term growth and employment prospects of the supported regions, and thereby to support convergence towards higher levels of per capita income. In the short run, however, EU Cohesion Policy may at times amplify macroeconomic challenges for supported countries. In periods of a downturn of the economy it can have a stabilising impact. During periods of unsustainably fast economic growth, however, its short-term demand effects may contribute to internal and/or external macroeconomic imbalances. Economic policymakers should thus ensure that EU Cohesion Policy enhances long-term productivity, while avoiding, in times of overheating, an increased risk of unsustainable developments as a result of the additional demand stimulus from EU Cohesion Policy.

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**Bishop Graham**

**The euro and financial markets: the first ten years  
in Europe en formation (L'), n. 351, printemps , 89-110**

Full text available on-line: <http://www.cife.eu/UserFiles/File/EEF/351/BISHOPEEF351.pdf>

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**Dyson Kenneth**

**The evolving timescapes of European economic governance: contesting and using time  
in Journal of European Public Policy , Volume 16 Issue 2 2009 , 286 – 306**

This article examines the ambivalent character of time in European economic governance and how it is conceptualized, especially by its constituent expert elites. On the one hand, it serves to rationally order and stabilize power relationships; on the other, it provokes contest about its appropriate use, focused on fiscal and economic reform policies. The article also highlights the different functional specificities in temporal governance in monetary, fiscal, financial stability and economic reform policies and the differences in potential of issues to mobilize political opposition and to produce problems of synchronization. In particular, monetary union forms an inner circle within European economic governance. Its discursive, regulative and strategic effects radiate with varying results into its other circles. Nevertheless, European economic governance is not a single 'time-rule' exercise. Finally, the article examines how, through its 'compression' effects on European states, European economic governance raises serious issues about the quality of modern democracy.

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**Cuniberti Gilles**

**The first stage of the abolition of the exequatur in the European Union  
in Columbia Journal of European Law, Vol.14, issue 2**

On October 15 and 16, 1999, the European Council met in Tampere, Finland, and approved the principle of mutual



recognition of judicial decisions and judgments. In its conclusions, the European Council insisted that the principle should become the “cornerstone of judicial cooperation in both civil and criminal matters within the Union.” In civil matters, which will be the exclusive focus of this note, the European Council specifically made clear that the “intermediate measures which are still required to enable the recognition and enforcement of a decision or judgment” in other States of the Union should be further reduced. As a first step, these intermediate measures should be abolished for certain titles, i.e., for certain types of judgments. The European Council asked the Council of Ministers and the Commission to adopt, by the end of 2000, a “programme” of measures to implement the principle of mutual recognition.

A joint Commission and Council Programme of Measures for Implementation of the Principle of Mutual Recognition of Decisions in Civil and Commercial Matters (the “Programme”)<sup>#</sup> was adopted on November 30, 2000. The Programme recognized the term “intermediate measures” as a reference to one particular procedure whereby member states assess whether foreign judgments may be declared enforceable within their jurisdiction. This procedure aims at verifying that foreign judgments meet certain requirements which typically include whether the foreign court retained jurisdiction on a reasonable basis, whether the procedure followed by the foreign court comported with basic procedural rights, and whether the outcome adopted by the foreign court, on the merits, is not shocking from the perspective of the forum. The French have a specific name for this procedure: *exequatur*. Although the procedure varies from one jurisdiction to another, the Commission and the Council have also chosen to call it *exequatur*. Thus, what the principle of mutual recognition is really about in civil matters is the abolition of the *exequatur* procedure throughout the European Community.

The European Council had alluded to the existence of several steps in the process of implementing the principle of mutual recognition. It had previously discussed the first one: abolishing intermediate measures for judgments in certain areas and for certain types of claims. The Programme proposed that a second stage be the abolition of the *exequatur* “in other areas,” and a third and final stage the abolition in all remaining areas.

Since 2004, the European Community has initiated the process of implementation of the principle of mutual recognition by adopting several regulations. In the first section of this note, I offer a brief survey of these regulations. In the second section, I explore whether these regulations and, indeed, the whole process comports with European human rights law.

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Moss Frank

#### **The global vocation of the euro**

in *Europe en formation (L')*, n. 351, printemps, 9-34

Full text available on-line: <http://www.cife.eu/UserFiles/File/EEF/351/MOSSEEF351.pdf>

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Slepcevic Reinhard

#### **The judicial enforcement of EU law through national courts: possibilities and limits**

in *Journal of European Public Policy*, Volume 16 Issue 3 2009, 378 – 394



Since the supremacy of European law was established, public interest group litigation before national courts is regularly presented as a promising instrument of decentralized law enforcement capable of effectively remedying compliance problems. It has, however, attracted little empirical research. In this paper, I analyse the limits and possibilities of this enforcement instrument on the basis of new empirical evidence. After having identified the conditions under which the instrument should work, I present the results of an in-depth comparative study on the implementation of the Natura 2000 Directives in France, Germany and the Netherlands. In all these countries, environmental organizations turned to their national courts in order to enforce key provisions of the Directives, yet with very differential effects. I argue that the instrument is in principle able to remedy compliance problems, but only if a set of demanding conditions is met.

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Fratzscher Marcel, Stracca Livio

**The political economy under monetary union: has the euro made a difference?**

in *Economic Policy*, Volume 24 Issue 58, 307 - 348

Economic and monetary union (EMU) has transformed Europe and has created an integrated pan-European economy. Much research has focused on understanding this integration process and what benefits and costs it entails. This paper identifies a political economy channel of EMU as the monetary union implies that member states had to transfer or at least curtail their policy autonomy in several areas, such as monetary policy and fiscal policy. The paper shows that EMU has helped reduce the impact of political shocks on the domestic economy of member states but magnified the transmission of political shocks within the euro area. Equally importantly, economies with weak domestic policies and institutions exhibited a significantly higher sensitivity to domestic political shocks before EMU, but not thereafter. While this may entail that EMU has brought benefits to countries with weaker policies and institutions by insulating them from adverse political developments at home, a potential drawback is that it may provide weaker market discipline for domestic political stability.

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Beetsma Roel, Eijffinger Sylvester

**The restructuring of financial supervision in the EU**

in *European View*, vol. 8, n. 1, June, 3-12

The integration of financial markets is a fast growing phenomenon worldwide, but especially in the EU. Along with the positive aspects such as simplifying financial transactions, there are also negative implications attached to it. As was the case with the current economic and financial crisis, a problem which arose locally managed to spread to a global level at an impressive speed. After examining the US and European financial supervision models, the authors conclude that a direct supervisor of cross-border acquisitions would be a good, although somewhat unrealistic, solution. This paper puts forward arguments in favour of separating all financial supervision of individual financial institutions from that of the stability of the financial system as a whole, which would be known as European Financial Services Authority (EFSA) in the case of the EU.

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Paasi Anssi

**The resurgence of the 'Region' and 'Regional Identity': theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dynamics in Europe**

in *Review of International Studies (The)*, Vol. 35, S1, February , 121-146

'New regionalism', 'region', 'city-region', 'cross-border region', 'border' and 'identity' have become important catchphrases on the global geo-economic and geopolitical scene. The resurgence of these terms has been part of the transformation of both political economy and governance at supra-state, state and sub-state scales. Regions have been particularly significant in the EU where both the making of the Union itself and the 'Europe of regions' are concrete manifestations of the re-scaling of state spaces and the assignment of new meanings to territory. Such re-scaling has also led to increased competition between regions; a tendency that results from both the neo-liberalisation of the global economy and from a regionalist response. Regional identity, an idea at least implicitly indicating some cohesiveness or social integration in a region, has become a major buzzword. It has been particularly identified in the EU's cohesion policy as an important element for regional development. In spite of their increasing importance in social life and academic debates, regions, borders and identities are often studied separately, but this paper aims at theorising and illustrating their meanings in an integrated conceptual framework and uses the sub-state regions in Europe, and particularly in Finland, as concrete examples. Regions are conceptualised here as processes that gain their boundaries, symbolisms and institutions in the process of institutionalisation. Through this process a region becomes established, gains its status in the broader regional structure and may become a significant unit for regional identification or for a purported regional identity. This process is based on a division of labour, which accentuates the power of regional elites in the institutionalisation processes.

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Thloniat Luc

**The temporal constitution of the European Commission: a timely investigation**

in *Journal of European Public Policy* , Volume 16 Issue 2 2009 , 221 – 238

This paper examines the main temporal factors impacting on the European Commission and sheds light on its particular relationship to time. By way of illustration, it discusses two relatively recent, but increasingly significant, features of the Commission's work: its planning and programming cycle and its use of impact assessments. These two techniques are at the core of the Commission's quest for exemplary management and of its endeavour to promote 'better regulation' principles. Taken together, they can transform EU policy-making and bring about a greater predictability and transparency of EU action. They cannot, however, fully capture the more political and discretionary role of the Commission, which must adapt to a diverse and changing EU agenda.

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Sieberson Stephen

**The treaty of Lisbon and its impact on the European Union's democratic deficit**

in *Columbia Journal of European Law*, Vol.14, issue 3



In volume 10 of this journal the editors published an extensive article by the author, entitled "The Proposed European Union Constitution-Will It Eliminate the EU's Democratic Deficit?" That article analyzed the first draft of the European Union's Constitution against a wide array of scholarly comment on the EU's so-called "democratic deficit." When the Union abandoned the Constitution in 2007, the editors invited Professor Sieberson to follow up his earlier article with an analysis of the Constitution's replacement, the new Treaty of Lisbon. Because this article builds on the previous piece, the full background analysis will not be repeated. Rather, the author will draw from his earlier catalogue of factors that comprise the democratic deficit, briefly identifying the primary components of the theory and citing representative sources. For each item he will offer a brief evaluation of whether and how the Lisbon Treaty will affect the deficit.

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De Schutter Olivier

**The two Europes of human rights: the emerging division of tasks between the council of Europe and the European Union in promoting human rights in Europe**

in *Columbia Journal of European Law*, Vol.14, issue 3

This article addresses the division of tasks between the Council of Europe and the European Union in the protection of fundamental rights in Europe. As part of its project to establish an area of freedom, security, and justice, the EU has recently sought to develop a more proactive fundamental rights policy. However, in the debate on the shape of the EU's fundamental rights policy, one issue that has repeatedly surfaced is the EU's relationship with the Council of Europe, the leading regional organization for standard-setting and monitoring in the field of human rights. In particular, some have questioned whether the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality which should guide the Union's exercise of the powers it shares with the member states should take into account either the fact that the Council of Europe has already defined standards in the area of fundamental rights for the EU member states, or the fact that the forum of the Council of Europe might be better suited than the EU for the development of new standards where new problems emerge. This study is an attempt to answer this question in a rapidly changing political environment.

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Wimmel Andreas

**Theorizing the Democratic Legitimacy of European Governance: a Labyrinth with No Exit?**

in *Journal of European Integration*, Volume 31, Number 2 / March , 181-199

In recent years, the question of the legitimacy of European governance and the repercussions it has on democratic procedures in EU member states has led to an extraordinarily intricate and controversial debate. Indeed, it seems as if one is trapped in a labyrinth with no exit. This article makes an effort to disentangle the intertwined strands of theory and to present an analytical differentiation that sheds light on this complex maze. Taking the available categorizations into consideration, this article develops a meta-theoretical framework that differentiates between particular concepts, objects, variables and standards of democratic legitimacy in the European multi-level system. The result is a heuristic that enables a more precise analysis and evaluation of democracy and legitimacy criticisms with which the European Union is increasingly confronted.

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Conti Nicolò

**Tied hands? Italian political parties and Europe**

*in Modern Italy*, Volume 14, Issue 2, May , 203-216

Italian political parties have been involved for almost three decades in a multi-level electoral game encompassing the election of national, supranational and local institutions. The content of the electoral competition has also changed to include not only nationwide, but also sub-national and supranational issues. This article analyses the interaction between Italian parties and the theme of European integration. The aim is to explore the role of contentious European Union matters in domestic electoral competition, specifically at the time of European elections. Such a role is important to understand to what extent the Italian parties politicise the EU issues during EP elections, and to determine the impact of such issues on the Italian party system and on its patterns of policy competition. In particular, the article will explore whether Europe as an issue has been internalised along the main patterns of party competition or has produced a disruptive effect and forms of realignment.

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Verstraete Ginette

**Timescapes: An artistic challenge to the European Union paradigm**

*in European Journal of Cultural Studies*, Volume 12, No. 2, May 2009 , 157-172

This article focuses on the development of trans-European corridors of mobility to the east of Europe. It argues that the European Union's infrastructures are intent upon erasing the past and integrating the new places with as little tension as possible, for economic purposes only. Running counter to this late-capitalist investment is the collective video project Timescapes, which includes Angela Melitopoulos' road movie Corridor X, on the history of the Balkan Highway between Germany and Turkey. The deeply historical and transnational networking practices at the heart of this art project offer us a possible paradigm for rethinking what Europe could mean in an age of EU enlargement to the east.

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Koivula Tommi

**Towards An EU Military Ethos**

*in European Foreign Affairs Review*, Volume 14, Issue 2 , 171-190

Since the late 1990s, we have witnessed a substantial expansion in the European Union's crisis management efforts. Less attention, however, has been given to the way in which the involvement in EU crisis management affects the roles and missions of the participating soldiers. This article seeks to address this issue by proposing that as a consequence of the increased crisis management efforts, a specific military ethos is about to emerge in the EU. The ethos can be characterized with three cornerstone commands: 'Pretend to be warlike but don't fight'; 'Master civilian skills'; and 'Redefine your patriotism'. It will be suggested that, its added value in crisis management notwithstanding, the emerging



military ethos does not address the initial aims of the ESDP. Rather, it constitutes a strategic handicap to the Union's external capabilities.

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**D. Logan**

**Turkey and its Middle Eastern Neighbours: Threat or Opportunity for the European Union?**

in *Asian Affairs*, Volume 40, Issue 1 , 34 - 43

Following the end of the Cold War, Turkey has been rebalancing its relations with the Middle East. The author considers how Turkey's unique historic relations with Iran, Iraq and its other neighbours might be of assistance to the European Union. It also explores the connection between the accession negotiations and Turkish internal politics, with special reference to the Kurds.

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**Ülgen Sinan**

**Turkey's route to the EU may be via the Middle East**

in *Europe's World*, Issue 11, Spring

With western influence in the Middle East faltering in the wake of America's misadventure in Iraq and Europe's general indecision, Sinan Ülgen argues that Turkish diplomatic successes in Syria and Iran and its growing stature throughout the Middle East have the potential to make it more attractive to the European Union.

<http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/21347/Default.aspx>

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**Klaus Vaclav, Lepage Henry**

**Un Européen atypique**

in *Politique internationale*, n°122 - Hiver

Élu président de la République tchèque en février 2003, Vaclav Klaus est un cas unique parmi les chefs d'État de l'Union européenne. Non seulement il est libéral et se revendique ouvertement comme tel - ce qui, par les temps qui courent, n'est plus très à la mode - mais, surtout, il est le seul à exprimer publiquement, et de manière répétée, son désaccord avec la façon dont évoluent les institutions politiques de l'UE. Vaclav Klaus était opposé au projet de Constitution européenne rejeté par le double non français et hollandais. Aujourd'hui encore, alors même que son pays vient de prendre en charge la présidence du Conseil de l'Union européenne pour six mois, il n'hésite pas à se présenter en adversaire résolu du traité de Lisbonne, version allégée et révisée du défunt projet de Constitution. Une situation inédite et paradoxale qui fait de Vaclav Klaus la cible privilégiée de tous ceux qui, à Bruxelles, et notamment au



Parlement européen, n'imaginent l'avenir que dans une conception fédérale de l'Europe, sans autre voie possible. La presse européenne le décrit comme un « eurosceptique », voire un « europhobe ». Elle dénonce son arrogance, son attachement dogmatique à l'économie de marché et - comble de tous les crimes - son hostilité sans réserve aux mouvements environnementalistes qui, dit-il, propagent une idéologie fondamentalement contraire aux idées de démocratie et de liberté. Mais qui est-il vraiment ? Quelle est sa véritable vision de l'Europe ?

C'est pour en savoir davantage que nous sommes allés l'interviewer dans son vaste bureau du château de Prague, demeure traditionnelle des chefs d'État tchèques. Sa réponse est claire. Elle tient dans un néologisme : la dénonciation de la dérive « supranationaliste » de ceux qu'il considère comme des fanatiques de l'Europe. À ses yeux, le militantisme « supranationaliste » ne vaut pas mieux que les formes les plus communes de « nationalisme ». Il s'agit d'une même attitude à caractère idéologique dont l'expression, en s'appuyant sur des conceptions erronées de la politique et de la démocratie, ne peut que conduire au déclin de la liberté.

À ce titre, Vaclav Klaus - ami personnel de Milton Friedman et membre de la Société du Mont-Pèlerin - n'est pas seulement un économiste libéral formé à l'école reaganienne ou thatchérienne. Plus fondamentalement, sa pensée s'enracine dans les valeurs d'une vision philosophique libérale classique, à la Hayek ou à la Popper, qui soumet la politique au règne du droit, et pour laquelle la pratique de la démocratie ne saurait se réduire au seul primat d'une volonté majoritaire.

C'est dans ce contexte qu'il faut apprécier et interpréter ses déclarations et ses prises de position, littéralement incompréhensibles pour des milieux européens qui viennent d'autres horizons intellectuels. Sans prendre parti, il est clair que cette divergence philosophique est, en définitive, la source de la méfiance qu'inspire le président Vaclav Klaus - véritable OVNI de la politique européenne - à Bruxelles et dans la plupart des capitales de l'Union.

As the Czech Republic takes over the presidency of the European Union, all eyes are turned towards its president, an atypical character who for years has embodied the most virulent strain of euroscepticism. In this exclusive interview with Henri Lepage of *Politique Internationale*, Vaclav Klaus has no qualms about presenting himself as a resolute opponent of the Lisbon treaty. He denounces the drift towards the "supranationalism" of those whom he considers the fanatics of Europe. In his eyes, the "supranationalist" militancy is no better than the most common forms of "nationalism". They both share the same kind of ideological attitude which, based on flawed conceptions of politics and democracy, can only lead to the decline of liberty. One thing is certain: his thinking is rooted in the classic free market philosophy typified by the likes of Hayek or Milton Friedman, which doesn't find many takers in Brussels, nor in the other capitals of the European Union.

