Bulletin n. 1/2017
June 2017
INDICE
  • Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government
  • Section B) Global governance and international organizations
  • Section C) Regional integration processes
  • Section D) Federalism as a political idea
  • Crombez Christophe, Huysmans Martijn, Van Gestel Wim
    Choosing an informative agenda setter: The appointment of the Commission in the European Union
    in European Union Politics , vol. 18, n. 2, June ,  2017 ,  145–167
    We present a game-theoretical analysis of Commission appointment in the European Union. In the model, the European Parliament and the member states look ahead and consider the outcomes that result from the appointment of alternative Commissions. In contrast to earlier work, we assume the European Parliament and the member states have incomplete information on the consequences of policies, whereas the Commission acquires private information. We find that the increased use of codecision gives the Council an incentive to appoint a Commission that is closer to the European Parliament, because the European Parliament then trusts the Commission more and the Commission is more informative as a result. Thus, we shed new light on the Spitzenkandidaten Coup that preceded the appointment of the Juncker Commission.
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