Bulletin n. 1/2006
May 2006
CONTENTS
  • Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government
  • Section B) Global governance and international organizations
  • Section C) Regional integration processes
  • Section D) Federalism as a political idea
    • Riou Stéphane
    Transfer and tax competition in a system of hierarchical governments
    in Regional Science and Urban Economics , Volume 36, Issue 2 ,  2006 ,  249-269
    This paper analyzes the relation between tax competition and interregional transfer in an economic geography framework. In the absence of a transfer scheme, we show that a purely decentralized tax system in an economy with asymmetric regions can lead to more agglomeration effects than those resulting from the free market location equilibrium. Moreover, the model suggests that a transfer mechanism with an explicit redistributive character leads to a lower local tax pressure. Finally, we show that a myopic behavior adopted by the region which contributes to the transfer gives rise to an involuntary decrease in the federal tax.
    ©2001 - 2020 - Centro Studi sul Federalismo - P. IVA 94067130016