SPECIAL ISSUE
CONTENTS
  • Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government
  • Section B) Global governance and international organizations
  • Section C) Regional integration processes
  • Section D) Federalism as a political idea
  • Bulman-Pozen Jessica
    Federalism as a safeguard of the separation of powers
    in Columbia Law Review , Volume 112, Number 3, April ,  2012 ,  459-506
    States frequently administer federal law, yet scholars have largely overlooked how the practice of cooperative federalism affects the balance of power across the branches of the federal government. This Article explains how states check the federal executive in an era of expansive executive power and how they do so as champions of Congress, both relying on congressionally conferred authority and casting themselves as Congressís faithful agents. By inviting the states to carry out federal law, Congress, whether purposefully or incidentally, counteracts the tendency of statutory ambiguity and broad delegations of authority to enhance federal executive power. When states disagree with the federal executive about how to administer the law, they force attention back to the underlying statute: Contending that their view is consistent with Congressís purposes, states compel the federal executive to respond in kind. States may also reinvigorate horizontal checks by calling on the courts or Congress as allies. Cooperative federalism schemes are a more practical means of checking federal executive power than many existing proposals because such schemes do not fight problems commentators emphasize ó a vast administrative state, broad delegations, and polarized political parties ó but rather harness these realities to serve separation of powers objectives. Full text available online at http://columbialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/112-3_Bulman-Pozen.pdf
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