Bulletin n. 1/2005 | ||
December 2005 | ||
Falleti Tulia G. |
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A Sequential Theory of Decentralization: Latin American Cases in Comparative Perspective | ||
in American Political Science Review , issue 3, vol. 99, august , 2005 , 327-346 | ||
ABSTRACT: Both advocates and critics of decentralization assume that decentralization invariably increases the power of subnational governments. However, a closer examination of the consequences of decentralization across countries reveals that the magnitude of such change can range from substantial to insignificant. In this article, I propose a sequential theory of decentralization that has three main characteristics: (1) it defines decentralization as a process, (2) it takes into account the territorial interests of bargaining actors, and (3) it incorporates policy feedback effects. I argue that the sequencing of different types of decentralization (fiscal, administrative, and political) is a key determinant of the evolution of intergovernmental balance of power. I measure this evolution in the four largest Latin American countries and apply the theory to the two extreme cases (Colombia and Argentina). I show that, contrary to commonly held opinion, decentralization does not necessarily increase the power of governors and mayors. | ||