Bulletin n. 1-2/2014
November 2014
CONTENTS
  • Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government
  • Section B) Global governance and international organizations
  • Section C) Regional integration processes
  • Section D) Federalism as a political idea
  • Asteris Pliakos and Georgios Anagnostaras
    Blind Date Between Familiar Strangers: The German Constitutional Court Goes Luxembourg!
    in German Law Journal , vol. 15, issue 2 ,  2014 ,  369-382
    Preliminary references by national constitutional courts are not an everyday occurrence in Union law. No surprise, therefore, that they attract considerable publicity and give rise to a significant amount of academic comment. However, the recent preliminary request of the German Federal Constitutional Court (GFCC) in Gauweiler constitutes undoubtedly the most important and historic preliminary reference made thus far by a constitutional court. This is not only because it is the very first preliminary request of this particular court, inaugurating potentially a whole new era in its institutional relationships with the Court of Justice and paving the way for other national constitutional courts to make more regular recourse to the preliminary reference procedure; but also because it relates to an issue of central importance for the process of European integration with far reaching economic and political repercussions. The preliminary request concerns the compatibility with primary Union law regarding the European Central Bank’s bond purchases program. This program envisions that the European System of Central Banks can purchase government bonds of certain Member States on the secondary market to an unlimited extent, if and so long as these Member States participate in a reform program agreed upon with the European Financial Stability Facility and the European Stability Mechanism. The objective of this program is to safeguard the monetary policy transmission mechanism in the euro area, preserving the singleness of monetary policy. According to the GFCC, this program amounts to an ultra vires act and national authorities are obliged to refrain from its implementation. This is for two basic reasons. First, because the program is not covered by the mandate of the European Central Bank but constitutes in essence an independent act of economic rather than monetary policy that falls within the competence of the Member States. Second, because the program infringes the...
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