Bulletin n. 1/2015
June 2015
CONTENTS
  • Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government
  • Section B) Global governance and international organizations
  • Section C) Regional integration processes
  • Section D) Federalism as a political idea
  • iain mclean
    Spending Too Much, Taxing Too Little? Parliaments in Fiscal Federalism
    in European Political Science , Volume 14, Issue 1 ,  2015 ,  15-27
    In aggregate, general government spending in a democracy always tends to exceed general government revenue. This is because local orders of government typically raise less than they spend, with the difference covered by a block grant. This sets up well-known moral hazards associated with the resultant vertical fiscal imbalance. Various strategies for reducing this moral hazard are discussed, with foci on the possibilities of secession and of finding other ways to apply the Tiebout and marginalism principles.
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