Bulletin n. 0/2004
December 2004
CONTENTS
  • Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government
  • Section B) Global governance and international organizations
  • Section C) Regional integration processes
  • Section D) Federalism as a political idea
    • Powell Benjamin
    Competition and Monopoly Power in Local Government: An Extension of Caplan (2001)
    in Public Choice , Volume 120, Number 3-4 ,  2004 ,  353-357
    Caplan (2001) shows that because land is a source of immobile wealth, local governments can use the property tax to avoid competitive pressures of the Tiebout model, allowing them to deviate from citizens' preferences. In this comment I show that the property tax is not the only tax local governments can use to avoid competitive pressure. Most taxes placed on property owners allow local governments to extract some rents despite perfect citizen mobility.
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