Bulletin n. 1/2010 | ||
July 2010 | ||
Auel Katrin |
||
Between Reformstau and Laender Strangulation? German Co-operative Federalism Re-considered | ||
in Regional and Federal Studies , Volume 20 Issue 2 , 2010 , 229 - 249 | ||
Two features of German federalism have been the subject of much criticism in recent years, the veto power of the Bundesrat and the centralization of legislative competences. The former is made responsible for the (in)famous German 'Reformstau', the latter for severely limiting autonomous policy making at the Laumlnder level. The paper argues that both complaints about the federal system are exaggerated. Neither does the bicameral structure completely block reforms, nor are the Laumlnder immobilized by the corset of centralized legislation. Instead it will be argued that public opinion and electoral dynamics constrain political actors and provide them with few incentives to pursue a radical reform course or to embrace policy competition at the Laumlnder level. | ||