Bulletin n. 3/2006
December 2006
CONTENTS
  • Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government
  • Section B) Global governance and international organizations
  • Section C) Regional integration processes
  • Section D) Federalism as a political idea
    • Balassone Fabrizio , Franco Daniele, Zotteri Stefania
    EMU fiscal indicators: a misleading compass?
    in Empirica: Journal of Applied Economics and Economic Policy , Volume 33, Numbers 2-3 ,  2006 ,  63-87
    The effectiveness of any device for fiscal discipline crucially depends on the indicators it refers to. This paper assesses the indicators adopted for fiscal rules in the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) with respect to their relevance for EMU’s objective of fiscal soundness and to the adequacy of the underlying statistical framework in providing conditions for enforcement. The paper argues that EMU’s deficit and debt indicators present several shortcomings with respect to both sustainability analysis and monitoring requirements. The debt indicator allows the achievement of targets via operations that do not improve fiscal sustainability and tends to underestimate overall outstanding liabilities. The deficit indicator cannot be monitored in a timely manner, allows too much room for discretion, and is subject to significant revisions. While acknowledging that any single indicator can be distorted when used as a policy target, the paper argues that the weaknesses of EMU’s indicators would be much reduced if consistency cross-checks played a larger role than they currently do.
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