Bulletin n. 3/2007
December 2007
CONTENTS
  • Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government
  • Section B) Global governance and international organizations
  • Section C) Regional integration processes
  • Section D) Federalism as a political idea
    • Cockerham Geoffrey B.
    The Delegation of Dispute Settlement Authority to Conventional International Governmental Organizations
    in International Politics , Volume 44, Number 6, November ,  2007 ,  732-752
    The issue of dispute settlement is problematic in the international system because it may conflict with sovereignty. States may find, however, that in order to facilitate cooperation, they should delegate some authority to resolve disputes to a third party. This article seeks to provide a measure for dispute settlement authority and some explanation for the delegation aspect of international cooperation by examining why states agree to grant dispute settlement authority to a particular kind of institutional arrangement, conventional international governmental organizations (IGOs). The analysis reveals that states tend to enter into IGO agreements with a higher degree of dispute settlement authority when members have a greater incentive to defect due either to the large number of other parties to the agreement, or due to greater cooperative demands as provided by the agreement.
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