Bulletin n. 1/2017
June 2017
INDICE
  • Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government
  • Section B) Global governance and international organizations
  • Section C) Regional integration processes
  • Section D) Federalism as a political idea
    • Pablo Guerrero Vázquez
    Gobernanza económica y régimen sancionador en caso de incumplimiento en la Eurozona
    in Revista de Derecho Constitucionál Europeo , no. 26 ,  2016
    The budgetary imbalances after the economic crisis of 2008 demonstrated the deficiencies that the European community continued to have regarding budgetary discipline and debt control, despite the system being reformed in 2005. As a response to this situation, between 2011 and 2013 European institutions and member states themselves designed a new economic governance system by approving a set of interconnected regulatory instruments whose applicability is implicitly mutually dependent in most cases. Some of the agreed rules have been regulated, at least temporarily, outside of the European Union’s legal system. Others are only binding for Eurozone states and their application, in certain cases, is limited to those states that have received extraordinary financial assistance. In the enormous economic governance system, the budgetary obligations of member states have grown considerably, while at the same time new sanctions have been added for cases of non-compliance with these new commitments and with earlier ones. The objective of this paper is to determine and analyse these new fiscal obligations and the sanctioning procedure that is potentially applicable to Eurozone states in the event of non-compliance. We will then move on to a diachronic analysis of this regulatory framework in order to more accurately clarify the reasoning and determining factors behind the set of sanctions for budgetary indiscipline.
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