SPECIAL ISSUE | ||
Harrington Joanna |
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Scrutiny and approval: the role for Westminster-style Parliaments in Treaty-making | ||
in International and Comparative Law Quarterly , Vol. 55, January 2006 , 2006 , 121-160 | ||
SCRUTINY AND APPROVAL: THE ROLE FOR WESTMINSTERSTYLE
PARLIAMENTS IN TREATY-MAKING
JOANNA HARRINGTON*
I. INTRODUCTION
In December 2004, Parliaments Joint Committee on Human Rights added its
voice to the call for a greater parliamentary role in the making of treaties. In
its report on Protocol No. 14 to the European Convention on Human Rights,
the Joint Committee included a one-page chapter on Increasing Parliaments
involvement in the adoption of human rights treaties, expressing the view that
it was desirable for Parliament to become more involved prior to ratification
on the grounds that effective parliamentary scrutiny would serve to enhance
the democratic legitimacy of human rights obligations incurred . . . by the
Executive pursuant to the prerogative power.1 Motivated by this concern, the
Committee has undertaken, on its own initiative, an extensive review of the
UKs treaty commitments in the human rights field with a view to securing
greater parliamentary support for these obligations through the mechanism of
public scrutiny.2
* Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Alberta, Canada; former Visiting Fellow,
Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law, Faculty of Law, University of New South Wales, Australia;
former Parliamentary Legal Officer to Lord Lester of Herne Hill QC. This article builds on my
writings on treaty-making in Hilary Charlesworth et al (eds), The Fluid State: International Law
and National Legal Systems (Federation Press Sydney 2005) and the McGill Law Journal. Thanks
are due to the University of Western Ontario for funding research undertaken in Australia and
New Zealand, which led to valuable discussions with Professor Peter Bailey AM OBE (Australian
National University); Julie Bishop MP, Gillian Gould, Julia Morris and Glenn Worthington
(Australian Joint Standing Committee on Treaties); Allan Bracegirdle (Legislative Counsel,
Office of the Clerk of the (New Zealand) House of Representatives); Steve Cutting and David
Sanders (New Zealand Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee); the Rt Hon Sir Kenneth
Keith (New Zealand Supreme Court); Professor David Kinley (Monash University); and Anne
Twomey (NSW Cabinet Office). I have also benefited from presenting my research at workshops
held at the Australian National University in August 2004 and at Duke University in March 2005
and I am grateful to the organizers for their invitations to participate. Lastly, thanks are due to
Professors Grant Huscroft, John Law and George Williams and to Lord Lester of Herne Hill QC.
1 UK Joint Committee on Human Rights, Protocol No. 14 to the European Convention on
Human Rights, HL Paper 8/HC 106, Session 200405 (1 Dec 2004) at 6.
2 See UK Joint Committee on Human Rights The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child,
HL Paper 117/HC 81, Session 20023 (9 June 2003); UK Joint Committee on Human Rights The
International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights, HL Paper 183/HC 1188,
Session 200304 (20 Oct 2004); UK Joint Committee on Human Rights The Convention on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, HL Paper 88/HC 471, Session 20045 (16 Mar 2005) and
UK Joint Committee on Human Rights Review of International Human Rights Instruments, HL
Paper 99/HC 264, Session 20045 (23 Mar 2005).
[ICLQ vol 55, January 2006 pp 121160] doi: 10.1093/iclq/lei069
jharrington@law.ualberta.ca
Such concerns about the democratic credentials of treaty law are nothing
new, as evidenced by the intent in the US Constitution to subject the
Presidents treaty-making power to Senate approval.3 However, as the volume
of treaty-making has grown,4 so has its scope, with treaties now covering an
endless range of subjects as diverse as trade, climate change, and crime, all
with clear implications for domestic law and policy. This in turn has prompted
greater interest in the executives prerogative to make treaties in a
Westminster-style democracy, with the writings of David Marquand
contributing the term democratic deficit5 as the shorthand reference for the
absence of parliamentary oversight, albeit that Marquand was referring at the
time to the functioning of the European Community.6
Yet, despite the impact of treaty-making, including the occasional controversy,
law-making by treaty remains an executive act in countries that follow
the British constitutional tradition. The common law imposes no obligation to
inform or involve Parliament, albeit that Parliament is the ultimate law-making
authority in a Westminster-style democracy. Of course, optics or politics may
compel an executive to seek parliamentary approval for a treaty prior to its ratification
or accession, but the lack of a legal requirement for such involvement
grounds complaints that a democratic deficit exists, whatever may be the
correct definition of democracy (a subject beyond the scope of this article).
Moreover, in federal Commonwealth States, such as Australia and Canada, and
even quasi-federal States such as the UK, an additional deficit exists since there
is no requirement for the central executive to involve the legislative or executive
branches of the sub-national units in the treaty-making process.
Of course, the rebuttal argument to granting Parliament a role in treatymaking
is two-fold. The practical response is that in a Westminster democracy,
the executive comes from the party with the most seats in Parliament,
absent a minority situation, and thus the executive reflects (or controls) what
would be the wishes of Parliament. The legal response is that a treaty does not
have domestic legal effect until Parliament so chooses through the enactment
of implementation legislation, and thus Parliament retains its primary responsibility
for law-making. But law-making by treaty does not always require the
enactment of legislation, particularly if the treaty obligation can be implied
within or carried out through a pre-existing law, and thus Parliament may not
in fact have this role. Moreover, once ratified, treaties are clearly binding
122 International and Comparative Law Quarterly
3 Art II(2) of the US Constitution provides that the President shall have the Power, by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators
present concur.
4 The UNs treaty collection contains over 50,000 treaties, many of which remain in force. See
UN Treaty Collection |
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