Bulletin n. 2-3/2012
October 2012-February 2013
CONTENTS
  • Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government
  • Section B) Global governance and international organizations
  • Section C) Regional integration processes
  • Section D) Federalism as a political idea
    • Robert L. Hetzel
    Central bank accountability and independence: Are they inconsistent?
    in Journal of Macroeconomics , volume 34 n.3 ,  2012 ,  616–625
    The language of discretion offers little information about monetary policy beyond the assurance that policymakers always “do the right thing at the right time”. This language renders problematic the reconciliation of central bank independence with accountability. Monetary policymakers should articulate an analytical framework using the language of economics that allows them to respond to the question, “What variables does the central bank control and how does it exercise that control”.
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