Bulletin n. 1/2010
July 2010
CONTENTS
  • Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government
  • Section B) Global governance and international organizations
  • Section C) Regional integration processes
  • Section D) Federalism as a political idea
    • Aoyama Naoto, Silva Emilson C. D.
    Equitable and Efficient Federal Structures with Decentralized Leadership, Spillovers, and Attachment of Heterogeneous Labor
    in Journal of Public Economic Theory , Volume 12 Issue 2 ,  2010 ,  323-343
    Relying on differentiability assumptions and on conditions that guarantee interior solutions, we show that a federation featuring decentralized leadership, interregional spillovers, and labor attachment allocates resources efficiently under two sets of circumstances. The first is when the center is Rawlsian. The second is when individual utilities are quasi-linear, regional welfare functions are Benthamite, and the center's objective function is a Bergson–Samuelson transformation of regional welfare levels, which also satisfies conditions needed for the center to view regional welfare levels as normal goods. In both sets of circumstances, efficient behavior follows from incentive equivalence promoted by the center's egalitarian transfers.
    ©2001 - 2020 - Centro Studi sul Federalismo - P. IVA 94067130016