Bulletin n. 1/2016
June 2016
INDICE
  • Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government
  • Section B) Global governance and international organizations
  • Section C) Regional integration processes
  • Section D) Federalism as a political idea
  • John V. Kane
    Control, Accountability, and Constraints: Rethinking Perceptions of Presidential Responsibility for the Economy
    in Presidential Studies Quarterly , Volume 46, Issue 2 ,  2016 ,  335–364
    The state of the national economy is known to be of fundamental consequence for presidential fortunes, which implies that citizens (1) believe presidents exert substantial control over the national economy and, consequently, (2) hold presidents accountable for economic conditions. Yet the ability of presidents to control the national economy is highly constrained. Thus, we know relatively little about how citizens come to perceive the presidency as being so responsible for economic outcomes. Using a survey experiment, this study examines whether presidential campaigns, and candidates’ claims specifically, are capable of shaping citizens’ perceptions of presidential responsibility for the economy. Paradoxically, the results reveal that the public is inclined to hold presidents accountable for the economy to a significantly greater extent than it perceives presidents to actually control the economy. Moreover, the results suggest that, by deliberately omitting information about the constraints on presidential power over the economy, candidates’ claims may play an important role in perpetuating unrealistic expectations of the president among the general public.
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