Bulletin n. 3/2011
February 2012
CONTENTS
  • Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government
  • Section B) Global governance and international organizations
  • Section C) Regional integration processes
  • Section D) Federalism as a political idea
    • Hillesheim Inga
    Relative consumption and majority voting: supplementing Oates’ “Decentralization Theorem”
    in Journal of Economics - Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie , Volume 105, Number 1 / January 2012 ,  2012 ,  29-43
    This paper reconsiders the question of whether centralized or decentralized provision of local public goods is preferable, taking into account two new elements: the appearance of relative consumption effects and the possibility of an inefficient election outcome due to a right-skewed income distribution. Surprisingly, our results indicate that (1) decentralization may lead to a strictly higher welfare level than centralization, even if regions are homogeneous, and (2) under certain circumstances centralization may be welfare superior, even though traditional public good spillovers are not considered in our framework. Whether centralization or decentralization is preferable crucially depends on the extent to which social interaction takes place between regions.
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