Bulletin n. 1/2008
May 2008
CONTENTS
  • Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government
  • Section B) Global governance and international organizations
  • Section C) Regional integration processes
  • Section D) Federalism as a political idea
    • Méon Pierre-Guillaume
    Majority voting may not rule (in monetary unions): A comment on Matsen and Rĝisland [Eur. J. Political Economy 21 (2005) 365–384]
    in European Journal of Political Economy , Volume 24, Issue 1, March 2008 ,  2008
    This note reconsiders the results obtained by Matsen and Rĝisland [Eur. J. Political Economy 21 (2005) 365–384] by dropping the simplifying assumption that the median of country-specific shocks is equal to their mean. Majority voting then increases the volatility of the chosen interest rate without giving member countries a sufficient probability of having their domestic shocks absorbed by the common monetary policy. It thus results in lower welfare than other decision rules. When the variances of domestic shocks sufficiently differ, voting may however reduce the volatility of the interest rate and raise welfare in more stable countries.
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