Bulletin n. 1/2013
June 2013
CONTENTS
  • Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government
  • Section B) Global governance and international organizations
  • Section C) Regional integration processes
  • Section D) Federalism as a political idea
    • Victor Shih and David A. Steinberg
    The Domestic Politics of the International Dollar Standard: A Statistical Analysis of Support for the Reserve Currency, 2000–2008
    in Canadian Journal of Political Science--Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 45 - Issue 04 ,  2012 ,  855 - 880
    Why did most central banks continue to purchase dollar reserves during the 2000s even though they suffered mounting financial losses as a result of this policy? This paper argues that domestic political considerations determine whether policy makers accumulate or dump the reserve currency. We hypothesize that central bank independence decreases support for the dollar because independent central banks reduce the political clout of exporters and increase the salience of financial performance. This argument is tested using data on countries' holdings of US Treasury securities between 2000 and 2008. The statistical results indicate that countries with independent central banks were more likely to sell and less likely to purchase US treasuries. Our findings suggest that a complete understanding of the international dollar standard requires greater attention to domestic politics and how political institutions influence the balance of power between competing interest groups.
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