Bulletin n. 1-2/2014
November 2014
CONTENTS
  • Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government
  • Section B) Global governance and international organizations
  • Section C) Regional integration processes
  • Section D) Federalism as a political idea
    • Markussen Thomas, Reuben Ernesto, Tyran Jean-Robert
    Competition, Cooperation and Collective Choice
    in Economic Journal , Volume 124, Issue 574, February 2014 ,  2014 ,  163-195
    The ability of groups to implement efficiency-enhancing institutions is emerging as a central theme of research in economics. This study explores voting on a scheme of intergroup competition, which facilitates cooperation in a social dilemma situation. Experimental results show that the competitive scheme fosters cooperation. Competition is popular but the electoral outcome depends strongly on specific voting rules of institutional choice. If the majority decide, competition is almost always adopted. If likely losers from competition have veto power, it is often not, and substantial gains in efficiency are foregone.
    ©2001 - 2020 - Centro Studi sul Federalismo - P. IVA 94067130016