[http://www.politiqueinternationale.com/revue/article.php?id\\_revue=122&id=776&content=synopsis](http://www.politiqueinternationale.com/revue/article.php?id_revue=122&id=776&content=synopsis)

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Velo Francesco

#### **Un evviva, ma per quale Europa?**

**in Queste istituzioni**, n. 150-151, 4-14

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Napolitano Giorgio

**Uno scatto risolutivo per l'Europa**

in *Affari Esteri*, Anno XLI, n. 163, 483-484

No abstract available

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Maas Willem

**Unrespected, unequal, hollow?: contingent citizenship and reversible rights in the European union**

in *Columbia Journal of European Law*, Vol.15, issue 2

In theory, citizenship denotes intrinsic status, signifying both full membership in the political community and a set of rights that adhere inherently and equally to all citizens. In practice, however, the rights of citizenship are variable and differentiated, and governments often approach citizenship not as a fundamental birthright or basic legal status but rather as a policy tool that is subject to constant adaptation, alteration, and modification. The question of which individuals are citizens is as important as the issue of what the status of citizenship entails. The instability of citizenship is heightened by the pluralism of contemporary societies, bounded political communities in which the processes of state-building and those of nation-building have never been perfectly synonymous. Indeed, the demands of creating and operating a functioning state can clash with those of maintaining or building national identity. The result is the constant creation and recreation of exceptions and partial or quasi-citizenships. This is one sense in which citizenship is contingent: rather than being a fundamental status, it is uncertain and subject to unforeseen and perhaps even accidental events. EU citizenship is also contingent in another sense. Possessing it depends on continued recognition as a citizen of an EU Member State: if one's Member State of citizenship withdraws the status, one's access to the rights of EU citizenship also cease. One of the functions of rights is to insulate and protect individuals from political pressures that challenge their rights, but EU institutions have little power to prevail upon Member States which adjust their citizenship criteria and thereby include or exclude individuals from the status of EU citizen. In light of the contingent nature of citizenship generally, this article introduces three challenges to EU citizenship. First, the efforts of EU institutions to command respect for common European rights reminds us that all rights, whatever their source, are only as meaningful as the legitimacy they enjoy and, ultimately, the force available to impose them. Second, EU institutions must work to limit differential or unequal application of European rights. This is likewise a challenge for all governments committed to equality among citizens. Third, unless EU institutions are able to guarantee some degree of access and portability to the entitlements of the welfare state—in areas such as health care, education, pensions, and other benefits, which remain mostly provided at the national level—the content of EU citizenship will remain meager compared with Member State citizenship.

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Adebahr Cornelius

**Untergehen, um zu überleben**

in *Internationale Politik*, 64. Jahrgang, n. 5, Mai, 34-43



ABSTRACT: Der Fortgang der europäischen Integration ist seit langem nicht mehr frei gewählt, sondern aufgrund globaler Herausforderungen notwendig. Anhand der beiden Beispiele Weltwirtschaftskrise und Klimawandel erklärt der Autor, warum die Schaffung eines europäischen Unionsstaats so wichtig ist: ohne ihn gingen die Nationalstaaten unter.

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Avery Graham

**Uses of time in the EU's enlargement process**

in *Journal of European Public Policy*, Volume 16 Issue 2 2009, 256 – 269

The instruments of temporality played a key role in driving institutional action and political decision in the process of expansion of the European Union (EU) from 15 to 27 members. The Opinions made by the European Commission in 1997 on the countries of Central and Eastern Europe interpreted for the first time the 'Copenhagen criteria' for EU membership, and by using a 'medium-term' horizon introduced an important time-factor. The 'roadmap' developed by the Commission and approved by the Council of Ministers in 2000 effectively structured the decisive stages of the accession negotiations. In the 'battle of dates' with the applicant countries concerning the prospective timing of their accession, the EU refused to commit itself to a precise date until the last stages of the negotiations. Overall, it used time-factors in such a way that the existing members and the applicant countries were mobilized to reach a timely conclusion.

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Brandt Wioleta

**Verfassungsrecht in Polen: Verfassungsbeschwerde und Rechtsprechung des polnischen Verfassungsgerichtshofes zu Fragen der EU-Mitgliedschaft**

in *Europarecht*, Volume 44, Issue 1, 2009, 131-145

No abstract available

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Fidrmuc Jan, Ginsburgh Victor, Weber Shlomo

**Voting on the choice of core languages in the European Union**

in *European Journal of Political Economy*, Volume 25, Issue 1, March 2009, 56-62

Extensive multilingualism is one of the most important and fundamental principles of the European Union (EU). However, a large number of languages (currently 23) hinders communication and imposes substantial financial and legal costs. On the other hand, the reduction of the number of languages would disenfranchise some or many EU citizens. We use the results of a survey on languages and argue that even though a linguistic reform reducing the number of languages is unlikely to gain sufficient political support today, this may change in the future since young people are more proficient at speaking foreign languages.



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Le Maire Bruno

**Vouloir l'Europe politique. Entretien**

in *Esprit*, n. 355, juin 2009 , 149-155

A defence of European political voluntarism. An interview with Bruno Le Maire

The French State Minister for European affairs argues that EU would feel all the stronger again if France took a strong stance for a return to political voluntarism. He explains why he is confident in the driving role of a Franco-German alliance, providing examples of priority action for the EU.

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Aucremanne Luc, Boeckx Jef, Dhyne Emmanuel, Smets Jan

**What have we learned about prices and inflation in 10 years of monetary union?**

in *Europe en formation (L')*, n. 351, printemps , 65-88

Full text available on-line: <http://www.cife.eu/UserFiles/File/EEF/351/SMETSEEF351.pdf>

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Vetters Regina, Jentges Erik, Trenz Hans-Jorg

**Whose project is it? Media debates on the ratification of the EU Constitutional Treaty**

in *Journal of European Public Policy* , Volume 16 Issue 3 2009 , 412 – 430

This article explores the contentiousness of European integration in the process of constitution-making. A public sphere perspective is introduced which relates the legitimacy of the emerging EU polity to the constraining and/or enabling context of mass media communication. Starting from an outline of constitutional claims-making in quality newspapers in France and Germany between 2001 and 2005, the article focuses on ratification as a period of intense politicization of EU constitutional affairs. In spite of high media salience, the data indicate only few instances of inter-discursive exchanges across borders. The French referendum had a clear effect on domesticating constitutional contention in France, and became a substitute for raising the constitutional issue in German newspapers, notwithstanding the lack of domestic contention. In both countries perceptions of legitimacy were primarily based on notions of the EU as a problem-solving arrangement with few references to common values and democracy.

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Heinemann Friedrich, Mohl Philipp, Osterloh Steffen

**Who's afraid of an EU tax and why?—revenue system preferences in the European Parliament**

in *Review of International Organizations (The)* , vol. 4, n. 1, march , 73-99



ABSTRACT: The current revenue system of the EU is still structured like that of an organization based on intergovernmental cooperation, although the EU is already far advanced in legislative and political integration. This antagonism gives reason to discuss whether or not the EU should be granted an autonomous tax source. Our contribution to this debate explores the factors which shape the acceptance of the EU tax option among European policy makers. A self-conducted survey among Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), which resulted in a response of some 150 of the representatives, offers us a unique database. Concerning MEPs' revenue system preferences, our findings confirm an important impact of party ideology and individual characteristics while they indicate that country-specific factors also contribute to understand the attitudes towards an EU tax. In the light of our findings the status quo bias in the revenue system of the EU can be attributed to the persistent importance of national interests with respect to tax policy.

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**Speyer Bernhard, Walter Norbert**

**Why Europe must create a strong financial watchdog**

**in Europe's World**, Issue 11, Spring

The financial crisis has raised serious doubts about the effectiveness of Europe's efforts to address its fragmented national systems of financial regulation. Deutsche Bank's Norbert Walter and Bernhard Speyer argue for the setting-up of a pan-European financial supervisor with real clout, and warn that if EU governments fail to summon up enough political courage, the economic cost will be very high.

<http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/21305/Default.aspx>

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**Geoana Mircea**

**Why we mustn't look at Eastern Europe as a single bloc**

**in Europe's World**, Issue 11, Spring

Brussels likes to think big, with large blanket strategies that embrace many of the countries around its periphery. But Mircea Geoana, Chairman of the Romanian Senate and a former Foreign Minister, pleads the case for more narrowly focussed bi-lateral relationships.

<http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/21316/Default.aspx>

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**Euskirchen Markus, Lebuhn Henrik, Ray Gene**

**Wie Illegale gemacht werden. Das neue EU-Grenzregime**

**in Blätter für deutsche & internationale Politik**, Juli, 2009 , 72-80



Derweil ganz Italien ob des jüngsten Skandals um Silvio Berlusconi Kopf steht, ist bereits völlig vergessen, dass dort am 15. Mai die bisher gravierendsten Entscheidungen der europäischen Einwanderungspolitik getroffen wurden. Künftig gilt in Italien die illegale Ein- oder Durchreise als Straftat. Wer illegalen Immigranten eine Unterkunft bietet, muss mit einer Freiheitsstrafe von bis zu drei Jahren rechnen. Um die illegale Einwanderung auf dem Seeweg einzudämmen, wollen Italien und Libyen ...

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**Moreau-Defarges Philippe**

**With no constitution, does Europe have a foreign policy Plan B?**

in *Europe's World*, Issue 11, Spring

The suspicion persists that even without an EU constitution some plan exists to informally implement its core institutional innovations – especially in foreign policy. Philippe Moreau-Defarges says it's untrue, and explains why such an undemocratic agenda would be doomed to fail.

<http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/21312/Default.aspx>

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**Mény Yves, Moravscik Andrew**

**Yves Mény e Andrew Moravscik discutono di democrazia europea**

in *Mulino (il)*, n. 3, maggio-giugno, 2009 , 457-466

No abstract available

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**Lindner Josef Franz**

**Zur grundsätzlichen Bedeutung des Protokolls über die Anwendung der Grundrechtecharta auf Polen und das Vereinigte Königreich – zugleich ein Beitrag zur Auslegung von Art. 51 EGC**

in *Europarecht*, Volume 43, Issue 6, 2008 , 786-800

No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 6. The European unification process*

**Evenett Simon J.**

**“Murky protectionism” in Europe: How should binding rules be evaluated in tough times?**

in *Intereconomics*, Volume 44, Number 2 / March, 2009 , 70-71



European governments have reacted to the worst Continent-wide deterioration in economic performance in several generations with a plethora of interventions. Not all of these interventions are nationality-blind, that is, some seek to overtly or covertly discriminate against foreign commercial entities or workers. Worse, as Richard Baldwin and I have recently argued (in our recent voxEU collection of such matters titled "The collapse of global trade, murky protectionism, and the crisis: Recommendations for the G20", available at [www.voxeu.org](http://www.voxeu.org)), some of the very measures taken to stimulate national economies have discrimination against foreigners buried within them. Fears about such "murky protectionism" are particularly hard to dispel, as it is far less transparent than overt trade policy measures such as tariffs and quotas. Politicians find pressures to retaliate harder to resist when the mere accusation of foreign protectionism cannot be obviously and costlessly rebutted.

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 6. The European unification process*

Yakemtchouk Romain

**« La politique étrangère » de l'Union européenne**

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, n. 527, avril, 217-227

The EU would like to play an international role commensurate with its economic capacity, but it is an ambitious plan, as the political Union of its member countries is still in the making, and the passing of the Lisbon Treaty that could open new prospects is still to take place. It will soon adjust to the new directions of American politics championed by Barack Obama towards Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan, and in the meantime, the EU has reopened its cooperation with China, as well as to some extent, with Russia, with which it used to have diverging positions about Georgia and Ukraine. It condemned the shooting of Palestinian rockets against Israel, while blaming the continuing humanitarian crisis in Gaza. With Islam-oriented parties now in power, Turkey is still applying for EU membership, though its file is on standby. The European Union has continued its work in the area of climate change in advance of an international treaty, that would follow the Kyoto Protocol in 2012. It was critical of Nicolas Sarkozy's plan regarding the Mediterranean, which is now blocked by Arab-Muslim countries. Europe's safety and defence policy is the hardest area of European cooperation: its limits result from the requirements of the sovereignty of its member countries.

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*Subsection 6. The European unification process*

Briones Razeto Sebastián, Kammel Arnold, Kernic Franz

**¿Buscando un nuevo paradigma? La Unión Europea en busca de un nuevo concepto de seguridad en las Relaciones Internacionales**

in *Relaciones internacionales : revista publ. por el Instituto de Relaciones Internacionales*, N°9, Octubre de 2008

This article presents an analysis of the fundamental changes affecting the theoretical orientation of the European security in the post-Cold War World. The main objective is to investigate the development of new European security concepts in the context of European integration and to analyze the chief possibilities of establishing a new security paradigm with regard to the future development of the security policy of the European Union (EU). The starting point of the analysis is the social discourse on new risks and challenges for the European security and the relation between the perception of a list of new menaces and the formulation and formation of a new security policy. The focus of the study is the European Union and the contemporary discourses concerning the genesis of a new security paradigm fit to scale of



the EU and its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

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*Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation*

Jazra Bandarra Nelly

**Union pour la Méditerranée: point de vue de l'autre rive**

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, n. 523, décembre , 689-693

No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation*

Mildner Stormy, Ziegler Oliver

**A Long and thorny road. Regulatory cooperation under the framework for advancing transatlantic economic integration**

in *Intereconomics*, Volume 44, Number 1 / January, 2009 , 49-58

When the European Union and the United States agreed on the Framework for Advancing Transatlantic Economic Integration at the EU-US Summit on 30 April 2007, creating the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC), they praised themselves for opening a new era in transatlantic regulatory cooperation. Transatlantic integration and growth were said to be enhanced and efforts to reduce barriers to transatlantic trade and investment redoubled. However, after two meetings of the TEC with only modest achievements, enthusiasm has faded quickly and finger pointing has begun anew. What went wrong?

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M. Reiterer

**ASIA-EUROPE MEETING (ASEM): fostering a multipolar world order through inter-regional cooperation**

in *Asia Europe Journal*, Volume 7, Number 1 / February , 179-196

Since its inception in 1996 ASEM has provided an opportunity for focussing relations between the EU and East Asia as a forum for informal multilayered dialogue and building a framework for enhanced cooperation in the political, economic and social/cultural fields. Inter-regionalism, of which ASEM is the incarnation in the EU-Asia relationship, developed into an important policy tool of the EU in an effort to maintain a multipolar setting. Regional identities in Asia are at a different level when comparing South East Asia, North East Asia, East Asia and South and Central Asia. ASEM contributed to a certain extent to the region building in East Asia. Although the economic pillar of ASEM turned out to be the more important one when compared to the political and the people-to-people pillars, it will not become the basis for a (deep) inter-regional free trade agreement because of the diversity of the Asian members, reinforced by the last ASEM enlargement. However, turning weakness into strength, ASEM could become the EU's vehicle for a more holistic approach to Asia thereby fostering a more economic and political multipolar world order. The financial melt down of the international financial order lead to the rediscovery of the need for international cooperation not only on the level of business but also among states. Making use of ASEM, developed over the last 12 years, could provide the much



needed platform in the EU-Asia relationship.

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Kelam Tunne

**An EU realpolitik to unravel the riddle of unruly Russia**

in *Europe's World*, Issue 11, Spring

Russia's behaviour is neither unfathomable nor about to change for the better, says Tunne Kelam, an Estonian MEP who is part of the EU-Russia Parliamentary Cooperation Committee. He warns that as Moscow always acts in its own national interest, it's left to the EU to insist on the international rule of law.

<http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/21348/Default.aspx>

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

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Mahbubani Kishore

**Be quick Europe, or miss out on the Asian century**

in *Europe's World*, Issue 11, Spring

As we advance into "the Asian century", Kishore Mahbubani expresses frustration at the EU's lack of engagement with Asia. His advice for European strategists is to accept the inexorable rise of the East and learn from examples like China's free trade agreements with its neighbours and ASEAN's cultural diversity.

<http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/21345/Default.aspx>

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation*

M. Maes

**Civil society perspectives on EU-ASIA free trade agreements**

in *Asia Europe Journal*, Volume 7, Number 1 / February , 97-107

This paper focuses on the positions taken by civil society organisations that actively campaign on trade policies. Trade campaigners oppose the neo-liberal approach to trade and development and advocate a much more gradual and prudent approach to trade liberalisation. They stress that trade liberalisation will only lead to sustainable development if it respects environmental and social concerns, including the gender dimension of trade; if trade liberalisation is properly owned, prepared and sequenced; adapted to the institutional and economic needs and capacities of the countries and people involved, and accompanied by all necessary flanking measures. Trade campaigners stress the need to maintain policy space and the necessary governance instruments to react to changing circumstances and address social and environmental concerns. They denounce the lack of information, consultation and participation provided by governments in trade policy formulation and negotiations and they campaign to raise awareness and create more room for debate and



participation.

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**D. Konstadakopoulos**

**Cooling the earth? The changing priorities of EU–Asia technology cooperation**

in *Asia Europe Journal*, Volume 7, Number 2 / June , 345-366

External crises such as the Bird Flu epidemic, as well as severe environmental problems, are changing overall attitudes towards research in human health and the environment. At present, the EU is putting pressure on developing countries in Asia and elsewhere to increase their environmental capacities and put forward methods of environmental management that support innovation and competitiveness. They are also being encouraged to participate in the Kyoto protocol and Bali processes on climate change. This paper aims to address the current issues faced by the EU in promoting environmentally friendly technologies in Southeast Asia, as well as to examine the opportunities for technological cooperation between Europe and Asia. It will use Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Vietnam—some of the EU’s chosen recipients of official development assistance in the region—as case studies, in order to examine how these countries implement policies that incorporate environmental technology strategies designed to promote sustainable development. It will also attempt to identify the type of actions that are being pursued by their respective governments, with the support of the EU and its member states. Finally, the paper will suggest which types of environmentally friendly technologies and best practice could be transferred from Europe to Southeast Asia, and to the wider Asian region.

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

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**B., Gavin; A. Sindzingre**

**EU trade relations with Emerging Asia: identifying the issues**

in *Asia Europe Journal*, Volume 7, Number 1 / February , 9-22

Trade interdependence between Europe and Asia has rapidly increased in recent years. Europe–Asia trade flows now constitute a ‘third link’ in the global economy. As trade expands, however, global trade governance has declined and free trade agreements (FTAs) have increased. Hence, the Global Europe strategy has been designed to enhance trade relations with emerging Asia which is the most dynamic region in the global economy today. But Asia’s model of export led growth leaves it more exposed to shocks emanating from outside the region than ever before raising questions about its sustainability. Deep integration agreements between Europe and Asia are needed to foster economic growth. They also need a development dimension to help Asian countries address their key development challenges.

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*Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation*

**Bernadette Andreosso-O’Callaghan**

**Economic structural complementarity: how viable is the Korea-EU FTA?**



in **Journal of Economic Studies**, Volume 36 Issue 2 , 147 - 167

Economic structural complementarity between country A and country B, or the way the two countries specialize in different industries is a useful tool for the analysis of the likely impact of trade liberalization. Although implicit in earlier work on economic integration, this concept has been overshadowed subsequently, probably because of the “econometrization” of the studies on trade liberalization. This paper aims to discuss first the relevance of the concept of structural complementarity between two economies in the context of regional integration. Second, since the EU and Korea are on the verge of signing a free trade agreement (FTA), it aims to show that measuring economic structural complementarity in the case of these two countries is all the more desirable.

