Bulletin n. 3/2015
January 2016
INDICE
  • Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government
  • Section B) Global governance and international organizations
  • Section C) Regional integration processes
  • Section D) Federalism as a political idea
    • Heinemann Friedrich, Janeba Eckhard, Moessinger Marc-Daniel, Schröder Christoph
    Who Likes to Fend for Oneself? Revenue Autonomy Preferences of Subnational Politicians in Germany
    in Publius: The Journal of Federalism , vol. 45, n. 4. Fall ,  2015 ,  653-685
    In the context of German federalism and its current reform debate, this article explores the federal reform preferences of members from all sixteen German Länder parliaments. We examine the role of Länder self-interest, party ideology, and individual characteristics to understand the preferences for tax autonomy and fiscal equalization. One clear result is the joint importance of ideology and jurisdictional interests. We use the empirical results to simulate which type of reform would garner the necessary support in Germany’s upper house, the Bundesrat. Finally, we draw conclusions for federal reform strategies which could enjoy the support of veto players who feel disadvantaged.
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