Bulletin n. 1/2008 | ||
May 2008 | ||
Alt James E., Lassen David D. |
||
Political And Judicial Checks On Corruption: Evidence From American State Governments | ||
in Economics and Politics , Vol. 20 Issue 1 , 2008 , 33-61 | ||
This paper investigates the effects of checks and balances on corruption. Within a presidential system, effective separation of powers is achieved under a divided government, with the executive and legislative branches being controlled by different political parties. When government is unified, no effective separation exists even within a presidential system, but, we argue, can be partially restored by having an accountable judiciary. Our empirical findings show that a divided government and elected, rather than appointed, state supreme court judges are associated with lower corruption and, furthermore, that the effect of an accountable judiciary is stronger under a unified government, where the government cannot control itself. | ||