Bulletin n. 1/2008
May 2008
CONTENTS
  • Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government
  • Section B) Global governance and international organizations
  • Section C) Regional integration processes
  • Section D) Federalism as a political idea
  • 651-657
    A Note on the Dynamic Analysis of Fiscal Competition
    in Urban Studies , Volume 45, No. 3 ,  2008 ,  Tamai Toshiki
    This note presents an analysis of dynamic aspects of fiscal competition in a model with local capital accumulation. This shows that, even when a head tax is available, the optimal capital tax rate is generally non-zero. In addition, a decentralised equilibrium without a head tax might be characterised by overprovision of local public goods in a dynamic fiscal competition model. The source of inefficiency is overaccumulation of local capital.
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