Bulletin n. 2/2006
September 2006
CONTENTS
  • Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government
  • Section B) Global governance and international organizations
  • Section C) Regional integration processes
  • Section D) Federalism as a political idea
  • Bolleyer Nicole
    Federal Dynamics in Canada, the United States, and Switzerland: How Substates' Internal Organization Affects Intergovernmental Relations
    in Publius: The Journal of Federalism , Vol. 36, n. 4, Fall ,  2006 ,  471-502
    This article argues that internal substate dynamics can systematically account for the organization of intergovernmental relations (IGR) in dual federal systems. Whereas majoritarian executive-legislative relations tend to weaken the institutionalization of intergovernmental arrangements (IGAs), power-sharing executive-legislative relations tend to facilitate it. Two of the mechanisms at work serve to illustrate this point. Given one-party majority cabinets, complete government alternations strongly alter actors' interest constellations over time, thereby increasing the costs of maintaining stable cross-boundary IGR. Moreover, the heavy impact of a potential electoral loss induces politicians to shift blame to other governments, thereby undermining cross-boundary cooperation. Majoritarian dynamics also weaken integration between IGAs. Furthermore, integration is weakened by compulsory power-sharing structures unbridged by party ties. In contrast to noncompulsory party cooperation, such internal constitutional divides easily undermine the setup of strong interorganizational linkages.
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