Bulletin n. 3/2010
January 2011
CONTENTS
  • Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government
  • Section B) Global governance and international organizations
  • Section C) Regional integration processes
  • Section D) Federalism as a political idea
    • Joshua C. Hall, Justin M. Ross
    Tiebout Competition, Yardstick Competition, and Tax Instrument Choice: Evidence from Ohio School Districts
    in Public Finance Review , 38 (6) ,  2010 ,  710-737
    Previous research has shown that Tiebout-style fiscal competition among local governments reduces the likelihood of adopting income taxes. This literature has not yet considered the impact of yardstick competition on tax instrument choice. This article uses spatial econometrics to test for yardstick competition in the decision to adopt an income tax. The results, based on Ohio school district data, indicate that school districts are more likely to adopt an income tax if their neighbors have already done so. While a negative correlation of Tiebout competition on district income tax adoption persists, controlling for spatial dependence reduces the statistical significance of the effect.
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