Bulletin n. 1/2007
June 2007
CONTENTS
  • Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government
  • Section B) Global governance and international organizations
  • Section C) Regional integration processes
  • Section D) Federalism as a political idea
  • Stoiber Michael
    Gewaltenteilung, Machtteilung und das Vetospieler-Konzept
    in Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft , 17. Jahrgang (2007), Heft 1 ,  2007 ,  21-41
    Separation of Power, Power Sharing and the Veto Player Theory The concept of the separation of power is positioned in normative political theory while the veto player theory is an empirical-analytical concept. To bring them together, I distinguish two traditions in the history of ideas. The functional separation of power is part of models of the sovereignty of the people (Locke, Rousseau, Sieyes and Kant). Power sharing refers to Montesquieu and figures prominently in the Federalist Papers. Tsebelis’ veto player theory can be connected to the latter tradition and can be used to find out the actual degree of power sharing. I propose a modification to allow for additional elements, especially the inclusion of societal actors. The aim is to identify different mechanisms of the political game to compare political systems by mapping them on a “vector of power sharing”.
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