Bulletin n. 1/2010
July 2010
CONTENTS
  • Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government
  • Section B) Global governance and international organizations
  • Section C) Regional integration processes
  • Section D) Federalism as a political idea
    • Wright John R.
    Ambiguous Statutes and Judicial Deference To Federal Agencies
    in Journal of Theoretical Politics , Volume 22, n. 2, April ,  2010 ,  217-245
    The Supreme Court’s Chevron decision raises questions about why Congress passes ambiguous statutes and why courts defer to agencies rather than impose their own interpretations. This article presents a model of policymaking where the legislature chooses strategically between an ambiguous and explicit statute, and where rulemaking and judicial review follow. The analysis reveals that when statutes are ambiguous, judges gain few policy advantages by deciding strategically on the basis of their policy preferences as opposed to simply following Chevron precedent. The results shows that legislative policy entrepreneurs can frequently advance their policy interests more successfully with ambiguous than with explicit language.
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