Bulletin n. 1/2010
July 2010
CONTENTS
  • Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government
  • Section B) Global governance and international organizations
  • Section C) Regional integration processes
  • Section D) Federalism as a political idea
    • Kelders Christian, Koethenbuerger Marko
    Tax incentives in fiscal federalism: an integrated perspective
    in Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue Canadienne d'Economique , Volume 43 Issue 2 ,  2010 ,  683 - 703
    Models of fiscal federalism rarely account for the efficiency implications of intergovernmental fiscal ties for federal tax policy. This paper shows that fiscal institutions such that federal tax deductibility, vertical revenue-sharing, and fiscal equalization (being common features of existing federations) encourage local taxation, but may discourage federal taxation. Furthermore, the structure of public spending is skewed towards local spending. We also show that, when considering Leviathan governments, fiscal institutions reduce confiscatory taxation by the federal government. The result is contrary to the Cartelization Hypothesis (Brennan and Buchanan 1980). Finally, we characterize the efficient design of intergovernmental fiscal ties.
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