Bulletin n. 3/2010
January 2011
CONTENTS
  • Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government
  • Section B) Global governance and international organizations
  • Section C) Regional integration processes
  • Section D) Federalism as a political idea
    • Kropp Sabine
    The Ubiquity and Strategic Complexity of Grand Coalition in the German Federal System
    in German Politics , Volume 19, Issue 3-4 Special Issue: Grand Coalition as Systemic Transformation? The German Experience , September ,  2010 ,  286-311
    The 2005-09 Grand Coalition under Chancellor Angela Merkel was generally seen as an exceptional response to a difficult verdict of the voters in the 2005 elections. It was also seen as a chance to overcome the legislative gridlock characteristic of much of the Kohl and Schrder chancellorships. This article demonstrates that grand coalition politics based on relatively inclusive bargaining processes runs much deeper in the German federal republic than is sometimes acknowledged. Since unification in 1990, federal-state coalitions across the national government-opposition divide in the Bundestag have become more frequent, reflecting the change from a two-bloc towards a 'fluid five-party system' (Niedermayer) and necessitating inclusive bargaining in the Bundesrat. The federal states have become a testing ground for new coalitions. Not only do these more fluid coalition patterns at the state level include grand coalitions of the two major parties, but also 'Red-Green' minority cabinets of SPD and Greens, 'Red-Red' coalitions of SPD and Linke, 'Jamaica coalitions' of CDU, FDP and Greens, and 'traffic-light coalitions' of SPD, FDP and Greens. Although the 2006 reform of German federalism reduced the share of bills requiring Bundesrat consent, the Grand Coalition under Merkel was tied into a comprehensive multi-level bargaining system as were its predecessors and successors. Majoritarian decision-making is close to impossible in this system, horizontal and vertical bargaining prevails.
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