Bulletin n. 1/2010 | ||
July 2010 | ||
Fix Michael P.; Randazzo Kirk A. |
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Judicial Deference and National Security: Applications of the Political Question and Act of State Doctrines | ||
in Democracy and Security , Volume 6, Issue 1, January , 2010 , 1-16 | ||
This article briefly examines the history of federal court adjudication of national security issues to determine how judges have employed specific legal rationales for deciding not to decide in order to avoid confrontation with the executive branch. By focusing on the historical development of these legal strategies, we demonstrate that while judges have been generally deferential to the executive on national security issues, this deference increases in times of crisis. Through a series of qualitative case studies, we examine the use of threshold issues as a legally justifiable means to avoid ruling on the merits. Specifically, we focus on the use of the political question and act of state doctrines both historically and in the post-September 11th environment. We conclude that the federal courts continue to employ these techniques to avoid resolving challenges to national security, thereby promoting a continued deference to the executive branch. | ||