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J. Rössler

**Eurasia: re-emergence of two world regions**

in **Asia Europe Journal**, Volume 7, Number 2 / June , 313-326

Relations between Asia and Europe have a long history back to ancient times. This history is also a history of superpowers. Today the relations between Asia and Europe are dominated by various regional actors, mainly the EU and ASEAN. Their bi- and multilateral cooperations have changed the international system. These processes, called inter- or transregionalism, also have deep impact on the regional integration in both regions, but especially in Asia. Interregionalism fosters open regionalism in Asia and has catalysed further efforts to multilayered regional integration in this world region.

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation*

Nam-Kook Kim

**European experience for East Asian integration: ideas, national interests, and the international circumstance**

in **Asia Europe Journal**, Volume 7, Number 2 / June , 295-312

This paper traces the possibility of East Asian integration through comparison with the early stage of European integration on three different levels: ideas, national interests, and international circumstance. Judging from the European experience, ideas always come first, then national interest contests, and eventually the international circumstance conditions the context. I compare the multilateral approach in Europe with the imperial hegemony competition in East Asia, Adenauer’s regionalization policy in Europe with the Yoshida line of Westernization detouring from Asia, and the US and Russia’s different roles in the two regions as external forces constraining the international order. My conclusion for the future of East Asia is located somewhere between views of procedural divergence and fundamental skepticism. I worry about integration for the sake of integration in which regional integration is presupposed as inherently good. Such discourse will easily be deteriorated and such a blind community simply collapses when circumstances change. For these reasons, there needs to be an adequate discussion regarding for what, by whom, and through which method integration is achieved.



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Rizzo Aldo

**Gli Stati Uniti, Obama, l'Europa, Sarkozy**

in *Affari Esteri*, Anno XLI, n. 161, 73-81

No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation*

Saint-Martin Gilles

**How EU policies could address Africa's food security**

in *Europe's World*, Issue 11, Spring

Increasing farm production isn't enough to ensure food security in Africa. Gilles Saint-Martin calls for a global body to coordinate resources and regulations to reduce the hunger problem while also reining in the speculators.

<http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/21359/Default.aspx>

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

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B. Andreosso-O'Callaghan

**How is the EU-ASEAN FTA viewed by ASEAN stakeholders?**

in *Asia Europe Journal*, Volume 7, Number 1 / February, 63-78

Since April 2007, the EU Commission has been entrusted to start negotiating a FTA with ASEAN countries. Being enshrined in the logic contained in its 'Global Europe strategy', the proposed EU-ASEAN FTA finds its economic rationale in the expected overall positive impact found by most econometric studies on the topic. This article argues that although beneficial, these studies are limited conceptually and methodologically. In particular, they are unable to tackle the issue of differentiated effects on several groups of stakeholders. By analysing, through a questionnaire, the opinion of a number of ASEAN stakeholders, this article brings complementary information on the perception of the planned EU-ASEAN FTA by these different stakeholders. Whilst offering many opportunities, the FTA presents also a number of risks, the most critical one being the costs of adjustment, particularly for poorer ASEAN member countries.

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Landaburu Eneko

**It's time for hard choices on EU-Russia relations**

in *Europe's World*, Issue 11, Spring



The Georgia crisis has been a catalyst for bringing the uneasy EU-Russia relationship into sharper focus. Eneko Landaburu outlines the shape of the updated partnership needed to prevent more conflicts in their shared neighbourhood while putting the wider issues of economic cooperation and energy supply on a much surer footing.

<http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/21349/Default.aspx>

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

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Jazra Bandarra Nelly

**L'Union pour la Méditerranée : le cas du Liban**

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, n. 526, mars , 163-167

The last development of the Israelo-Palestinian conflict have exacerbated divisions between the countries around the Mediterranean. One of the main difficulties facing the supporters of the Union pour le Méditerranée (UPM), including President Sarkozy at the Paris Meeting of July 13, 2008, was already to bring all the countries together around the same table. After the high price paid by Palestinians, the relationship is even more tense. It is all the more necessary to increase the dialogue and solidarity around the Mediterranean. As a result, how to re-launch the UPM and what would be the role of a country such as Lebanon? Lebanon has interesting features in the Union, since it is located in the Middle East, and is one of the countries most open to the Western world. Due to its history, it has been a link between Europe and the Arab world. For the UPM, it could play a pivotal role between the various civilisations that it belongs to. The article goes over the main features of the evolution of the Lebanese economy and puts Lebanon back in the heart of the ground and maritime networks. It considers that in this geostrategic context, it should resume its place in the international context and in the black gold traffic between the Middle East and Europe. As part of the UPM, it would be important to set up an energy network that the various neighbouring countries would be connected to. Fossil energy would be complemented by other renewable energies such as the solar energy, well adapted to the region. What is important in the UPM is that for the first time, there is a co-organisation with an equal participation by the countries on both shores (joint chairmanship), treated as equal partners, with the implementation of joint management. Therefore more active participation by southern Mediterranean countries would be needed, where Lebanon could take interesting initiatives, which, with the financial crisis, could be found all the more useful in the framework of regional cooperation.

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Kirilov Iskren

**La Unión por el Mediterráneo: ¿mediterraneización del Norte o europeización del Sur?**

in *Cuadernos de pensamiento político*, Nr 19, julio-septiembre 2008 , 167-185

No abstract available

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

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Kaddouri Amid

**La gestion des conflits dans le cadre de la politique euro-méditerranéenne – Le cas des événements de Gaza**



in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, n. 527, avril , 228-235

Faced with the recent Gaza events, similar to what happened during the Israel-Lebanon war in the summer of 2006, Euro-Mediterranean partners are faced with a major dilemma: either they try and find a solution within the institutional framework provided by the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (PEM), with the rights of giving the world, in the event the negotiations fail, an example of weakness and uselessness, or they let international dialogue act, with the risk of showing the pointlessness of the process. Disabled by their own feeling of powerlessness, Euro-Mediterranean decision makers have opted for the second option to deal with the issue at a very high level. Driven by the will to clarify the connection between conflict management and cooperation in the Mediterranean area, this contribution offers to analyse the safety approach planned in the framework of the PEM, from Barcelona to Paris, by emphasising the respective contributions of Europe's safety strategy and its neighbourhood policy.

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Vadcar Corinne

**La relation transatlantique à l'heure de Barack Obama – Le faux débat du protectionnisme**

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, n. 527, avril , 213-216

United States will enter with the international economic crisis in protectionist practices but they will not be alone in this way and these practices won't be new in this country. In this context, protectionism is a wrong debate in transatlantic relations. It is better to work for reviving the transatlantic dialogue with the Presidency of Barack Obama who is conscious of the complexity of the world: Europe is now only one of the political partners of Washington and US trade policy won't be the same during the next months without being completely another one.

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

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Weisstaub Lara

**Las Nociones De Cooperación Y La Articulación De Los Actores En Los Diálogos Unión Europea-América Latina**

in *Análisis político* , Vol.21, issue 64 , 57-66

El artículo tiene como objetivo identificar las nociones de Cooperación Internacional que se utilizan en el diálogo birregional entre la Unión Europea y América Latina. Para ello, se realizó un análisis del contenido explícito e implícito de las Declaraciones Ministeriales y de Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno de la UE y del Grupo de Río.

Se describe el proceso y los actores involucrados en la construcción de la política de cooperación birregional y se analizan las principales características de ambas regiones, para ahondar en la comprensión de las nociones de cooperación y sus implicancias para la relación entre Europa y América Latina.

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Françoise Nicolas

**Negotiating a Korea – EU free trade agreement: easier said than done**



in *Asia Europe Journal*, Volume 7, Number 1 / February , 23-42

A number of countries have chosen recently to shift away from an exclusive support to trade multilateralism and towards regional or bilateral trade agreements. Being no exceptions in this respect, the Republic of South Korea and the European Union have engaged in a bilateral FTA negotiation in early 2007. The objective of the paper is to account for the unexpected difficulties encountered in the negotiation. The paper starts with a brief overview of the trade and investment relations between the two partners and underlines the complementarity between the two partners, as well as their respective offensive and defensive interests. As a next step, the paper delves into the “politics” of the FTA negotiation with a view to highlighting the motivations and objectives of the various partners involved. It comes to the conclusion that the major reason why the negotiation turned out to be more complex than initially expected relates to the two partners’ diverging views as to what a discriminatory FTA should imply.

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De Grossouvre Henri, Pascallon Pierre

**Organising Cooperation and Security in Greater Europe**

in *World Affairs*, Vol. 12, n. 4, Winter

Russia is a European nation which stretches across Northern Asia all the way to the Pacific. Its future therefore lies, at least in part with the EU, in spite of US inspired attempts to keep the two apart by perpetuating the Cold War. HENRI DE GROSSOUVRE and PIERRE PASCALLON suggest that the OSCE may provide the right platform to heal this historic rift and rebuild continental unity.

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P. Holmes; A. Shingal

**Potential Benefits from a Deep EU–India Free Trade Agreement**

in *Asia Europe Journal*, Volume 7, Number 1 / February , 43-62

Both parties to an eventual EU India FTA have agreed that it should not merely address tariff barriers but should also go further into what is known as deep integration, originally developed in the 1990s by R.Z. Lawrence. This relates to the removal of all obstacles to cross border business whether actual trade barriers or domestic regulations. We distinguish deep institutional integration from the deep integration of markets. We ask the question how one may support the other. There are potential market failures that can be addressed by trans-national rules on standards and technical regulations and services, but we conclude that the biggest impact of a deep RTA would be on the domestic economy of India if it provides an opportunity for reform. It should be noted that the paper draws on a study undertaken by the authors for DG Trade, but it represents only the views of the authors.

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*Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation*

Antkiewicz Agata, Momani Bessma



**Pursuing Geopolitical Stability through Interregional Trade: the EU's Motives for Negotiating with the Gulf Cooperation Council**

in *Journal of European Integration*, Volume 31, Number 2 / March , 217-235

The European Union's drawn-out trade negotiations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) could result in the first region-to-region free trade agreement. The EU's motives for advancing interregional negotiations with the GCC have not been focused primarily on creating trade, which is argued to be relatively limited for the EU. Instead, the EU's motives for continuing negotiations with the GCC are explained by the EU's geopolitical and ideational interests and to a lesser extent by interest group influences. We do not find, however, strong evidence of EU bureaucratic motives as a factor in GCC negotiations. Based on these findings, this paper suggests that the recent reawakening of EU-GCC negotiations can best be explained by the relative increase in the geopolitical importance of the Gulf.

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Hodu Yenkong Ngangjoh

**Regionalism in the WTO and the Legal Status of a Development Agenda in the EU/ACP Economic Partnership Agreement**

in *Nordic Journal of International Law*, vol. 78, issue 2 , 225-248

ABSTRACT: The proliferation of regional trade agreements (RTAs) which share similar ideals with the World Trade Organization (WTO) has added to claims of disintegration within international trade law. Notwithstanding the ambiguity surrounding the reading of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article XXIV on RTAs, WTO members are continuously negotiating RTAs with objectives which have so far not received universal acceptance under the WTO treaty system. In the context of European Union (EU)-Africa trade relations, the December 2007 EU-Africa summit was expected to be an appropriate venue for leaders from both sides to resolve the controversy surrounding the idea of development-friendly free trade agreements between the contracting parties. But, the summit was wrapped up without achieving any clear answer to this issue. Similarly, at the multilateral level, i.e. the WTO Doha Development Round negotiations, which the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States have sponsored, numerous development-friendly proposals on RTAs stalled since July 2006. Consequently, in view of this controversy, if development concerns can be factored into economic partnership agreements (EPAs), what would be an acceptable threshold for such RTAs to conform to GATT Article XXIV requirements of "substantially all trade" and "reasonable period of time"? This paper discusses the idea of development and WTO compatibility in the context of the EU-Africa Economic Partnership negotiations. In view of the flawed dispute settlement provisions under the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA), the paper further tries to answer the question of whether the CPA contains rights and obligations that need protection by individual EU member courts and may necessarily be enforced before the European Court of Justice. The paper ends with some thoughts on the post-EPAs adjustment programme.

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Alfredo C. Robles Jr.

**The EU and ASEAN: Learning from the Failed EU-Mercosur FTA Negotiations**

in *ASEAN Economic Bulletin*, Volume 25, Number 3 , 334-344



In May 2007, the EU and ASEAN agreed to launch negotiations for an FTA. In entering the negotiation process, it is obvious that the EU has learned lessons from its failed negotiations with Mercosur. Thus the EU sought to ensure that there was a consensual basis for the (positive) assessment of an FTA's consequences, and it insisted on setting a deadline for the negotiations. ASEAN has to learn two lessons from the EU-Mercosur experience. First, there is a difference between the EU's rhetoric and the reality of the negotiations. Second, there is a wide gap between the possible negative consequences of FTA and the assistance that the EU may offer to enable countries, firms and workers to cope with these consequences.

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Carranza Mario E.

**The North–South divide and security in the Western Hemisphere: United States–South American relations after September 11 and the Iraq war**

in **International Politics**, Volume 46, Issue 2-3, March, 276-297

This paper examines the economics–security nexus in US policy toward South America, and the implications for South America of the 'securitization' of US foreign economic policy during the Bush administration. There has always been a tight linkage between the US foreign economic and security agendas but the real issue is the degree of 'tightness' at a given point in time. After the Alliance for Progress lost its way the United States tended to pursue its economic and security interests in South America in separate tracks, even if preventing Soviet intrusions in the region remained in the background. Yet after the collapse of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) negotiations in 2004 a US strategy of 'divide and conquer' through bilateral trade deals has been accompanied by a 'securitization' discourse and there are some indications that it may 'securitize' as a new threat the social movements and neopopulist regimes that oppose neoliberal economic policies. The paper discusses the limits of the securitization thesis. The conclusion examines the future of US–South American relations and argues that the United States needs to renew its commitment to genuine multilateralism and re-engage the region to establish an effective and lasting partnership for dealing with common economic and security challenges in the twenty-first century.

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Balfour Rosa

**The Transformation of the Union for the Mediterranean - Profile**

in **Mediterranean Politics**, Volume 14, Issue 1, March, 99-105

No abstract available

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Melleuish Greg

**The West, the Anglo-Sphere and the Ideal of Commonwealth**

in **Australian Journal of Politics & History**, Volume 55, Issue 2, June, 233-247



This article considers the idea of commonwealth as a means of understanding human "politics" that does not rely on the violence of the state. It considers the idea of commonwealth to involve cultural and other forms of ties that transcend the borders of states and link people who share common views and aspirations together. It examines two contemporary visions of commonwealth, that of the West and that of the Anglo-sphere. It argues that the sorts of bonds that these commonwealths entail are positive so long as they are recognised as embodying both strengths and weaknesses and are not used as means to attempt to demonstrate the supposed superiority of their virtues.

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Elgström Ole

**Trade and aid? The negotiated construction of EU policy on economic partnership agreements in *International Politics*** , Volume 46, Issue 4, July , 451-468

Efforts by the European Commission and by leading member states, to normatively frame the debate about trade – and thus rhetorically entrap other actors by references to previous commitments – are ubiquitous; and member states do take account of the potential effects of their actions, in terms of potential praise or shaming, and adapt their behaviour to the institutional setting. However, this holds true only up to a certain limit. If sensitivity to domestic constituencies is high enough and the issue gets politicized, then member states may break ranks regardless of institutionalized normative constraints, especially if the issue-area is linked to proclaimed key self-images of the government. External pressure can also play its part. Indeed, the Commission's reluctant decision to include development sections in the final offer was arguably not only the result of internal member state activity, but also of pressure from the EU's counterpart – Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific – whose main bargaining objective was to include strong and effective development provisions in the final agreement.

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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation*

Jazra Bandarra Nelly

**Un développement durable pour la Méditerranée**

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, n. 528, mai , 294-300

The Mediterranean is concerned by a few serious issues, such as environment degradation, problems related to sea pollution, water, agriculture and energy, which are discussed in various instances. The institutional construction of the Union for the Mediterranean (UFM) still remains incomplete, as the head office has not been designated yet, and the secretariat does not work. This construction has also been delayed by the burst of the conflict between Israel and Palestine, and the Gaza conflict. Still, several projects are in progress and many propositions are discussed within the partnerships around the Mediterranean. Financings are possible through certain credit institutions. Regional and local authorities, especially in urban, maritime and some rural areas, are involved in the construction of new infrastructures and the promotion of renewable energies. They realize the gravity of not answering immediately to emergencies such as the lack of water, of cleansing and of other infrastructures. As we can observe through the projects mentioned in this article, if as far as politics is concerned, the UFM has undergone a reduction of activities, the cooperation between the various countries is maintained and becomes stronger through the carrying-out of actions and the working-out of propositions which have a common interest.



