Bulletin n. 3/2007
December 2007
CONTENTS
  • Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government
  • Section B) Global governance and international organizations
  • Section C) Regional integration processes
  • Section D) Federalism as a political idea
    • Melo Marcus André Barreto Campelo de
    Institutional Weakness and the Puzzle of Argentina’s Low Taxation
    in Latin American Politics & Society , Vol. 49, Nr. 4 ,  2007
    Current explanations of taxation levels have identified a host of factors, such as levels of economic development and GDP per capita, tax handles, tax morale, and political regimes. But none of them can account for Argentina's exceptionalism. Using a "transaction cost politics" approach and the case of Brazil for comparison, this article argues that the key to explaining low taxation in Argentina is political instability. Systemic instability affects the tax behavior ofjavascript:SubmitForm( 'Details' ); Memorizza governments. Facing an uncertain future, incumbent governments choose to extract resources from society through inflation rather than normal taxation. This article argues that political institutions, particularly federalism, contribute to instability and thereby reduce the discount rates of government policymakers.
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