Bulletin n. 3/2009
January 2010
CONTENTS
  • Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government
  • Section B) Global governance and international organizations
  • Section C) Regional integration processes
  • Section D) Federalism as a political idea
  • Christina J. Schneider
    Fighting with one hand tied behind the back: political budget cycles in the West German states
    in Public Choice , Volume 142, Numbers 1-2 ,  2010 ,  125-150
    Theories of political budget cycles have been contested because scholars find that incumbents can manipulate deficits in the pre-election period only if fiscal transparency is low. I argue that these findings do not generally rule out the possibility of fiscal electioneering. Governments may increase spending on highly visible policies. The composition of the budget serves as a second-best strategy. It increases political support without straining the budget balance. An empirical analysis of the West German states reveals alternative electoral budget strategies and ultimately point to the importance of analyzing how governments choose between alternative fiscal instruments.
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