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**Section C) Regional integration processes**

*Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation*

**Meshkov Alexey**

**Un'alleanza Europa-Russia**

in *Affari Esteri*, Anno XLI, n. 161 , 39-41

No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 1. Federalism*

**Montchamp Joseph**

**Building a Federation During a Revolution is not Easy**

in *Federalist Debate (The)*, Year XXII, n. 1, March , 34-37

No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 1. Federalism*

**Onida Valerio**

**Federalismo, eguaglianza, giustizia**

in *Questione giustizia*, fasc. 6

No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 2. Nationalism*

**Stoicheva Tatyana**

**'Giving everyone their due': Religious buildings in Sofia and the conceptualisation of national identity, 1878-1912**

in *National Identities*, vol. 11, n. 2, June , 187-207

This article concerns the attempt of the re-emerged Bulgarian state to re-define and re-conceptualise national identity in Sofia's visual and spatial representations. The idea to conceptualise and represent Bulgarian identity as homogeneous in the monumental St Nevsy's Cathedral was transformed through the simultaneous and synchronic emergence of monumental houses of worship of other ethnic and religious communities. The forging of Bulgarian identity, in anticipation of reunification, veered from official concepts towards pre-liberation democratic ideology. This countered the elite's vision and helped others assert difference as a component of Bulgarian-ness, thus introducing an alternative to the homogenising model.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 2.Nationalism*

Behar Moshe

**Across Nationalisms: Nascent Conceptualisation, Rudimentary Cross-Regional Historicisation in Politics**, Vol. 29, Issue 2, May , 83-92

If nations are non-preordained configurations of socio-political collectivities then they cement – or fragment – as a consequence of two core sets of on-the-ground interactions: those taking place within a national movement among contending intra-national constituents; and those taking place between competing national movements, typically over territory. A third set of on-the-ground socio-political interactions has received less attention in the study of the phenomenon of nationalism: I term it 'dynamics across nationalisms'. If such dynamics are explored in conjunction with the more prevalent study of interactions within and between nationalisms, they can shed brighter explanatory light on the phenomenon of national consolidation/disintegration.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 2.Nationalism*

Körner Axel, Riall Lucy

**Alberto Banti's Interpretation of Risorgimento Nationalism: a Debate. Introduction: the new history of Risorgimento nationalism**  
in **Nations and Nationalism**, Volume 15, Issue 3, July 2009 , 396-401

No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 2.Nationalism*

Banti Alberto

**Alberto Banti's Interpretation of Risorgimento Nationalism: a Debate. Reply of A.M. Banti**  
in **Nations and Nationalism**, Volume 15, Issue 3, July 2009 , 446-454

No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 2.Nationalism*

Herzog Ben

**Between nationalism and humanitarianism: the glocal discourse on refugees**  
in **Nations and Nationalism**, Volume 15, Issue 2, April 2009 , 185-205

The public and researchers alike view global/humanitarian and local/national logics as based on different, and even contradictory, regimes of justification. In this paper, however, I argue that these logics are complementary in the case of refugees. By asking 'who is a refugee?' within the Israeli case study, I empirically ground the claim that nationalism and humanitarianism should be grasped as Glocal. Content analysis of the Israeli case reveals how the Israeli establishment 'translates' the universal notion of humanitarianism. Humanitarian discourse does not offer an answer to the refugee



problem by invoking a universal identity, nor is it just a euphemism for particularistic interests. On the contrary, the humanitarian logic is in fact based on the national order, and does not attempt to replace it. The political meaning of the term 'refugee' is an endless transcription of the national logic, and thus cannot be cosmopolitan.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 2. Nationalism*

Ortega Gutiérrez David

**Democracy vs. Nationalism: A View from Tocqueville Upon the Basque Country  
in Democracy and Security**, Volume 5, Issue 1, January , 1-18

The point of departure of this study is a theoretical and practical analysis of the current state of our Western democracies in order to subsequently apply it to the current situation that Spain is undergoing with the terrorism of ETA in the Basque Country. It concludes with a vision of Alexis de Tocqueville's democracy and its possible practical contribution to the case of the present Spanish democracy and its problems with the terrorism of ETA, studied from the perspective of politicians at a national (PSOE / PP) and autonomous level (PNV), as well as from the social level of the Basque people.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 2. Nationalism*

Winter Elke

**Die Dialektik multikultureller Identität: Kanada als Lehrstück  
in Swiss Political Science Review - Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft - Revue suisse de science  
politique**, Volume 15, Number 1, Spring 2009 , 133-168

Dieser Aufsatz untersucht die Konstruktion multikultureller nationaler Identität am Beispiel Kanadas. Mittels einer Untersuchung ausgewählter Artikel zweier großer kanadischer Zeitungen, der Globe and Mail und der Toronto Star in den 1990er Jahren wird gezeigt, dass sowohl Kanada-USA Gegenüberstellungen als auch Vergleiche des englischsprachigen Kanadas mit dem französischsprachigen Quebec eine wichtige Rolle für die Konstruktion des Mythos "multikulturelles Kanada" spielen. Die mittels der Fallstudie gewonnenen Einsichten werden anschließend dazu genutzt, zwei in der Fachliteratur gängige Darstellungen des Kanada-Quebec Verhältnisses zu nuancieren und die Konstruktion eines multikulturellen nationalen Selbstverständnisses theoretisch zu erfassen.

The full text is free:

<http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/spsa/spsr/2009/00000015/00000001/art00005>

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 2. Nationalism*

Isabella Maurizio

**Emotions, rationality and political intentionality in patriotic discourse  
in Nations and Nationalism**, Volume 15, Issue 3, July 2009 , 427-433

No abstract available



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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 2.Nationalism*

Kachun Mitch

**From Forgotten Founder to Indispensable Icon: Crispus Attucks, Black Citizenship, and Collective Memory, 1770–1865**

in *Journal of the Early Republic*, Volume 29, Number 2, Summer , 249-286

This study illustrates and assesses the historical amnesia surrounding Crispus Attucks and his role in the American Revolution between his death at the 1770 Boston Massacre and the 1850s, when he first became widely used as a symbol of African American patriotism and citizenship. Studies of collective memory and the role it plays in shaping historical understanding, developing commemorative traditions, defining culture heroes, and constructing group or national identity, have been expanding in recent decades, including significant work related to the Revolutionary era and African American history. In particular, there are growing bodies of work on blacks' uses of public commemoration and on the development of a pantheon of race heroes to advance both race pride and African Americans' legitimate claims to American citizenship. Scholarship on figures such as Richard Allen, Sojourner Truth, Nat Turner, and others suggests the ways in which black Americans have constructed heroic traditions in ways that fostered both racial and American identities. After the 1850s, black activists presented Crispus Attucks as a "black Founding Father"—not merely an important race hero, but a legitimate national hero. But this seminal figure in African Americans' quest to define their legitimate place in United States history and culture was virtually ignored by both blacks and whites in the early republic. Understanding the process of Attucks's rediscovery after the 1830s contributes not only to our understanding of African American history, but also to our understanding of how collective memory is constructed and appropriated to serve particular political agendas.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 2.Nationalism*

Cusack Igor

**From Revolution to Reflection: The National Anthems of the New Lusophone Worlds**

in *Luso-Brazilian Review*, Volume 45, Number 2, 2008 , pp. 45-67

Os hinos nacionais, tais como as bandeiras, os brasões, os selos e o dinheiro, são elementos simbólicos que fazem parte de um equipamento que acompanha as reivindicações de especificidade de cada nação. As letras dos hinos dos países pós-coloniais podem ser vistos como documentos ilustrativos, já que reflectem as ideologias e preocupações da era da independência. Os temas mais comuns são apelos ao despertar da nação ou elogios às maravilhas 'únicas' do território nacional. No entanto, os hinos dos cinco países da África lusófona e Timor-Leste diferem da maioria dos outros estados pós-coloniais na medida em que as elites políticas recorreram a poetas e escritores conhecidos e proclamaram a revolução socialista. Enquanto que na maioria dos outros países os hinos iniciais permanecem, no novo mundo lusófono a transformação política do socialismo para o capitalismo foi acompanhada pela substituição-ou planos de substituição-dos hinos. Os discursos de identidade nacional que inicialmente celebravam os heróis de libertação e preconizavam a construção de um futuro próspero foram substituídos por hinos que enfatizam a cultura e o encanto do país amado.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 2. Nationalism*

Altan-Olcay Özlem

**Gendered projects of national identity formation: The case of Turkey**

in *National Identities*, vol. 11, n. 2, June , 165-186

The consolidation of the Turkish Republic in 1923 took place in opposition to multiple 'others' - that is, multiple ideologies with alternative models of modernity and state formation. An important aspect of the resulting negotiations was their gendered nature. This article explores the multiplicity of subject-positions made available to women using the nationalist literary production of the first half of the twentieth century. By linking literary production with the official discourse, it argues that blurring the distinction between public and private discourses can better capture the gendered character of the nationalist discourse. The analysis details the common denominators between articulations about women's bodies and familial ties, and the building of a nationalist discourse. In these works, typologies of mothers, fathers, daughters, step and adopted ones, and those female figures seen as threats to these families tallied with the ongoing attempts to popularise a particular imagining of the nation. The desired unity of the republic, figuring in these roles, seemed to depend on controlling, taming and erasing a variety of designated identities and ideologies.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 2. Nationalism*

Bose Anuja

**Hindutva and the Politicization of Religious Identity in India**

in *Peace, Conflict and Development*, Volume 13, Issue 13, February , 30

An important question that gets frequently asked about Hindu nationalism in India is “why the secular and civic nationalism of Jawaharlal Nehru degenerated into the ethnic nationalism of the Hindutva ideologues?” An answer to this question is typically articulated by looking at crucial transformations in Indian politics. For instance, the decline of the Indian National Congress in the late 1980s, and the gradual erosion of democratic structures are the two most common reasons given to explain the rise of the Hindu nationalist party, Bharatiya Janata Party, to power. However, these explanations do not probe into why religious identity was particularly prone to politicization in India. To that end, the prevailing explanations for the rise of Hindu nationalism leave some fundamental questions unanswered.

Full text available on-line: <http://www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk/docs/Issue%2013%20Article%208%20formatted.pdf>

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 2. Nationalism*

Bastianelli Rodolfo

**I rapporti tra la Serbia e il Kosovo**

in *Affari Esteri*, Anno XLI, n. 163 , 607-617

No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**



*Subsection 2.Nationalism*

Dibattito in redazione

**Il nazionalismo etnico e l'Europa**

in *Queste istituzioni*, n. 150-151 , 88 - 115

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 2.Nationalism*

Bauder Harald, Semmelroggen Jan

**Immigration and Imagination of Nationhood in the German Parliament**

in *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, Volume 15, Issue 1, January 2009 , 1-26

Immigration policy and debate can reveal how a nation imagines itself. This study examines the dialectic between immigration and German nationhood in the context of the parliamentary debates between 2002 and 2006. Contents and discourse analyses of transcripts of the Bundestag were supplemented with interviews with policymakers. Our interpretation of the data reveals two distinct narratives: that Muslim immigration is a threat to the democratic order of the German state; and that immigration constitutes a utility serving economical and social objectives. European Union regulations, party politics, and the nature of parliamentary speech also play a role in framing parliamentary discourse of immigration and nationhood.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 2.Nationalism*

Gorenburg Dmitry

**Is Russia a Nation-State?**

in *Russian politics and law*, vol. 47, n. 2, March April , 3-7

This issue of Russian Politics and Law is devoted to a debate on the nature of Russian national identity. This debate is focused on whether a civic nation can exist in Russia or if Russia will remain a state composed of a number of ethnic nations.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 2.Nationalism*

Bonnin Leah

**Isaiah Berlin: de la pertenencia cultural al sionismo liberal**

in *Cuadernos de pensamiento político*, Nr 21, enero-marzo 2009 , 203-216

El nacionalismo proclama una supremacía del “nosotros” frente al “yo”, en completa contradicción con los presupuestos liberales defendidos por Isaiah Berlin y con lo que él considera principio regulador de la civilización occidental, esto es, la concepción de origen kantiano (común a protestantes, judíos, musulmanes y ateos) de que los hombres son “fines en sí mismos” y, en consecuencia, tienen la capacidad de elegir qué hacer y qué ser, por más restringidas que sean sus



circunstancias.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 2. Nationalism*

Tate John William

**John Howard's "Nation": Multiculturalism, Citizenship, and Identity**

in *Australian Journal of Politics & History* , Volume 55, Issue 1, March , 97-120

This article identifies the specific concept of "nation" that informed John Howard's politics from his time as Liberal Party leader in the second half of the 1980s to the final years of his 1996–2007 prime ministership. It compares and contrasts the constitutive, procedural and multicultural models of nation to show Howard's continuing commitment to a constitutive understanding of the Australian nation. He endeavoured to give this understanding expression at the policy level by explicitly moving against the multicultural concept of nation that had informed Australian policy from the late 1970s. The Citizenship Test, introduced in his final year of office, is presented as the final move in this departure from multiculturalism.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 2. Nationalism*

Lysaght Karen

**Living in a nation, a state or a place? The Protestant gentry of County Cork**

in *National Identities*, vol. 11, n. 1, March , 59-71

The communal narrative of the Irish state defined the criteria for membership of the nation in opposition to the characteristics of the Irish gentry class, whether in their Protestantism, Anglicised lifestyles or external focus on Britain and its empire. The result ensured that while all Protestants engaged with the institutions of state, their inclusion in the nation proved much more difficult to negotiate, and for those with a gentry background, it would appear an impossibility. This article argues, in contrast, that the remnants of the Protestant gentry class successfully insert themselves into an alternative conception of the Irish nation that draws directly upon the longevity of their family association with specific localities in the Irish landscape.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 2. Nationalism*

De Gennaro Chiara

**L'India tra democrazia e fondamentalismo**

in *Affari Esteri*, Anno XLI, n. 162 , 378-383

No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 2. Nationalism*

Hoehne Markus V.



**Mimesis and Mimicry in Dynamics of State and Identity Formation in Northern Somalia**

**in Africa: The Journal of the International African Institute**, Volume 79, Number 2 , 252-281

In this article, mimesis and mimicry are used as analytical concepts to explore dynamics of state and identity formation in Somaliland and Puntland since the early 1990s. Mimesis captures endeavours to imitate well-established models of social and political organization. Mimicry involves the deceptive imitation of such models in order to reach a certain aim. In the particular setting of northern Somalia, miming and mimicking in state and identity formation are also related to conflict escalation. The article first presents relevant political and legal positions on state collapse and secession. This helps to grasp the theoretical and policy implications of the empirical material. Then, the establishment of Somaliland and Puntland through mimesis and mimicry is sketched. The outline of the repeated military confrontations between both sides, particularly the last round of fighting in and around the town of Laascaanood in late 2007, indicates the relation of state and identity formation to military conflict. These localized dynamics are embedded into the continuing conflict in southern Somalia that involves a number of internal and external actors. The article concludes that miming and mimicking underlie many of Somaliland's and Puntland's internal developments and their conflictive relationship. Moreover, since the conflict in northern Somalia concerns state formation, it might have far-reaching consequences for the future of Somalia as a whole. This finally leads to the suggestion that the international norms regarding state collapse and secession have to be re-evaluated in the light of the empirical realities at hand.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 2. Nationalism*

**Etzioni Amitai**

**Minorities and the National Ethos**

**in Politics**, Vol. 29, Issue 2, May , 100-110

This essay focuses on the question of how to curb the tension between the rights of members of minorities and the particularistic values of the national community. The essay first examines a radical multicultural treatment of this issue and shows it to be unattainable and inadvisable. The essay then proposes an alternative treatment, Diversity Within Unity, a societal design that combines the nurturing communities of minorities and of the majority and is more conducive to human flourishing. Diversity Within Unity assumes that all citizens will embrace a core of values while being welcomed to follow their own subcultures on other matters.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 2. Nationalism*

**Rivedro Angel**

**Nacionalismo y multiculturalismo: ¿una traición a la verdadera izquierda?**

**in Cuadernos de pensamiento político**, Nr 17, enero-marzo 2008 , 137-154

No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 2. Nationalism*

**Crow Joanna**



**Narrating the nation: Chile's Museo Histórico Nacional**

in *National Identities*, vol. 11, n. 2, June , 109-126

This article explores the role of museums in the social construction of national memories and identities, focusing on Chile's Museo Histórico Nacional (National Historical Museum) and its representations of Mapuche history and culture. Created by state decree in 1911, the Museo Histórico Nacional is one of the most conservative museums in Chile; it is also the most prone to government intervention. The important changes undertaken since the museum's creation demonstrate both the agency of civil society (i.e., different social sectors' involvement in and impact on the museum) and the state's willingness to open up debates on national identity. However, the over-arching narrative provided by this cultural institution indicates the continuing dominance of discourses of mestizaje (racial and cultural mixture), which ultimately serve to eliminate the Mapuche from Chilean nationhood

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 2. Nationalism*

Riall Lucy

**Nation, 'deep images' and the problem of emotions**

in *Nations and Nationalism*, Volume 15, Issue 3, July 2009 , 402-409

No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 2. Nationalism*

Hansen Holley E., Hesli Vicki L.

**National Identity: Civic, Ethnic, Hybrid, and Atomised Individuals**

in *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 61, n. 1, January , 1-28

We challenge the civic-ethnic dichotomy drawn by previous authors and propose a four-category typology of identities based on out-group tolerance and in-group attachment. Drawing from work on national identity formation and nation-building, we test hypotheses about the processes that cause individuals to adopt one identity over others using survey data based on representative samples of five ethnic groups in Ukraine. We find that the effects of socialisation processes vary greatly depending upon ethnic group. Our results challenge some long-held assumptions about the potential destabilising effects of 'ethnic' identities and the degree to which 'civic' identities correspond to values and behaviours supportive of democracy.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 2. Nationalism*

Imre Anikó

**National intimacy and post-socialist networking**

in *European Journal of Cultural Studies*, Volume 12, No. 2, May 2009 , 219-233

Social networking sites have become a part of everyday life in post-Soviet cultures. 'International Who is Who' (Iwiw) is unparalleled in its popularity. Modelled after Friendster, Iwiw had 1.5 million registered users in Hungary (a country of 10



million) by 2006, when it was purchased by Deutsche Telecom. The emergence, rapid growth and functioning of this predominantly language and location-based virtual public space provide valuable insight into the formation of a networked public in post-socialist cultures. The article discusses the political and economic context of Iwiw's emergence in comparison with popular social network sites of a global reach such as Facebook and MySpace. It introduces the notion of 'national intimacy' to reflect on a specific post-communist tension between the democratic model of interaction presented by Iwiw and the national boundaries of this model; and between the global potential of the technology and its restricted, national use.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 2. Nationalism*

Goio Franco

**Nazione e identità multiple**

in **Quaderni di Scienza Politica**, anno XV, n. 3, dicembre , 389-442

No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 2. Nationalism*

Senderov Valerii

**Neo-Eurasianism: Realities, Dangers, Prospects**

in **Russian politics and law**, vol. 47, n. 1, January-February , 24-46

This broad survey of post-Soviet intellectual and political currents considers the transmutation of various ideologies in contemporary Russia. It criticizes both classical and neo-Eurasianism and highlights commonalities and differences between these two approaches, as well as their role in contemporary Russian politics.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 2. Nationalism*

Muller Jerry Z.

**Noi e loro. Il nazionalismo etnico: un potere duro a morire**

in **Queste istituzioni**, n. 150-151 , 71-87

No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 2. Nationalism*

Berger Stefan

**On the Role of Myths and History in the Construction of National Identity in Modern Europe**



in *European History Quarterly*, Volume 39, n. 3, July

No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 2. Nationalism*

**Sluga Glenda**

**Passions, patriotism and nationalism, and Germaine de Staël**  
in *Nations and Nationalism*, Volume 15, Issue 2, April 2009 , 299-318

This essay examines the influence of sentimentalism on conceptions of patriotism at the turn of the nineteenth century in order to historicise conventional views of the nature of patriotism as a fundamental human emotion. It uses a focus on the intellectual thought of Germaine de Staël in order to understand how a 'sentimental' view of patriotism took hold at a crucial moment in the European history of the idea of the nation and of the conceptualisation of emotions. I argue that de Staël's ideas and influence lead us to a radical reconsideration of the significance of the emotional history of patriotism for how we explain nationalism.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 2. Nationalism*

**Cabanel Patrick**

**Protestantism in the Czech historical narrative and Czech nationalism of the nineteenth century**  
in *National Identities*, vol. 11, n. 1, March , 31-43

A number of the leading figures of nineteenth-century Czech nationalism were Protestant, either by upbringing (Kollr, Safark, Palack) or by conversion (Masaryk). Another Protestant - the French historian, Ernest Denis - became the leading national historian after Palack. They opposed the Czech 'genius' to the Austrian 'genius', defining the latter in terms of Catholicism and the former in terms of Hussism, and portraying Hussism as the first expression of the typically Czech aspiration to a freedom of the spirit and of the people. This prominence of Protestants happened at a time when Protestants represented only 2.3% of Czechs. Bohemia poses, therefore, the same enigma as France of the Third Republic: how could two countries almost entirely Catholic allow historians and statesmen favourable to Protestantism (re-)write the national narrative and set in motion a process of laicisation? The answer lies in the fact that in each case the adversary to a modernisation ardently sought (in the form of Third Republic in France and national independence in Bohemia) was conceived as fundamentally Catholic.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 2. Nationalism*

**Rigoulot Philippe**

**Protestants and the French nation under the Third Republic: Between recognition and assimilation**  
in *National Identities*, vol. 11, n. 1, March , 45-57

The French Protestant minority has always maintained an ambiguous relationship to the French nation. At the end of the nineteenth century, confronted by a Catholic supremacy that placed their continued existence in doubt, they found in the



Republican cause a mode of integrating themselves into the national political community. Their integration into the nation went hand in hand with their efforts to decrease the danger of Catholic domination through the laws separating church and state. The association with the war effort in 1914, and again in 1939, enabled them to silence the anti-Protestant rhetoric of Maurrasian nationalists and overcome the ultimate barrier to their full integration into the nation.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 2.Nationalism*

**Finkelman Paul**

**Race, Federalism, and Diplomacy: The Gentlemen's Agreement A Century Later**  
in *Osaka university law review*, n. 56 - february , 1-30

No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 2.Nationalism*

**Mevius Martin**

**Reappraising Communism and Nationalism**  
in *Nationalities Papers*, Volume 37, Issue 4, July 2009 , 377-400

No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 2.Nationalism*

**Billig Michael**

**Reflecting on a critical engagement with banal nationalism – reply to Skey**  
in *Sociological Review*, Volume 57, Issue 2, May 2009 , 347-352

No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 2.Nationalism*

**Breuilly John**

**Risorgimento nationalism in the light of general debates about nationalism**  
in *Nations and Nationalism*, Volume 15, Issue 3, July 2009 , 439-445

No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 2.Nationalism*



Pain Emil'

**Russia Between Empire and Nation**

in *Russian politics and law*, vol. 47, n. 2, March April , 60-86

No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 2.Nationalism*

Raskin D. I.

