Bulletin n. 1-2/2014
November 2014
CONTENTS
  • Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government
  • Section B) Global governance and international organizations
  • Section C) Regional integration processes
  • Section D) Federalism as a political idea
  • Randour François,de Visscher Christian
    The reform of the Belgian federal administration 10 years on: what balance has been achieved between operational autonomy of top managers and the supervision carried out by the horizontal ministerial departments?
    in International Review of Administrative Sciences , vol. 80 - No. 1 ,  2014
    In the wake of the Copernic reform, Belgium’s senior federal civil servants are now appointed for a fixed term and guided on performance via management plans. This article sets out to assess the impact of the introduction of the fixed-term system on the autonomy of senior civil servants with regard to the horizontal departments responsible for the budget, on the one hand, and human resources, on the other hand, within Belgium’s federal administration. Based on the so-called ‘inconsistencies’ approach, the article focuses briefly on three inconsistencies: internal, discursive and contextual. An analysis of these inconsistencies confirms one of the forms of ‘cheating’ in the relationship between ministers and senior civil servants formulated by Hood and Lodge (2006), namely that the first can be inclined to reduce the margin of discretion of the latter by maintaining formal or informal mechanisms to exercise control over the provision of resources. Points for practitioners Greater managerial autonomy for senior civil servants, as advocated by NPM, cannot succeed without a transformation of the traditional modes of operation of the political-administrative relationship accompanying structural reforms. The low degree of autonomy of senior civil servants does not stem so much from the introduction of a ‘contractual’ relationship, but from the lack of support shown by the latter in the implementation of such reforms. In the case studied, senior civil servants can only be made more accountable and given greater autonomy if the ‘pyramid’ of control is reformed and internal audit activities developed.
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