Bulletin n. 3/2010
January 2011
CONTENTS
  • Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government
  • Section B) Global governance and international organizations
  • Section C) Regional integration processes
  • Section D) Federalism as a political idea
    • De Bonis Valeria, Della Posta Pompeo
    On the Coordination of National Fiscal Policies in a Monetary Union
    in Economia internazionale , 2010, Volume 63, Issue 3 ,  2010 ,  273-296
    In this paper we analyze the issue of cooperation among national fiscal authorities in a monetary union within the framework of their strategic interactions with the common monetary authority. We find that: a) in the lack of cooperation with the central bank, cooperation among fiscal authorities is not desirable; b) if the authorities have different targets, both fiscal leadership and monetary leadership result in a Pareto improvement with respect to the Nash outcome; however, the central bank is better off acting as a follower rather than as a leader; c) harmonization of targets makes policy coordination unnecessary, unless countries are hit by asymmetric shocks: in this case,either cooperation among national fiscal authorities or state-contingency of targets are necessary to obtain an efficient outcome. These findings are applied to the EMU case.
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