**Russian Nationalism and Issues of Cultural and Civilizational Identity**

in *Russian politics and law*, vol. 46, n. 6, November-December , 28-40

No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 2.Nationalism*

Puig Valenti

**Sociedad abierta y nacionalismos**

in *Cuadernos de pensamiento político*, Nr 17, enero-marzo 2008 , 121-136

No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 2.Nationalism*

Loughlin John

**The 'Hybrid' State: Reconfiguring Territorial Governance in Western Europe**

in *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, vol. 10, n. 1, April, Special Issue "Reconstituting Political Order in Europe, West and East" , 51-68

Abstract

One of the central questions in contemporary social science is the fate of the nation-state. The nation-state reached its apogee during the period of post-war economic boom and expanding welfare states. European integration was a means of 'rescuing' nation-states during this period. Neo-liberalism mounted a serious challenge to the welfare version of the nation-state following a series of political, economic and social crises in the 1970s. The nation-state survived albeit in a form different from the previous version. It is now more characterized by a combination of centralist interventionism and 'choice' in its territorial organization and policy approaches. This may be seen in patterns of central-local relations, public administration and fiscal relations. This we have called the 'hybrid state'.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 2.Nationalism*

Formisano Ronald P., Pickering Stephen



### **The Christian Nation Debate and Witness Competency**

in *Journal of the Early Republic*, Volume 29, Number 2, Summer , 219-248

Historians have examined closely the Founders' intentions regarding the First Amendment's religious establishment clause as well as the influence of Protestant Christianity in the public life of the early republic. The new national government, and particularly several states, often breached Jefferson's "wall of separation" between church and state. While these complex and important subjects, hardly confined to academic circles, will continue to spur research and controversy, this article addresses one feature of the prominence of Christianity in civic life. In courtrooms across the country, well into the nineteenth century, judges allowed witnesses to be questioned regarding their religious beliefs, with some requiring belief in the "future state" doctrine of divine rewards and punishments before permitting them to testify. Some courts accepted witnesses who believed in divine punishment in this life, or in non-eternal retribution in the hereafter. This common law tradition affected primarily Universalists, various kinds of nonbelievers, and of course atheists. While the common law adapted to rapid change in the economic and technological realm, common law religious tests for witness competency proved remarkably durable.

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#### **Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 2.Nationalism*

**Cabo Miguel, Molina Fernando**

#### **The Long and Winding Road of Nationalization: Eugen Weber's Peasants into Frenchmen in Modern European History (1976—2006)**

in *European History Quarterly*, Volume 39, n. 2, April

Thirty years after its publication, Eugen Weber's *Peasants into Frenchmen* still occupies a central place in European historiography on identity construction and the nationalization of the masses. This article reviews a number of studies that have been critical of Weber's theoretical and methodological design, and contrasts his approach with research in various European countries. Finally, it underscores the importance of comparative analysis when examining nationalization processes, and suggests some future lines of research.

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#### **Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 2.Nationalism*

**Miller Alexei**

#### **The Nation as a Framework for Political Life**

in *Russian politics and law*, vol. 47, n. 2, March April , 8-29

The stable existence of the state is impossible without nationalist discourse.

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#### **Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 2.Nationalism*

**Kustarev Aleksandr**

#### **The Nation. Crisis of a Project and of a Concept**



in **Russian politics and law**, vol. 47, n. 2, March April , 87-96

It would be most reasonable not to use the concept "nation" or its derivatives at all in political discourse.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 2. Nationalism*

**Tønnesson Stein**

**The class route to nationhood: China, Vietnam, Norway, Cyprus – and France**

in **Nations and Nationalism**, Volume 15, Issue 3, July 2009 , 375-395

This essay explores the proposition that China and Vietnam represent a fourth class route to modern nationhood, in addition to the ethnic (German), civic (French) and plural (American) routes. Nation-states emerging along the class route are characterised by an exclusive membership based on social class rather than just ethnicity, living under the same laws or participation in liberation from foreign rule. The essay compares China's and Vietnam's class-based nationalism with the more inclusive labour movement nationalisms of Norway and Cyprus. Then it explains how the class route differs from the French civic route. In the conclusion, the author concedes that the Chinese and Vietnamese class route is perhaps a detour rather than a route of its own, since it leads to inevitable tension between the divisive history of how the nation was formed and the need of its later leaders to include and represent the same social classes that were originally excluded. These leaders and their national storytellers are forced to undertake a redefinition of the national self as ethnic, civic and/or plural in an attempt to recreate national legitimacy, often in competition with more radically nationalist opposition groups.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 2. Nationalism*

**Beer Chris**

**The national capital city, portraiture, and recognition in the Australian mythscape: The development of Canberra's National Portrait Gallery**

in **National Identities**, vol. 11, n. 2, June , 149-163

This article explores nation-making at the intersection of the imagination and practice of national capital cities, portraiture, and the politics of recognition. Specifically examining Canberra's National Portrait Gallery as a national cultural institution, it seeks to account for the development of the Gallery as a place of portraiture and the Australian national politics of historical recognition. After situating the Gallery generally in the context of the development of national cultural institutions as a practice of national capital city and nation-state production and reproduction, it then briefly examines the role of particular contingencies and the specific imagination of national portrait galleries in the 'Anglosphere' in producing the Gallery. I subsequently then explore the development of the Gallery as a visual-material national centre through its built accommodation and its discursive framing, along with its practice in the field of portraiture intersecting with the building of a Australian national history through the recognition of individuals. The article concludes by emphasising that while the Gallery is a place of national pasts, presents and futures, it should be stressed that it, and Canberra's other national cultural institutions, are also very much spatial products (and producers) of particular spatial imaginations and practices of nationality and the urban.



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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 2. Nationalism*

**Skey Michael**

**The national in everyday life: A critical engagement with Michael Billig's thesis of Banal Nationalism**  
in *Sociological Review*, Volume 57, Issue 2, May 2009 , 331-346

This paper is designed to provide a critical engagement with Michael Billig's seminal thesis of Banal Nationalism (1995), perhaps the most influential study of everyday forms of nationhood. With an increasing number now focusing on the (re) production, dissemination and negotiation of the national through routine texts and practices (cf Foster, 2002; Edensor, 2002; Madianou, 2005; Brubaker et al., 2006; Bratsis, 2006) and others employing the concept of banality in relation to non-national (Gorringe, 2006) and post-national identities (Aksoy and Robins, 2002; Szerszynski and Urry, 2002; Beck, 2006; Cram, 2001), it would seem like an opportune moment to assess Billig's contribution and also the limits of his approach.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 2. Nationalism*

**Neufeldt Reina C.**

**Tolerant exclusion: expanding constricted narratives of wartime ethnic and civic nationalism**  
in *Nations and Nationalism*, Volume 15, Issue 2, April 2009 , 206-226

During war, the demarcation 'enemy alien'— whether on ethnic or civic grounds – can lead to loss of political, social or economic rights. Yet not all minorities are excluded even though they pose problems for civic and ethnic national categories of belonging. This article explores the experiences of an ethno-religious minority who posed an intriguing dilemma for ethnic and civic categorisation in North America during World War II. The Mennonite experience enables a close examination of the relationship between a minority ethnic (and religious) group and majority concepts of wartime civic and ethnic nationalism. The article supports arguments that both ethnic and civic nationalism produce markers for the exclusion of minority groups during wartime. It reveals that minority groups can unintentionally become part of majority 'nationalisms' as the content of what defines the national ideal shifts over time. The experiences also suggest that a minority group can help mobilise symbolic resources that participate in transforming what defines the national ideal.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 2. Nationalism*

**Riga Liliana, Kennedy James**

**Tolerant majorities, loyal minorities and 'ethnic reversals': constructing minority rights at Versailles 1919**  
in *Nations and Nationalism*, Volume 15, Issue 3, July 2009 , 461-482

The 1919 Versailles Peace Conference created new states in East Central Europe (ECE), but the imperfect implementation of the 'one nation, one state' formula resulted in more than twenty-five million 'unassimilable' minorities. With the introduction of majoritarian democracy, this gave rise to what we term 'ethnic reversals': 'formally dominant majorities' suffered status decline, while previously 'minoritised majorities' found new political powers. Accordingly, the



1919 Minorities Treaties sought to manage these 'ethnic reversals' by instituting a liberal minority rights regime that tried to create both 'tolerant majorities' and 'loyal minorities'. While the Treaties reflected the influences of Anglo-American and Anglo-American Jewish elites – the most notable voices of liberalism in an age of ethnic homogenisation – we suggest that in contexts of historical diversity with little institutionalised liberalism, 'ethnic reversals' raise issues that cannot be resolved within liberal conceptions of minority rights that rely solely or primarily on cultural protections.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 3. Federalist authors, personalities and organizations*

**Glencross Andrew**

**Altiero Spinelli and the Idea of the US Constitution as a Model for Europe: The Promises and Pitfalls of an Analogy**

in **Journal of Common Market Studies**, Volume 47, Issue 2, March 2009 , 287-302

Altiero Spinelli believed European integration needed to draw inspiration from the US constitutional founding. The article uses Spinelli's analogy to assess how useful it is to compare the predicament of European integration with US constitutional politics. The analysis reveals both how Spinelli exaggerated the extent to which the US Constitution established and delimited federal political authority once and for all as well the way in which, despite its functionalist non-constitutional origins, the EU has experienced its own brand of constitutional politics. The analogy is thus most useful in showing how both polities faced similar tensions over the process of constitutionalism, restraining unit sovereignty and the institutionalization of popular sovereignty at the federal level.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 3. Federalist authors, personalities and organizations*

**Dupeyrix Alexandre**

**Dieu, le savant et le cosmopolite. Sur des écrits récents de Jürgen Habermas**

in **Esprit**, n. 354, mai 2009 , 18-29

God, the savant and the cosmopolitan. On recent writings by Jürgen Habermas.

Why has religion come increasingly to pervade the German philosopher's thinking, as testified in *Between Naturalism and Religion*, which has recently been translated into French? This has to do with his enquiries into the limitations of his own procedural approach, including the ethical back-up of the modern liberal State. Can democracy face up to the potential for "secularization gone out of joint"?

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 3. Federalist authors, personalities and organizations*

**Denord François, Schwartz Antoine**

**Dès les années 1950, un parfum d'oligarchie**

in **Monde Diplomatique (Le)**, Juin

« Vous rêvez d'une Europe unie, autonome, socialiste. Mais si elle refuse la protection des Etats-Unis, elle tombera



fatalement dans les mains de Staline . » Ces propos tenus par l'un des protagonistes des Mandarins, le roman de Simone de Beauvoir, ont le mérite de rappeler un fait essentiel : au lendemain du second conflit mondial, c'est la guerre, demeurée « froide », entre les Deux Grands qui insuffle sa dynamique au projet européen.

<http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2009/06/DENORD/17243>

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 3. Federalist authors, personalities and organizations*

**Szymkowiak Aaron**

**Kant's Permissive Law: Critical Rights, Sceptical Politics**

in *British Journal for the History of Philosophy*, Volume 17, Issue 3, June 2009 , 567-600

No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 3. Federalist authors, personalities and organizations*

**Melchionni Maria Grazia**

**Le donne nella costruzione dell'Europa di domani**

in *Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali*, Volume 76, n. 1, gennaio-marzo , 11-23

The role of women in the building of Europe is retraced by the Author to the thought of Simone Weil, Maria Zambrano, Hannah Arendt, the philosophers who, having experienced first hand the crisis of civilisation and the historic and political catastrophe of Europe in the twentieth century, have foreseen the death of the old European system of States and, particularly the last one, looked forward to the European uniting. Their great contributions to the European discourse, however, developed far from the centres of power and did not have direct effects on the transformation of the inter-European relations.

Therefore the Author recalls some female figures – such as Louise Weiss, Simone Veil, Ursula Hirschmann –, who already have historical status for having been involved in European political action, and shows how women's agenda for Europe was focused on concrete problems. The Author underlines the necessity for women's participation in perfecting the process of integration and making Europe more democratic, economically vital, socially stable and culturally complete, but also stresses the fact that the contribution of women to the Europe of tomorrow will depend on the development of the process of female emancipation in all European countries.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 3. Federalist authors, personalities and organizations*

**Paradiso Massimo**

**Luigi Einaudi e il liberalismo romantico**

in *Critica liberale*, Volume XV, n. 148, febbraio

No abstract available



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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 3. Federalist authors, personalities and organizations*

**Carini C.**

**Mazzini e Linton. Una democrazia europea (1845-1855)**

in **Pensiero Politico (II)**, Anno XL, n. 3, settembre-dicembre 2007 , 543-562

No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 3. Federalist authors, personalities and organizations*

**Hale Matthew Rainbow**

**On Their Tiptoes: Political Time and Newspapers during the Advent of the Radicalized French Revolution, circa 1792–1793**

in **Journal of the Early Republic**, Volume 29, Number 2, Summer , 191-218

No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 3. Federalist authors, personalities and organizations*

**Benoist de Alain**

**Qualche riflessione sul "e-comunitarismo"**

in **Diorama**, n. 293, marzo-aprile

No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 3. Federalist authors, personalities and organizations*

**Waechter Matthias**

**Revolutionär, Föderalist, Europäer. Mensch und Gesellschaft bei Alexandre Marc**

in **Osteuropa**, 58. Jahrgang, Heft 12, Dezember , 125-136

ABSTRACT: Viele Protagonisten der Europäischen Einigung waren von ihren Erfahrungen im Widerstand gegen den Nationalsozialismus geprägt. Nicht so Alexandre Marc. Er wuchs als Jude im revolutionären Russland auf, studierte in Deutschland, trat zum Katholizismus über, verbrachte den Krieg zum Teil im Schweizer Exil und wurde als französischer Intellektueller bekannt. Unter den Vordenkern Europas nimmt er eine Sonderstellung ein: Mit Hilfe der europäischen Einigung wollte er einer föderalistischen Revolution den Weg bahnen.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 3. Federalist authors, personalities and organizations*



Schmeller Mark

**The Political Economy of Opinion: Public Credit and Concepts of Public Opinion in the Age of Federalism**  
in *Journal of the Early Republic*, Volume 29, Number 1, Spring , 35-61

This essay examines the origins of the concept of public opinion in early national political discourse. It argues that the science of political economy and institutions of public finance made the idea of public opinion “thinkable” in important and distinctive ways. Focusing on controversies over revolutionary war debts and Alexander Hamilton’s system of public finance, I show how “public opinion” passed into the American political lexicon through the medium of economic discourse. In debates over the assumption and funding of public debts, and the chartering of the Bank of the United States, previously vague and unarticulated assumptions about the nature and role of public opinion quickly evolved into explicit and politicized theories of public opinion. In many respects, the partisan conflict of the early 1790s can be understood as a struggle between different “political economies of opinion”: divergent understandings of the relation between value and public opinion, and the management (or manipulation) of both by.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 3. Federalist authors, personalities and organizations*

Lucht Marc

**Toward Lasting Peace: Kant on Law, Public Reason, and Culture**

in *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, Volume 68 Issue 1, January 2009 , 303-326

Kant helps us understand the conditions for peace by reminding us that lasting peace requires both cosmopolitan legal reform and individual moral improvement, including resistance to egoism and the cultivation of cosmopolitan attitudes. The duty to pursue peace includes the duty to promote the rule of domestic and international law and work against its unilateral subversion. The juridical cosmopolitanism of a worldwide league of free peoples enables resistance to the dangers posed by authoritarian regimes and their dangerous willingness to manipulate their subjects and ignore international law. Constraining egoism enables people to overcome the tyranny of their desires and cultivates a sense of affiliation with the larger community of humanity in general, providing the moral foundation needed to support a cosmopolitan legal order. Moral development to a great extent is fostered through the arts and humanities, and a robust cultural life therefore ought to play a central role in the pursuit of global peace.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

O’Connell Mary Ellen

**Defining Armed Conflic**

in *Journal of Conflict and Security Law*, Volume 13, Number 3, Winter , 393-400

Within hours of the 9/11 attacks in the United States, President George W. Bush declared ‘a global war on terrorism’. Experts around the world assumed this declaration was a rallying cry, a rhetorical device to galvanise the nation to serious action. By November 2001, however, the evidence began to mount that the President was ordering actions that could only be lawful in a de jure armed conflict: targeting to kill without warning, indefinite detention without trial and search and seizure on the high seas without consent. It was difficult to criticise these actions on the basis of international law, however, given that international law contained no widely accepted definition of armed conflict. By May 2005, the International Law Association (ILA) determined that there was a pressing need for a report on the meaning of armed



conflict supported by international law. The Use of Force Committee presented its Initial Report on the Meaning of Armed Conflict in International Law at the Rio de Janeiro biennial meeting of the ILA in August 2008. The Report concludes that all armed conflicts have as a minimum of two necessary characteristics: (1) the presence of organized groups that are (2) engaged in intense armed fighting. The Report indicates that while the United States has been engaged in an armed conflict in Afghanistan and in Iraq since 9/11, the US has not been engaged in a global armed conflict. The Initial Report will be expanded for presentation in final form in 2010 at The Hague biennial meeting.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

