Bulletin n. 1/2005 | ||
December 2005 | ||
Sinha Aseema |
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Political Foundations of Market-Enhancing Federalism: Theoretical Lessons from India and China | ||
in Comparative Politics , Vol. 37 n. 3 , 2005 | ||
Decentralization’s welfare effects on economic reform are dependent upon crucial political conditions that are left unanalyzed in the conventional theories of fiscal and market-preserving federalism. This lacuna can be addressed only if decentralization is disaggregated along its different political and economic dimensions and the combined effect of the two dimensions is then reanalyzed. Certain political dimensions provide linkage mechanisms between regional and national politicians, making economic reform self-enforcing. Three such mechanisms — of authority, institutions, and personnel — are identified and used to compare India’s and China’s reform trajectories | ||