Bulletin n. 2-3/2012
October 2012-February 2013
CONTENTS
  • Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government
  • Section B) Global governance and international organizations
  • Section C) Regional integration processes
  • Section D) Federalism as a political idea
    • Robinson Nick
    Structure Matters: The Impact of Court Structure on the Indian and U.S. Supreme Courts
    in American Journal of Comparative Law , Volume 61, Issue 1 / Winter ,  2013 ,  173-208
    The U.S. Supreme Court sits as a unified bench of nine justices. The Indian Supreme Court sits in panels, and can have up to thirtyone justices. This Article uses the divergent structures of the U.S. and Indian Supreme Courts to explore how specific court structures are adopted to promote different values or understandings of what a supreme court should be. It analyzes how structure impacts: (1) access to these courts; (2) the cohesiveness of the doctrine they produce; (3) interjudge relations; and (4) perceptions of these courts, including perceived politicization. It argues that a comparative analysis of court structure can challenge common assumptions about the ideal role of a court, as well as aid in judicial institutional design and reform. Such an analysis helps make explicit how law is permeated by the structure of the courts that interpret it. I. The Supreme Court of India A. History 1. The Court's Founding 2. The Court's Expansion B. The Impact of Size and Structure 1. Access 2. Cohesiveness and Polyvocality 3. Inter-Judge Relations: Chief Justice Dominance, Judicial Entrepreneurs, and Judge Clusters 4. Image and Expertise II. The Supreme Court of the United States A. History 1. The Court's Early Years 2. A Backlogged Court and Tightening Access B. The Impact of Size and Structure 1. Access 2. Cohesiveness 3. Inter-Judge Relations: The Swing Justice 4. Image and Politicization III. Recasting Assumptions and Prescriptive Power A. Unequal Judges and Institutional “Integrity” B. Reforming Courts: Prescriptive Claims Conclusion
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