Oliver Selma

**A New Challenge to International Law: The Disappearance of the Entire Territory of a State  
in International Journal on Minority and Groups Rights**, Volume 16, Number 2 , 209-243

The physical disappearance of a state's entire territory is an event forecasted to happen as a result of sea-level rise, affecting some of the smallest nation states in the world, primarily islands in the South Pacific. The focus of this article is on the human rights of the inhabitants of the disappearing states when they are forced to relocate.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

Turchin Peter

**A theory for formation of large empire  
in Journal of Global History**, volume 4, Issue 02, July , 191-217

Between 3000 BCE and 1800 CE there were more than sixty 'mega-empires' that, at the peak, controlled an area of at least one million square kilometres. What were the forces that kept together such huge pre-industrial states? I propose a model for one route to mega-empire, motivated by imperial dynamics in eastern Asia, the world region with the highest concentration of mega-empires. This 'mirror-empires' model proposes that antagonistic interactions between nomadic pastoralists and settled agriculturalists result in an autocatalytic process, which pressures both nomadic and farming polities to scale up polity size, and thus military power. The model suggests that location near a steppe frontier should correlate with the frequency of imperiogenesis. A worldwide survey supports this prediction: over 90% of mega-empires arose within or next to the Old World's arid belt, running from the Sahara desert to the Gobi desert. Specific case studies are also plausibly explained by this model.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

Pera Marcello

**Alle origini del liberalismo. A proposito di Pannunzio e Tocqueville  
in Nuova Storia Contemporanea**, a. XII, n. 6, novembre-dicembre

No abstract available



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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

Perry Valery

**At Cross Purposes? Democratization and Peace Implementation Strategies in Bosnia and Herzegovina's Frozen Conflict**

in *Human Rights Review*, Volume 10, Number 1 / March, 2009 , 35-54

The case of post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) provides an interesting lens through which to reflect on the interconnected and often conflicting challenges of implementation of internationally brokered peace agreements, external support to democratic transition and consolidation, and contemporary notions of sovereignty and state building. This chapter suggests that in the case of BiH, certain contradictions and tradeoffs have been and may still be necessary to ensure a foundation for future stability and democratic consolidation. The situation in post-Dayton BiH can be described as a frozen conflict that has remained frozen in large part due to an international presence that ensures that an imperfect peace prevails while also providing a basis for incremental reform. The peace implementation process in BiH is briefly reviewed by looking at two reform strategies: the "soft" protectorate strategy used in BiH as a whole and the "hard" protectorate option exercised in the District of Brčko. The aim is to demonstrate that while a democratic end-state remains the goal in such transitions, the means toward getting there can include a number of contradictory policy options.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

Barder Alexander D., Debrix François

**Au-delà de la souveraineté biopolitique : Schmitt, Arendt, Foucault et les usages de la violence dans la politique internationale**

in *Etudes Internationales*, 1, Mars 2009

No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

Jean Carlo

**Barack Obama e l'ordine mondiale**

in *Affari Esteri*, Anno XLI, n. 161 , 82-93

No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

Richmond Oliver P., Franks Jason

**Between partition and pluralism: the Bosnian jigsaw and an 'ambivalent peace'**



in **Southeast European and Black Sea Studies**, vol. 9, n. 1-2, March , 17-38

This article argues that the attempted creation of a liberal state in Bosnia and Herzegovina by various international actors has failed to generate legitimacy among the local population. While the Dayton agreements institutionalized ethnic divisions, the post-Dayton reconstruction process was dominated by Western liberal discourses that have tended to marginalize local voices. Thereby, a conservative version of the liberal peace has been institutionalized, based on top-down mechanisms that mobilized public support only when war elites could co-opt the international agendas. Instead of creating inclusive structures within society, international authorities have become central mechanisms of governance in Bosnia without being accountable to the population. Alongside further fragmentation of society, this has undermined the development of democratic structures and a true engagement with the historical and societal context in which peace-building programmes are deployed. Both civil society development and economic liberalization have been externally driven, hence provoking local resistance and undermining a sustainable peace process. The authors argue that such an approach is not conducive to an emancipatory version of the liberal peace, which would be based on local consent and would genuinely engage with people's welfare.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

**Goddard Stacie E.**

**Brokering change: networks and entrepreneurs in international politics**

in **International Theory**, Volume 1, Issue 02, July , 249-281

Political entrepreneurs reside at the core of international relations (IR) theory. Structures might constrain agents, but entrepreneurs can remake and transform these structures, contesting norms, shifting identities and creating space for significant political change. Despite this, IR theorists note that key questions about entrepreneurs remain under-theorized. Under what conditions are political entrepreneurs likely to emerge? Who is likely to succeed as an entrepreneur, and how do entrepreneurs produce structural change? I argue scholars could strengthen their answers to these questions by drawing from the growing program of social network theory. Networks influence entrepreneurship in three ways. First, networks provide certain actors – brokers – with resources to effect change. It is not an actor's attributes or interests but her position, then, that enables entrepreneurial behavior. Second, networks create the conditions of entrepreneurship. While certain networks are extremely stable, others contain contradictions that allow entrepreneurs to emerge. Finally, network theory posits structural mechanisms – including mobilization, polarization, and yoking – to explain political change.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

**Pasquier Emmanuel**

**Carl Schmitt et la circonscription de la guerre : le problème de la mesure dans la doctrine des « grands espaces »**

in **Etudes Internationales**, 1, Mars 2009

No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

Ramel Frédéric

**Carl Schmitt face à Hans Kelsen : la joute se poursuit à l'échelle internationale**

in *Etudes Internationales*, 1, Mars 2009

No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

Gromyko Alexei

**Civilizational Guidelines in the Relationship of Russia, the European Union, and the United States**

in *Russian politics and law*, vol. 46, n. 6, November-December , 7-18

No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

Philliou Christine

**Communities on the Verge: Unraveling the Phanariot Ascendancy in Ottoman Governance**

in *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Volume 51, Issue 1, January , 151-181

Phanariots were an Ottoman Christian elite which, despite structural impediments, imperial ideology, and religious doctrine that would preclude their participation in Ottoman governance, ascended to power in multiple political arenas between the 1660s and 1821. Their rise came about just as the larger imperium was undergoing profound military and political crises precipitated by both internal threats and periodic invasions by the Russian and Habsburg Empires. While some Phanariots were stalwart servants of the sultan, others exacerbated these crises, allying with Russian officials and planning a secessionist uprising that would later unfold into the Greek War of Independence. Their ascendancy, however, is an Ottoman story—a specific outcome of Ottoman responses to the dilemmas of empire in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

Di Donato Francesco

**Considerazioni liminari sull'antistatualità nell'Italia contemporanea**

in *Storia amministrazione costituzione*, Vol. 16 , 278-304

No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

Armillotta Giovanni

**Considerazioni sulla politica estera nucleare**

in *Affari Esteri*, Anno XLI, n. 162 , 346-364

No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

Klosko George

**Cosmopolitanism, Political Obligation, and the Welfare State**

in *Political Theory* , Volume 37, n. 2, April , 243-265

While we generally take it for granted that governments should provide social welfare and other benefits to their citizens, justification of these services depends on special moral requirements people owe to their compatriots, as opposed to inhabitants of other countries, who may be far more needy. While widely discussed defenses of compatriot preferences can be seen to be flawed, the latter may be justified through a public goods argument. Security and other public goods are not only necessary for acceptable lives but are provided through the cooperative activity of compatriots, coordinated and enforced by the state. Because the necessary public goods require general cooperation throughout society, all individuals who are required to comply should have rights to participate in decisions about the form in which they are provided. Because these political rights must be substantive rather than merely formal, they justify requirements of distributive justice and so compatriot preferences.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

Del Lucchese Filippo

**Crisis and Power: Economics, Politics and Conflict in Machiavelli's Political Thought**

in *History of Political Thought*, Vol. 30, Issue 1 , 75-96

Niccolo Machiavelli is one of the very few authors to assign a positive role and political value to the theme of social conflict. Although not repudiating this principle, in the Discourses Machiavelli seems to distinguish between a form of conflict that is moderate and positive and another form that is violent and extreme, ultimately leading to the ruin of Rome. In his more mature work Florentine Histories, the tone changes and the distinction becomes less consistent. Moreover, analysis of the institutional results of conflict is enriched by novel elements, revealing Machiavelli's attention to the economic causes and motives of social struggles. While in the first model crisis and power are counter-posed to one another, in the second they are inseparable and this couplet becomes the key to a theoretical understanding of Machiavelli's political thought.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

Black Monica



### **Death and the Making of West Berlin, 1948-1961**

in *German History*, vol. 27, n. 1, January , 9-31

This essay traces shifts in attitudes towards death, practices of burial, and rituals of mourning in West Berlin from the 1948 currency reform to the 1961 construction of the Berlin Wall. It shows that West Berliners in the years immediately following the Second World War maintained an arduous devotion to their dead—particularly the war dead. Yet as the war became a less immediate experience over the course of the 1950s, broad cultural shifts took shape, including a renewed sense of optimism and an emerging feeling that the suffering associated with the war could be and was being redeemed. Meanwhile, a cult of the dead long venerated as part of the very foundation of German culture gradually became 'less German' and 'more Western' over that same period. In this way, it also became a means of distinguishing West Berlin from its Communist neighbour to the East. By focusing on shifts in perceptions and practices surrounding death, the essay reveals part of the process by which moral and ethical values were reconstructed after Nazism, and how the racist collectivism of the Third Reich gradually gave way to the broadly individualist, democratic-socialist humanism that would form the basis of an expressly West German politics and society.

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#### ***Section D) Federalism as a political idea***

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

**Rundell John**

#### **Democratic Revolutions, Power and the City: Weber and Political Modernity**

in *Thesis Eleven*, vol. 97, n. 1, May , 81-98

This article develops three interconnected arguments concerning the image of modernity as a revolutionary epoch and the way in which this image has been understood and theorized. These three lines of conceptualization, which can only be sketched in less rather than greater detail here, concern the constellation or figuration of modernity, its democratic dimension, and in reference to each, the work of Max Weber, especially *The City*. More specifically, the article argues that modern democracy is revolutionary when viewed as an open and self-instituting articulation of political power. Its modern revolutionary impulse begins in the Italian Renaissance city-states, the German 'free' cities, and the Swiss federation where urban autonomy was matched by the creation of elected forms of rulership and the development of federated circulations of power.

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#### ***Section D) Federalism as a political idea***

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

**Hendriks Frank**

#### **Democratic reform between the extreme makeover and the reinvention of tradition: the case of the Netherlands**

in *Democratization*, vol. 16, n. 2, April , 243-268

Democracy in the Netherlands, like in so many other Western countries, is under substantial reform pressure. The problem with the democratic system in the Netherlands, according to democratic reformers, is that it is out of step with the fast and major changes taking place in modern society. Champions of democratic reform in the Netherlands mostly look to sweeping, large-scale, and all-encompassing plans for democratic reform, achieving, however, little success. Major structural changes have been planned time and again, but eventually the institutional structure has remained largely the same. This article presents a critical analysis of the standard recipe that democratic reformers often prescribe - radical makeover - and outlines a viable alternative that can also be derived from the Dutch case - reinventing tradition.



Reinventing tradition implies a mixture of change and preservation, of movement and counter-movement. It is, arguably, the only way for democratic reform to go, at least in a consensus democracy like the Netherlands. Dutch history demonstrates that large-scale blueprint reform runs a serious risk of non-implementation, and that small-scale adaptive tinkering, part of the incremental 'reinvention of tradition', can be significantly more successful as a reform strategy.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

Murji Karim

**Enacting the sacred: nation and difference in the comparative sociology of the police**

in *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* , vol. 7, n. 1, March , 23-37

No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

Humphreys David

**Environmental and Ecological Citizenship in Civil Society**

in *International Spectator (The)*, Vol. XLIV, n. 1, January-March , 171-183

Drawing from the work of Andrew Dobson, two notions of citizenship in civil society can be distinguished: environmental citizenship, which focuses on environmental rights and seeks to redefine the relationship between the state and the citizen; and ecological citizenship, which goes beyond a rights-based notion of citizenship to advocate the fair usage of ecological space across international borders. Using civil society initiatives to conserve forests, this article argues that these two notions of citizenship should be seen as overlapping in that civil society groups seek to work through national and international law to reduce the ecological footprint of some countries on others. The article concludes by drawing a distinction between the environmental state and the ecological state.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

Stirk Peter M.R.

**Et l'ère de l'État touche à sa fin: Carl Schmitt et la conceptualisation du changement d'époque historique en relations internationales**

in *Etudes Internationales*, 1, Mars 2009

No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

Pickering Paula M.

**Explaining Support for Non-nationalist Parties in Post-conflict Societies in the Balkans**

in *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 61, n. 4, June , 565-591



#### Abstract

Parties willing to engage in cross-ethnic political cooperation are essential for the stability and democracy of ethnically divided post-conflict states. The investigation of voting in Macedonia and Bosnia, which are similarly small, impoverished, ethnically fragmented and threatened states that arose out of Yugoslavia, helps uncover factors that encourage voters to support parties willing to engage in cooperative multiethnic governance. Analysis of survey data suggests that supporters of the non-nationalist challengers in the first post-violence elections expressed both strong positive associations with the past communist system and clear negative assessments of the governing record of the incumbent nationalists, sentiments that were stronger among Macedonians than among Bosniaks. Data, however, call into question popular contentions that voters' support for non-nationalists is rooted in their social tolerance or engagement in civil society. The finding that Macedonian support for non-nationalist parties is partly due to negative voting combines with difficult domestic social and economic conditions, unfriendly neighbours and uncertain regional integration processes to suggest continuing challenges for Macedonia.

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#### **Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

**Jackson Robert H.**

#### **Failed States and International Trusteeship**

**in Relaciones internacionales : revista publ. por el Instituto de Relaciones Internacionales** , N°10, Febrero de 2009

This chapter addresses the question whether international society has or should have any responsibility concerning the domestic civil conditions of independent countries. Some states clearly are a calamitous reality for their populations. But do they constitute a normative problem for international relations? Who is responsible of the uncivil and often unsafe domestic conditions of what are usually termed failed states? Are the government and citizens of those countries responsible? Is the society of states responsible? Is there any place for international trusteeships or protectorates in contemporary international society?

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#### **Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

**Edwards Ronald A.**

#### **Federalism and the balance of power: China's Han and Tang Dynasties and the Roman Empire**

**in Pacific Economic Review**, Volume 14 Issue 1 February 2009 , 1-21

This paper compares the institutional history of the Han Dynasty (206 BC–AD 220), Tang Dynasty (AD 618–AD 906) and the Roman Empire (27 BC–AD 476). I document a common institutional reform in all three cases: the central government assumed power to appoint key regional officials and diffused authority across a greater number of regional officials. I argue that this served to increase coordination costs among key regional officials, making rebellion and resistance to central directives more costly. As a result, this institutional reform shifted the balance of power toward the central government, giving it more control.

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#### **Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

**Bianco Luigi**



**Fra storia e storiografia. A trent'anni da "Lo Stato moderno"**

in *Storia amministrazione costituzione*, Vol. 16 , 184-206

No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

Hilson Chris

**Framing the Local and the Global in the Anti-nuclear Movement: Law and the Politics of Place**

in *Journal of Law and Society*, Volume 36 Issue 1 - March , 94-109

This article examines the politics of place in relation to legal mobilization by the anti-nuclear movement. It examines two case examples – citizens' weapons inspections and civil disobedience strategies – which have involved the movement drawing upon the law in particular spatial contexts. The article begins by examining a number of factors which have been employed in recent social movement literature to explain strategy choice, including ideology, resources, political and legal opportunity, and framing. It then proceeds to argue that the issues of scale, space, and place play an important role in relation to framing by the movement in the two case examples. Both can be seen to involve scalar reframing, with the movement attempting to resist localizing tendencies and to replace them with a global frame. Both also involve an attempt to reframe the issue of nuclear weapons away from the contested frame of the past (unilateral disarmament) towards the more universal and widely accepted frame of international law.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

Frödin Olle

**Generalised and Particularistic Thinking in Policy Analysis and Practice: The Case of Governance Reform in South Africa**

in *Development Policy Review* , Volume 27 Issue 3 , 287 - 306

This article is concerned with the relationship between generalised and particularistic knowledge in the context of policy-making and policy analysis. It argues that it is problematic to assume that a reform model will generate similar outcomes across a wide variety of contexts. It presents a conceptual framework, including the concepts of transaction domain and domain consensus, that enables context-sensitive analyses. The argument is exemplified by South Africa's introduction in the 1990s of an Integrated Development Planning model, based on British reform experience and various international public-management models. With a case study of such planning in Lukhanji Municipality in the Eastern Cape Province, it illustrates how the conceptual framework may be used in policy research and analysis.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

Smith Stephen A.

**Gli anni di Mao: storia e politica del presente**



in *Passato e Presente*, fasc. 76

The Years of Mao. History and Politics today - Reflects on how political changes that have taken place in the People's Republic of China (Prc) during the era of economic reform, together with changes that have taken place in the world at large since 1989, especially those following the collapse of Communism in Europe, have shaped the way in which historians inside and outside the Prc have written the history of the Mao era (1949 to 1976). The article examines both Chinese and western historiography of four key issues relating to the Mao era: the idea of the 1950s as a golden age; the Great Leap Forward (1958-61); the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) and the view of Mao himself. The more negative representation of these issues derives, in part, from the fact that scholars now have much greater access to sources than was true prior to the 1980s. At the same time, the more negative representation it is bound up with political changes that have occurred inside and outside the Prc. For that reason, the historiography of the Mao may be said to represent an almost textbook example of the way in which historical writing is implicated in the politics of the present.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

Linklater Andrew

**Grand narratives and international relations**

in *Global Change, Peace & Security*, vol. 21, n. 1, february , 3-17

ABSTRACT: Grand narratives that trace the development of society and politics over centuries or millennia fell into disrepute during the twentieth century. However, efforts to trace long-term developments without preserving earlier notions of progress have proliferated in recent years. Revived grand narratives have moved relations between communities to the centre of the explanatory enterprise, and many cast considerable light on how humans have been forced together in longer webs of interconnectedness. Contemporary grand narratives underline the need for systematic reflection on the normative principles that might regulate the coming phases of global interconnectedness. But they may also have an important role in promoting higher levels of emotional identification between human groups and higher levels of attunement to their respective needs and interests.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

Akanji Olajide O

**Group Rights and Conflicts in Africa: A Critical Reflection on Ife-Modakeke, Nigeria**

in *International Journal on Minority and Groups Rights*, Volume 16, Number 1 , 31-51

The issue of group rights is indubitably an issue that concerns both minority and majority groups. Notwithstanding, minorities are quicker to claim the rights than the dominant groups. But the fact that group rights are a set of rights, though distinguishable from individual rights, within the general framework of fundamental human rights, shows that both minority and majority groups can exercise and enjoy them. The thrust of this article, however, is to fill the lacuna in extant literature on the need to appraise the role and place of group rights in the generation, transformation and sustenance of conflicts in Nigeria. The paper uses the age-long, protracted Ife-Modakeke conflict as a case study. Nigeria, being a plural society, the paper infers, is indeed susceptible to conflicts that border on issues of the collective rights of ethnic, sub-ethnic and religious groups. The article, nonetheless, argues that it is the non-recognition and respect of the rights of groups, both minority and majority, through the non-provision of adequate and appropriate



measures by successive governments, contrary to international standards to which the country is a signatory, that often heightened tension and fractured inter-group relations in the country.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

Finlay Christopher J.

