Bulletin n. 1/2005
December 2005
CONTENTS
  • Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government
  • Section B) Global governance and international organizations
  • Section C) Regional integration processes
  • Section D) Federalism as a political idea
    • Feld Lars P. , Schaltegger Christoph A.
    Voters as a Hard Budget Constraint: On the Determination of Intergovernmental Grants
    in Public Choice , Volume 123, Numbers 1-2 ,  2005 ,  147 - 169
    Recent empirical literature has shown that the determination of intergovernmental grants is highly influenced by the political bargaining power of the recipient states. In these models federal politicians are assumed to buy the support of state voters, state politicians and state interest groups by providing grants. In this paper we provide evidence that the fiscal referendum reduces the reliance of states on matching grants received from the central government and thus the possibility of interest groups and state bureaucrats to obtain more grants. If referendums are available, voters serve as a hard budget constraint.
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