Bulletin n. 1/2010 | ||
July 2010 | ||
Nunes Rodrigo M. |
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Politics without Insurance: Democratic Competition and Judicial Reform in Brazil | ||
in Comparative Politics , Volume 42, No. 3 , 2010 , 313-331 | ||
Brazilian presidents have expanded the authority of the Supreme Court since democratization to improve governance and facilitate the policy pursuits of electoral winners. This conclusion contradicts insurance theories of judicial reform, which argue that incumbents promote judicial power when they foresee an electoral defeat in order to constrain future majorities. In contrast, analysis of judicial reform in Brazil suggests that powerful courts are not antithetical to the interests of elected governments, and that even politicians who expect to remain in office may find it beneficial to support and promote independent judicial authority. As observed in Brazil, a court that is institutionally subject to politics may provide incumbents with benefits that exceed the costs usually associated with judicial review. | ||