**Hannah Arendt's Critique of Violence**

in *Thesis Eleven*, vol. 97, n. 1, May , 26-45

This article critiques the idea of instrumental justification for violent means seen in Hannah Arendt's writings. A central element in Arendt's argument against theorists like Georges Sorel and Frantz Fanon in *On Violence* is the distinction between instrumental justifications and approaches emphasizing the 'legitimacy' of violence or its intrinsic value. This doesn't really do the work Arendt needs it to in relation to rival theories. The true distinctiveness of Arendt's view is seen when we turn to *On Revolution* and resituate the later arguments of *On Violence* in the context of her ideas about the separation between revolution and liberation. Arendt's commitment to the American discovery in revolutionary politics of a means that needs no further ends to justify it permits a rereading of her conception of liberation as an attempt to envisage a violence that, while tactically instrumental, is at the same time politically non-instrumental. But while Arendt's view is distinct, the article also highlights important thematic continuities with the writings of Sorel and Walter Benjamin.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

De Benedictis Angela

**Heautontimorumenos**

in *Storia amministrazione costituzione*, Vol. 16 , 215-228

No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

Assefa Getachew

**Human and Group Rights Issues in Ethiopia: A Reply to Kjetil Tronvoll**

in *International Journal on Minority and Groups Rights*, Volume 16, Number 2 , 245-259

In an article published in the *International Journal on Minority and Group Rights* ('Human Rights Violations in Ethiopia: When Ethnic Identity is a Political Stigma', 15(1) (2008) 49-79), Kjetil Tronvoll from Oslo University argued that in federal Ethiopia, the violations of human rights are in some ways ethnically motivated. Tronvoll's arguments are based on the concluding observations of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) on Ethiopia. The objective of my Reply is to show that both CERD and Tronvoll have made unsubstantiated generalisations in trying to gauge any violation of human rights in Ethiopia as an ethnically-motivated occurrence. With this purpose in view, the current article briefly discusses the constitutional legal framework of the Ethiopian federal system, and critically examines the positions of CERD and Dr. Tronvoll.



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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

**Odysseos Louiza**

**Humanité, hostilité et ouverture de l'ordre politique dans la pensée internationale de Carl Schmitt**

in *Etudes Internationales*, 1, Mars 2009

No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

**Obama Barack**

**I nuovi Stati Uniti**

in *Affari Esteri*, Anno XLI, n. 161, 27-33

No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

**Pitty Roderic**

**Imagining Liberation: Russian Critiques of Stalinism**

in *Debatte: Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe*, vol. 17, n. 1, April, 99-116

This article reviews hidden critiques of Stalinism published in the USSR from the late 1960s until the relaxation of censorship in the late 1980s. The main focus is on those Russian scholars who analysed particular phenomena in the Third World as a parallel process to highlight key problems in the USSR. The work of several of these "inside dissidents" who used Aesopian language to criticize Stalinism is explained in terms of the weakening of ideological control after 1956. Two scholars whose criticism is assessed are Viktor Sheinis and Marat Cheshkov, both of whom analysed key features of the Stalinist system during its mature or stagnant phase prior to its disintegration. The article highlights the continuing relevance of several points of their criticism, such as the need for social control over the state and the difficulty of social transformation.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

**Barber Benjamin R., Kim Sungmoon**

**Imparare l'interdipendenza tra le tribù del mondo**

in *Reset*, Numero 112, Marzo / Aprile

No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

Scott David

**India's "Extended Neighborhood" Concept: Power Projection for a Rising Power**

in *India Review*, Volume 8, Issue 2, April , 107-143

This article looks at India's "extended neighborhood" concept, a formulation that has come into India's official vocabulary during the past decade to describe India's aspirations outside its "immediate neighborhood" of South Asia. This concept is considered in theoretical terms with regard to its economic, energy, security and military associations for India. The way in which India's sense of its "extended neighborhood" has itself been further extended is also noted; as are its competitive undertones with China. The concept is then considered in practical terms; through looking at its implementation by India southwards in the Indian Ocean, eastwards to Southeast Asia and beyond, northwards into Central Asia, and westwards into the Gulf and beyond. In retrospect, the "extended neighborhood" concept fits into India's sense of foreign policy concentric circles, serving as a bridge between India's local role in South Asia and its global role as an aspiring Great Power.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

Thibault Jean-François

**Introduction: Pertinence et actualité de la pensée internationale de Carl Schmitt**

in *Etudes Internationales*, 1, Mars 2009

No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

Gilley Bruce

**Is Democracy Possible?**

in *Journal of Democracy*, Volume 20, Number 1, January , 113-127

Anti-democratic thought is enjoying a resurgence with new claims of citizen incompetence, ignorance, and irrationality. While these claims have a long pedigree, they have become more widely held in a democratic age. They point to important insights concerning the limits of popular rule, although they are often based on misunderstandings or simple errors. Those that are valid are in any case already reflected in the institutions of democratic countries, especially those of the United States, where the claims are mostly made. The overstatement of these claims reminds us that democracy is not just possible, but also necessary. While the belief in democracy has spread around the world, it has begun to crumble in some of the West's finest academic institutions.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

Tansey Oisín

**Kosovo: Independence and Tutelage**



in **Journal of Democracy**, Volume 20, Number 2, April , 153-166

In February 2008, Kosovo broke away from Serbia and declared its independence. But to what extent is it making progress toward its goals of sovereignty and democracy?

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

**Sinatti Piero**

**La Russia tra la crisi e la Presidenza Obama**

in **Affari Esteri**, Anno XLI, n. 162 , 289-302

No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

**Plutino Guido**

**La crisi dei mercati e le possibili vie d'uscita**

in **Affari Esteri**, Anno XLI, n. 161 , 147-153

No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

**Parsi Vittorio Emanuele**

**La crisi di Gaza: quale ruolo per Stati Uniti e Unione europea**

in **ItalianiEuropei**, n. 1

No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

**Defeis Elizabeth F.**

**La protection des droits individuels – Une comparaison entre l'Union européenne et les États-Unis**

in **Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne**, n. 526, mars , 168-173

The Human Rights are considered as fundamental and are protected, both in the European Union and in the United States. That protection offers striking resemblances in both cases, in terms of origin, development and substance. This article stresses that fact and reviews some of those similarities.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**



*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

Rivero Angel

**La reivindicación de la ciudadanía**

in *Cuadernos de pensamiento político*, Nr 20, octubre-diciembre 2008 , 241-252

No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

Bautista Jiménez Juan Manuel

**La vinculación entre la protección de algunos derechos fundamentales y la « seguridad y la paz » internacionales: el antecedente de la Sociedad de Naciones**

in *Revista Electrónica de Estudios Internacionales*, Numero 16/2008

No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

Benigno Francesco

**Lo Stato moderno: le prospettive concorrenti**

in *Storia amministrazione costituzione*, Vol. 16 , 206-213

No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

Honnefelder Ludger

**Menschenwürde und Transzendenzbezug**

in *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie*, 57. Jahrgang, Heft 2, 2009 , 273-287

Is the meaning of "human dignity" dependent on metaphysical and theological premisses? The author's answer to this (controversially disputed) question is based on the thesis that metaphysics and theology are not primary sources of the idea of human dignity, but that they have additional relevance in understanding and promoting human dignity. For the world wide consensus that fundamental human rights have to be protected is based – at a first level – on the practical evidence that human life cannot be lived if some basic claims are not safeguarded. This practical evidence which is implied in the self-experience of the subject – acting and suffering in the first person singular – has at its core the ultimate practical judgment that human life as a self-related and self-determined practice has to be considered as an end in itself. Based on this practical evidence – at a second level – an ethical reflexion shows that every human being as a human being has not only a value which can be replaced by other values, but an unretrievable dignity because of this form of life, i. e. with the nature of a moral agent. From this practical evidence and its ethical evaluation – at a third level – metaphysical conclusions can be drawn, e. g. that human beings have a nature to which the faculty of reason belongs substantially (Aristotle) or that human beings as subjects are part of an intelligible world (Kant). The viewpoint of a



faith-based theology presupposes the practical evidence with which human beings experience themselves as subjects, but gives to the recognition of the human dignity (which is inherent to this practical evidence) an additional critical, hermeneutical and motivational force.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

Ako Rhuks T., Okonmah Patrick

**Minority Rights Issues in Nigeria: A Theoretical Analysis of Historical and Contemporary Conflicts in the Oil-Rich Niger Delta Region**

*in International Journal on Minority and Groups Rights*, Volume 16, Number 1 , 53-65

Nigeria's delta region was famous for its role in the trade and supply of palm-oil to the then industrialising world. Thereafter, its high quality crude-oil made it a significant player in the global oil market. However, the region has become (in)famous for the spate of violent conflicts that threaten both local and international economic stability and security. This paper highlights the correlations between these two eras, the parties and fundamental causes of the violent conflicts that beset the area. It argues that the underlying factor for restiveness in both periods is the exclusion of the local communities from participating in the exploitation and benefits of the resources. The paper theorises the causes of conflicts during the two periods based on social justice concepts of distribution and recognition. It suggests that the actualisation of normative elements of distribution and recognition that quelled the first of these conflicts has a fundamental role to play in resolving the multifarious conflicts that currently pervade the Niger Delta region. Consequently, it suggests that initiatives that recognise public participation in the crude-oil industry be extended to resolve the present conflicts.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

Behr Hartmut, Heath Amelia

**Misreading in IR theory and ideology critique: Morgenthau, Waltz and neo-realism**

*in Review of International Studies (The)*, Vol. 35, Issue 2, April , 327-349

This article is interested in the hegemony which neo-realism accomplished during the second half of the 20th century in both the academic field and policy making of I/international R/relations. Our examination posits the argument that neo-realism can be seen as an ideology rather than a theory of international politics. While this view can connect to individual voices from the 1960s as well as to an emerging body of critical literature since the 1990s, we propose an ideology critique to explore this argument. To unfold this approach we will elaborate some neo-realist misreadings which we think manipulate intellectual history (among others, the writings of Hans J. Morgenthau) and represent an ideological impact intrinsic in the development of IR. An ideology critical approach – which is inherent in Morgenthau's thoughts on international theory themselves and thus helps to reveal profound discrepancies at the heart of an ostensible 'realist'-neo-realist 'unity' – has, firstly, to problematise those discrepancies and, secondly, to focus on hegemonic strategies applied to ideologise and mainstream the academic field. The first part of such an agenda is what we present here; the second part is what we outline methodologically and suggest for further studies in, and of, IR.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

Broome André

**Money for nothing: everyday actors and monetary crises**

in *Journal of International Relations and Development*, Volume 12, Number 1, March , 3-30

Why do monetary unions fail? Structural approaches that focus on shifts in the distribution of capabilities ascribe non-elites limited agency to influence large-scale political and economic change. Existing agent-centred approaches tend to simplify the social dynamics of the everyday politics of money by concentrating on how elites determine formal changes within monetary systems. Answers to this question from a material-based perspective often point to a breakdown in elite political support, driven by actors' material incentives to cheat on their multilateral commitments rather than cooperate to overcome the collective action problem that a monetary union entails. Recent ideational perspectives have focused on the role of shared economic ideas among elites, as well as elite struggles over national identity, as crucial ingredients in the construction, maintenance, or failure of a monetary union. While drawing on the insights of rationalist and constructivist theories, this article uses a historical sociology approach to argue that the everyday actions taken by non-elites as survival strategies in a monetary crisis provide an important additional ingredient for understanding monetary system change. This approach is illustrated through a case study of the collapse of the ruble zone monetary union over 1991–1993.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

Akkerman Tjitske

**New Wars, New Morality?**

in *Acta Politica*, Volume 44, Number 1, April , 74-86

Has war fundamentally changed? If so, it may be time for reconsidering accepted moral standards for waging wars and for conduct in war. The new war thesis holds that wars have fundamentally altered since the end of the Cold War. Proponents such as Kaldor and Weiss hold that wars today are intrastate rather than interstate and are primarily being fought in the context of fragmented states. This thesis has acquired broad support, but it has also raised various criticisms. Taking account of empirical evidence, this review starts with an assessment of the various aspects of the thesis. The new war thesis has important normative implications. It challenges the traditional presumption that the sovereign state is the only authority capable of legitimate political violence. It also questions traditional justifications for humanitarian military intervention and for restrictions of human rights in the war against terrorism. These challenges are taken up by just war theorists. The review concludes that while the new wars thesis tends to overestimate the novelty of empirical trends, the just war theorists risk to overemphasize the need for ethical renewal.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

Levy Jacob T.

**Not So Novus an Ordo: Constitutions Without Social Contracts**

in *Political Theory* , Volume 37, n. 2, April , 191-217

Social contract theory imagines political societies as resting on a fundamental agreement, adopted at a discrete moment



in hypothetical time, that binds individual persons together into a polity and sets fundamental rules regarding that polity's structure and powers. Written constitutions, adopted at real moments in historical time, dictating governmental structures, bounding governmental powers, and entrenching individual rights, look temptingly like social contracts reified. Yet something essential is lost in this slippage between social contract theory and the practice of constitutionalism. Contractarian blinders lead us to look for greater individualism, social unity, and coherence of principles than should be expected. Real constitutional orders appropriate, incorporate, and channel the histories and divisions of the societies they govern. Treating them as social contracts flattens and distorts them, making those engagements with the past or with social plurality appear anomalous and encouraging their minimization. Accordingly this article redirects attention to non-contractarian strands within constitutionalism's intellectual inheritance and lived practice.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

**Buccellato Tullio, Mickiewicz Tomasz**

**Oil and Gas: A Blessing for the Few. Hydrocarbons and Inequality within Regions in Russia**  
in *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 61, n. 3, May , 385-407

Building on earlier work on regional inequality in Russia the article seeks to demonstrate that the regional oil and gas abundance is associated with high within-region inequality. It provides empirical evidence that hydrocarbons represent one of the leading determinants of an increased gap between rich and poor in the producing regions. The discussion focuses on a possible cluster of geographic, economic and political factors underlying the phenomenon.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

**Obama Barack**

**Per un mondo senza armi atomiche**

in *Affari Esteri*, Anno XLI, n. 162 , 257-261

No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

**Bartenstein Kristin**

**Planter des drapeaux : quelles règles pour répartir le plancher océanique de l'Arctique ?**

in *Etudes Internationales*, 4, Decembre 2008

No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

**Frazer Elizabeth**

**Politics, Violence and Revolutionary Virtue: Reflections On Locke and Sorel**



in **Thesis Eleven**, vol. 97, n. 1, May , 46-63

John Locke (1632—1704) and Georges Sorel (1859—1922) are commonly understood as representing opposed positions vis-a-vis revolution — with Locke representing the liberal distinction between violence and politics versus Sorel's rejection of politics in its pacified liberal sense. This interpretation is shown by a close reading of their works to be misleading. Both draw a necessary link between revolution and violence, and both mediate this link through the concept of `war'. They both depoliticize revolution, as for both of them `war' is understood as extra-political. The revolutions of 1989 emphasize what actually is true of previous revolutions: they cannot coherently be thought of as extra-political.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

**Galperin Larisa**

**Post-Soviet Russia and the World: Guest Editor's Introduction**

in **Russian politics and law**, vol. 46, n. 6, November-December , 3-6

No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

**Arfi Badredine**

**Probing the Democratic Peace Argument Using Linguistic Fuzzy Logic**

in **International Interactions**, vol. 35, issue 1, january

ABSTRACT: Why have the numerous debates on the “democratic peace” remained inconclusive? In addressing this question, the paper examines causality in social sciences by using propositional calculus in the framework of linguistic fuzzy logic. The paper does this by taking into account the possibility that some causal relations might be more or less of a sufficient type while others might be more or less of a necessary type, and while still others might be of both types to a lesser or greater degree of truth. The paper shows that depending on how much more or less democratic the two states are, and depending on how much more or less they feel threatened by one another, this more or less sufficiently causes a more or less possibility of fighting between the two states. Therefore, the lack of agreement on the possibility of a democratic peace is strictly speaking neither a problem of empirical validation, nor one of theoretical explanation, although these are still important issues. Instead, the lack of agreement has much to do with taking for granted a Boolean logic approach as a framework for validating the democratic peace argument. A linguistic fuzzy-logic framework predicts a much more diverse set of conclusions than just whether or not two democracies go to war.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

**van der Walt Johan**

**Rawls and Derrida on the Historicity of Constitutional Democracy and International Justice**

in **Constellations**, Vol. 16, Issue 1, March , 23-43



No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

**Cesa Marco**

**Realist Visions of the End of the Cold War: Morgenthau, Aron and Waltz**

**in British Journal of Politics & International Relations** , Vol. 11, Issue 2, May , 177-191

Although realist theory did not predict the end of the cold war, prominent realist scholars such as Hans Morgenthau, Raymond Aron and Kenneth Waltz did give some thought to the conditions under which the cold war might be settled. Both Aron and Morgenthau characterised the cold war as a combination of traditional power politics and ideological competition, but they differed on the relative weight of each component. For Morgenthau, a diplomatic settlement would deactivate the unsettling potential of the ideological conflict; for Aron, only the disappearance of the ideological conflict could pave the way to some lasting diplomatic settlement. For Waltz, ideology had little impact; the bipolar structure of the international system was the main variable on which both the cold war and its end depended.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

**Cesa Marco**

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

**Chen Maggie X.**

**Regional economic integration and geographic concentration of multinational firms**

**in European Economic Review**, Volume 53, Issue 3, April 2009 , 355-375

A number of theoretical studies have predicted that preferential trade agreements (PTAs) raise outside multinationals' incentive to invest in the participating countries, especially in those that are integrated with larger markets and have lower production costs. The hypothesis has, however, not been tested empirically. This paper addresses the issue by estimating the impact of PTAs on countries' ability to attract multinationals. The evidence is broadly consistent with expectations. The formation of PTAs leads to an increase in FDI by outside multinationals, but the effect varies sharply with the size of integrated markets and countries' comparative advantage. Countries integrated with larger markets



experience a greater increase in total and export-platform FDI. Those with a higher labor endowment also attract more FDI especially in labor-intensive industries, but at the expense of their labor-scarce PTA partners.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

**Elshtain Jean Bethke**

**Religion and Democracy**

in **Journal of Democracy**, Volume 20, Number 2, April , 5-17

The secularization hypothesis has failed, and failed spectacularly. We must find a new paradigm to help us understand the complexities of the relationship between religion and democracy.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

