Bulletin n. 2/2006
September 2006
CONTENTS
  • Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government
  • Section B) Global governance and international organizations
  • Section C) Regional integration processes
  • Section D) Federalism as a political idea
    • Rizzo Leonzio
    Le inefficienze della competizione fiscale: una rassegna dei principali modelli teorici
    in Economia Politica , Fascicolo 2 ,  2006 ,  89-120
    The choice of local tax rates and local public good levels in an interregional economic system cannot be efficient when there is mobility of persons or goods. In fact in a federal system each region chooses tax rates and/or local public goods taking into account only the level of its welfare and not the level of the welfare of all regions of the federation. We examine how the literature deals with this issue, looking at some interesting particular cases: tax competition on consumption goods (Mintz - Tulkens, 1986; Kanbur - Keen, 1993; Bordignon, 1995; Hamilton - Slutsky, 1997; Scharf, 1999) and on factors of production (Zodrow - Mietzkowsky, 1986 Wildasin, 1988; Bucotvesky, 1991; Wilson, 1986; 1991). We discuss the policy implications of these theoretical analyses, pointing out the empirical relevance of the fiscal relationship among regions in a federation (Besley - Case, 1995; Besley - Griffith - Klemm, 2001; Devereux - Lockwood - Redoano, 2002). We finally discuss some recent literature on the role of vertical externalities (Keen - Kotsogiannis, 2002; Rizzo, 2005) and interregional transfers (Wildasin, 1991; Dalbhy, 1996; Bucovetsky - Smart, 2002; Esteller-Moré - Solé-Ollé, 2002; Köthenburgen, 2002; Rizzo, 2003).
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