Bulletin n. 1/2008
May 2008
CONTENTS
  • Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government
  • Section B) Global governance and international organizations
  • Section C) Regional integration processes
  • Section D) Federalism as a political idea
    • Kelly Brian
    The Treatment of Profit in the Export Market in Antidumping Duty Proceedings
    in Journal of World Trade , Volume 42 Issue 2 ,  2008 ,  299-313
    The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Antidumping Code and US law and practice allow a seeming asymmetry in the antidumping calculation. While expenses in the domestic market result in adjustments based on the expense incurred, expenses in the export market may attract an element of profit. This results in a larger adjustment for export sales than for normal value, increasing antidumping duties relative to the case in which the adjustments are made symmetrically. This article appraises US policy both before and after the Uruguay Round Agreements Act using the off-cited “level playing field” rationale to determine whether the additional deduction for profit in the export market is compatible with that rationale. We conclude that US practice prior to the Uruguay Round in fact was largely compatible with the level playing field rationale, but the adoption of the more far-reaching profit calculation following the Uruguay Round has created a serious distortion in the antidumping calculation. Since US law and practice reflect the Antidumping Code in this respect, this problem may exist in the practices of other signatories as well.
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