**Anne Stevens**

**Representative Bureaucracy — What, Why and How?**

in **Public Policy and Administration**, Volume 24, No. 2 , 119-139

Issues of representation have become increasingly salient in European countries with attempts to find mechanisms to increase the representation of women, including various types of quota and parity legislation. This article examines the extension of the idea to bureaucracies. It looks at two arguments about this extension: should bureaucracies be regarded as places where representation can and should occur, and, even if representation in bureaucracies is regarded as possible, is it desirable. Having concluded that it is both possible and desirable, the article then examines the outworking of the notion of representation within one bureaucracy, the European Commission, on the basis of the considerations applied by feminists to elected representation. The example of the EC illuminates aspects of representative bureaucracy, and supports a normative argument for representation on the basis of symbolic, justice and deliberative arguments even if the agency argument must be nuanced by the need to avoid partiality.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

**Milward David**

**Restless Spirits in the Land: Finding a Place in Canadian Law for Aboriginal Civil Disobedience**

in **International Journal on Minority and Groups Rights**, Volume 16, Number 1 , 1-29

This article will argue that Aboriginal use of civil disobedience should be legalised within limited circumstances. Aboriginal peoples have constitutional rights under s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. The Supreme Court of Canada decided in *Haida* that if a Canadian government possesses knowledge, real or constructive, that its actions may affect Aboriginal interests that are potentially protected under s. 35(1), that government then has duties towards the Aboriginal peoples concerned. These duties can include giving prior notice of the proposed action, or even interim accommodation of the Aboriginal interests pending final resolution. If the Canadian state undertakes an action that 1) threatens harm to or interference with an Aboriginal interest and 2) in a manner that reflects a failure to uphold its obligations under *Haida* and 3) the action is commenced before the interim hearing contemplated by *Haida* can be initiated, Aboriginal peoples



should be allowed to have recourse to civil disobedience to block that action. The idea is that the action reflects a failure by the state to uphold the rule of law with respect to Aboriginal rights and therefore should disentitle the state from enforcing such action through criminal prosecution.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

**Mannori Luca**

**Rileggendo oggi "Stato moderno". Vitalità e limite di una lezione storiografica**  
in *Storia amministrazione costituzione*, Vol. 16 , 229-239

No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

**Wadlow René**

**Salvador De Madariaga: Conscience of the League of Nations**  
in *Federalist Debate (The)*, Year XXII, n. 1, March , 38-40

No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

**Harris Anita**

**Shifting the boundaries of cultural spaces: young people and everyday multiculturalism**  
in *Social Identities*, Volume 15, Issue 2, March 2009 , 187-205

This paper investigates the significance of everyday intercultural social practice enacted in the mundane sites of young people's daily life to the development of new research directions for multicultural youth studies. It explores the idea of everyday multiculturalism as an appropriate analytical approach for understanding the ways that young people deal with cultural difference in conditions of super-diversity. It considers how this approach gives descriptive and explanatory priority to sites and literacies such as everyday neighbourhood locales, vernacular expressions and popular culture that form an important part of young people's 'habitus', and provides insight into how struggles over the decentring of whiteness from the national imaginary occur in quotidian ways.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

**Chiti-Batelli Andrea**

**Spengler aveva ragione?**

in *Affari Esteri*, Anno XLI, n. 162 , 402-407

No abstract available



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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

**Meriggi Marco**

**Stato moderno e 'miracolo' europeo**

in *Storia amministrazione costituzione*, Vol. 16 , 241-246

No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

**Ricciardi Maurizio**

**Storia e sistema della costituzione dello Stato e della società**

in *Storia amministrazione costituzione*, Vol. 16 , 247-277

No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

**Canali Laura**

**Tblisi at the core of Caucasus Energy Game**

in *Heartland – Eurasian Review of Geopolitics*, n. 1, "Obama's Challenges"

Georgia as one of the most important energy hubs for the oil and gas routes towards Europe. Moscow's corridors and the Nabucco Project.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

**Niezen Ronald**

**The Aufklärung's Human Discipline: Comparative Anthropology According to Kant, Herder and Wilhelm von Humboldt**

in *Intellectual History Review*, Volume 19, Issue 2, July , 177-195

No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

**Monticone Ronald C.**

**The Changing Balance of Power**

in *Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali*, Volume 75, n. 4, ottobre-dicembre , 498-514



The Changing Balance of Power is an article which traces the history of the balance of power in the world from the beginning of the modern nation-State system in 1648 to the present and then makes some predictions about the balance of power in the future. The article begins by discussing the concept of the balance of power and how it ensures not only stability in a system composed of a number of sovereign States but also the independence of most States as well. The bulk of the article is devoted to the period since the end of World War II. The balance of power was multi-polar and therefore flexible between 1648-1939. Starting in 1945, the balance of power underwent several fundamental changes which impaired the manner in which it traditionally operated, becoming inflexible due to bipolarity and the two-bloc system, then uni-polar at the end of the Cold War. Finally, it is apparent that the balance of power is becoming multi-polar again with the rise of the European Union, China, Russia, India, Indonesia and Brazil. With a return to a multipolar system, the balance of power will again become flexible within the next 20-25 years.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

Carbone Giovanni

**The Consequences of Democratization**

in *Journal of Democracy*, Volume 20, Number 2, April , 123-137

For the past few decades, scholars have been focusing on the causes of democratization. It is now time to devote systematic attention to analyzing the costs and benefits that democracy brings.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

Sloane Robert D.

**The Cost of Conflation: Preserving the Dualism of Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello in the Contemporary Law of War**

in *Yale Journal of International Law (The)*, Vol. 34 N. 1 , 48-112

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

Evans R. J. W.

**The Creighton century: British historians and Europe, 1907–2007**

in *Historical Research*, Volume 82, Issue 216, May , 320-339

The series of Creighton memorial lectures, delivered annually since 1907, reflects changing interests and priorities within British historiography. This centenary address seeks to illustrate attitudes to the history of Europe as revealed especially in the lectures, but also in the context of the development of the historical profession in this country as a whole. Many of the issues raised were already adumbrated in the work of Mandell Creighton himself. How far was Britain a part of Europe for historiographical purposes? Did a British perspective involve any particular presuppositions or yield particular insights? And in what ways did the study of individual foreign countries interplay with attitudes to



Britain, and to the Continent as a whole?

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

**Flandreau Marc, Jobst Clemens**

**The Empirics of International Currencies: Network Externalities, History and Persistence**  
in **Economic Journal**, Volume 119 Issue 537, April 2009 , 643-664

Using a new database for the late nineteenth century, when the pound sterling was the world's leading international currency, this article provides evidence on the empirical determinants of international currency status. We report evidence in favour of the search-theoretic models to international currencies. Using a microeconomic model of currency choice, we provide empirical support to strategic externalities. We find strong confirmation of the existence of persistence, but reject the view that the international monetary system was subject to pure path dependency and lock-in effects, suggesting that, even in the absence of WWI, the USD was bound to overtake sterling.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

**The Nature of German Environmental History**

in **German History**, vol. 27, n. 1, January , 113-130

Scholars of German history, literature and cultural studies have created a long and rich scholarly tradition analysing the adoration of 'nature' in German Romantic, nationalist, Heimat, youth, and Lebensreform movements. Political scientists have also produced a voluminous literature on the origins and significance of Germany's Green Party and the 'post-material' values of the post-1968 generation. Germany is also well-known for its commitment to sustainable industrial development, as evidenced by one of Europe's best records in recycling, the regulation of industrial emissions and nature conservation. Yet 'environmental history', at least this field as understood among its North American practitioners, has remained underdeveloped among German historians until very recently. Franz-Joseph Brüggemeier's pioneering studies of air and water pollution control in the Ruhr area were part of a growing interest in Umweltgeschichte in Germany during the 1980s and early 1990s, but these did not immediately spawn a new generation of imitators.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

**Fitzmaurice Malgosia**

**The New Developments Regarding the Saami Peoples of the North**

in **International Journal on Minority and Groups Rights**, Volume 16, Number 1 , 67-156

This article will explore the new developments regarding the Saami peoples of Northern Europe. In particular it will be focused on new legislation promulgated in Norway and the Draft Saami Convention and their right to self-determination.



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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

Richmond Oliver P.

**The Romanticisation of the Local: Welfare, Culture and Peacebuilding  
in International Spectator (The)**, Vol. XLIV, n. 1, January-March , 149-169

The key feature of the dominant liberal approach to peacebuilding is the neoliberal marketisation of peace, rather than engagement with civil society and the agents and subjects of this peace. This is a particularly Western, liberal, and Enlightenment-derived discourse of peace, which is far from culturally and socially appropriate or sensitive, and has little chance of establishing a locally self-sustaining peace. This represents a “romanticisation of the local”, of civil society, and of the liberal culture of peacebuilding. Its cultural engagement, including its support for civil society development, is therefore little more than instrumental and is used to defer responsibility for the welfare of the local.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

Mousseau Michael

**The Social Market Roots of Democratic Peace  
in International Security**, vol. 33, n. 4, spring , 52-86

ABSTRACT: Democracy does not cause peace among nations. Rather, domestic conditions cause both democracy and peace. From 1961 to 2001, democratic nations engaged in numerous fatal conflicts with each other, including at least one war, yet not a single fatal militarized incident occurred between nations with contract-intensive economies—those where most people have the opportunity to participate in the market. In contract-intensive economies, individuals learn to respect the choices of others and value equal application of the law. They demand liberal democracy at home and perceive it in their interest to respect the rights of nations and international law abroad. The consequences involve more than just peace: the contract-intensive democracies are in natural alliance against any actor—state or nonstate—that seeks to challenge Westphalian law and order. Because China and Russia lack contractualist economies, the economic divide will define great power politics in the coming decade. To address the challenges posed by China and Russia, preserve the Westphalian order, and secure their citizens from terrorism, the contract-intensive powers should focus their efforts on supporting global economic opportunity, rather than on promoting democracy.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

John Marangos

**The evolution of the term Washington consensus  
in Journal of Economic Surveys**, Volume 23 Issue 2 , 350 - 384

The term Washington Consensus, as Williamson conceived it, was the lowest common denominator of the reforms that he judged 'Washington' could agree were required in Latin America. The term has evolved to denote a different set of policies from those initially conceived. This paper investigates the different versions and interpretations of this



controversial term and assesses whether the term itself is suitable and viable or slowly becoming irrelevant and obsolete. Most importantly, the evolution of the term mirrors the evolution of economic thought on economic development for nearly the last two decades.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

**Maggetti Martino**

**The role of independent regulatory agencies in policy-making: a comparative analysis**  
in *Journal of European Public Policy* , Volume 16 Issue 3 2009 , 450 – 470

This article examines the role of formally independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) in policy-making, focusing on six cases concerning the revision of crucial laws related to the competencies of the investigated IRA. These cases were selected from three small European countries (the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland) and two policy areas (finance and competition). After collecting documental and survey information on the participation and weight of each actor, the Actor-Process-Event Scheme was used to obtain a synthetic measure of agencies' centrality in the course of each policy process. My hypotheses on the centrality of agencies are then tested with a two-step Qualitative Comparative Analysis. Results suggest that de facto independence from the political decision-makers is a necessary condition for the maximal centrality of agencies in policy-making, whilst non-professionalization of the legislature and low independence from the regulatees are jointly sufficient for explaining this outcome.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

**Charia Sharad, Verderya Katherine**

**Thinking between the Posts: Postcolonialism, Postsocialism, and Ethnography after the Cold War**  
in *Comparative Studies in Society and History* , Volume 51, Issue 1, January , 6-34

Lenin spoke at the Second Congress of 1920 to multiple audiences. In continuity with the First International, he spoke in the utopian language of Bolshevism, of the successful revolutionary proletariat that had taken the state and was making its place in history without the intercession of bourgeois class rule. Recognizing the limits of socialism in one country surrounded by the military and economic might of "World imperialism," however, Lenin also pressed for a broader, ongoing world-historic anti-imperialism in alliance with the oppressed of the East, who, it seemed, were neither sufficiently proletarianized, nor, as yet, subjects of history. There are many ways to situate this particular moment in Lenin's thought. One can see the budding conceits of Marxist social history, or "history from below," in which millions in the East could become historical subjects under the sign of "anti-imperialism." One can also see this gesture to those outside the pale as a flourish of the emergent Soviet empire, and as a projection of anxieties about Bolshevik control over a vast and varied Russian countryside with its own internal enemies. But Lenin also spoke to audiences who would make up the next, Third International, like the Indian Marxist M. N. Roy, who saw imperialism dividing the world into oppressed and oppressor nations. For this Third Worldist audience, looking increasingly to the new Soviet Union for material and military support for "national self-determination," Lenin extends the historic mission of a future world socialism.



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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

**Godrej Farah**

**Towards a Cosmopolitan Political Thought: The Hermeneutics of Interpreting the Other**

*in Polity*, Volume 41, Issue 2, April , 135-165

The emergence of the field of comparative political theory suggests that the encounter with non-Western texts be considered a legitimate and necessary part of political theory, so that the field is reconstituted in a truly cosmopolitan manner. However, this also presents unique challenges to political theorists. Chief among these is the question of what hermeneutic approach would allow us to understand well the ideas contained in these texts. This essay will argue for a particular approach to the interpretation of non-Western texts and ideas, providing an account of a methodologically self-conscious approach to comparative political theory. A serious comparative political theorist will inevitably have to alternate between an internal immersion in the lived experience of the text, and an external stance of commentary and exegesis of the text. Struggling with the conflicting imperatives of these moments is precisely the task of a more nuanced approach to comparative political theory. Ultimately, however, I also argue that this particular approach has implications for the development of a genuine cosmopolitanism in the field of political theory. A cosmopolitan political theory is precisely one in which such struggles and complex encounters with the otherness of texts are increasingly made available to provoke, dislocate, and challenge our own understandings of political life. The method I offer is thus deeply implicated in the evolution of our self-understanding as political theorists.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

**Epstein Mikhail**

**Transculture: A Broad Way Between Globalism and Multiculturalism**

*in American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, Volume 68 Issue 1, January 2009 , 327-351

This paper develops a concept of transculture as a model of cultural development that differs from both leveling globalism and isolating pluralism. While culture frees humans from the material dependencies of nature, it also creates new, symbolic dependencies—on customs, traditions, conventions, which a person receives as a member of a certain group and ethnos. Among the many freedoms proclaimed as rights of the individual, there emerges yet another freedom—from one's own culture, in which one was born and educated. Transculture is viewed as the next level of liberation, this time from the "prison house of language," from unconscious predispositions and prejudices of the "native," naturalized cultures. The case of the Japanese poet Araki Yasusada (1903–1972), a survivor of Hiroshima, demonstrates how transcultural creativity, though cast in the form of a literary hoax, can produce an internationally recognized achievement. Transculturalism is especially needed in world politics, where the factor of fixed cultural identity based on race, ethnos, religion, or ideological commitments turned out to be a source of conflict and violence. This paper argues that the categories of opposition and identity do not preclude the significance of the third category, which is difference. The differences complement each other and create a new interpersonal transcultural community to which we belong, not because we are similar but because we are different. The transcultural perspective opens a possibility for globalization not as homogenization but, rather, as further differentiation of cultures and their "dissemination" into transcultural individuals, liberating themselves from their dependence from their native cultures. The global society can be viewed as the space of diversity of free individuals rather than that of fixed groups and cultures. It is an alternative to



the clash of civilizations and a hope for lasting peace.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

**Castaldo Massimo**

**Un nuovo scenario mondiale**

in *Affari Esteri*, Anno XLI, n. 161 , 104-122

No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

**Macartney Huw**

**Variegated neo-liberalism: transnationally oriented fractions of capital in EU financial market integration**

in *Review of International Studies (The)*, Vol. 35, Issue 2, April , 451-480

This article develops a twofold critique: on the one hand it addresses those accounts commonly associated with the Varieties of Capitalism literature and their associated understanding of neo-liberalism to argue that there is a dominant tendency to collapse into a binary analysis that asserts either we are witnessing convergence or we are experiencing path dependency. On the other hand it addresses 'neo-Gramscian' accounts which tend to overemphasise processes of transnational convergence and the emergence of a transnational capitalist class at the expense of the embeddedness of capital in national-domestic contexts. On this basis, it is argued that several contributions within political geography pose meaningful questions about the premise that neo-liberalism is inherently variegated. Principally, this involves developing the notion of variegated neo-liberalism to analyse the dynamics of a contingent neo-liberal consensus between transnationally-oriented fractions that both drives EU reform in a neo-liberal direction and reinforces domestic linkages organic to the national context. As a result, the article suggests we therefore reject the notion of a transnational capitalist class somehow detached from the national.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

**Auer Stefan**

**Violence and the End of Revolution After 1989**

in *Thesis Eleven*, vol. 97, n. 1, May , 6-25

The series of Velvet revolutions in 1989, which brought about the collapse of communism in Europe, seem to have vindicated those political theorists and activists who believed in the possibility of non-violent power. The relative success of the 1989 revolutions has validated a new paradigm of revolutionary change based on the assumption that radical changes were attainable through moderate means. Yet the legacy of these non-violent revolutions also points towards the limits of political strategies fundamentally opposed to violence. The article shows that the key architects of non-violent revolutions in 1989 were well aware of the contingent nature of all political actions, and were thus willing to take risks in their pursuit of freedom.



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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

**Blaug Ricardo**

**Why is there hierarchy? Democracy and the question of organisational form**

in **Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy**, Vol. 12, n. 1, March , 85-99

Elitist and technocratic accounts of democracy assume the necessity of leadership and hierarchy, while participatory approaches claim that organisations can be more 'horizontal' yet remain effective. To inform this debate, this paper presents a critical examination of the hierarchic organisational form. It explores classic economic and political accounts of how hierarchy emerges and is maintained, and seeks to reveal the mechanisms by which it achieves organisational effectiveness. The paper argues that significant ideological distortion lies at the heart of elitist accounts of democracy and sometimes in our popular conceptions as well. This distortion takes the form of a false equation between organisational effectiveness and hierarchy, one that allows hierarchy to appear necessary, when it is no such thing. With social science unable to confirm the popular belief that hierarchy is inevitable, the paper concludes that those who seek to build more participatory organisations are correct to question its unreflective use. The paper is thus intended as a contribution to the activities of democratic citizens in their vigilant management of this most prevalent, yet mysterious, of organisational forms.

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

**Christian Westra**

**Will the “Bush Doctrine” Survive Its Progenitor? An Assessment of Jus ad Bellum Norms for the Post-Westphalian Age**

in **Boston College International and Comparative Law Review**, Vol.32, n.2 , 399-422

No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

**Rodriguez Magda Rosa Maria**

**¿De quién es la ciudadanía?**

in **Cuadernos de pensamiento político**, Nr 20, octubre-diciembre 2008 , 253-263

No abstract available

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**Section D) Federalism as a political idea**

*Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous*

**Gonzalez Quiros José Luis**

**¿Educación para la Ciudadanía o atentado a la democracia?**

in **Cuadernos de pensamiento político**, Nr 20, octubre-diciembre 2008 , 265-284



No abstract available