Bulletin n. 3/2011
February 2012
CONTENTS
  • Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government
  • Section B) Global governance and international organizations
  • Section C) Regional integration processes
  • Section D) Federalism as a political idea

  • Vertical tax competition and consumption externalities in a federation with lobbying
    in Journal of Public Economics , Volume 96, Issues 3-4, ,  2012 ,  295–305
    Tax-base sharing by two layers of government can be an efficient tax regime. Tax policy swayed by lobbying can be Pareto superior to lobby-free tax policy. Tax-base sharing is efficient if the externality linked to the taxed good is large. The dispersion of taxing powers may reduce the influence of pressure groups. Leviathan politicians are better off when facing lobby groups with opposed interests.
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