Bulletin n. 1/2012
June 2012
CONTENTS
  • Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government
  • Section B) Global governance and international organizations
  • Section C) Regional integration processes
  • Section D) Federalism as a political idea
    • H. Spencer Banzhafa, B. Andrew Chupp
    Fiscal federalism and interjurisdictional externalities: New results and an application to US Air pollution
    in Journal of Public Economics , volume 96 n. 5-6 ,  2012 ,  449-464
    The economics of fiscal federalism has identified two book-end departures from first-best provision of a public good. Local governments may respond to local conditions, but ignore inter-jurisdictional spillovers. Alternatively, central governments may internalize spillovers, but impose uniform incentives ignoring local heterogeneity. We provide a simple model that demonstrates that the choice of pricing policy also depends crucially on a third factor, the shape of marginal costs of providing the public good. If marginal costs are convex, then marginal abatement cost elasticities will be higher around the local policies. This increases the deadweight loss of those policies relative to the centralized policy, ceteris paribus. If they are concave, then the opposite is true. Using a detailed simulation model of the US electricity sector, we then empirically explore these tradeoffs for US air pollution. We find that US states acting in their own interest lose about 31.5% of the potential first-best benefits, whereas the second-best uniform policy loses only 0.2% of benefits. The centralized policy outperforms the state policy for two reasons. First, inter-state spillovers are simply more important that inter-state heterogeneity in this application. Second, because of the convexity of the marginal cost functions, elasticities are much lower over the range relevant to the centralized policy, dampening the distortions.
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